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Abstract
This thesis addresses the campaign of militant activism which Wales witnessed 
between 1963 and 1969. It demonstrates that the unprecedented period of violence 
was fuelled by both the contentious flooding of Cwm Tryweryn and crucially, the 
failure of Plaid Cymru to prevent the valley’s drowning through constitutional means. 
By not taking passive and timely protest action, Plaid Cymru ensured that militancy, 
as predominately undertaken by Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, became a feature of the 
Welsh geo-political landscape. Moreover, had the party taken a more sharpened 
approach during the earlier stages of the proposal, it is likely that the emergence of the 
so-called Free Wales Army, which campaigned along the lines of using ‘propaganda 
against the Establishment’, may well have been avoided. However, this is a view 
which is challenged by, among others, former members of the displaced community, 
who maintain that Plaid Cymru - and most notably its president - did all they could to 
prevent the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill becoming law. Nonetheless, the escalation in 
militant strategy came in response to the impending Royal Investiture of Charles 
Windsor as Prince of Wales. In retaliation, the authorities established the so-called 
Shrewsbury Unit. This was borne of an increasingly desperate attempt to apprehend 
those responsible, in order to ensure the safety of the Royal Party and the success of 
the ceremony.
By considering the publicity conscious Free Wales Army, the thesis 
demonstrates that the group undertook one failed militant strike. It also establishes 
that the militant offensive undertaken by MAC comprised two distinct phases. The 
first in 1963 was predominately marshalled by Emyr Llywelyn Jones. The second 
period of hostilities, between 1966 and 1969, was orchestrated by John Jenkins; who 
critically, was a Sergeant in the British Army Dental Corps.
This thesis seeks to reinstate the importance of the militant campaign in Welsh 
history, neither by judging it nor dismissing it, but by establishing the importance of 
these protests to both the nation’s history and its cultural and political advance. It also 
establishes the detail of what happened, while seeking to tell the story in a balanced 
way, paying full attention to the perspective of the perpetrators and those actively 
engaged in their detection.
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
Signed...  (Candidate)
Date................. ...............................................................
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A 
bibliography is appended.
Signed   (Candidate)
Date..........................I?.:.?!:";..........................................
STATEMENT 2
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to available for photocopying and for 
inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed   (Candidate)
Date.......................^ ?... P f. ..............................................
HI
Acknowledgements
‘Dying embers can still start a fire’.
Western Han Dynasty.
A Ph.D incurs many considerable debts. Firstly, I would like to thank William 
George, Joe Nich’, Henry, Annie, Harry and Gwenda. Also, Dad and Mum; not least 
for allowing me to watch the World at War in 1973 (against the initial advice of wider 
family members) and for buying Heritage o f Britain in 1975. Thanks also for the 
musical instruments and the encyclopaedias and atlases which graced the family 
bookshelves; thanks also for introducing me to Tony Hancock. So too, along with the 
Glamorgan County History Trust, for their considerable financial support during the 
latter stages of the write-up.
Thanks to Sue: what a journey. Thanks also for the drives, the walks, the 
meals and the chance to ‘off-load’; all wonderful de-stressers. Big thanks to Tyson 
(what a dog) and Skuff (sorry for habitually calling you Tys’ for the first eighteen 
months of your life). Thanks to my brother Paul for bringing home the Beatles ‘blue’ 
album 1967-70 in 1978. Some things are meant to be. Thanks to my other brother 
David for showing me what hard work really means; so too for the same reason Mair 
Hendy and for giving me her copy of Bob Dylan’s Greatest Hits in 1982, life was 
never the same again. Thanks to my uncle Les for Radnorshire by W. H. Howes, the 
guitar and the many trips to Welsh historical sites on Sunday afternoons, during 
which, all too often, I ungraciously nursed a chronic end-of-weekend hangover. 
Thanks to ‘the boys’: Jason ‘Lumber’ Hendy, Giles ‘the Kid’ Davies and Peter 
‘Gunner’ Thomas: great lads, great times (and one or two others besides). Thanks to 
Uncle Tom, titans on the Llanbister music scene! Ah, what might have been! Still, 
the music industries loss is Welsh history’s gain!
Thanks to teacher Jennie Davies for encouraging my interest in history while 
at primary school; and also to teachers Rosemary Crump, Arwyn Williams and David 
Worgan for seeing something in that cocky, adolescent schoolboy. Thanks to Emma 
Stevens for finally convincing me that I had what it took to return to education in 
1989; so too Bernadette, for making me realise in 1993 that life is not a game. Thank 
you to the 1970s Welsh rugby union side for introducing me to exercise, what an
enduring friendship that has proved to be. As such, thank you to jogging and hill- 
walking. Thank you to Bobby Sands et al and a number of British Army personnel 
for demonstrating to an impressionable schoolboy what courage really is.
Thanks to Jim Chapman; and to Mark Lowther for finding my joke about the 
Turkey football team funny and giving me a job. Thus began the long, meandering 
road to ‘achievement’. Especial thanks to Catrin Stevens. If ever I needed to meet 
someone at a certain time in my life, it was Catrin in 1998. How little I realised, as I 
routinely browsed through my well-thumbed copy of the Trinity College brochure 
during my day’s global backpacking, how great an impact ‘Catrin Stevens, Head of 
the History Department’ would have on my life. Catrin is quite without comparison, 
the best exponent of reverse psychology I have ever met! It took me a while, but it 
finally dawned that muttered comments that I was not up to undertaking a Ph.D was 
designed to put fire in my belly. It worked. One recollection best sums up Catrin. 
Having handed in my third year dissertation, it was handed back and I informed, in no 
uncertain terms, that it was ‘not up to the standard’ she now expected of me. She did 
not need to; it went beyond what was expected of her. I re-wrote. It made the 
difference between receiving a mid 2.2 for the paper and very high 2.1. Thank you, 
both for that and supporting my application to upgrade my M.Phil to a Ph.D. A big 
thank you also to the lecturing staff at Swansea University and especially Martin 
Johnes; another timely and suitable encounter. I hope to no longer wake up screaming 
‘shift in focus’! I will never think of the band Marillion quite the same way again! 
Catrin and Martin appeared to instinctively understand what the thesis was ‘getting 
at’. Subsequently, their support and suggestions proved invaluable to the overall 
‘success’ of the paper. I owe them both a great deal.
Deepest gratitude to Home Care. If ever I needed to do something at a certain 
time, Home Care in 1993 was it. Thanks therefore to: Liz Cullen, Eluned Allen, 
wonderful colleagues (the book vouchers when I left) and especially to my elderly 
clients and their countless words of wisdom. So much learnt. Thanks to Gwalia for 
turning a blind eye when I worked on my thesis during a quiet moment, for a 
dignified redundancy package and for taking me back eighteen months later when the 
fear of long-term unemployment loomed increasingly large.
Thanks to my many historical heroes. This includes: Hywel Dda, Llywelyn ap 
Iorwerth, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Owain GlynDwr, William Wilberforce, Oscar 
Wilde, David Lloyd George, Emily Davison, Michael Collins, Ernest Shackleton,
Tom Barry, Winston Churchill, Violette Szabo, Erwin Rommel, Gandhi, Rosa Parks, 
JFK, Martin Luther King, John Lennon; and indeed, all those who have died or 
suffered for a cause they believe in. Heartfelt thanks also to Liverpool Water 
Corporation, John ‘perfect rendition’ Redwood and Kenneth ‘keep the Boyo out of 
Downing Street’ Baker. If ever my nationalism required crystallising. Words cannot 
express.
Thank you to Gwynfor Evans; and all those interviewed and contacted in the 
course of researching this thesis. Without exception, all individuals were patient and 
enthusiastic in their support. These include: Rhodri Evans, Dalis Evans, Richard 
Thomas, Avril Coslett, John Owen Evans, Geoffrey Davies, Gwilym Tudur Jones, 
Royston Jones, David John Underhill (Dafydd y Dug), Toni Lewis, Dafydd Glyn 
Rowlands, Lyn Ebenezer, Pedr Lewis, Lyn Wilson, Lord Snowdon, Sir Tasker 
Watkins, Sir John Mortimer, Roy Clews, Gillian Davies, Eurgain Prysor Jones, 
Martha Jane Roberts, Ian Skidmore, Trevor Fishlock, Gareth Miles, Ian Cox, Emrys 
Roberts, David Walters, Vernon Griffiths, Raymond Kendall, Jennie Evans, Dafydd 
Evans, Eileen Beasley, Rhobert ap Steffan, John Humphries, Buckingham Palace, 
Clarence House, The Home Office, The House of Commons, The National Archives, 
The National Library of Wales, Carmarthen Library, Swansea City Library, Llanelli 
Library, Swansea University Library and The Ministry of Defence. Nonetheless, 
particularly thanks to John Jenkins, Denis Coslett, Emyr Llywelyn Jones, Owain 
Williams and Gethin ap Iestyn for their unremitting candour; so too for their 
encouragement and the courteous manner with which they greeted innumerable 
unexpected phone calls.
It has been an honour and a privilege to undertake this thesis and to meet and 
correspond with all concerned. I am blessed. Please excuse the self-indulgence 
above!
Finally, thanks to You; you know who you are; and you.
Wyn Thomas.
Carmarthen, May 2011.
Contents
Abstract: ii
Declaration and Statements: iii 
Acknowledgements: iv 
Contents: vii 
Abbreviations viii
Pages: 1 - Introduction.
Page: 28 - Chapter 1. ‘Pathological and pathetic fixation...’. 
Page: 69 - Chapter 2. ‘Liverpool - Hands off Wales’.
Page: 122 - Chapter 3. Fantasists, fanatics and kamikaze corgis. 
Page: 193 - Chapter 4. Peace talks aboard a coracle.
Page: 271 - Chapter 5. ‘Amenace to everyone’.
Page: 357 - Conclusion.
Page: 380 - Bibliography.
Page: 396 - Appendices: Central Figures & Time Line.
Abbreviations
TNA - The National Archives 
NLW - National Library of Wales 
LRO - Liverpool Record Office 
HO - Home Office 
WT - Wyn Thomas
Movements and Terrorist Organisations
MAC - Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru
FWA - Free Wales Army
PF - Patriotic Front
CylG - Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg
IRA - Irish Republican Army
FLN - Front de Liberation Nationale
FLQ - Front de Liberation du Quebec
ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FLB - Front for the Liberation of Brittany
Newspapers
CJ - Carmarthen Journal
CT - Carmarthen Times
LDP - Liverpool Daily Post
LE - Liverpool Echo
SWEP - South Wales Evening Post
WoS - Wales on Sunday
WM - Western Mail
Welsh-language publications
BaAC - Baner ac Amserau Cymru
Periodicals
NS - New Statesman
Newspapers and other publications mentioned once, or entitled with one word, are 
included entirely.
viii
Wales and militancy 1952-1970
Introduction
Between 1963 and 1969, Wales was rocked by a series of bomb-blasts. The first 
explosion in the series occurred at the Tryweryn Reservoir site on 11 February 1963. 
The bombing campaign was the first sustained use of explosives, as a means of 
political protest, which the nation had ever witnessed.
There were twenty explosions, while six other devices failed to activate. 
Although the identity of those responsible for all these attacks has never been 
established, the two groups most prominent in their campaigning at this juncture were 
the Free Wales Army and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. This thesis will show that 
contrary to some speculation, the two groups did not act in tandem. The FWA, 
established in 1963, comprised a somewhat motley membership of between fifty and - 
if the group’s self-styled leader and able publicist Cayo Evans is to be believed - 
several thousand. Despite the group’s fictitious cries of responsibility for the bomb 
blasts, its donning of military-style uniforms and its engagement in elaborate 
manoeuvres, the FWA was primarily involved in a campaign of propaganda. Yet, as 
this thesis will demonstrate, the group was nonetheless involved in one failed militant 
action. Nine activists, either members of the group or those sympathetic to its aims of 
achieving independence for Wales, were arrested and tried for Public Order and 
various firearms and explosives violations between April and July 1969. Three, 
including Cayo Evans, were sentenced to terms of imprisonment.
Contrary to the FWA’s affectation, the covert and audacious Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru undertook its campaign of militant activism with considerable 
effect. The group, thought to comprise some fifteen activists, operated along the lines 
of an insular three-four man cell structure, with only the cell leader known to MAC’s 
operational director, John Jenkins. It proved an impressive and somewhat 
impenetrable system. Led by the charismatic, prudent, if solipsist Jenkins, MAC was 
responsible for many of the explosions, including a number of notable ‘successes’. 
Nevertheless, what MAC most needed, John Jenkins believes, was political approval 
from Plaid Cymru. Had the party endorsed its action, or more tacitly offered its
1
support, a la Sinn Fein/IRA, ‘it would have made a big difference’, Jenkins 
maintained:
We had the almost impossible job of trying to show the authorities that we were prepared to 
kill, when in fact we had no intention of doing so. All records of our actions prove this. We 
were not into taking life. We wanted to save our soul; the soul of the nation.1 
Yet, John Jenkins’ collective use of the word ‘we’ is challenged by Emyr Llywelyn 
Jones, who rejects the idea of ‘an underground movement’ as fallacious. Jones does 
not ‘think there was a MAC or anything like it as such, just groups of people, working 
independently of one another, determined to do something’. Moreover, ‘the whole 
Welsh militant campaign of the 1960s’ had ‘become a little more than a myth’, he 
believed, and this because, there has been ‘so little effort to write an account of the era 
accurately’. Not only does this thesis try to rectify that, its importance is all the more 
critical because many of the perpetrators and protagonists have passed away since 
being interviewed.
Why militancy emerged
Why was it, in the face of traditional political activity, that a number of people in 
Wales adopted the gelignite and the timer as a means of political expression? This 
dissertation will argue that the answer to this question, can be traced to the refusal of 
Gwynfor Evans and the Plaid Cymru hierarchy to stray from its chosen path of 
constitutional politics when first confronted with the proposal by Liverpool 
Corporation to flood Cwm Tryweryn in Meirionnydd in 1955. This single episode 
proved to be the most inflammatory, yet decisively unifying issue in post-1945 Welsh 
politics. It seemed to encapsulate the manifold concerns of the nation’s nationalist 
community, sparking an unprecedented outpouring of resentment and outrage. The 
resultant excitation came to symbolize and embody Wales’ stark political denudation. 
If ever the country needed to awake to the grim truth that its essential cultural identity 
was at stake, nationalists opined gravely, it was provided by ‘Tryweryn’. 
Nonetheless, to those on the militant periphery of Welsh nationalism, ‘the party of 
Wales’ and more specifically Gwynfor Evans, had propitiated Liverpool Corporation.
•5
This perceived ‘betrayal of Tryweryn’ began a chain of events, which by the decade’s
1 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. ‘What we lacked was popular support.
There was a lot o f tacit, acquiescent support’.
2
Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 10 October 2005.3
Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. ‘Gwynfor Evans redeemed
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end, had seen the so-called Free Wales Army all but disbanded, a ten-year-old boy 
badly injured, two apparent members of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru dead and the self- 
styled director-general of the organisation imprisoned for ten years in solitary 
confinement.
For John Jenkins, the future director-general of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, as 
for many drawn to the ranks of Welsh militancy, the judicial process to secure 
parliamentary support for the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn and more potently, the 
inability of the Plaid Cymru leadership to orchestrate effective opposition, struck a 
loud and disturbing chord. Nevertheless, blame for the valley’s flooding lay not so 
much with Liverpool, nor indeed Parliament, but rather, Jenkins believed, with the 
hierarchy of Plaid Cymru. Liverpool was not targeted throughout the MAC 
campaign, Jenkins revealed, as the city council had not been at fault. It was rather, 
‘acquiescence on the part of Gwynfor Evans’, Jenkins argued, which had sealed the 
valley’s fate. ‘Had Plaid Cymru announced at any stage prior to the valley’s 
clearance that it had a task force, which would literally fight anyone who attempted to 
forcibly remove villagers and farm owners from their properties, then it would have 
been stopped’, he declared in 2007. For, had this stand resulted in open hostility, the 
moral outrage and uproar would have been deafening. As a result, Jenkins asserted, 
‘nothing further would have been done’.4
Jenkins’ later decision to spearhead a militant campaign against what he 
believed to be insensitivity by central government towards Wales and its resources 
could be specifically traced to one key event: the U-tum taken by Gwynfor Evans, to 
appoint Emrys Roberts as party opposition coordinator to the Tryweryn proposal. 
Roberts’ appointment, Jenkins demurred, ‘succeeded in that most basic of political 
provisos: it seemed to be doing the job, without actually doing it’. Crucially, Jenkins 
added,
Roberts was regarded as a man o f great integrity: known and respected within the party, 
including by those intent on undertaking action over Tryweryn...When they were informed 
that the great organiser had been appointed, they sat back and waited...but meanwhile, time 
was going on, the houses were being demolished and the people were being shifted away. By
himself as a nationalist leader with his threat to hunger strike over S4C’, declared Jones. Others 
however take a dimmer view, believing that Evans’ intention conflicted with his life-long pacifist 
espousals. Violence they attest is violence, whether directed inward or not. Gwynfor Evans: The 
Member fo r  Wales? BBC Wales Production. Screened April 2005.
4 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 October 2007.
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the time people had opened their eyes to what was happening it was all over and done with.5 
In January 2008, Emrys Roberts himself noted that ‘there was a great deal of 
frustration and resentment by the ‘Young Turks in the party over Tryweryn...They 
intended to act and the party leadership had to do something to draw the sting’. Yet, 
no sooner was Roberts ‘appointed to ‘organise a plan of opposition’, he ‘was hedged 
in by so many constraints’ that he ‘couldn’t do anything’. Roberts believes ‘Gwynfor 
began to get cold feet. He alone had the authority to reverse any such decision; the 
party wasn’t even consulted’. Subsequently, Roberts asserts, ‘every suggestion’ he 
proposed ‘was rejected for one reason or another’. His ‘hands were tied’. For 
instance, Emrys Roberts proposed a hunger strike, but was then put under pressure by 
the party to forget the idea, on the grounds of it not being ‘party policy’. This was 
‘quite ironic’, Roberts added, when considering what ‘happened later in Gwynfor’s 
career’.6 Yet, if  this were indeed true, why had the party hierarchy been so reluctant 
to ally itself, albeit officially, to any form of militant action? An opinion, vociferously 
shared by Owain Williams and Emyr Llywelyn Jones, each of whom was imprisoned 
in 1963 for undertaking the first truly militant protest over the Tryweryn issue, is that 
Cwm Tryweryn was sacrificed on the altar of Plaid Cymru’s electoral advance.7
However, as with any historical event, the furore which surrounded both the 
flooding of Cwm Tryweryn and the rationale which subsequently gave rise to militant 
Welsh nationalism did not develop in isolation. Each was a culmination of anxieties, 
frustrations and, crucially, the result of a gradual shift in the political and cultural 
Zeitgeist of the nation. An indication of this, was the servile and parochial reaction 
expressed to the flooding of Cwm Elan at the close of the nineteenth century and the 
nation’s response to the drowning of Cwm Tryweryn some sixty years later; so too,
Q
the contrast between the 1911 royal investiture and 1969 ceremony. A significant 
starting point for this epochal change is the end of World War Two, which acted, so
5 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 November 2008. Although initially supportive, the more 
militant thinkers grew quite dismissive o f Emrys Roberts as he ‘was a talker’. Interview between WT
6  Emyr Llywelyn Jones. 10 October 2005.
6 Telephone interview between WT & Emrys Roberts, 18 January 2008. In 1980, Gwynfor Evans 
announced his intention to hunger strike in response to the Conservative Government’s decision to 
renege on its manifesto pledge to establish a Welsh-language television service. The Government 
reversed its decision. Dafydd Williams, The Story o f  Plaid Cymru, (Aberystwyth, 1990), pp.39,40.
7 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
8 Elizabeth Clarke, The Valley (London, 1969), pp. 160-70; also, Francis Brett Young, The House 
Under the Water (London, 1932); also, Observer (Supplement), 22 June 1969, p. 18. In 1911, a few 
dissenting voices in the Welsh press, raised the point that since the death of prince Llywelyn, the title 
Prince o f Wales ceased to exist.
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believed Gwynfor Evans, as a chrysalis for what was to develop into the post-war 
nationalist movement. This was because, Evans maintained, the period of hostility 
demonstrated to Welsh servicemen and women the illogicality of conflict to liberate 
nations abroad, while their own was itself the victim of constitutional subjugation.9
Yet, this apparent disaffection with the political status quo was not recognized 
by any of the pivotal political parties at the 1945 General Election, with each 
favouring a broad policy of central government re-planning.10 However, with the 
years of hostility and the call for unionist harmony principally answered, it was time, 
separatists believed, for the nationalist struggle to reawaken. Neither the symbolism 
of Penyberth,11 nor the mass unemployment of the 1920s and 30s had been forgotten 
and a new era, demanded change. Nowhere was this burgeoning sense that it was 
time for Wales to take a new direction better exemplified than at the Ogmore and 
Aberdare by-elections in 1946, when against all expectation, Plaid Cymru polled 30
1 9percent and 20 percent of the vote respectively. The result did not go unnoticed by 
senior Welsh Labour figures. For the second time in eight years, it was proposed that 
Wales should receive a Secretary of State.13 Furthermore, the incumbent would have 
a seat in the cabinet, head a Welsh Office and enjoy ‘reasonable powers in 
administration’.14 Two years later, the wheels of nominal devolved government for 
Wales began to turn, when the Atlee administration created the Council for Wales and 
Monmouthshire. Having been established ostensibly to assist the government in 
policy and economic matters, it was nevertheless devised by a scathing and sceptical 
Deputy Leader, Herbert Morrison, as an ethereal alternative to the degree of 
devolution for Wales favoured by Jim Griffiths and other Welsh Labour spokesmen.15 
However, such ministerial compromises rarely reap good harvest and accustomed to 
the often meandering nature of political debate, the pro-devolution lobby, led chiefly
9
Telephone interview between WT & Dafydd Evans, 10 February 2007.
10 Kenneth O. Morgan, ‘Power and Glory: War and Reconstruction, 1939-1951’, in Duncan Tanner, 
Chris Williams and Deian Hopkin (eds), The Labour Party in Wales (Cardiff, 2000), p.171.
11 Dafydd Jenkins, A Nation on Trial (Cardiff, 1986), pp.38, 39, 305. At 1.30 a.m. on 8 September 
1936, Saunders Lewis, Revd. Lewis Valentine and D. J. Williams committed arson in protest at the 
construction o f an RAF bombing school in an area of Llyn considered o f sensitive Welsh cultural and 
historic importance. At the Old Bailey, all three received a nine month gaol term.
12 Dafydd Williams, The Story o f  Plaid Cymru (Aberystwyth, 1990), pp. 14, 15.
13 James Griffiths, Pages from Memory (London, 1969), p. 158.
James Griffiths, James Griffiths and his Times (Femdale, 1975), p.41
15 Kenneth O. Morgan, Rebirth o f  a Nation (Oxford, 1982), pp.332, 377. In Duncan Tanner, Facing 
the New Challenge: Labour and Politics, 1970-2000, The Labour Party in Wales (Cardiff, 2000), 
pp.265.
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by the influential Jim Griffiths, would see their dream realized.
Of considerable importance to the development of Welsh nationalism in the 
post-war era, was both the Parliament for Wales campaign, which by April 1956 had 
drawn 240,000 petitioned signatures and the stoic struggle of the Beasley family to 
receive a bi-lingual rate demand from Llanelli Rural Council.16 Each episode 
managed to cultivate and attract some degree of cross party, if individual, support and 
sympathy. As did the clarion call by Saunders Lewis to the nation’s youth to adopt 
‘revolutionary methods’ to safeguard the Welsh language.17 A response was not long 
in coming: and so began the struggle to see one of Europe’s oldest vernaculars 
afforded legal status in its own country. While often bitter and divisive, the campaign 
of Cymdeithais yr Iaith Gymraeg proved vital in the journey for Welsh cultural 
recognition.18
However, of arguably paramount importance to the growth of militant Welsh 
nationalism, was the first use of explosives as a means of direct action, by members of 
Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (the Welsh Republican Movement) on 19 October 
1952.19 The targeting of a water pipeline near Llandrindod, was undertaken in protest 
at the flooding of Cwm Claerwen, the last project in Birmingham Corporation’s water 
storage programme in Cwm Elan.
Amid this atmosphere of what was believed by disgruntled Welsh nationalists 
to be self-assertion, came a series of further protests. All were fuelled by a real 
concern that the nation’s cultural life and environmental splendour faced a grievous 
threat. For example, in the immediate post-war period, anger was levelled at the 
British military establishment, for refusing to honour a 1940 pledge to return 
commandeered farmland to the people of y Epynt when hostilities ceased. 
Meanwhile, in 1951, Plaid Cymru led a sit-down demonstration near Trawsfynydd, to 
protest at the War Department’s intention to add a further 10,000 acres to its already
1 Williams, Plaid Cymru, p. 16; also, interview between WT & Eileen Beasley, 29 July 2004. Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones declared Eileen Beasley: ‘the beacon of modem Welsh nationalism. Her action, along 
with her husband Trefor, created the atmosphere for Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg’; it had been its 
‘motivating force’ and ‘a very brave thing to do. Beasley was’, stated Jones ‘the Welsh Rosa Parks’. 
Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2004. The Beasley protest drew 
admiration from among others, Denis Coslett, who declared it to have been instrumental in instilling ‘a 
sense o f nationhood’ within him. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
17 Janet Davies, The Welsh Language (Cardiff, 1988), p. 102.
18 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008.
19 Gweriniaethwr. The Young Republicans (Llanwrst, 1996), pp.92,100; also, Express and Times, 25 
October 1952, p.l; also The Welsh Republican, (June-July 1953); also, Telegraph, 4 January 2004.
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9 1sizable military range in the area. By the mid-1950s, what was perceived by the 
Welsh nationalist community to be the ‘awful march’ of the Forestry Commission’s
22 . 23conifers had struck a chord, as had, the continuation of National Service. 
Nonetheless, the essential experience of military life proved fertile to the growth of 
extreme nationalist thinking in the years to come. Rural de-population also proved 
pivotal to the rise of nationalist political sentiment, being the product, so separatists 
alleged, of successive economic incompetence and indifference to the Welsh rural 
landscape by central government.24
Issues and events on the wider domestic front also fostered a belief within the 
Welsh nationalist community that the time had come for the nation to stand alone. For 
example, The Butler Education Act 1944, created a verdant, dissenting and more 
informed generation, many of whom, fuelled with a wider understanding of political 
awareness, embarked with zeal on life’s journey, to right the wrongs of the preceding 
generation. Furthermore, despite demonstrating to many the advantages of the British 
State, the birth of the NHS was also a factor. With its promise of free ‘cradle to the 
grave’ health care for all, the Welsh nationalist community now demanded further
9 Schange and improvement.
Yet, the shift in central party policy towards Wales, was not confined to the 
Labour Party. Following the ‘success’ of the Parliament for Wales campaign, the 
Conservative Party, often depicted within nationalist circles as hostile to Welsh 
cultural interests, also attempted to make political in-roads into what it had 
traditionally regarded as somewhat precarious political territory. Returned to 
government in 1951, the following year, the Churchill administration launched the 
office of Minister for Welsh Affairs. Its overall purpose was to coordinate issues 
relating to Wales, hitherto dispersed throughout various government departments. 
Essentially a minor arm of the Home Office, it was later immersed within the Ministry
Western Mail (Supplement), 30 November 2002, p.7; also, Planet, No 48, May 1979, pp.29, 30.
21 Gwynfor Evans. For The Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 1996), p.74. An earlier protest regarding ‘army
land grabs’ was held on 11 January 1947, when 400 Plaid Cymru members rallied at Llyn y Fan, in
upland Carmarthenshire. Rhys Evans, A Portrait o f  a Patriot (Talybont, 2008), p. 111.
22 Jan Morris, The Matter o f  Wales (London, 1986), p.404.
23 Williams, Plaid Cymru, p. 16. A number o f men who later rose to prominence in the FWA had been 
conscripted. Men such as Cayo Evans, Denis Coslett, Toni Lewis and Glyn Rowlands had to some 
extent been militarised by their experience; it was certainly a factor in their later being drawn to the
Free Wales Army. Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009.
24 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005.
25 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 October 2008.
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of Housing and Local Government. Meanwhile, the thawing within the Labour Party
96to the idea of a political office for Wales in Cardiff, as officially launched in its 1959 
election manifesto, led many nationalists to believe that the wheels of autonomous 
political recognition for Wales were now in irreversible motion. However, such 
political modulation did not translate into electoral support for Plaid Cymru. At the 
1959 General Election, Gwynfor Evans, standing as the Plaid Cymru candidate for 
Meirionnydd received just 22.9 percent of the vote. Despite it being the party’s best 
showing of the night, it was to be, Evans was later to recall, ‘the election result which 
was the most bitterly disappointing of all’.27 The Meirionnydd ballot box revealed 
much about Plaid Cymru and its fledgling political status. It appeared to provide 
irrefutable proof that although somewhat sympathetic to many of the party’s political 
ambitions, the electorate was far from ready to entrust the ‘party of Wales’ with the 
reins of self-government.
International issues were also significant to the rise of Welsh nationalism. The 
end of hostilities in 1945 precipitated a new World Order, whereby two vast 
superpowers faced each other uneasily over a gulf of military and ideological mistrust. 
With this re-shaping of the political world, Great Britain found its days as a world 
political heavyweight at an end; nowhere was the country’s titular position at the table
98of world influence more blatantly exposed than during the Suez debacle in 1956. 
How could central government, particularly one so obviously out of kilter with world 
political opinion, understand how Wales, England’s first colony, thought and defined 
itself, Welsh nationalists asked.
Nevertheless, life for many on the domestic economic front continued to 
improve. With the eventual end of rationing in Britain in 1956, came the rise in 
consumerism, most notably the widespread availability of both the motor car and the 
television set, each, in their own distinct way, leading arguably to a more informed 
and critical populace. Yet, if  the languid Harold Macmillan could announce with 
some justification in July 1957 that ‘most’ of the nation had ‘never had it so good’,29 
such earnest sentiments could not charm the fears posed by the ever-present horror of 
nuclear annihilation. Its dark shadow dampened any sense that with the tempestuous
26 John Davies, A History o f  Wales (London, 1993), p.639.
27 Evans, ForSake o f  Wales, p. 145.
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Wood, Great Britain, p.430
29 Asa Briggs, A Social History o f  England (London, 1984), p.422.
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fascist threat all but removed, the world was now a safer place. For those raised 
with an unquestioning loyalty to the state and the crown, the Cambridge Spy Scandal 
provided further proof that the country had lost its moral compass. Despite later calls 
that the defections had resulted from a belief that knowledge of the nuclear issue
-j i
needed to be balanced, for Wales’ weary, unsuspecting and unforgiving populace, 
the episode further served to embody the fear and uncertainty of the Cold War period.
Amid this atmosphere of political and perfidious intrigue, the political map of 
the world was being re-drawn. Whether as a way of exacting the moral high ground, 
or due to logistical and financial expediency, ‘the West’ began a policy of de­
colonization. Nowhere perhaps was the brutal resistance to the end of colonial rule 
more apparent than in French Algeria and British Kenya. Nonetheless, as ‘the wind of 
change’ continued to blow, the Black Civil Rights Movement in the United States 
gathered momentum, as did the Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa. Each, 
along with the particular efforts of the FLQ, the Front de Liberation du Quebec to 
receive political independence from the Canadian government, was perceived by the 
nationalist community of Wales, to be further testament that the time had come for the 
so-called ‘oppressed communities’ of the world to make a stand.33 As the very term 
‘protest’ appeared to re-enter common parlance with a youthful vigour,34 the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962, ruthlessly demonstrated the ever-present threat of nuclear 
conflict.
Yet, it was far from all doom and gloom, either in Wales, or beyond. As Rock 
’n’ Roll music swept all before it, the teen-movement and ‘generation gap’ quickened 
apace. In an atmosphere of enlightened protest, artistic expression and sexual 
liberation, youth worldwide embarked on a journey to right the wrongs of what many 
regarded to be, the antiquated policies of the establishments social domination. For 
Wales, as elsewhere, the times indeed were changing. Monochrome austerity gave 
way to the technicolour optimism of the 1960s, as a new era dawned: whereby
Andre Fontaine, History o f  the Cold War (Norwich, 1968), p.253.
31 The Plot Against Harold Wilson. BBC Production. Screened BBC 2, 16 March 2006.
32 Peter Lewis, The Fifties (London, 1978), p. 156.
33 Correspondence between WT & Royston Jones, 18 February 2010. Responsible for over 200 violent 
actions, including eight deaths, the left-wing nationalist paramilitary FLQ was active between 1963 and 
1970. Welsh activists deemed the Canadian situation ‘more analogous’ to Wales, rather than the US or 
SA. Moreover, ‘many militants admired the Afrikaners and were ambivalent about Apartheid’. 
Equally, they identified more closely with ‘Malcolm X and the Black Panthers than Martin Luther
King’, whom, Jones added, they considered ‘a bit o f a waffler’.
34 Address by Senator John F. Kennedy to the National Press Club, Washington DC, 14 January 1960.
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traditional and entrenched mores were rejected, to be replaced with new ideas, 
lifestyles, beliefs and concepts.
Speaking in 2000, the former Free Wales Army ‘commandant’ Denis Coslett, 
attempted to identify why he believed this shift in social thinking was instmmental to 
the rise of the FWA. ‘The late 1950s and 1960s’, he explained, ‘was a time when it 
was felt that anything could be achieved. I suppose the FWA saw itself as a part of 
that call for change’. While this spirit of optimism was shared by Owain Williams, 
it was nevertheless, the inability of the Plaid Cymru hierarchy to depart from its 
ineffectual, cautious hectoring which proved the nationalist struggle’s biggest 
handicap. Its constitutional straightjacket, he believed in 2006, having presented at 
the time of the Tryweryn issue, little more in political terms than sentimental 
loquaciousness.36
Historians, commentators and Welsh militancy
Neither the bombing campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, nor the so-called 
‘propaganda campaign’ of the Free Wales Army, has been the subject of concerted 
historical analysis - even by Welsh historians. More notably, no one has 
acknowledged that neither group would have materialized had ‘the party of Wales’ 
taken a more sharpened approach when first confronted with the proposal to flood 
Cwm Tryweryn in 1955. For instance, Gwyn Alf Williams, states that Welsh 
militancy was fuelled by what he terms "the scandal of Tryweryn’. He notes that a 
number of people, having seen both the ‘powerlessness of Wales exposed’ and, 
crucially, passive demonstrations fail, resorted to sabotage as a means of expressing 
their anger, when a successor dam was constructed at Cwm Clywedog.37 Yet, by 
attaching all specific blame to the development of militancy in Wales to the drowning 
of Tryweryn, Williams fails to address the specific role played by Plaid Cymru to its 
rise.
John Davies offers a wider suggestion as to why militancy entered the Welsh 
political landscape. He argues that a number of Plaid Cymru’s members felt 
compelled to adopt violence to further the nationalist agenda because of the party’s
35 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. ‘The sixties’, Coslett added, ‘was a 
wonderful period o f time...a renaissance for the Welsh people. We were bom again weren’t we?’.
36 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 15 March 2006.
37 Gwyn A lf Williams, When Was Wales? (London, 1985), p.291.
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marginal position within Welsh politics. Furthermore, he suggests that the decrease in 
the number of Welsh-speakers and the decline in the values considered to be central to 
Welshness, fostered the feeling that uncompromising nationalism alone could save the 
nation from extinction. While Davies correctly acknowledges the importance of an 
existent threat to Welsh cultural identity to the growth of Welsh consciousness, 
historians have all too often been guilty of failing to recognise the more complex and 
broader issues involved. Namely, that contrary to accepted thinking, the cause of 
Welsh militancy was not merely a parochial struggle, but rather a feature of a wider 
period of protest. In such a climate, it was inevitable that many in Wales, influenced 
by events both at home and across the globe, would voice their concern for the nation 
and its future. The reasons therefore are multi-faceted and yet surprisingly, they are 
routinely ignored.
Historians have also made factual errors in their treatment of the subject. For 
instance, while addressing Wales in his study, British History, 1945-1989, K. O. 
Morgan clearly recognises the threat to unionist harmony as posed by the Free Wales 
Army. It is they, he states, this ‘small guerrilla group’, who rock the political 
symmetry with sinister ‘paramilitary activities’, such as attacking government 
buildings and ‘a new phenomenon - second homes’ owned in Wales by English 
occupiers. However, the FWA was neither responsible for targeting a government 
building, nor was the group embroiled in the ‘holiday home’ action, which began in 
December 1979. Morgan’s seminal history of modem Wales makes no mention of 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru; rather it erroneously states that the ‘uglier side’ of 
extremism was undertaken by the ‘small, but fanatical Free Wales Army’, who 
Morgan correctly adds, conducted parades and manoeuvres and paid homage to the 
Irish Republican Army.40 Gareth Elwyn Jones also wrongly places the Free Wales 
Army at the forefront of vehement Welsh political agitation. He attests that it is not 
the shadowy Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru which posed the security threat to the 
investiture, but rather, the FWA, this ‘sinister fringe movement’.41
Geraint H. Jenkins, in contrast, roundly dismisses the campaign of the Free 
Wales Army as ‘risible antics’. The group, he opines, merely a ‘gimcrack outfit, with
38 Davies, A History o f  Wales, pp.665, 671.
Kenneth. O. Morgan, British History, 1945 -1989  (Oxford, 1990), p.288.
40 Morgan, Rebirth o f  Nation, p.384.
41 Gareth Elwyn Jones, M odem Wales: A Concise History: 1485-1979 (Cambridge, 1984), p.268.
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a reputation for flamboyant gestures, rather than military prowess’. Nevertheless, he 
adds that along with the hastily organized investiture of Prince Charles, maximum 
publicity was afforded the FWA, ‘in a desperate bid to spike nationalist guns’.42 A 
broader perspective is taken up in some measure by Jeremy Black, who states that 
nationalist consciousness and pressure was not merely restricted to concerns for the 
statistical decline and lack of legislative status for the Welsh language. Violent Welsh 
nationalist groups, he writes, used bombs to attack what they saw as ‘alien bodies’, 
such as reservoir dams and pipelines taking water from drowned Welsh valleys to 
English cities. Such was the seriousness of the Welsh bombing campaign, asserts 
Black, that ‘until the outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland’, Wales was 
considered ‘the bigger internal security risk’.43 Yet, while some historians like Black 
recognize the importance of militanism, others ignore it completely. In his study, A 
History o f Wales (2000), D. Gareth Evans makes no mention of either Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru or the Free Wales Army.44 In 2008, John S. Ellis, Investiture: 
Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911 -  1969 was published. 
Although a more comprehensive account of these events, it too is guilty of notable 
omissions and factual inaccuracies.45
It is not just academics who offer stinging rebukes of the Free Wales Army. 
In his study Wales and the Welsh, the cultural commentator Trevor Fishlock, and, at 
the time of the investiture, The Times correspondent for Wales, regarding the group as 
‘a strange brotherhood which throve on dreams, fantasies and beer-built 
schemes...Mittyish dreamers, puffed up with hot air and all manner of swaggering, 
posturing and boastful talk’. As for John Jenkins and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, 
contrary to ‘the make-believe’ of the FWA, Jenkins ‘played it wholly for real’, 
Fishlock states. Moreover, despite ‘delusions of grandeur’, the commander-in-chief 
of MAC cared ‘passionately for Wales and found ample evidence that his country was 
being sapped and destroyed’.46 Yet, for all those content to castigate the FWA, it 
should be noted that the group’s impact on Welsh political and public life was 
considerable, even if its modus operandi did routinely appear ill-conceived and ill
42 Geraint H. Jenkins, A Concise History o f  Wales (Cambridge, 2007), p.294.
43 Jeremy Black, A New History o f  Wales (Stroud, 2000), p.218.
44 D. Gareth Evans, A History o f  Wales: 1906 - 2000 (Cardiff, 2000).
45 J. S. Ellis, Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911 -  1969 (Cardiff, 2008). 
For a more detailed critique o f this study, see chapter 5.
46 Trevor Fishlock, Wales and the Welsh (London, 1972), pp. 109,116.
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judged.
Another non-academic view comes from the BBC journalist Andrew Marr, 
whose history of Britain states that ‘Welsh nationalism came out of a need to protect 
the Welsh language’ and that violence in its name, was ‘thankfully unpopular and 
badly organized’.47 By expressing such, Marr too merely scratches at the surface. He 
also fails to recognise the wider cultural issues which prompted a militant response; 
such as the threat to the nation’s environment posed by forestation and the drowning 
of valleys to provide the conurbations of England with water.
Historians of terrorism and the intelligence services have also ignored Welsh 
militancy. In July 1975, while imprisoned at HM Prison Albany, an indignant John 
Jenkins wrote of reading a book outlining the exploits of the so-called Angry Brigade. 
It purported, Jenkins added, to focus upon ‘Britain’s first Urban Guerrilla Group’, a 
title surely more worthy of MAC. There is also no mention of the MAC campaign 
by Christopher Andrew in his study: The Defence o f  the Realm. The Authorized 
History o f  MI5 or by Michael Burleigh in his study: Blood and Rage: A Cultural 
History o f  Terrorism.49 The failure of each author to include anything other than 
passing reference to Welsh militancy - all the more surprising when smaller, 
apparently less influential groups are addressed - adds to the widely held nationalist 
belief that the campaign of militant action has been ‘deliberately air-brushed out of 
history’.50 Yet, might a more unpalatable explanation be responsible: namely, that it 
has been passed over owing to its Welsh context? Certainly MAC’s action has not 
received the same degree of attention which other militant organizations operating at 
the same juncture have subsequently received. During a period characterized by ‘the 
spirit of revolution’, the IRA (Irish Republican Army), FLN (Front de Liberation
47 Andrew Marr, A History o f  M odem Britain (London, 2007), p.448.
48 Jenkins, Prison Letters, p. 117. Letter to Sara Erskine, dated, 18 July 1975. The anarchist Angry 
Brigade was comprised o f a small number o f university drop outs. The group took its philosophy from 
two counter-culture theorists, Frenchman Guy Debord and Belgian Raoul Vaneigem, who believed 
both capitalism and Soviet Communism were equally repressive. Members o f  the group were 
imprisoned, following 123 bomb attacks in Britain throughout the early 1970s. Andrew Marr, A 
History o f  Britain (London, 2008), pp.330,333; also Christopher Andrew, The Defence o f  the Realm. 
The Authorized History ofM15 (London, 2009), pp. 610-612,960.
49 Andrew C. The Defence o f  the Realm: The Authorized History ofM I5 (London, 2009). Burleigh, M., 
Blood and Rage: A Cultural History o f  Terrorism (London, 2008). Professor Andrew could ‘remember 
the explosions’ which Wales witnessed during the 1960s, but believed they failed to come within the 
security remit o f MI5, as the intelligence agency was contemporaneously ‘more concerned with Soviet 
infiltration o f  the Labour Party’ and other perceived or existent ‘threats to state security’. Welsh 
militant activity ‘was a police matter’. Interview between WT & Prof. C. Andrew, 29 March 2011.
50 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
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Nationale); the FLQ, (Front de Liberation du Quebec)., ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), 
the Black Panther movement in the US and the FLB, (Front for the Liberation of 
Brittany), have all enjoyed considerable subsequent media and analytical coverage, at 
least within their own countries of insurrection. Whatever the truth, while the Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru protest may not resonate through the pages of a British-leaning 
study, the fact the Provisional IRA based its cell structure on that deployed by 
MAC,51 with - as they saw it - spectacular ‘success’, surely warrants inclusion in any 
comprehensive analytical account of militanism.
There are however, non-academic books and studies which look at Welsh 
militancy, but they are somewhat narrow and selective in their synopsis. To Dream o f  
Freedom by Roy Clews is not an historiographical account, but rather a populist study 
of each campaign undertaken by the Free Wales Army and Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru. It is not, by the author’s admission, a serious attempt to probe and analyse, 
but rather an attempt to highlight that Wales has a history of militant resistance to 
what the protagonists regard as English imperialism. Meanwhile, Owain Williams’ 
account of the drowning of Tryweryn entitled Cysgod Tryweryn;53 Watcyn L. Jones’ 
account entitled, Cofio Tryweryn54 and indeed John Jenkins’ Prison Letters,55 all 
address each author’s own involvement in the events under review, rather than 
offering an analytical study of the entire process itself.
A more comprehensive non-academic history of Welsh militancy was 
published in 2008, while research for this thesis was progress. Freedom Fighters, by 
the former editor of the Western Mail, John Humphries, offers a number of valuable 
and useful insights within its very broad account. Nonetheless, it contains a number 
of uncorroborated and contested assertions, most notably, that the device which 
exploded in Abergele on the eve of the investiture, comprised ‘a fifty stick gelignite 
bomb’ and was ‘the largest ever assembled’ by MAC. It was, Humphries tantalisingly 
intimates ‘clearly intended for a major target’. He further suggests - through an
51 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 12 December 2003. Jenkins admitted to being informed, 
‘years after his militant campaign ended’, that so-impressed were the IRA with his command policy of  
insular four man units, that it based its hugely ‘successful’ cell structure on Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.
52 Interview between WT & Roy Clews, June 2006.
53 Owain Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn (Llanwrst, 1995).
54 Watcyn L. Jones, Cofio Tryweryn (Llandysul, 1988); also, Cofio Capel Celyn (Tal-y-bont, 2007). It 
should be noted that the latter publication, resolutely questions the true extent of Plaid Cymru’s 
involvement in spearheading the Save Tryweryn campaign, (most notably the roles performed by 
Gwynfor Evans and J. E. Jones) as supported by Rhys Evans, A Portrait o f a Patriot, (Talybont, 2008).
55 John Jenkins, Prison Letters (Talybont, 1981).
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unspecified source - that contrary to all available oral and archival evidence, that it 
was not in fact the town’s Social Security Office the saboteurs intended to attack, but 
rather the rail track upon which the Royal Train was shortly to pass. Moreover, the 
device, Humphries alleges, was transferred by Alwyn Jones and George Taylor by 
way of a paint pot tied to a ladder.56 Yet, contacted to discuss these ‘findings’, John 
Jenkins dismissed all aspects of Humphries’ account out of hand; further adding that
cn
he had ‘no idea’ where the former journalist had acquired this apparent knowledge. 
Among a number of additional points requiring clarification, is the claim that ‘one of 
the saboteurs’ involved in the Clywedog action in March 1966, was ‘living aboard in 
2008’.58 However, this was again refuted categorically by John Jenkins, on the 
grounds that ‘all those involved have long since passed away’,59 leading to the 
suggestion that Humphries - on occasion - has succumbed to the temptation of 
journalistic embellishment. It is this ‘access’ to those who actively participated in the 
militant struggle and the level and accuracy of disclosed detail, which sets this thesis 
apart from Humphries’ journalistic account.
Such scant historical attention serves only to convince many linked to the 
nationalist cause that a deliberate policy of academic indifference is at foot. Indeed, 
such is the cursory nature of academic and cultural comment, that many prominent 
figures within the militant nationalist community, believe that no mention has been 
made of those groups most closely identified with Welsh political extremism. For 
example, in November 2007, John Jenkins stated that the nationalist militant 
campaigns had been ‘ignored’ by, what he termed, ‘so-called reputable historians 
...It’s as if these campaigns never happened’. Meritorious historians, he felt, ‘must 
not, for what ever reason, ignore events - they may not agree with them, but it was 
their duty, as historians, to establish the facts as they happened and not to ignore those 
episodes they simply wished to ignore or forget’.60 For historian, Hywel Teifi 
Edwards, such fleeting historiographical mention, often laced with disparaging 
overtone, demonstrates the political nature of history writing. Historians had, he
56 John Humphries, Freedom Fighters (Cardiff, 2008), pp. 123,124.
57 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 18 April 2010.
58 Humphries, Freedom Fighters, p.5. John Humphries also alleged that ‘in accordance with good 
records management practice’, file 18/16/103 ‘Activities o f the Free Wales Army’ was destroyed by 
the Home Office in June 1990’, p. 101. This was disputed by material received from the National 
Archives.
59 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 18 April 2010.
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, November 2007.
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believed in March 2008, regarded this type of action as being detrimental to Welsh 
cultural and political standing. Such a movement, he opined, would not have appealed 
to Welsh historians. Furthermore, they would view it as peripheral and non­
productive. Moreover, historians would not want to consonance that type of 
opposition, and would certainly have been reluctant to be thought of as supporting 
such a campaign through historical analysis.61
It is perhaps understandable that both the Free Wales Army and Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru are the focus of so little historical examination; after all, such 
political activity hardly falls within the parameters of mainstream political thinking. 
What is more, it should be noted that comparatively little post-1945 Welsh history has 
been the subject of academic study.
Thesis and Method
Can the FWA really be dismissed as a Welsh historical irrelevance, a mere ‘footnote’
f\7.as Trevor Fishlock opined in 1995? More contentiously, can a sporadic, well- 
orchestrated, three year bombing campaign, truly be worthy of so little, if indeed, any 
real analysis or comprehensive historical comment? This thesis seeks to reinstate the 
importance of the militant offensive in Welsh history, neither by judging it nor 
dismissing it, but by establishing the importance of these campaigns to both the 
nation’s history and its cultural and political advance. It also establishes the detail of 
what happened, while seeking to tell the story in a balanced way, by paying full 
attention to the perspective of the perpetrators and those actively engaged in their 
detection. It will do so through five distinct chapters, each addressing the manifold 
reasons for the escalation in both nationalist thinking and militant strategy. The first 
chapter will focus upon the period 1955 to 1962. It will identify why a number of 
people in Wales were drawn to the ranks of militant nationalism. This will be 
achieved, by briefly addressing the immediate historical background which led to the 
rise of Welsh nationalism as a relevant political force and the subsequent rise of both 
the Free Wales Army and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Most notably however, the 
chapter will establish that both the militant action of MAC and the propaganda 
campaign of the FWA, were initially fuelled by frustration for the judicial process of 
the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill, which culminated in Parliament in July 1957. It will
61 Telephone interview between WT & Hywel Teifi Edwards, 10 March 2008.
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clearly identify that despite outrage at the passing of the Tryweryn Bill, the main 
protagonists of each campaign were drawn to act ‘in the defence of Wales’ as a result 
of what they considered to be both Plaid Cymru’s refusal to stray from the path of 
constitutional political campaigning and the perceived indifference of central 
government to Welsh cultural identity.
Chapter 2 will focus upon the initial militant campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru. It will further address the group’s apparent demise, following the 
apprehension and imprisonment of its main members in the spring of 1963, the 
formation of the FWA and the reaction of the government and the police to the 
growing political unease in Wales. It will culminate with the opening of Llyn Celyn 
and the first public appearance of the so-called Free Wales Army.
Chapter 3 will address the period January 1966 to December 1967. This was 
the second phase of the campaign undertaken by MAC; and coincided with the rise to 
prominence of John Jenkins, from peripheral member, to operational-commander. It 
will also address the on-going propaganda campaign of the FWA.
Chapter 4 will focus upon the period January 1968 to December 1968. The 
coherence of this period will be identified, by demonstrating that the increase in 
militancy was fuelled by the impending investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of 
Wales. To this end, the chapter will establish the strategy and efforts of both MAC 
and the FWA to undermine both public and authoritarian support for the ceremony. 
Among other notable events, it will address the explosion at RAF Pembrey in 
September 1968 and the establishment of the Shrewsbury Unit.
The last chapter will address the period from January 1969 to April 1970. It 
will address the efforts of the militant community to undermine the prestige of the 
Royal Investiture and the efforts of the security services, most notably the Shrewsbury 
unit, to ensure the success of the ceremony. This it endeavoured to achieve, by 
apprehending those responsible for the militant activism. Subsequently, it will 
highlight the factors which led to the arrest, trial and sentencing of the leading 
members of both the Free Wales Army and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.
The story is not a simple one and is clouded with uncertainty. It is inevitably 
both complicated and heavy with names, dates and conflicting accounts. To help the 
reader, the appendices contain reminders of the key characters and a timeline to ensure
62 Only Yesterday, HTV Production. Screened HTV, 1995.
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an easier navigation of the narrative.
The previous section described amd demonstrated the existing historiography. 
It identified the apparent indifference of historians and commentators to the study of 
militant Welsh nationalism in the 1960s and the many inaccuracies and assumptions 
which subsequently surround the issue. Yet such anomalies are not confined to 
historians and contemporary observers. Thiis thesis draws upon oral interviews with 
thirty seven of those involved in the evemts. Of that number, some seventy percent 
expressed factual errors with regard mames, dates and incidence. While often 
frustrating, it nevertheless illuminated the importance of deploying sound 
methodology when tackling any such historical episode. This section outlines the 
method employed in this thesis, focusing <on the use of oral history as a source. It will 
elaborate on the issues related to the selection of respondents and the formula adopted 
for conducting the interviews, most notably, the process undertaken to establish trust 
between the interviewer and the respondent, a factor which proved essential to the 
success of the project.
My interest in this issue was fuiellled by having been bom the son of an 
eventual high-ranking policeman, who whiilst a junior officer, was routinely instructed 
to walk Radnorshire sections of the Cwnn Elan to Birmingham water pipeline in an 
attempt to discover explosive devices. My initial approving awareness that an 
aqueduct along the route, located just five: oir so miles from the family home had been 
targeted by militant nationalists, was temipered with knowledge that my mother had 
often feared both for my father’s welfare and her ability to raise three sons alone, 
should he suffer serious injury - or indeed loss of life - whilst undertaking his duties. 
This has fuelled my conviction to approach historical writing in a fair, considered and 
balanced manner.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the question of balance presented difficulty. This is 
because the subject of Welsh nationalism is an emotional one; its message promotes 
strong feelings which many people find impossible to be dispassionate about. The 
reason for this, is that all drawn to Welsh mationalism are united with regard one over­
riding factor. Whether it be a conservative viewpoint, or one which endorses the 
position taken by the militant wing o f  the movement, all share an emphatic, 
compelling belief that the nation’s cultural identity faces a grievous threat. 
Nonetheless, even with such an emotional topic, it should be possible to treat both the 
subject matter and all those involved with (dignity and informed respect.
us
The selection of subjects to interview, began with making telephone contact with 
Rhodri Evans, the son of Cayo Evans, the man widely regarded as the former leader of 
the Free Wales Army. As a result of an enlightening evening spent at Evans’ home, 
further telephone numbers of former senior members of the FWA were received. 
Having gained a positive endorsement from Rhodri Evans, all responded favourably to 
the request to be interviewed. Moreover, as a result of further positive discussions, 
each was forthcoming in providing additional telephone numbers and addresses of 
other former activists. Apart from former members of the FWA, leading members of 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, such as John Jenkins, Owain Williams and Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones were also contacted and interviewed. Along with Denis Coslett of the 
FWA, all three former members of MAC were interviewed several times. These 
individuals were approached, as all were at the vanguard of each respective 
organization and in the hope of establishing each person’s actual involvement. These 
interviews generated evidence previously unknown outside the so-called ‘inner circle’, 
and subsequently enabled the thesis to address many of the misconceptions which 
have developed in the ensuing period. The wealth of evidence from the oral testimony 
of many of the leading protagonists forms the main focus of the research. Indeed, the 
tone and content of the thesis is shaped primarily by the memories and recollections of 
those individuals, supplemented to a lesser extent, by archive materials, newspapers, 
literature and television programmes and documentaries.
Oral testimony
The benefits of oral history to a project where there exists relatively little alternative 
material cannot be overstated. As several studies have persuasively argued, oral 
evidence can be understood as crucial in cataloguing and exploring contexts where 
this factor presents a problem.63 Oral testimony is also of fundamental importance 
when considering an event, such as the campaign of militant nationalism in Wales, 
where there is an often disagreement and conflict with the ‘official’ narrative. In this 
respect, the value of interviewing those involved - in whatever capacity - provided 
insight into what otherwise appeared to be largely inaccessible episodes of the past. 
In many respects, the oral record has recognizable advantages over the written 
account. One such advantage is that there can be no doubt to the authorship of a
63 Paul Thompson, The Voice o f  the Past: Oral History (Oxford, 2000).
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particular point of view. Furthermore,, in recording the memories, opinions and 
experiences of persons who may have neither the inclination, nor the literary talent to 
submit their experiences to paper, oral history facilitates a process which explores the 
impact ‘ordinary’ men and woman can have on the course of history.64
Given the subject matter, it was important to develop a trusting relationship 
with those most prominently involved in the events under review. This was achieved 
in the first instance, through establishing a firm overview of both the facts of the 
campaign and perhaps more importantly, the motives of those involved. It should be 
made clear that some of those contacted - most notably John Jenkins - were 
interviewed as much as fifteen times and this, it is believed, could not have happened 
had an empathetic, though neutral and informed approach, not been taken. There was 
no condemnation of actions by the interviewer and each interview revealed new 
information as trust increased. As a consequence, the thesis’s strength lies in the 
unique insight that was gained from interviewing leading figures and others 
significantly involved over a number of years.
From the outset, it became apparent that all drawn to act ‘in the defence of 
Wales’ had harboured an undisguised belief that the Welsh nation was under threat. 
Moreover, all saw Wales within the confines of a homogeneous, unionist state, largely 
ignorant, if not openly hostile, to the unique cultural landscape of their ‘beloved’ 
homeland. Having therefore established this important platform, it was next necessary 
to determine the campaign as a whole. This was achieved by asking the following 
questions. What had each former activist hoped to achieve? How had their protest 
action been orchestrated, organized and implemented? Had they enjoyed the 
experience of challenging, what they considered to be, English political and cultural 
oppression and domination? Had they, to some extent, basked in their apparent 
notoriety? And not least, did they feel the risks taken and in some cases 
imprisonment, to have been worthwhile when considering their action with the benefit 
of some forty years hindsight? Although this format followed a certain structure, 
interviews were not conducted on a formal basis. Rather, each was allowed to ‘free- 
fall’ and to develop at their own pace. This ‘open’ policy encouraged dialogue and 
debate, and although broadly similar, enabled each interview to become characterized 
by what amounted to an individual identity.
64 Ibid, p.28.
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It was, at this juncture, having overcome some initial reluctance and distrust, that the 
‘sensitive’, informed approach to the subject deployed was rewarded with further 
candid revelations and exclamations of what was believed to be genuine 
encouragement and support. At no point was this established ‘rapport’ better 
highlighted, as when, after much regular contact, information was disclosed of not 
only the true extent of an activist’s personal involvement, but also what some came to 
regard as mistakes and hitherto unknown reservations. Such was the degree of frank 
exchange by this stage, that a number of those interviewed became visibly upset and 
agitated when recounting more difficult aspects of the campaign. One example of this 
was when John Jenkins, the former director-general of MAC, described the events 
which led to the deaths of two alleged members of the movement whilst on ‘active 
duty’. It should also be established at this juncture, that respondents were not obliged 
to continue with the interview if they felt in any uncomfortable. This understanding 
went some way to alleviate any issues regarding exploitation, or their forcible 
participation within the project. It was supplemented by an offer of anonymity, which 
was routinely offered and occasionally accepted.
In an attempt to gain a legal understanding of the issues involved, former 
members of the judiciary were also interviewed. As with regard to members of the 
nationalist fraternity, here also a policy of informed neutrality was employed. Those 
contacted were Sir Tasker Watkins, who led the prosecution in the trials against Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones in 1963, the Free Wales Army in 1969 and John Jenkins, the director- 
general of Mudiad Amddifyn Cymru in 1970; and Sir John Mortimer, who acted on 
behalf of Denis Coslett, during the so-called FWA trial. In an attempt to establish a 
political understanding of the period, Gwynfor Evans, the former president of Plaid 
Cymru was interviewed; while in order to gain a fuller understanding of police 
activity to counter those perpetrating the Welsh militant campaign in the 1960s, 
retired police Assistant Chief Constable, John Owen Evans was also consulted, as was 
Raymond Kendall, a junior member of the Shrewsbury Unit: the group assembled in 
1968 to both apprehend the saboteurs and to monitor the perceived threat to the Royal 
Investiture the following year. Indeed, as with several members of the militant 
community, both Evans and Kendall were interviewed and/or contacted on a number 
of occasions. All of the above responded with candour to the questions put forward, 
while also revealing a number of hitherto unknown and interesting points.
How the oral testimony collated could be verified proved a pressing concern.
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A major problem regarding oral testimony is the fallibility of memory. As Diana 
Greenway noted, ‘personal memory does not handle interval very well’.65 
Nevertheless, to ignore oral evidence appears tantamount, as Hywel Francis opines, 
‘to taking the decision to write off whole areas of human experience’.66 While this 
view must be acknowledged, there nonetheless exists the constant threat of confusion, 
particularly where dates and incidents feature prominently. This recognized threat to 
factual accuracy, inherent within oral history studies, presented itself during this 
project, most notably, with regard the dates of actions undertaken. Yet, despite the 
frustrations of factual inconsistency, it is possible to recognize that there exists little or 
no purpose in pursuing detailed ‘accuracy’ from oral interviews, and crucially, that 
‘accuracy’ should not be confused with reliability or validity. Furthermore, that 
certain measures can be applied to ensure that the information collected is both 
scrutinized and that subsequent safeguards can then be adopted to maintain the 
verifiability of the evidence. This process of validation is ensured, through assessing 
additional resource material. For example, archive evidence and newspaper sources 
were explored to discover and verify factual information. An example of how this 
process developed included the alleged reaction of police to protestors demonstrating 
in Cardiff in 1968 against the investiture. A number of those interviewed spoke of an 
unprecedented aggression shown towards them by the police. This testimony was 
then, to some considerable degree, corroborated by accessing newspaper sources 
which had reported extensively on the episode. This same pattern of verifying oral 
testimony through cross-referencing with archive and newspaper sources was 
followed throughout the period of research. As a result, despite its recognized flaws, 
the strength of oral testimony as a source cannot be discounted.
Yet, there are important limitations which need to be identified when using 
oral testimony. While its strength as a source derives from it being a first-hand 
account and recollection, not to mention its ‘originality’ and its ability to ‘capture’ the 
emotion of an interviewee, a degree of caution and scrutiny is required. The 
credibility, selectivity and impartiality of those interviewed needs to be assessed. It 
was important to remain ever mindful as to the ‘reliability’ of the information being 
relayed. For example, in addition to how the interviewee ‘performed’ with regard
65 Diana E. Greenway, ‘Dates in History: Chronology and Memory’, Historical Research. LXX11, 
178, (June 1999), pp. 28-45.
66 Hywel Francis, ‘The Secret World o f the South Wales Miner: The Relevance of Oral History’, A
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dates and facts, how ‘open’ were they? How confident could one remain that 
‘everything’ was being disclosed? Might they have been boasting and/or exaggerating 
their personal involvement or status? Such questions were more difficult when it 
came to the telephone discussions that were undertaken alongside the recorded ‘face 
to face’ interviews. These enquiries were another opportunity to gain material 
‘straight from the horse’s mouth’, but their weakness derived from an inability to
67accurately gauge facial reaction and more subtle emotional responses.
Another potential hazard oral testimony can present, is the question of 
‘relationship’. For example, every interview, Ithiel de Sola Pool suggests, is an 
‘interpersonal drama with a developing plot’. In other words, the standpoint from 
which the information is offered, continually unfolds in relation to interview 
interaction. It is therefore a ‘power relationship’, in that interview respondents not 
only offer substantive insight pertinent to the topic under consideration, but they also 
simultaneously and continuously monitor who they are in relation to themselves 
within the context of the interview.68 This perspective is reminiscent of Michael 
Foucault’s argument regarding the role of the ‘confession’, namely, that a person 
cannot confess without the presence of a partner. This so-called ‘partner’ is not 
merely there to receive divulged information, but their presence is one of authority: 
which intervenes, judges, punishes or forgives the person confessing. In this context, 
Foucault suggests that all formal, verbal interactions are laden with an implicit power 
relationship.69
It is an argument endorsed by The Popular Memory Group at Birmingham 
University, which has argued that oral testimony is ‘undemocratic’, in that interviews
K\are an ‘imbalance of power’. The group substantiates this claim by maintaining that 
the interview process is routinely governed by numerous factors. These can include 
the choice and contacting of respondents, the nature and manner of the interview 
process and the collating and interpretation of data. Yet, while this must be 
recognized, it is possible to suggest that the interview process is not simply a one­
sided, ‘hegemonic’ experience for the interviewer; and oral history practitioners have
People and a Proletariat: Wales 1780-1980, ed. Dai Smith, (London, 1980), pp.67-72.
67 Eliot Mishler, The Discourse o f  Medicine Dialectic o f  Medical Interviews. (Norwood, 1984).
68 Ithiel de Sola-Pool, ‘A Critique of the Twentieth Anniversary Issue’, Public Opinion Quarterly 21, 
H957), pp. 190-98.
9 Michael Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality: Vol.2, (New York, 1975), pp.16-18.
70 The Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory: Theory, Politics and Methods’, in Richard Johnson
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suggested ways in which to neutralize the power imbalance inherent in any oral 
history project. One such method is to allow the subjects to take an active role in 
determining the final version of the project itself.71 A further suggestion - and one 
deployed within this study - was made by Penny Sommerfield, who argues for 
undermining the power imbalance through the use of anonymity.72
Moreover, oral history studies have typically been viewed as asymmetrical 
encounters in which the interviewer solicits information from an interviewee who 
responds passively to the interviewer’s enquiries. This oversimplified view suggests 
that those who wish to learn more about an historical event, merely have to ask the 
right questions and the interviewees will provide the necessary information. Studs 
Terkel has argued that this is an elementary part of the interview process and that once 
trust has been established, ‘the sluice gates of damned up hurts and dreams (are) 
open’.73
Yet, subjects have power too. They can withhold information or suggest false 
interpretations. Oral history is not just an interviewer exercising power to gain 
information. Overcoming this problem requires trust. The importance of trust cannot 
be underestimated, as nor can the difficulty of a respondent hiding behind the assumed 
narrative. These problems are often interlinked and they occurred within this thesis, 
with regard the former ‘commandant1 of the FWA Denis Coslett. Having 
demonstrated an initial ambivalence towards questions which attempted to determine 
the full extent of the FWA’s involvement in the militant struggle, a breakthrough was 
finally achieved. The episode exemplified how through regular and courteous 
persistence, in this instance following some three years and six lengthy interviews, a 
trusting relationship necessitated a full and frank admission as to the group’s actual 
participation. Prior to this, Coslett had continued to propagate the belief that the 
group had enjoyed a far more active association in the militant offensive than, as it 
transpired, was actually the case. The issue was reminiscent of that identified by 
Alastair Thomson, who suggested that a personal interpretation or narrative is often
(ed.), The Popular Memory Group (London, 1982).
71 Lilian Lanzardo, Class Consciousness and the Fiat Workers of Turin since 1943, in Paul Thompson
(ed.), Our Common History: The Transformation o f  Europe, (London, 1982), pp.79-93.
72 Penny Sommerfield, Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives (Manchester, 1998).
73 Studs Terkel, Working People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About It ( New 
York, 1972), p.25.
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borne of a need to legitimize behaviour.74
As a result of all the techniques followed, it is possible to appreciate that the 
power relationship typical of an oral interview need not be static and that the process 
can both flow and be dynamic. Furthermore, by allowing the respondent to engage 
fully in the process, the interview will change and develop to the satisfaction of both 
parties as the procedure progresses.75 This was therefore a vital instrument in the 
methodology deployed in a thesis of this nature.
Of secondary importance to oral testimony in the methodology used was newspaper 
evidence. As a primary source, its strength proved to be its ‘contemporary’ 
viewpoint; its weakness was editorial or journalistic political and/or cultural bias. A 
number of television and radio programmes, both contemporary and those 
subsequently produced, were also consulted. Once again, as with newspapers sources, 
the same strengths and weakness were found to apply, as indeed was proved to be the 
case when further sources were exercised, such as government-released papers, 
Hansard and books and periodicals. Each, it must be recognized, proved invaluable in 
providing a fuller understanding of the events under review, however, each proved 
equally as susceptible to a pre-determined political and/or cultural standpoint. For 
example, FWA: Fr Gad!, (FWA: To Battle!) screened in 1999, adopted a somewhat 
sympathetic tone, while Wales and the Welsh, by Trevor Fishlock, appeared to be far 
more critical of the Free Wales Army, both as a so-called ‘terrorist’ organization 
and/or as a political mouthpiece.76 This sentiment was particularly in evidence, with 
regard government or civil service papers, which, released under the thirty-year public 
access rule, were surveyed during a number of visits to the political archive 
department at the National Archives in Kew. One memorable incident concerned a 
letter viewed at the National Archives in December 2008, which appeared to 
incriminate a person’s involvement in the militant struggle. Yet, on returning to the 
National Archives some sixteen months later, it was discovered the letter had been 
removed from the file. The archive, it would therefore appear, was not neutral, but
74 Alastair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living With The Legend (Oxford, 1994), pp,7,8. Alessandro 
Portelli, The Peculiarities o f Oral History, History Workshop Journal, 12. (1981), pp.96,107.
75Cheryl Russell, What’s Rapport Got To Do With It? http://www.nova.edu/ssss/OR/OR7- 
1/russell.html: also, Patricia M. Thane, Oral History, Memory and Written Tradition: an introduction, 
Transactions o f  Royal Historical Society, sixth series, 9, (1999), pp.291, 301.
16 FWA: I ’r Gad! Zenana Production. Screened S4C, 1999. Fishlock, Wales and Welsh, pp. 110,111.
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subject to the ever active security interests of the state.
Numerous visits to the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth were also 
undertaken, where papers donated to the political archive department from Plaid 
Cymru and personal papers from among others George Thomas, Gwynfor Evans and 
Cledwyn Hughes were also consulted. Files returned to Denis Coslett in accordance 
with the thirty-year ruling, of the court transactions used in the trial of the so-called 
Free Wales Army, were also used. Although each source proved prodigious, a 
constant evaluation was nevertheless required, in order to determine the amount, 
degree and direction of any apparent or concealed bias: whether it be political, cultural 
or linguistic.
The power of nationalism
Whether through accident or design, this enigmatic period in the nation’s history has 
been largely overlooked by historians and cultural commentators. For the first time, 
this thesis will analyse the events which for too long have been met with historical 
indifference. The importance of the subject, its illegality, and the myths which 
encompass much of the detail, demand that the topic is closely examined; while full 
attention to the motives and thinking of those routinely dismissed by contemporaries 
and historians as ‘terrorists’ is paid. It is hoped that this thesis gets as close to the 
‘truth’ as anything previously compiled. It is, for that reason, groundbreaking.
A re-examination of these events is both necessary and important to the 
historical, cultural and political journey of the Welsh nation. This is because any 
development of Welsh history, which does not include this episode, is surely 
incomplete. Much is said of nationhood being an ‘imagined community’, most 
notably by Benedict Anderson;77 of nationalism and cultural identity being a mere 
construct and projection, in that members of even the smallest nations will never 
know, meet or even hear of most of their fellow-members. Yet, while such opinion 
must be acknowledged, it fails to capture the full power of nationalism. It fails to 
recognise the raw emotion that ‘nationality’ can produce. What is it about that less 
easily defined force that can drive educated, thinking people to do both great and 
dreadful things? Throughout Welsh history’s often troubled passage, when the death 
knell for Welsh nationhood has apparently sounded, patriotism has re-emerged to
77 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 1991), p.6.
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challenge and protect. Time and again, that mysterious allure has brought men and 
women to the fore, all united in the moral cause to safeguard that which defines the 
Welsh nation. And so it was in the 1960s: that same inexplicable force led men to lay 
explosives in the name of Welsh cultural identity; despite appalling risk, to both 
themselves and to others. It is time that these events are given their true place within 
the rich, lurid pages of Welsh history.
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Chapter 1 
'Pathological and pathetic fixation...'
Cwm Tryweryn is flooded
Introduction
This chapter addresses the proposal by Liverpool Water Corporation to flood Cwm 
Tryweryn in Meirionnydd. It examines the hostility with which the measure was 
greeted within both Welsh nationalist and wider political circles; and further identifies 
how frustration with the judicial process and the failure of constitutional Plaid Cymru, 
underpinned the emergence of militant Welsh activism, which marked the period in 
Wales between 1963 and 1969.
The Tryweryn Reservoir Bill
On 22 December 1955, the Liverpool Daily Post carried the headline: ‘Big new dam 
near Bala planned’, before outlining Liverpool Corporation’s plan to augment the 
city’s water provision by promoting a Parliamentary Bill, so as to receive the legal 
authority to dam the Tryweryn river and valley. Perhaps to circumvent Welsh 
nationalist suspicions of a ‘done deal’, ten other ‘considered’ sites were listed in the 
Corporation’s report.1 In an embittered response, Plaid Cymru declared that the 
Corporation’s announcement demonstrated its complete inability to assess the nature 
of Welsh opposition. It was intolerable for a Welshman to be told that he must ‘yield 
(a) thoroughly Welsh-speaking area’. The English authority had ‘no claim to (any 
Welsh) valley in law or morality’.
It soon became clear that any committee established to fight the proposal 
would need real political clout. In March 1956, with some of Wales’s most 
influential and prominent personalities, including: Megan Lloyd George, T. I. Ellis, 
Lord Ogmore and Ifan ab Owen Edwards at the vanguard, the Capel Celyn Defence
1 Liverpool Daily Post, 22 December 1955. Unknown to the inhabitants o f Cwm Tryweryn, in March 
1955, a four man delegation arrived from Liverpool Corporation to undertake suitability surveys.
2 LDP, 21 December 1955.
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Committee was formed;3 along with its Liverpool branch, the Tryweryn Defence 
Committee.4 Nonetheless, for Plaid Cymru and in particular its president Gwynfor 
Evans, it was arguably the start of the most difficult and challenging period of his 
political life, as repeated calls ‘to do something self-sacrificial’ were constrained with 
the duties of fatherhood and the financial restrictions of the party.5
Through the diligence of Plaid Cymru activist Dafydd Alun Jones, who 
consulted the records of Liverpool Corporation’s Water Committee as far back as 
1865 - most notably the years 1920-19556 - it was revealed that the city was already 
receiving some 50 M.D.G. from Lake Vymwy; despite an existing domestic 
consumption of just 26.9 M.D.G.7 Thus, should the Tryweryn proposal be ratified, 
Liverpool Corporation stood to gain an additional daily increase of some sixty-five 
million gallons.8 Intriguingly however, the supply of water which Liverpool 
Corporation provided for industry between 1920 and 1955, had increased from 8.52 
million gallons per day to 20.23 million gallons per day.9 Therefore, to those 
opposed to the motion, the reason for the further flooding of Cwm Tryweryn, seemed 
to have far less to do with social need than with increased profit for Liverpool City 
Council.10
Nevertheless, opposition to Liverpool’s proposal was far from universal. At 
the end of September 1956, it was announced that Talyllyn Parish Council in 
Meirionnydd, had decided not to join the protest.11 Despite the announcement, Plaid
3 Casglu'r Tlysau. www.tlysau.org.uk.
4 NLW. Ymgyrchu - The Water Industry. Plaid Cymru Archive. M55. NLW.www.uk 
http://www.llgc.org.Uk/ymgyrchu/D wr/Tryweryn/index-e,htm
5 Telephone interview between WT & Dafydd Evans, 10 February 2007. An opposition rally, 
organised by Dewi Prys Thomas, to march through the streets of Liverpool in August 1956, failed to 
attract enough support. Rhys Evans, Gwynfor Evans: A Portrait o f  a Patriot (Talybont, 2008), p. 168.
6 Gwynfor Evans, Fighting fo r  Wales (Talybont, 1991) p. 89.
7 P. Berresford Ellis, Wales: A Nation Again (London, 1968), p. 128.
g
NLW. Ymgyrchu - The Water Industry. Plaid Cymru Archive. M55. NLW.www.uk9
LDP, 13 December 1956. In light o f such, why, it was suggested, could Liverpool not follow the 
example o f Warrington which had utilized perfectly suitable water for industry from the Mersey; as had 
London from the Thames.
10 Evans, Fighting fo r  Wales, p. 89. As Gwynfor Evans was later to recall, not only was the English 
authority receiving its water at the cheapest price in Britain, it was ‘already reselling some of the 
Vymwy water for millions o f pounds a year; in addition to meeting the needs o f its own homes and 
industries’. Gwynfor Evans, For The Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 1996), p.127. In addition to Lake 
Vynwy, Liverpool Corporation was also entitled to abstract a further 10 M.G.D. from the river Dee in 
north Wales. Moreover, Liverpool regions Birkenhead and Bootle, abstracted huge amounts o f water 
from other north Wales sources, lakes Alwen and Brenig. Evans, Fighting for Wales, p.89.
11 LDP, 25 September 1956. A councillor declared: ‘all reasonable forms of development (in the area) 
should be welcomed’. In a letter dated 14 December 1956, apparently written by T. J. Parry o f Bala, a 
former Cwm Tryweryn farmer, the author complained of unknowing outsiders orchestrating opposition
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Cymru was determined to demonstrate clear leadership over the issue, by 
spearheading resistance. Under the banner ‘Hands off Tryweryn’, the party led a 
procession through the streets of Bala. For three hours, the crowd numbering four 
thousand packed into a marquee on the edge of the town, where speeches of hostility
were heard. Without a single dissentient, a resolution was passed calling on
12 , 
Liverpool Corporation to abandon its scheme. Yet, the victory was short-lived.
Within a fortnight, a motion to oppose the measure on the grounds that it might
adversely affect the towns existing supply from Llyn Arenig was opposed by Bala
Town Council.
If Liverpool Corporation believed - or hoped - that the decision of Bala Town 
Council undermined the burgeoning protest, it was in for a surprise. Just weeks later, 
the Lord Mayor of Cardiff, Alderman J. H. Morgan, held a meeting in the city beneath 
the increasingly emotive banner ‘Save Tryweryn’. There were ten MPs and three- 
hundred representatives from local government and trade unions present. It was 
decided that a delegation would go to Liverpool, to appeal for a change of heart. 
However, the proposal was brusquely refused on the grounds that the council’s policy 
was never to receive deputations.14 Unperturbed, on 7 November, the leader of Plaid 
Cymru attempted to address Liverpool City Council. Hoping to appeal for the 
argument of the nationalist community in Wales and those facing expulsion from their 
homes;15 it proved a futile exercise. Led by the indefatigable Bessie Braddock - the 
staunch socialist champion of the city’s so-called underclass - those in support of the 
motion began to bang the lids of their desks, raising the volume within the chamber to 
that akin, ‘to the roars of hell’s pit’.16
The efforts of Gwynfor Evans were not however in vain. Galvanised by the 
stoic resolution shown by the party leader in Liverpool, letters were sent on behalf of
the Defence Committee to councils, chapels, churches, trades unions and a variety of
11other societies and organisations seeking support. As the months passed, the protest 
movement, which once appeared meek and supine, began to gather considerable 
momentum. The extent of which was outlined in 1970 in the memoirs of J. E. Jones,
to the scheme. Moreover the land was ‘useless’ owing to forestation. TNA, BD 24/174.
12 LDP , 1 October 1956.
13 Einion Thomas, Capel Celyn (Llandybie, 2007), p.48.
14 Evans, Fighting fo r  Wales, p.88.
15 Rhys Evans, Gwynfor Evans: A Portrait o f  a Patriot (Talybont, 2008), p. 171.
16 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. Evans was accompanied by R. 
Tudur Jones and Councillor Dafydd Roberts, both o f whom tried to address the meeting.
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the former Plaid Cymru General Secretary. The first big achievement, recalled Jones,
was to get virtually the whole of Wales - local councils, one-hundred-and-twenty-five
of them and movements of all sorts - to adopt resolutions opposing Liverpool’s plan.
Indeed, he felt that ‘all Wales was on our side’.18 Correspondence opposing the
measure soon arrived at the offices of Liverpool Water Corporation. At a meeting on
20 November 1956, it was stated that throughout the year, the authority had received
29 letters hostile to its proposal to flood Cwm Tryweryn. One, included a petition
from the Capel Celyn Defence Committee, signed by 614 residents of Bala.19 Many
more were to follow.
The following day, as Liverpool City Council prepared to vote whether or not
to proceed with the Tryweryn Water Bill, all but three members of the Cwm Tryweryn
community marched with banners through the streets of Liverpool to protest the
proposal. With placards bearing slogans such as: ‘Your homes are safe - why
destroy ours’ and ‘Please Liverpool, be a great city not a big bully’, the protesters
made their way to the Town Hall. Whether or not deemed by the city’s authorities to
be a cause of discomfort, the hopelessness of the situation must have begun to strike a
loud and clear chord in the hearts of the assembled coterie of hill farmers and
villagers, as their repeated pleas to be heard, were met with a courteous, yet firm 
21refusal. The ‘youngest to march’ was Eurgain Prysor Jones. Speaking in 2006, she 
recalled the hostility shown towards the marchers by a number of the city’s 
inhabitants; most notably Bessie Braddock.22 Also among the ranks of the protestors 
was Harriet Jones Parry. She, however, remembered ambivalence and even apathy
9^rather than hostility from the crowd.
A new tactic was deployed at this point by Liverpool Corporation: the 
promise of considerable compensation. In contemptuous response, councillor Dafydd
17 Gwynfor Evans, For The Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 1996), p.128.
18 J. E. Jones, Tros Gymru (Swansea, 1970), p.78; also, Dafydd Williams, The Story o f  Plaid Cymru 
(Aberystwyth, 1990), p.18. For a contrary view regarding Plaid Cymru’s involvement, see: Watcyn L. 
Jones, Cofio Capel Celyn, (Talybont, 2007).
19 Liverpool Record Office (LRO). Liverpool Corporation Water Committee Minutes, 
352MIN/WTR/1/59, p.343.
20 Williams, Story o f  Plaid Cymru, p. 18.
21 LDP, 22 November 1956.
22 Telephone interview between WT & Eurgain Prysor Jones, 29 June 2006. It was ‘a great expedition 
to go to Liverpool’, Jones explained. Nonetheless, ‘the Liverpool people were horrible; we had rotten 
tomatoes thrown at us’. Jones particularly recalled Bessie Braddock, who ‘was vile, really nasty’ and 
said ‘some horrible things’ to protestors.
23 Roy Clews, To Dream o f  Freedom (Talybont, 1980), p. 17. Telephone interview between WT & Roy 
Clews, 10 December 2008.
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Roberts, chair of the Defence Committee declared: ‘You can talk of compensation, it 
is not compensation we call for, but to keep our homes’.24 However, the lure of this
7Sfinancial incentive did prove too great for one family. This offer succeeded in 
eroding the united stance which had hitherto been taken by those residing in the area.
Whether or not Liverpool City Council was shamed by its earlier behaviour, or 
embarrassed by the resultant outcry, two weeks after refusing the three man
delegation to address the city council chamber, Gwynfor Evans was given the rare, if
26not unprecedented privilege of addressing the council for a quarter of an hour. The 
following day, the Manchester Guardian, reported that Evans had made such a 
brilliant plea for the preservation of the valley’s economic and cultural life, that the 
council broke into spontaneous applause at the end. Yet, the efforts of the Plaid 
Cymru president proved fruitless, as the council voted in favour to support the
9 o
proposal to flood Cwm Tryweryn by 95 votes to 1.
It soon became apparent, that those in favour of the motion, whether fuelled by 
wider political ideology or by less benevolent thinking, merely regarded Cwm 
Tryweryn, if  not to say the very country of Wales, as little more than an extended
70feature of a wider England. Nowhere was this better illustrated than by Liverpool 
Alderman John Braddock, who at the end of November, announced that the council’s 
duty was only towards the citizens of Liverpool; before inflaming nationalist outrage 
by adding ‘Wales is a part of our country’.30
Emotions were beginning to run high. On 14 December 1956, a letter was sent 
to the offices of Liverpool Corporation, warning the authority to abandon its proposal 
to flood Cwm Tryweryn. Declaring its intention to sabotage any work undertaken at 
the site, it was signed ominously ‘the WRA’. (Welsh Republican Army).31
24 Evans, Fighting For Wales, p.88.
25 Interview between WT & Eurgain Prysor Jones, 18 June 2010. Having accepted an offer to be 
relocated to a smallholding, some years later, John Evans and his wife were killed in a car accident. 
There were some in the Bala area who wondered whether divine punishment had been dispensed.
26 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
27 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 173.
28 The Times, 22 November 1956. News o f the result was contemptuously greeted in Y Cymro, (The 
Welshman). On 22 November 1956, its cartoon feature declared: ‘Nid oes gydwybod gan gorfforaeth 
. . . ’. ( ‘A corporation has no conscience...’).
29NLW. Ymgyrchu - The Water Industry. Plaid Cymru Archive. M55. NLW.www.uk
30 LDP, 1 December 1956.
31 Thomas, Capel Celyn, p.97. Addressed to Liverpool Corporation, the letter read: Keep out o f North 
Wales. We o f the South will driver any one (sic), who trys (sic) to take our peoples (sic) homes away 
from them. We mean what we write. We will sabotage any work you do there. Keep out o f our 
country. This is a warning. We remain, your truly, the Welsh Nation. Or WRA. P/S (sic) The 
Tryweryn Villey (sic) belong (sic) to Wales, not the English Government.
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It was at this juncture, in the comparatively early stages of the proposal to flood Cwm 
Tryweryn, that Liverpool Corporation first demonstrated to those against the motion, 
the efforts it would make to circumvent reasoned, if not to say, democratic politics, to 
see the Bill ratified by Parliament in the months to come. Before there was any 
chance of the proposed Liverpool City Council’s Bill passing through Parliament, it 
had first to have the approval of a public civic meeting. At the meeting, the city’s 
numerous Welsh inhabitants arranged for hundreds of their compatriots to attend. It 
soon became apparent to the city’s authorities and those proposing the motion, that 
with the Welsh in the majority, the spectre of defeat stared them firmly in the face. 
Adopting a delaying tactic, having failed to open the meeting at the pre-arranged time, 
some thirty minutes later, employees of Liverpool Water Corporation, some bedecked 
in the livery of the Water Board, entered the hall. With those on the platform now
9^confident of victory, the meeting was allowed to commence. On the vote by show 
of hands, 262 favoured the Bill’s promotion and 161 voted against.33
However, even Liverpool City Council was now divided. Having arguably 
proved the claim that Cwm Tryweryn was to be drowned solely for the purpose of 
fiscal gain, a number of labour non-members indicated their intention to abstain their 
vote at the impending and crucial Liverpool Council meeting.34 Yet, despite these 
indications of disapproval, on 18 December 1956, a vote of 160 to 90 in support of the 
proposal to flood Cwm Tryweryn was passed in the council chamber.35
Throughout January 1957 and beyond, opposition to the proposal continued to mount, 
as more councils joined the stand against Liverpool Corporation. Nonetheless, 
opposition to the measure remained fragmentary, with news that Radnor District 
Council had agreed not to take action regarding the proposed Bill.36 During the early 
months of 1957, Liverpool Corporation’s Private Bill passed through its first 
parliamentary stages. It now began to appear unstoppable. Whether deflated at the 
increasing prospect of failure, or whether re-aligning themselves for the final battles 
which now lay ahead, little was heard from those who opposed the Bill in the weeks 
to come.
32 Evans, Sake o f  Wales, p. 129.
33 LDP, 18 December 1956.
34 Evans, Fighting For Wales, p.91.
35 Trevor Fishlock, Wales and the Welsh, (London, 1972), p. 104.
36 LDP, 17 January 1957.
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On 1 May, the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill came before a select committee of the House 
of Lords, at the start of what was to become a nine-day hearing. It coincided with 
news that eleven petitioners hostile to the proposed Bill had withdrawn their 
objections.38 Among notable testimony, the committee heard extracts from the report 
submitted by Henry Brooke. It soon became clear as to which side of the argument the 
Minister for Welsh Affairs had pitched his coin. On the facts available to him, Brooke 
was ‘satisfied’ that Liverpool Corporation had ‘a real and urgent need to augment its 
water resources’, if  it was ‘to fulfil its duty of affording domestic and industrial 
consumers and to meet the needs of adjoining areas’ which depended upon it for their 
supply. However, not all of Henry Brooke’s findings read unfavourably. Along with 
his predecessor, Brooke had received 508 letters of protest: o f which 217 were from 
individuals, 91 from local authorities and 200 from other bodies such as churches, 
trade union branches and political organisations.39
On Day 5 of the Hearing, on behalf of owners, leasers and occupiers of 
properties in the parishes of Llanfor and Llanycil, Dewi Watkin Powell read aloud a 
list of distinguished Welsh people who had become honorary presidents of the Capel 
Celyn Defence Committee. The list included Lady Hughes Parry, Lady Megan Lloyd 
George and Lord Ogmore. One man unimpressed by the list of Welsh dignitaries was 
Alderman Frank Cain, chairman of (the) Liverpool Corporation, who retorted that the 
list was politically engineered. Moreover, Welsh nationalists, Cain asserted, had 
‘stoked the fires of protest’ which had ‘resulted in a fever pitch’.40
Dewi Watkin Powell then read a long list of Welsh public bodies and 
organisations opposed to the scheme. The list concluded, Powell turned to Frank 
Cain and asked whether he thought Liverpool Corporation should proceed in the face 
of such opposition? Cain’s reply was resolute: the Corporation had put the scheme 
before Parliament and was prepared to abide by its decision; adding that Liverpool
37 LDP, 31 January 1957; also, LDP, 21 February 1957.
38 LDP, 2 May 1957. The authorities which now withdrew their petitions o f protest included: 
Birkenhead Corporation; Denbigh County Council; Wallasey Corporation; East Denbigh Water 
Company; Mid and South East Cheshire Water Board; the Dee and Clwyd River Board and the West 
Cheshire Water Board. It followed ‘assurances’ and the formation o f a sub committee to discuss issues 
o f  interest.
39 LDP, 3 May 1957. On visiting Cwm Tryweryn, Henry Brooke marvelled at this ‘lovely part o f the 
world’ and declared he would return to London with ‘a much clearer impression o f the problems and 
difficulties faced in the area’. LDP, 26 April 1957. Brooke ‘came under false pretences’, believed 
Capel Celyn resident E. P. Jones. None realized it then, ‘but while there with his advisors, they were 
taking soil samples to see how much clay was in the soil, so as to work out the cost o f the building 
work’. Telephone interview between WT & Eurgain Prysor Jones, 29 June 2006.
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had more than 90,000 sub-standard houses, many of which shared their water supply 
from a half inch standpipe.41 On behalf of Meirionnydd County Council, Moses 
Gruffydd, the Welsh agriculturist, maintained that the soil in the river valley was fine 
silt of good depth, and as such, was far too good to be placed under water to satisfy 
the industrial demands of Liverpool, should the measure be ratified.42
In response, J. G. Eve, a senior surveyor and land agent employed by the 
English authority, fiercely attacked Moses Gruffydd’s testimony and submitted report. 
The country around Capel Celyn, declared Eve, was wild and thinly populated; 
furthermore, the valley was not a useful contributor to food production.43 Eve’s 
evidence served only to hammer another nail in the coffin of Cwm Tryweryn.
In support of the petition forwardedl by Meirionnydd County Council, was Dr. 
D. Robinson, a senior partner in a Manchester firm engaged in the design and 
construction of water undertakings. Robinson’s evidence gave fresh hope to those 
opposed to the measure, that a compromise might yet be reached. It was clear, 
Robinson stated, that even if Liverpool proved it needed 65,000,000 gallons a day, 
this could be provided from the river Dee with the assistance of a reservoir of much 
more modest dimensions than that proposed; and without the submerging of property 
and the expensive road and rail diversions.44 If it appeared that the matter was 
delicately balanced, following just a few minutes of apparent deliberation, it was 
announced that the House of Lords Select Committee was ‘of the opinion that the Bill 
should be allowed to proceed’.45
Despite the Bill’s hitherto successful passage, on 23 May 1957, the Liverpool 
Daily Post recorded that Welsh MPs on both sides of the Commons had agreed to 
fight the Bill when it came before the House to receive its Second Reading.46 This 
was billed in the national media as being ‘one of the keenest struggles seen for some 
time’.47 To an angry buzz from Welsh MIPs and amid cries of ‘Resign’ and ‘Go’, 
Henry Brooke, concluded the debate by stating that water shortages might occur in the
40 LDP, 8 May 1957.
41 Ibid.
42 LDP, 10 May 1957. Gruffydd’s earlier submittedl report proposed alternative measures, not hitherto 
examined, acceptable he hoped to both parties. LDP, 29 November 1956.
43 LDP, 8 May 1957. Photographs o f abundant com and hay fields contradicted J. G. Eve’s findings.
44 LDP, 9 May 1957. Robinson proposed three alternative sites, two on the river Celyn, the other on 
the Himant. Among further proposals - such as utillizing existing lakes overlooking Cwm Tryweryn - 
raising the existing wall at Llyn Vymwy was also deemed feasible.
45 LDP, 14 May 1957.
46 LDP, 23 May 1957.
A1 LDP, 3 July 1957.
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next few years on Merseyside and in south-west Lancashire. ‘I cannot believe’, the 
Minister for Welsh Affairs declared, ‘that preservation of the Welsh way of life 
requires us to go as far as that’. Moreover, Brooke could not ‘believe that the Welsh 
people, of all people’, wanted ‘to stand outside the brotherhood of man to that extent’. 
As doubts persisted as to the Bill’s likely outcome right up to the declaration of the 
vote, finally, by a majority of 49, with 166 in favour of the Bill and 117 against, the 
House of Commons passed the Second Reading of the Liverpool Corporation’s 
Tryweryn Reservoir Bill.48
During another nine day Select Committee Hearing, a chartered civil engineer 
approached by Liverpool Corporation to locate a suitable reservoir site, revealed the 
flooding Bala had also been considered. Furthermore, he had reviewed the company 
archive which proved that a detailed examination of Cwm Tryweryn had taken place 
in the 1890s, when the site had allegedly first been considered as a proposed area for 
flooding.49 Finally, with the committee confident that a clause inserted in the Bill 
adequately addressed both compensation and re-establishment claims,50 its 
endorsement was given. The stage was now set for the Third and final Reading of the 
Tryweryn Reservoir Bill.
As speculation abounded as to what strategy those opposed to the measure 
might be preparing, news began to filter through media channels in London that the 
game was already well and truly over. On 27 July, the Western Mail reported that 
Welsh MPs - and particularly the Members for north Wales - now conceded that a 
final stand would be profitless.51 However, refusing to ‘roll over’, the following day, 
Gwynfor Evans explained the concerns of the Welsh nationalist community in a letter 
to Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. If an English majority ensured the Bill passed 
through Parliament, it would ‘do no more than to give a veneer of legality to an 
immoral act of aggression’, he stated. ‘It would be a declaration by the English 
majority in Parliament’, that it had ‘the power to destroy Wales’...whose 
powerlessness ‘to protect’ its communities and resources would be observed; 
resulting in it being at the mercy of ‘other corporations and bodies’. Moreover, ‘if
48 LDP, 4 July 1957. Twenty-four of the thirty-six Welsh MPs voted in opposition, the rest either 
abstained or were not present. Those absent included: Aneurin Bevan, Megan Lloyd George, Iori 
Thomas and the Conservative member for Cardiff North, David Llywellyn, who was the only Welsh 
MP vocal in his support o f the measure.
49 LDP, 19 July 1957.
50 Z-DF, 25 July 1957.
51 Evans, Fighting fo r  Wales, p.97.
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all legal and constitutional endeavour to defend the Welsh heritage were ignored, 
despite the unity and depth of Welsh conviction, the defence’ would ‘continue, but 
by other means’.52
Yet Gwynfor Evans also met with some hostility for ‘dragging of feet’ over 
the Tryweryn question. One such remonstrator was Raymond Edwards of Blaenau, 
who believed there were many things Plaid Cymru, with Evans as its leader, could 
have done, but instead, Meirionnydd ratepayers had ‘a debt of over £3,000 for putting 
up a defence to save the valley’. The only conclusion Edwards could draw, after 
learning of the weaknesses of men who claimed to be leaders of the Welsh people, 
was that Wales was dying; dying fast of a cancer of respectability and of white-collar 
talkers who were not prepared to lead the nation to freedom and prosperity.53 It was 
an accusation which Gwynfor Evans was to face several times more again in the 
years that followed and laid the bedrock for the militancy already beginning to 
foment.
On 31 July 1957, the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill was passed by Parliament by a 
majority of ninety six. The next day in the House of Lords, amid much rancour and 
recrimination among Welsh MPs opposed to the measure, Liverpool Corporation’s 
Tryweryn Bill received its Royal Assent and so became law.54
Two months later, despite the declared Parliamentary support for the Bill, a 
national conference was called by Alderman J. H. Morgan, the mayor of Cardiff, to 
discuss a motion proposed by Gwynfor Evans. With the editorial backing of the 
Western Mail, it was hoped that perhaps a breakthrough could be reached and that all 
parties could be brought to support it.55 In this alternative motion, Gwynfor Evans, to 
widespread consternation from within the ranks of Plaid Cymru, endorsed the 
drowning of Tryweryn, but crucially proposed to safeguard the village of Capel
52 NLW. Ymgyrchu - The Water Industry. Plaid Cymru Archive. M55. NLW.www.uk. Dafydd 
Evans rejected the suggestion his father had meant violence, although he may have been deliberately 
ambiguous. Rather, he believed Gwynfor Evans may have been considering a sit down protest as 
earlier undertaken at Trawsfynydd. Such a repeat would have prevented construction machinery 
entering Cwm Tryweryn. Telephone interview between WT & Dafydd Evans, 27 September 2005.
53 LDP, 1 August 1957. Saunders Lewis later also spelt out who he considered to blame for the 
Tryweryn saga: ‘It was dishonest to blame the Minister for Wales for not opposing the measure. 
Tryweryn was ‘our matter (Welsh people), our responsibility only’. One Wales, October, 2001.
54 LDP, 2 August 1957. Henry Brooke later rejected claims that his dual responsibly had impacted 
negatively upon the anti-flooding lobby. ‘It had been better for Wales that the country’s Minister was 
also the Minister o f Local Government’, he maintained, because in the dual role he ‘could state the 
Welsh case; or at least the case o f those opposing the Bill’. LDP, 1 August 1957.
55 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, pp. 180-183. The decision to draft the alternative proposal, Gwynfor 
Evans ‘later saw as unwise’. Evans, Sake o f  Wales, p. 130.
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Celyn; with assurances made to the Liverpool authority, that it would receive the 
same amount of water as stipulated in the original Bill. Having initially refused to 
meet the five man delegation - led by Huw T. Edwards, chairman of the Council for 
Wales and Monmouthshire - Liverpool Corporation finally relented.56 Nevertheless, 
just weeks after the Bill’s Third Reading, the slow trickle of villagers from Capel
en
Celyn began. The anger within the nationalist community was such that on 15 
October 1957, David Cole the editor of the Western Mail, wrote to Henry Brooke, 
forecasting a grim warning: that ‘the seeds of an Irish problem’ had been sown in 
Wales.58 How perilously close that prediction might have proved to be in the years 
that followed.
It was not long before the Conservative government saw a chance to redeem 
itself and to stem the tide of nationalist thinking. Just weeks after the letter from 
David Cole, Henry Brooke presented a cabinet paper calling for the building of a 
suspension bridge across the river Severn to combat, if not alleviate, ‘the deep and 
widespread distrust of the Government's attitude towards Wales’.59 Moreover, cabinet 
papers disclose that such had been the alarm felt within the government of political 
unrest in Wales, following its handling of the Tryweryn issue, that it had felt impelled 
to locate the huge strip mill at Llanwem rather than Grangemouth in Scotland. In a 
memorandum to the cabinet, the Chancellor of the Exchequer warned of the political 
consequences of siting the strip mill elsewhere. There was still ‘resentment in Wales 
over the support given by the Government to Liverpool’s Bill for flooding part of the 
Tryweryn Valley,’ Heathcote Amery declared. If the Government did not support the 
construction of the strip mill in Wales, ‘criticism’ would ‘be greatly intensified and 
Welsh nationalist feeling aroused...The dangers of such a situation’, Amery 
concluded sombrely, ‘must not be underrated’.60
Defeat over ‘Tryweryn’ was indeed received with grave foreboding by many 
in Wales. To Plaid Cymru and its President Gwynfor Evans, it merely demonstrated
56LDP, 29 October 1957; also, LRO, Llyn Celyn Reservoir News cuttings, 1957-71. Hq352.6CUT. 
The meeting was held in Cardiff on Monday, 25 October 1957. Liverpool Echo, 23 June 1958.
57 Telephone interview between WT & Eurgain Prysor Jones, 5 December 2006.
58 TNA, BD 24/2. Administration, 1951-62.
59 TNA, CAB 129/90, 30 October - 31 December 1957. In the memorandum, dated 15 November 
1957, Henry Brooke stated that politically speaking, Wales was ‘presently, very disturbed’; yet 
nevertheless, his decision to advise parliament to support the Liverpool Tryweryn Bill had been ‘quite 
unavoidable’. Truth to tell, Brooke added, ‘many people in Wales’ were inclined to say that the Prime 
Minister may have chosen ‘a well-intentioned man to be the Minister for Welsh Affairs’, but that since 
his appointment, ‘things had turned out badly for Wales’.
60 Western Mail, 2 January 1989.
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how benighted the central parties were in recognising and defending the cultural, 
environmental and linguistic identity and interests of Wales. Nonetheless, with the 
constitutional battle lost, those opposed to the construction of a reservoir at Cwm 
Tryweryn, licked their wounds, took stock and vowed solemnly to carry on the fight.
Division threatens Plaid Cymru
For the wider nationalist community of Wales, it was obvious that the so-called 
democratic process had proved a disingenuous vessel on which to expect reasoned 
argument. This was typified, they believed, on 5 February 1958, when, following two 
months of apparent deliberation, Liverpool Corporation confirmed that it had decided 
to proceed with its Tryweryn scheme, following what it termed, ‘careful and 
sympathetic consideration to the suggested alternative sources put forward (by the 
deputation) from the Cardiff conference’.61 Whether resigned to defeat, or blinded by 
the lure of indirect financial gain from the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn, Meirionnydd 
County Council also refused to support the alternative motion.62 It was a decision 
which caused fragmentation within the ranks of the party faithful in Plaid Cymru
If it seemed to many - including influential Plaid Cymru member Elystan 
Morgan - that Gwynfor Evans had done ‘everything he could...(and) everything he 
could think o f  to try and stop Liverpool Corporation from digging a watery grave for
63Capel Celyn, others were quick to take a very different view. Evans they denounced 
was ‘a traitor’, who had been ‘ready to compromise with Liverpool’. The ambitious 
politician, too craven and respectable to go to prison for a Welsh-speaking 
community.64 Nevertheless, with work at the site still to begin, Plaid Cymru was at 
pains to prove that the Tryweryn issue would not be relinquished quite so easily. On 
16 February, following a meeting of the party executive in Dolgellau, a statement was 
released which declared it outrageous that at a time of financial stringency, one 
English municipality was to spend on one scheme in Meirionnydd, more than the total 
sum allocated annually by Whitehall for the entire educational needs of Wales. Its 
confident prediction that a one day strike by Welsh miners and steelworkers ‘could
61 LRO. Liverpool Corporation Water Committee Minutes, 352MINAVTR/1/69. p.l 1.
62 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 183.
63 Gwynfor. Yr Aelod Dros Gymru? BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005. The 
view was identically expressed by former Capel Celyn resident Eurgain Prysor Jones. Interview with 
WT, 18 June 2010. Also by Gethin ap Iestyn. Interview with WT, 21 August 2010.
64 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 161.
39
change the Tryweryn situation overnight’65 was met with predictable derision. A 
response in the Western Mail two days later to the call for a strike was not 
encouraging. Its editorial declared that ‘such action as the Welsh Nationalists are now 
advocating, would merely be a piece of futile industrial vandalism’. It could result in 
bitterness; harm two important industries and take money from the pockets of the 
workers involved.66
With the Bill’s passage through the parliamentary judicial process at an end, 
any hope that Gwynfor Evans harboured that the most challenging period of his 
political career to date was now behind him was quickly dispelled. Calls for the party 
leader to carry out some measure of illegal action, prevalent in certain quarters before 
the Third Reading, now reached a crescendo; and the spectre of Saunders Lewis, the 
man held in reverential awe by many of the party faithful, loomed ever large. 
Speaking in 2008, Gareth Miles, a former member of Plaid Cymru and Welsh 
language campaigner, remembered how the party leader’s indecision over direct 
action had caused much resentment, as a belief had permeated among many in the 
party, ‘that the Plaid Cymru leadership would carry out a symbolic act, as had 
happened at Penyberth’.67
In a speech at the National Eisteddfod in Ebbw Vale in August, Saunders 
Lewis, called once more for Plaid Cymru to adopt a policy of ‘direct action’. If that 
was not designed to embarrass the party hierarchy, his suggestion that his eventual 
successor as party president Gwynfor Evans was ‘too much of a coward’ to venture 
along that path, confirmed his status as chief thorn in the side of the nationalist party 
of Wales.68 The Plaid Cymru executive was quick to respond. On 9 August, having 
received constant calls from a number within the party to endorse ‘illegal action’, J. E. 
Jones, the Plaid Cymru General Secretary, announced that there now remained no 
practical method of freeing Tryweryn from the grasp of Liverpool Corporation. ‘We 
have lost a battle’, he declared ruefully, ‘now we must win a war’.69 The ‘war’ in 
question, it was widely supposed, was - at last - parliamentary representation.
In an interview with the Western Mail in October 1958, Huw T. Edwards, who 
had recently resigned as chairman of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire in
65 WM, 17 February 1958.
66 WM, 18 February 1958.
67 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008.
68 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 187.
69 Merthyr Express, 9 August 1958.
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protest at the government’s failure to deliver a Secretary of State for Wales, angrily 
responded to Liverpool Corporation’s rejection of all attempts to reconsider its 
decision. ‘Liverpool’, he declared, had asked for ‘whatever was coming to it’. The 
Tryweryn issue would not be forgotten in Wales; he was convinced that many 
thousands of Welshmen would be prepared to make sacrifices, including 
imprisonment, if it might prevent Liverpool from ‘getting away’ with its action. 
Threats made against the Mersey Tunnel should not be taken lightly.70 Yet, one man 
quick to discount himself from the fight was Saunders Lewis. In a letter to D. J. 
Williams, Lewis hoped to see ‘another Penyberth’. However, as for personal 
involvement, he himself would be ready to break the law, were it not for his ‘cares’
71and his wife, ‘Margaret’s opposition’.
79After returning invigorated from a publicity tour of America, the Plaid 
Cymru president decided to ‘up the ante’ over the party’s handling of the Tryweryn 
crisis. He now resolved to lead a campaign of civil disobedience. Just days into the 
new year, the Plaid Cymru executive passed a resolution proposing that ‘passive 
resistance’ be taken ‘at Tryweryn when the time’ came. Others soon followed Evans’ 
lead, with Elystan Morgan proposing the party should take ‘firm action’ with a ‘self- 
sacrificing’ edge to it.73 The militant wing of Plaid Cymru was thrilled. Speaking in 
2008, Emrys Roberts threw light on how far the party leadership was prepared to stray 
from its chosen path. Having been persuaded to join Plaid Cymru’s staff as deputy 
secretary to J. E. Jones, Gwynfor Evans further requested that Roberts organise direct 
action, perhaps even in Liverpool, to try and prevent the drowning of Cwm Tryweryn. 
Roberts readily agreed. One thing however was sacrosanct: nothing would be done 
which might endanger human life. Other than that, Roberts was offered no 
explanation as to what form direct action should take. It felt, he later revealed, like 
having been given ‘a clean slate’.74
Yet, Dewi Watkin Powell (the senior barrister and Plaid Cymru executor)
70 WM, 16 October 1958.
71 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 187.
72 TNA, BD 25/59. File entitled: Miscellaneous Welsh Bodies: Plaid Cymru 1958 - 1973. In Boston, 
Gwynfor Evans spoke to an audience o f hundreds at Harvard’s famous Law School. In a further twist 
o f fate - and unknown to Evans - Henry Brooke’s son attended. If G. Evans felt the meeting was a 
resounding success, Peter Brooke disagreed. It had been, he reported to his father: ‘mad, quite mad’. 
This, Brooke senior later wrote, was typical o f the response he received in relation to other meetings 
Evans addressed.
73 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, pp. 189, 190.
74 Telephone interview between WT & Emrys Roberts, 18 January 2008.
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attacked the party (and perhaps by association the party leader) for having a 
‘pathological and pathetic fixation’ over the adoption of direct action and perhaps the 
wider Tryweryn issue. Despite the valiant determination of the Plaid Cymru leader to 
appear unaffected, the stinging rebuke from the man he held in high esteem had struck 
a nerve. It forced a revision in Evans’ thinking and a reconstruction of his view.75
As if to remind the life-long pacifist leader what might be at stake, eight days 
later, police in Liverpool stated that ‘powerful blasting powder’ from a north Wales 
explosives factory, had been used in the assembling of a home-made bomb, found in 
the city two days before. Following an anonymous telephone call, the device was 
found in an office of the Federation of Building Trades Employers. It had been 
planted in a hollowed out loaf of bread and placed within a case also containing two 
bottles of petrol. It was here that many of the workers employed at the Tryweryn 
reservoir construction site signed on. With the police becoming increasingly 
concerned, a further two ‘bomb’ warnings were received. In each instance, 
anonymous telephone calls declared that a device had been planted both at Speke 
Airport and in an electrical components factory in the Broadgreen area of the city. 
Following intensive inspections at each of the sites, nothing was found.76 The identity 
of those responsible has never been established.
Perhaps in response to these events and to Emrys Roberts’ dismay, Gwynfor 
Evans had a change of heart. With Evans’ fourteen-year leadership beginning to 
flounder, at a meeting of the Plaid Cymru sub-committee in Dolgellau - without the 
wider party’s consultation - it was decided to make a U-turn and reject support for a 
law-breaking campaign. There would be no action, no repeat of Penyberth.77 The 
party did not decide that, remarked Roberts curtly in 2008, ‘Gwynfor did’.78 
Somewhat surprisingly, and perhaps uppermost in Evans’ mind, those party members 
most opposed to the use of direct action, were party activists in Meirionnydd.79 
Despite the anger at Evans’ apparent reversion, it was a decision widely endorsed by 
many in the party, who were now, more than ever, determined that the only route to
75 Evans, Portrait o f  Patriot, p. 190.
76 WM, 29 January 1959.
77 Gwynfor: Yr Aelod Dros Gymru, BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005. The 
meeting o f the ‘select few’ was held at the Golden Lion hotel in Dolgellau on 31 January 1959. WM, 2 
February 1959. It has since been described as ‘a vital moment in Welsh nationalist history’. Evans, 
Portrait o f  Patriot, p. 191.
78 Telephone interview between WT & Emrys Roberts, 18 January 2008.
79 John Davies, Transactions o f  the Merioneth History Society, 1999 (vol. XIII, part II); also, Gwynfor: 
The Member fo r  Wales? BBC Wales Production. Screened BBC 1 Wales, May 2005.
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parliamentary success lay with continuing along the path of constitutional politics. 
Speaking in 2003, Dewi Watkin Powell remained certain that the leader’s action had 
proved vital in ensuring the party’s tree would one day bear electoral fruit.80 
However, Gareth Miles later remembered the keen sense of betrayal. He could recall 
reading the banner headline in the Western Mail which marked the event: ‘Plaid 
Cymru volte-face on Tryweryn’.81
If those on the militant wing of the party dismissed the party leader as 
toothless, those loyal to Evans believed his action to be correct. Gwynfor Evans had 
recognised his target. It was Liberal, rural Wales. If the party was ever to pose a 
serious, credible threat, Evans knew he needed the vote of the chapel-going Welsh- 
speakers; a group unlikely to be won over by direct action. As a result, he set about 
diluting the party’s ultra-nationalist message. He also recognised the restrictions of 
the party’s purely cultural image, of its all too easy depiction in the unionist-based 
media, both national-and-British based, as a linguistic, inconsequential oddity. As a 
result, he began the process of broadening the party’s appeal.
This was not the only U-tum Evans made in the spring of 1959. In an attempt 
to seize both control of the Plaid Cymru and to ensure it remained steady on its 
constitutional course, he proposed that the party seek to establish a partnership with 
Liverpool Corporation.82 Evans now proposed, in a document hammered out by Dewi 
Watkin Powell, J. E. Jones and he, that Meirionnydd should receive ‘some profit from 
its water once Tryweryn had been drowned’.83 A number of other criteria were also 
put forward. These included that the workers involved in the construction of the dam 
would be Welsh; that the workers to be employed at the site - once it had become 
operational - would be Welsh and a Tryweryn Water Board, with its headquarters in 
Bala, would be established affording equal representation to Liverpool City Council 
and Penllyn Rural Council.84 Six months later, having apparently deliberated for eight 
months as to the feasibility of adopting some, if not all, of the measures in Tryweryn - 
New Proposals, the document was rejected out of hand by both Liverpool City
80 Terfysgwyr Tryweryn. S4C Production, 2003. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
81 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008.
82 One Wales, September 2001, p.67.
83 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 192.
84 WM, 23 March 1959. In response to Tryweryn - New Proposals, on 24 June 1963, a meeting was 
held between Gwynfor Evans and Minister for Welsh Affairs, Keith Joseph. The matters discussed, 
ranged from ‘the development and control o f water resources in Wales, with particular reference to 
Tryweryn’ and ‘the possibility o f treating Wales as a single entity for commercial television’. TNA, 
BD 25/59. File entitled: Miscellaneous Welsh Bodies: Plaid Cymru 1958 -1973.
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Council and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing.85
This new set of proposals undermined all the party’s nationalistic rhetoric: 
which demanded political recognition for Wales and the inalienable right for its 
people to control their own land and resources.86 A consequence of the party leader’s 
action was yet further fragmentation within the ranks of the party faithful. Two 
opposing camps now emerged, with the constitutional wing of the party and those 
who advocated ‘direct action’ determined to gain the upper hand. To many, Evans 
was the tireless campaigner, wholly committed to safeguarding the interests of the 
community of Tryweryn; the pragmatist, who recognised that only through 
constitutional means could the party advance. To others, however, Evans was to 
blame for what was seen as Plaid Cymru’s rudderless coasting between 1956 and 
1959. It was due, they contested, to the party leader’s inability to formalise a solid, 
aggressive and effective political dogma; furthermore, Plaid’s age old pacifist 
traditions appeared increasingly ‘old hat’.87 They maintained that a more forthright, 
less homespun, dogmatic direction was needed, to meet and combat the pressures of 
the nuclear, post-colonial age. The fall out from Evans’ decision threatened the very 
survival of Plaid Cymru, as internal denigration threatened to tear the party apart.
Whether stung by the backlash caused by the bitter Plaid Cymru in-fighting, 
disheartened by its efforts to prevent the Tryweryn Bill becoming law, or distracted 
by alleged dirty tricks employed by the Labour Party,88 at the General Election called 
for 8 October 1959,89 Gwynfor Evans, standing as the Plaid Cymru parliamentary 
candidate for Meirionnydd received just 22.9 percent of the vote. Despite it being the 
party’s best showing of the night, it was to be, Evans was later to recall, ‘the election 
result which was the most bitterly disappointing of all’.90 Crucially, the party’s share 
of the vote was virtually identical to the result the party president had polled in the 
same seat four years earlier.91 It was a firm indication that despite efforts to smooth 
its political edge, the Welsh electorate remained impervious to Plaid Cymru’s core
85 One Wales, September 2001.
86 Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot, p. 192.
87 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 16 March 2004; also interview between WT 
& David Walters, 29 December 2008. In the immediate post-war period, following ‘a conflict which 
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88 Evans, Sake o f  Wales, p. 142.
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mandate. Nonetheless, at the national Eisteddfod that summer, the party was given a 
welcome lift to its morale, when angered at what he considered to be the central 
political party’s dragging of feet over the question of self-government for Wales, Huw 
T. Edwards resigned from the Labour Party and announced he was joining Plaid 
Cymru.92
A more radical generation
The start of the 1960s saw Plaid Cymru attract a more radical generation of 
nationalists. With an entrenched belief that strong-arm tactics were needed to further 
the political advance of the party, this ‘new blood’ refused to blindly accept the 
autocratic, ‘Messianic’ leadership of Gwynfor Evans.93 In 2008, Gareth Miles 
reasserted how emotive the issue of Tryweryn remained, as a burgeoning militant 
wing of the party now emerged. It was not only intent to fight ‘the establishment’ and 
to create confrontation between itself and the British state, but also to reject the 
compromises that Gwynfor and Plaid Cymru had been involved in; ‘and which had 
failed’.94 Unlike Saunders Lewis, declared Owain Williams in 2005, Evans ‘had no 
vision’ at Tryweryn.95 It was Lewis, he argued, who in taking action twenty years 
before, had ‘led the way’, by sacrificing so much.96
To others however, any such repeat was seen as nothing more than futile 
histrionics. Despite its rightful position at the head of Welsh nationalist protest, 
‘Penyberth’ they argued, had achieved ultimately very little: what use was Evans 
languishing in prison to the tentative development of Plaid Cymru as an applicable, 
constitutional force? The time had come to severe the party’s umbilical link with 
Penyberth, they believed; events had surely proved that the party should now 
concentrate on ‘serious politics’. His apparent rejection by Evans and those on the 
right of the party hit Saunders Lewis hard. In a BBC interview broadcast in May 
1961, Lewis reflected mournfully to having had ‘no small desire to change the history 
of Wales’. To change ‘the whole course’ of its history, and to make Welsh Wales
92 Butt, Welsh Question, p.78.
93 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008. ‘Gwynfor’s politics were all 
emotion based; his ‘fits all’ approach antagonised many. It was a narrow-minded, middle class, 
romantic view o f Wales; very prone to high rhetoric. Saunders Lewis said it how it was: in order to 
achieve anything of value you had to break the law’.
94 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 14 October 2008. ‘We were young, romantic and 
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95 Gwynfor: Yr Aelod Dros Gymrul BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005.
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‘lively, strong and powerful’; belonging ‘to the modem World’. He had, he remarked 
dolefully, ‘failed completely’.97
The constitutional battle to save Tryweryn had sent ripples of resentment 
across the waves to Canada. Angry at what he perceived to be the arrogant legal 
pilfering taking place across the Atlantic, Owain Williams, from the Lleyn Peninsula 
in north Wales, living and working in the tough, uncompromising logging camps of 
British Columbia, resigned himself to return to Wales and to act in the defence of his 
homeland. At the close of 1959 - eighteen months after leaving - Williams arrived 
back in north Wales and along with financial support from his father, ploughed his 
hard-earned savings into opening a cafe in Pwllheli.98 Having barely readjusted to life 
on the Lleyn Peninsula, Williams began to make tentative inquiries as to who might 
be ‘interested in taking this to the limit’. A long-standing friend of Williams, John 
Albert Jones, responded positively. Having been invalided out of the RAF, due to a 
car accident in which he sustained head injuries, the unemployed Jones was a frequent 
visitor to Williams’ Espresso cafe. Over the many coming months, Williams and the 
former RAF policeman discussed the Tryweryn issue with increased resolve.99
The situation was agitated by a letter published in Y Faner. Enigmatically 
penned ‘Cymro’, it ‘openly called for insurrection’, so opined the Western Mail, with 
its message that the time had come to act against the ‘continual attacks on the Welsh 
nation from London’. Furthermore, a revolutionary movement was needed, with no 
connection to Plaid Cymru, to symbolise both inside and outside Wales, a form of 
strong, effective and if necessary, illegal protest, to counter the things that were being 
done by the government against the soul of Cymru. It would be a secret movement: 
whereby small units, or cells, comprised of three or four members, would remain 
unknown to another unit or cell. Each would be organised and led in their actions by a 
‘small national chief council’; it would be a secret movement in the truest sense of the 
word. Members of the movement would swear to act in the ‘only way’ that London 
understood. Moreover, it would resist actively anything the government might do, 
which would immorally prostitute the will of the people of Wales, either through
97 Planet, No. 53, Oct/Nov 1985, p. 9. Interview televised, 19 May 1961.
98 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. While in Canada, Williams read with 
increasing frustration accounts o f the struggle to save Cwm Tryweryn, in Welsh language newspapers 
posted from home. TNA, DPP 2/4471; also, Owain Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn (Caernarfon, 1979), 
p.9. Williams later claimed that he had in fact returned to Wales in the summer o f 1960.
99 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams 15 April 2007. At this juncture, as a means of 
gaining access, Williams and J. A. Jones attempted to get work at the Tryweryn site by pretending to be
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action or by ignoring its wishes. The only choice remaining, the article soberly 
concluded, was either to struggle, or face annihilation.100
For Emyr Llewelyn Jones, an eighteen-year-old undergraduate student at 
Aberystwyth University, the entire Tryweryn issue had proved unedifying. Having 
watched as a schoolboy the Bill successfully pass through the legislative process, only 
one conclusion could be drawn: the time had come to prevent another such drowning 
of a Welsh valley from ever happening again. Speaking in September 2003, Jones 
remembered the sense of outrage which many young Welsh nationalists had felt as the 
drama unfolded: people, he discerned, had forgotten that there was a community there, 
which had taken thousands of years to create. By that, he meant its ‘cultural 
atmosphere’. People talked of environmental concerns, but what of a ‘spiritual 
environment’, which encompasses the ‘values and culture within which people live?’. 
It seemed to Jones that ‘everybody acknowledged that an injustice had been done’. 
He and other like-minded students had felt compelled to say ‘that’s enough; you draw 
a line here; we’re not going to allow this kind of thing to happen again’.101
With such a vehement belief that Wales was suffering once again at the hands 
of its neighbour, it was not to be long before the practicalities of what action might be 
taken, began to hit home. ‘Everybody’ recalled Jones ‘was talking about it; and 
everybody was talking about doing something about it’. Yet, he and other concurring 
students we were aware of the question - ‘how do you fight the power of the modem, 
centralised state? ’.102
Gwilym Tudur Jones, a fellow student at Aberystwyth, returned from a visit to 
his home town of Pwllheli, with news that a certain twenty-seven-year-old coffee bar 
owner, had decided to strike a blow in the name of Welsh nationhood. A regular 
visitor to Owain Williams’ cafe during visits home from university, he in turn 
informed Williams that embittered by the drowning of Tryweryn, a number of 
students in Aberystwyth had all but decided to act. One such person was Emyr 
Llewelyn Jones.103
Speaking in 1969, Owain Williams was under no misapprehension as to where 
the blame lay for the rise in militant thinking. The ‘origins of underground, or semi­
Irish construction workers, Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn, p.27.
100 WM, 7 July 1960. John Jenkins later denied writing the letter. Interview between WT & John 
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underground organisations in Wales’, he asserted, could be ‘traced back to 
disillusionment with Plaid Cymru and its handling of the Tryweryn issue’; especially 
among ‘younger people’. Through perhaps their most formative political years, these 
people had watched the party stagnate. This younger element were ‘fed-up with so- 
called constitutional means of asking, bowing, scraping and grovelling’. They had 
instead decided: “we want this, we want that and we’re going to go out and get it”. 
They considered this the only way it had been achieved in other countries and so 
reasoned ‘it was time to do the same in Wales’.104 Emyr Llywelyn Jones also believed 
that Plaid Cymru’s spineless appeasement of Tryweryn had much to answer for. The 
flooding of Tryweryn symbolized ‘the social, economic, linguistic and cultural 
oppression of the Welsh nation’. Yet, having stated such, the party hierarchy then 
‘turned its back’ on the issue. Unsurprisingly, there had permeated, ‘a feeling of 
disappointment and anger. Something’, declared Jones, ‘had to be done’.105
These were not the only young Welshmen affected. Speaking anonymously 
in Llangollen in 1969, Marcus Gale, an ex-member of the Free Wales Army 
remembered how attempts, ten or so years before, had been made to contact other 
like-minded individuals in the town In those days, he did not belong to the FWA, but 
rather the WFA: the Welsh Freedom Army. There had been about three members of 
the group in the beginning, but this had ‘later increased to five’. Having decided to 
expand, use was made of a printing press; cards bearing the slogans: ‘Resist English 
Rule in Wales: WFA’, were printed off and distributed throughout various villages 
and towns. These cards had then been dropped off in public houses; placed under beer 
mats; in people’s pockets; in telephone kiosks; libraries; book shops, stuffed in 
between the leaves of the books...anywhere where people would find them.
As a result, ‘things usually happened’, such as an outbreak of slogan daubing. 
The WFA was usually able to trace these activists. The group reasoned the people 
responsible would be young people; probably from nationalist families, so they made 
use of a booklet called The Saint David’s Day Fund, which, while published by Plaid 
Cymru, also listed the names and addresses of subscribers to the fund. Consequently, 
whenever an outbreak occurred, the WFA would visit the place of the slogan-daubing 
and contact the families living in the area named in the publication. Purporting to be
103 Ibid.
104 Week In Week Out - Story o f  the FWA. BBC Wales Production. Screened BBC1 Wales, 3 July 
1969.
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reporters from the Welsh Nation, (the Plaid Cymru periodical) they would then inform 
those gathered who they really were. The strategy had often been successful, many 
times resulting ‘in a new company’ being formed. The WFA had been serious about 
its political objectives, it hadn’t got a set idea about what it was going to do, but the 
group knew ‘it just had to do something’. The main thing was ‘just to get organized’, 
in the belief that ‘something’ in the coming two or three years would happen.106
Speaking in 2006, Lyn Ebenezer recalled how the idea of a Free Wales Army 
was conceived. There had been a Free Wales Army before, but only in name. People 
like Harri Webb and Mike Stephens were writing songs about it, but he didn’t believe 
that there was any group as such. It was ‘people like Dai Bonar Thomas who seemed 
to be the bridge between those like Harri Webb and others who eventually joined like 
Cayo Evans’. He remembered Bonar Thomas at the Cardiff Eisteddfod in 1960, 
chatting about forming the FWA. He had been in the same crowd as Harri Webb and 
others from the Uplands in Swansea. The next thing he knew, Bonar Thomas was 
part of ‘Cayo’s set-up’.107 As the idea of a Free Wales Army began to gather 
momentum in the years that followed, the avuncular Dai Bonar Thomas introduced 
Cayo Evans to another passionate nationalist from Llangennech, the irrepressible 
Denis Coslett.108
It was at this time, that Cayo Evans, heavily steeped in the folk music, culture 
and history of Ireland, began to ponder the question of his own national identity. Lyn 
Ebenezer later recalled the day he met for the first time, the man who was to have 
such a profound effect on his life. Having attended a YFC speaking competition, 
Ebenezer had visited the adjoining pub. Sat on a bar stool and playing ‘Irish rebel 
songs’ on his accordion, was Cayo Evans. ‘I’ve got a nasty feeling that I was 
responsible for turning him into what he became you know’, Ebenezer declared. 
‘Because he was on about the Irish all the time; Ireland this and Ireland that. I
remember telling him - it was a risky thing to do! Why the hell don’t you do more
about your own country? And he said, “there’s bugger all here: there’s no-one here 
willing to stand”. So I said, well now’s your chance, come on’.109
During the same August that Ebenezer and Evans forged their friendship, the
105 Terfysgwyr Tryweryn, S4C Production. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
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work began to ready Cwm Tryweryn for flooding, as the construction site became 
operational.110 It was not the only cause of alarm for some in Wales. The following 
month, it was announced that Swansea Corporation planned to construct a reservoir in 
Cwm Gwendraeth Fach near the village of Llangyndeym in Carmarthenshire.111 Once 
more corporate insensitivity, albeit this time by a Welsh authority, threatened to 
escalate into unrestrained protest, as local people reacted with anger at the proposal to 
flood their homes. With memories of the failed campaign waged by the various 
branches of the Tryweryn Defence Committee still fresh in the mind, Plaid Cymru 
saw the opportunity to redeem itself by providing clear and focused leadership. 
However, fearing that the presence and involvement of the Plaid hierarchy might 
politicise the campaign and ultimately do more harm than good, those orchestrating 
the campaign at a local level, begged Gwynfor Evans to stay away.112
On 27 January 1961, the last goods train from Bala to Blaenau Ffestiniog 
stopped at Capel Celyn.113 Undaunted by the rejection of the Llangyndeym Defence 
Committee to assist its campaign, a faction within Plaid Cymru remained as 
determined as ever - if  not to prevent the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn - to at least 
hinder progress at the site. Despite Gwynfor Evans’ U-tum, Emrys Roberts set about 
his task of organising a campaign of action in response to the flooding of Cwm 
Tryweryn with typical vigour. As the construction work at the site continued at pace, 
in an action plan, the Blaid Deputy Secretary and 1960 parliamentary candidate for 
Ebbw Vale, proposed that progress at the site could be hindered through adopting any 
one of three strategies. The first was violent action of a destructive nature; with the 
intention of causing such a disturbance that extra police, possibly troops, would have 
to be called in to deal with it. The second, was to try to make the construction of the 
dam so costly for the contractors that they would either refuse to carry on, or 
Liverpool would find it impossible to raise the necessary capital. The third was to
109 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer 16 June 2006.
110 Guardian, 8 October 1965. Work began to develop the site on the 2 August.
111 Carmarthen Journal, 30 September 1960.
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take direct action, then hunger strike in prison.114 As for the timing of the proposed 
action, Roberts added that he had decided to take action over Tryweryn that summer. 
A response to the clarion call soon arrived, as party member and poet Harri Webb 
stated that ‘psychologically’, he was prepared for anything: ‘jail, disruption of 
personal life, hardship - the lot. I am on ‘active service’, he declared earnestly; he had 
been ‘called up’.115
Six months later, with Gwynfor Evans seriously considering his position as 
party leader, a motion that the party adopt and support a policy of ‘direct action’ was 
again proposed at the Plaid Cymru annual conference.116 Its most notable advocate 
was a faction calling itself the Belle Vue group, named after the Aberystwyth hotel 
where, it is believed, the decision was taken by those gathered, to adopt the use of 
force when confronted by ‘acts of aggression, such as Tryweryn’.117 The conference 
became a battle for the very soul of the party, as the principal debate of whether to 
support direct action threatened to shatter Evans’ leadership once and for all. 
Speaking in 2008, Emrys Roberts recalled how Plaid Cymru officials had attempted 
to placate those party members calling for a programme of militant action. With a 
number of plots being considered and the names of those prepared to undertake some 
measure of direct action about to be taken, a party member had approached R. Tudor 
Jones (Plaid Cymru Vice-President) suggesting that such a policy was contrary to that 
endorsed by the Plaid Cymru executive some months before. The vote, declared R. T. 
Jones, was merely being taken to appease the party’s more reactionary members and 
the Plaid Cymru executive had no intention of supporting such a measure. The 
remark had left Roberts feeling uneasy. He considered such a strategy to be 
dishonest; nevertheless, it typified the division which had enveloped the party.118
Speaking in 2005, Elystan Morgan remained confident that the contribution he 
made that day in Llangollen, had served the party well and had stood it in good stead 
for the years which followed. If it was not for Penyberth, he had declared, there 
would be no nationalist party of Wales, he agreed. Yet, if it carried on as if it were in
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the same era, as a faction rather than a constitutional group, it would have no future as 
a parliamentary party.119 Gwynfor Evans, ‘fearful that it could get out of hand’, also 
opposed the motion.120 His party supported him and his leadership - at least for the 
time being - was unassailable. To Cynog Dafis, the Plaid Cymru MP, the decision of 
the hall to support the party leader reflected the party’s coming of age.121 To many, 
Gwynfor Evans had led Plaid Cymru kicking and screaming into the ranks of mature 
political thinking. Finally, after years of pains-staking devotion to his task, the 
charismatic captain had ensured that the party now posed a more credible electoral 
threat to the three central political parties in Wales. Saunders Lewis never forgave 
him. He believed that Evans had sold Plaid Cymru down the river, it had lost its aura; 
it had betrayed its mystique by clambering to be seen as acceptable to white-collar 
Wales and middle England.
Unsurprisingly, with the Tryweryn issue uppermost in the minds of most 
nationalist students, the valley’s impending drowning became the subject of much 
discussion at the country’s foremost seats of academic learning, most notably, or so 
the police believed, at Aberystwyth.122 Speaking in 2003, Wyn Morris a retired 
Special Branch detective, suggested that much of the nature of these discussions had 
been unlawful and that lecturers had been all but complicit in their encouragement of 
students to actively involve themselves in felonious protest action. He believed that 
there was a ‘gang of about two dozen’ involved. Being with ‘the secret police’, most 
of his work had involved trying to find out who these people were. However, also 
speaking in 2003, Emyr Llywelyn Jones rejected Morris’s comments. He admitted 
that there were lecturers at Aberystwyth who would ‘talk about it and discuss it’, but 
nothing was organised and the idea that students had somehow been indoctrinated by 
the staff was quite wrong.123
Seeking clarity and perhaps even instruction, Jones and a small number of 
other like-minded students approached Plaid Cymru Deputy Secretary Emrys Roberts. 
Their question was unambiguous: did the Plaid Cymru executive have an action plan 
up its sleeve, to protest against the flooding of the valley? Roberts replied truthfully 
that he could not see the party leadership either endorsing or undertaking anything,
119 Gwynfor: Yr A elodD ros Gymru? BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005.
120 Telephone interview between WT & Dafydd Evans, 19 October 2005.
121 Gwynfor: Member fo r  Wales? BBC Wales Production. Screened April 2005.
122 Terfysgwyr Tryweryn, S4C Production. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
123 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 13 September 2003.
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which might hamper the party’s constitutional ambition. Nevertheless, sympathetic 
with Jones’ belief that a strike undertaken across generational lines would indeed have 
more clout, he suggested he contact Saunders Lewis. Among the Plaid hierarchy, 
declared Emyr Llywelyn Jones in 2005, it had been Emrys Roberts who was 
recognised as being most favourable to the young people of the party, those 
dissatisfied with its position and itching for change.
Towards the close of 1961, Saunders Lewis received two visitors to his 
Penarth home. One of them, Emyr Llywelyn Jones, a student with a growing 
reputation for academic attainment, respectfully attempted to ‘sound Lewis out’ as to 
his view on undertaking a peaceful protest at the Tryweryn site. A number of 
students, Jones added, had decided ‘to do something at Tryweryn’, and that its impact 
might be increased, should more respectable people, from an older generation also be 
involved. According to Jones, Saunders Lewis listened in silence, before declaring his 
belief that any such action would prove futile. To his credit, remarked Jones, ‘he told 
us to go back to college: that it would be a pity to waste our young lives over this. 
Were I in his shoes today, I would say the same’.124
If Emyr Llywelyn Jones was disappointed by Saunders Lewis’s reaction, it did 
not quell his enthusiasm to continue with his plans. Within months, a reconnoitre of 
the site had begun.125 Another figure emerges from the shadows at this time. For one 
demobbed national serviceman, the two years spent in the RAF had proved an eye 
opener in more ways than one. For the first time, Toni Lewis, who by the decade’s 
end had risen to enjoy a position of some prominence on the nationalist stage of 
Wales, had begun to question his own national heritage and cultural identity. Within 
weeks of leaving the Air Force, he visited the Plaid Cymru office in Cardiff. With an 
assortment of literature to be digested, Lewis spent all his free time either learning 
Welsh, making his way through the material handed to him by Plaid Cymru officials, 
or reading books which focused solely upon the historical journey of his homeland. It
was through Plaid Cymru party channels that Lewis was introduced to a magazine
126entitled Cilmery Centrepoint; distributed by Harri Webb and Emrys Roberts.
While attending the Plaid Cymru summer conference in Fishguard in 1964, 
Lewis met 17-year-old Keith Griffiths from Bridgend. Griffiths was an aspiring,
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intelligent young radical, with a swarthy appearance and passionate nature. Uneasy 
with the English resonance of his name, within weeks it had been Cymricized to
177  • •Gethin ap Iestyn. Following discussions with ap Iestyn, Toni Lewis’ political and 
spiritual allegiance was assured. The nation was in need of another society opined the 
two subversives, especially established to confront the contemptuous attitude to Wales 
and Welshness which seemed to permeate seamlessly throughout the more anglicised 
region of the south east industrial belt. Finally, declared Toni Lewis in May 2004, 
‘we had our perspective’. Having started the Owain Glyndwr Society, he then 
established the Llywelyn Society. Able to print and distribute hundreds of the 
society’s cards and literature, it was not long before the mysterious material found in 
telephone boxes and elsewhere throughout the county, came to the attention of the 
police. ‘They didn’t like our societies at all’, chuckled Lewis. ‘They kept trying to 
find us and discover where we were getting our funds from’. It was ‘preposterous’, 
because the printer belonged to Lewis. There was only the two of them, but the idea 
that there were many involved proved ‘highly successful’. Soon, with the ruse 
gathering momentum, the idea of forming a Free Wales Army began to develop. A 
motif was soon decided. It would be, declared Plaid Cymru activist Harri Webb, the 
fabled White Eagle of Snowdonia.128
It was not just Plaid Cymru that was changing, so too was the nation itself, as 
many of the country’s traditional mores were swept away on the tide of modernity. As 
the world began to dance to a different tune, the ‘grand old man’ of nationalist politics 
in Wales was not finished yet. Frustrated by what he regarded as the party’s rejection 
of civil disobedience, in a letter to D. J. Williams on 15 January 1962, Saunders Lewis 
spelt out the historical antithesis towards the Welsh language; and his vision for what 
was now needed to ensure its very survival. Centuries of political tradition, and the 
economic tendencies of the age, had contrived to undermine the survival of ‘y 
Gymraeg’, he declared, ‘nothing could change this, but determination, will, struggle, 
sacrifice and effort’.129
Consternation was raised following the 1961 census, which revealed that the 
number able to speak the language had declined to just 26 percent of the population.
127 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009. G. ap Iestyn first toyed with Ceith 
following a discussion with Trefor Morgan’s wife. He also revealed that he and Lewis were arrested 
for pulling down Union Jacks during the Eisteddfod and that Pedr Lewis ensured their release from 
police custody.
128 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
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One strategy deployed to see its legal status enhanced, was to ride two on a bicycle. 
Realising that such action would result in a summons, attention could then be drawn to 
the fact that it had been served only in English.130 Yet, if a solitary event can be seen 
as the catalyst for the change in the legal and administrative fortunes of the Welsh 
language, it occurred during the evening of 13 February 1962. In a paper for the BBC 
Wales Annual Radio Lecture, Saunders Lewis emerged from romantic seclusion and 
called upon the people of Wales, especially its youth, to make what was later described 
‘the salvation of the language their central, indeed, only priority’.131 In his lecture, 
entitled Tynged yr Iaith, (The Fate o f the Language) Lewis predicted that if the present 
trend continued, the Welsh language would cease to exist as a living language towards 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. Success, Lewis concluded gravely, could 
only come through ‘revolutionary methods’.132
The call by Saunders Lewis to undertake illegal action to secure legislative 
protection for the language, struck the constitutional politics of Gwynfor Evans a 
heavy blow. If that was not bad enough, the call to action was aimed at the nation’s 
youth: the very future of Wales and Plaid Cymru. John Davies believed the crisis that 
Lewis was describing was all too real, but it ‘became obvious that he was trying to 
turn Plaid Cymru into a militant language group and nothing else’. To Davies, this 
was ‘complete madness’.133 Nevertheless, Saunders Lewis was still held in the highest 
regard, and soon plans were being hatched to establish a movement whose sole aim 
was to protect and safeguard the Welsh language. At the Plaid Cymru summer school 
in August 1962, fifteen people decided to defend the actions of recently arrested 
Gareth Miles, who having received a summons in English for illegally riding his 
bicycle, had asked that the summons be issued in Welsh. Yet, despite the first 
unsteady steps towards a campaign to ensure legislative protection for the Welsh 
language, the storm clouds which hung over Tryweryn still cast a shadow.
One young man fully aware of the dangers facing both the linguistic and 
cultural landscape of the nation was Emyr Llywelyn Jones. Despite Saunders Lewis’
129 One Wales, October, 2001; also, WM, 11 October 1962.
130 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008; also, Dylan Phillips, A History 
o f  Cymdeithas yr  Iaith Gymraeg 1962-1992 (Llandysul, 1999).
1 1 Gwyn A lf Williams, When Was Wales? (London, 1985), p.292. Impressed the family’s stoic 
struggle to receive a bi-lingual council rates demand from Llanelli Borough Council, Lewis wrote to 
Eileen Beasley, asking for information which might be included in a radio address he was in the process 
of writing. Interview between WT & Eileen Beasley, 28 July 2004.
132 Janet Davies, The Welsh Language (Cardiff, 1999), p. 102.
133 Gwynfor: YrAelodD ros Gymru? BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005.
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reluctance to ally himself with protest action at Tryweryn, Jones was determined to 
make a symbolic strike at the Tryweryn reservoir site. In the spring of 1962, he 
decided that his best chance of gaining the necessary knowledge needed to assemble 
an explosive device, lay across the Irish Sea. Through Proinsias Mac Cana, the Irish 
academic, Jones was given the name and address of 65 year-old IRA veteran Martin O 
Cadhain.134 With the IRA on 26 February 1962 having terminated ‘the campaign of 
resistance to British Occupation’,135 to his initial dismay and later relief, Jones found 
the IRA ‘dead, defunct and inoperative’ and O Cadhain, although a cordial host, both 
unable and unwilling to help.136 Following a week of genial hospitality, Jones 
departed for home.
The ever-widening gulf between the constitutional and non-constitutional 
wings of Plaid Cymru still threatened to split the party. At the annual conference at 
Llangollen in August 1962, the two opposing factions: on one side, the Gwynforiaid; 
on the other, the self-styled activists competed for ascendancy. Following another 
tempestuous debate, a compromise was reached. No one, it was agreed, ‘was to take 
action in the name of Plaid Cymru, but members were free to undertake specific 
action when it was a matter of conscience or conviction’.137
The first militant strike at the Tryweryn reservoir site
It was not long before action was taken. Shortly after 22.00, on 22 September 1962, 
Police Constables Williams and Jones, having ‘received reports of loiterers on the 
Tryweryn site’, found ‘in possession of certain tools’, David Barnard Walters, a 
twenty-two-year-old underground colliery worker from Bargoed and David Glyn 
Pritchard, a twenty-five-year-old electrical planning engineer from New Tredegar.138 
Following an inspection of the site, it was discovered that a thousand gallons of oil, as 
stored in an electrical transformer, had been released. The two men were then taken 
to Bala police station for questioning. There, the following afternoon, each man
134 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005
135 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London, 1990), p.329.
136 Telephone interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 18 November 2007. An Aberystwyth 
lecturer who Jones refused to name, put him in touch with Proinsias Mac Cana. He in turn introduced 
him to Martin O Cadhain, a well-known writer and professor in Irish at Trinity College, Dublin. 
Although supportive in every other way, O Cadhain, did not want to take responsibility for any 
consequence which might occur should explosives be used.
137 Rhys Evans, Gwynfor RhagPob Brad (Talybont, 2005), p.222.
138 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008; also Berresford Ellis, Wales: Nation 
Again, p. 129; also WM, 25 September 1962; also Butt, Welsh Question, p.91.
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finally admitted that their real motive and purpose for visiting the construction site 
had been ‘to put the (site’s) electricity supply out of action’. Having been charged 
jointly under the 1882, Electric Lighting Act, Pritchard and Walters contacted Elystan 
Morgan, the Wrexham solicitor and member of the Plaid Cymru party executive, to 
act as their legal representative.
The following day, the two men appeared before magistrates at Bala. Police 
superintendent David Jones stated that despite Pritchard and Walters’ claim to have 
stolen the tools in their possession, extensive inquiries had failed to substantiate this. 
In attempting to secure bail, Elystan Morgan declared that neither had attempted to 
escape and that each had fully co-operated while in custody. In objecting to the 
request, David Jones submitted that the gravity and deliberate nature of the alleged 
offence should be considered, while moreover, there was ‘no guarantee the two might 
not try to repeat their act of sabotage’. Following Morgan’s disclosure that he had 
interviewed the accused for only a brief period the previous night and that he was 
therefore unable to offer any sureties, the request for bail was denied and Pritchard 
and Walters were remanded in custody.139 Significantly, both Pritchard and Walters 
were from the predominantly English-speaking industrial valleys of south-east Wales, 
neither were Welsh-speakers and Pritchard was a member of the Plaid Cymru 
executive.140
In Bala Shire Hall Assizes on 3 October, each man pleaded guilty to the 
charges against him. Unaware that two groups were involved in the action, 
prosecuting counsel, K. Dowling, erroneously stated that they had been sighted by a 
night watchman, ‘in a car at the Ffestiniog end of the site, some two miles from the 
transformer’.141 Having telephoned the police, they were arrested on the Bala to 
Capel Celyn road. Pritchard and Walters initially alleged that they had hitch-hiked 
from Gwent seeking employment at either Trawsfynydd or Tryweryn. The following 
morning, they each admitted that their police statements of the previous evening had 
been, ‘all wrong’.142 Pritchard now conceded that he and Walters had intentionally 
removed the caps from the drainage valves, to interrupt the sites electrical supply.
Explaining their actions, Pritchard declared that as Welshmen, he and Walters 
had considered a ‘personal strike’, such as that undertaken, to be their only answer
WM, 25 September 1962.
140 Butt, Welsh Question, p. 91
141 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008; also WM, 4 October 1962.
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against Liverpool Corporation. Furthermore, he hoped their small effort would deter 
any future English authority from encroaching into an area of Wales, without first 
having sanctioned the permission of the Welsh people. Not all were impressed by the 
two men’s apparent need to salve their consciences. The delay in revising their 
statements, declared Dowling, had simply been a premeditated ruse, in order ‘to 
ensure that all the oil would drain from the transformer’. Despite serious damage not 
having been committed by switching off the sub-station, it had nonetheless resulted in 
a ‘great inconvenience and had curtailed work on the night shift’.
In defending Pritchard and Walters, Elystan Morgan informed the court that 
the two accused were men of an ‘idealistic frame of mind, and deeply concerned, if 
not obsessed’, with issues of principle. It was an act, Morgan added, ‘conceived from 
a sense of duty’; undertaken in response to the over-whelming consensus of Welsh 
opinion against Liverpool’s ‘acquisition’ of Cwm Tryweryn.143 It was a view 
endorsed by Gwynfor Evans, who remarked to waiting journalists, that rather than the 
two accused, it should indeed be English authorities in the dock facing charges.144
In summing up his testimony, Elystan Morgan submitted that a dominant issue 
surrounding the background of the case was the question of ‘Wales as a nation’. If it 
was non-existent, with no rights, then the accused had indulged in wanton damage 
meriting strict punishment. However, if the Welsh nation did exist and had rights 
over its assets, then it may be believed that the two young men had acted in defence of 
those assets, and that, he asserted, must be viewed in a more mellow light. The 
chairman of the court declared that he had listened carefully to the argument proposed 
by the defence council, but nevertheless pronounced that each man had come 
deliberately from south Wales to commit the offences, and had certainly not done so 
without counting the cost. Pritchard and Walters - the first apprehended men to strike 
a blow in the name of Welsh nationalist protest since the opening of the Claerwen 
Dam ten years before - were each fined £50, ordered to pay £26 costs and given three 
months in which to pay.145 The seeds of protest, to lead by the turn of 1970, to the 
arrest and sentencing of many Welshmen and women, all drawn from within the
142 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
143 WM, 4 October 1962.
144 WM, 20 December 1962.
145 WM, 4 October 1962. Borne o f ‘fear the hearing and the wider situation might be inflamed’, 
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wider nationalist protest movement of Wales, from varying ages, socio-economic and 
linguistic backgrounds had been sown.
Whatever the thoughts of tthe magistrates, to the waiting crowd who warmly 
greeted the two discharged men as they appeared on the steps of the court, it seemed 
that their protest had been an act of industrial sabotage amounting to little more than 
measured symbolic resistance. In 2008, David Walters threw new light on this first 
‘militant’ action to protest the impending drowning of Cwm Tryweryn. Contrary to 
the belief that the two men had acted alone, he revealed six men had travelled to the 
site. Namely, Dave Pritchard, A lf Williams and himself in one car; and in another, 
approaching the reservoir site from the opposite, north westerly direction, Trefor 
Beasley, Dai Bonar Thomas and O. M. Roberts.
In attempting to quantify their action, Walters disclosed that the group, all 
prominent members of Plaid Cymru, had each declared that ‘something had to be 
done about Tryweryn’, but with no explosives, ‘the most efficient way’ had been to 
utilise David Pritchard’s expert knowledge of industrial machinery and in particular, 
electrical transformers. Employed in the design of such equipment, Pritchard knew 
that drained of oil, the transformer would ‘bum out internally’, thus destroying its 
inner workings. This, he was aware, would result in considerable damage and might 
delay the construction process by some weeks.146 Despite a suggestion made to the 
contrary in 2008,147 Pritchard also realized that the transformer would not in fact 
combust, owing to the large safety supply of oil which would cool the transformer 
when discharged. The release of this ‘safety valve’ would occur when the existing 
supply reached the level determined by a pre-programmed setting.148
Such was the threat of action, stated Walters, that officers consigned to Special 
Branch had been deployed at the site. It followed reports from construction workers 
that a photographer had been viewed apparently reconnoitring the area. The person in 
question, Walters revealed, was David Pritchard. The authorities, he added, had 
expected for a number of years that some measure of protest action would be taken, 
and indeed, a number of unreported incidents had occurred to substantiate their 
concerns. Walters was later informed of these developments by Irish nationals 
employed at the site.
146 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008; also telephone interview, 25 April 
2010 .
147 John Humphries, Freedom Fighters, (Cardiff, 2008), p. 19.
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Having made the necessary arrangements, it was decided that while Pritchard and 
Walters went for the transformer, an attempt would also be made to destroy the stores, 
machinery and materials at the other end of the valley. It had been a clear night and 
while en route to Capel Celyn, one of the men had briefed the driver. Instructed to 
turn off the car’s headlights when approaching the site and to coast quietly, the lights 
were kept on too long and the party was then spotted by workmen. Having alighted 
from the vehicle, the passenger and his companion had tried to get to the stores huts, 
but with the security men in pursuit, they had been forced to make their escape. 
However, on the other side of the valley, Pritchard and Walters took advantage of the 
diversion and were able to able to reach and drain the transformer. They then made to 
a pre-arranged pick-up point, but were there apprehended by the police. The two 
south Wales men, it was revealed, had mistaken a police car without lights for their 
own. Whether in an attempt to minimise the actions of Pritchard and Walters, or 
possibly in a genuine belief that the pair had acted alone, news of this further incident 
went unreported.
David Walters also revealed that the two arresting police officers, so one of 
them informed him many years later, had been subjected to considerable hostility 
throughout the Bala area following his and Pritchard’s apprehension. The officers, it 
was explained, ‘had to some degree been ostracized’. Such action, Walters believed, 
was unfair. Both he and Pritchard had been treated with ‘dignity and respect’, while 
each arresting officer had voiced their individual support for the protest action taken. 
This was highlighted, Walters disclosed, when having finally admitted their guilt the 
day following their arrest, the two officers informed he and Pritchard that had they 
stated their intention the previous evening, the policemen would have ‘let it go’ and 
rather than a police cell, they would each have slept in their ‘own beds’.
Nonetheless, having been arrested, Walters continued, not only had their cell 
doors been unlocked, allowing them to wile away the time chatting together, they had 
also been taken to the home of one of the officers in order ‘to eat a home-cooked meal 
and to admire his peacocks’. While such activity had occurred only when the senior 
officers had departed for home - the attitude of whom had conflicted somewhat with 
those of the junior officers - it should nevertheless be noted, Walters added, that the 
latter had been ‘as good as gold’, handing out cigarettes and against regulations,
148 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
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unfastening their handcuffs en route to the court hearings. Subsequently, he could not 
criticise them in ‘any way shape or form’ and felt nothing but gratitude for they way 
both he and Pritchard had been treated.149
The Plaid Cymru executive found itself in an awkward, political quandary: 
support the action and risk further alienating mainstream electoral support, or criticise 
the protest and risk losing both potential support and the support of an existing 
number within the party, wholly in support of the action taken. It was a dilemma 
which would blight Evans’ leadership throughout the entire period of the militant 
campaign.
This was highlighted just two days after Walters and Prichard were fined, 
when the Western Mail reported that Gwynfor Evans, in what was both seen - and 
intended to be seen - as a categorical denial, revoked any suggestion of there having 
been a ‘plan’ by a faction within the party to disrupt working progress at the 
Tryweryn site. Despite the denials, an editorial in the Plaid Cymru periodical the 
Welsh Nation, strengthened the persistent rumour of at least some measure of senior 
party collusion. This was achieved by it revealing that ‘a band of determined 
militants’ had met during the previous months and had ‘laid plans to carry their 
intentions into effect at a later date’. Moreover, the Welsh Nation added that it would 
be carrying further ‘news of the fighting in this important sector of the battle for 
Wales’. Responding to the article, Gwynfor Evans conceded the group’s existence, 
but stated that he could not take it very seriously and that consequently, no effort had 
been made to determine the identities of those involved. They had certainly not been 
acting on behalf of the party, he remonstrated. When pressed for comment with 
regard to his original statement denying any knowledge of the group, Evans cogently - 
and firmly - replied that he stood by what he had said.
Nevertheless, the party president ordered the September edition of the Welsh 
Nation to be destroyed. Instructed to do so, Harri Webb, the paper’s editor, stated his 
belief that Gwynfor Evans had not contradicted himself in his subsequent admission 
of the group’s existence. The article’s information had come from the persons 
concerned, Webb disclosed. He did not know exactly how many were involved, or 
what they planned to do, as the Welsh Nation had only been kept informed of events 
in general terms. As to the identity of those involved, Webb thought they were
149 Telephone interview between WT & David Walters, 25 April 2010.
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members of Plaid Cymru; however, acting not in the name of the party, but in 
accordance with their own convictions. As to the suggestion that as a result of the 
article the paper had received a measure of police attention, this was denied by Webb, 
who stated that there had been no police interest in the matter.150
In a letter to the Western Mail, published 11 October 1962, Gwynfor Evans 
defended the constitutional means employed by Plaid Cymru, while criticising the 
lack of democratic accountability which had seen the Tryweryn Bill passed some four 
years before.151 To those who endorsed the use of direct action however, yet again 
Evans had not gone far enough. They believed that an opportunity had been lost for 
the Plaid Cymru president to publicly applaud the actions of Pritchard and Walters; 
and by so doing, send a clear signal that the drowning of another Welsh valley would 
not be tolerated. The inevitable back-lash from within the rank and file of the party 
was not long in coming.
Yet, in 2008, a disclosure by David Walters contradicted the stance adopted in 
October 1962 by Gwynfor Evans and the Plaid Cymru ‘hierarchy’. Evans, he alleged, 
not only met both him, Pritchard and the others involved in the Tryweryn protest, but 
on the tacit understanding they would neither ‘endanger human life’ nor instruct the 
media of their intentions, had also given them his blessing. In a further twist, Walters 
also revealed that Evans had appealed to party members to attend the hearing at Bala 
Assizes, in order to show support for him and his co-defendant.152
The increasingly seasoned party leader was, as ever, walking a political tight 
rope. Ever mindful of just how damaging a link with militant nationalism might 
prove, Evans remained determined that nothing would undermine the party’s advance 
along the constitutional path to electoral success. His message was unequivocal: the 
party had to stand united against the use of illegal force. As such, dissention was not 
to be tolerated. In a letter to Gwynfor Evans, published in the Western Mail, Neil 
Jenkins, a young party official heaped praise on the actions of Pritchard and Walters, 
but concluded that all true Welshmen must have been utterly ashamed and disgusted 
by the disgraceful repudiation of their deed by the president of Plaid Cymru;
150 WM, 5 October 1962.
151 WM, 11 October 1962; also One Wales, September 2001.
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especially as one of the men (Pritchard) was a long-standing member of the party’s 
executive council.153 He kept his most stinging comment however for the final 
paragraph. ‘These men’, he proclaimed, ‘had certainly acted for Wales and in the 
name of Welsh nationalism, something which had probably never even occurred to 
Gwynfor Evans, during the eighteen fruitless years of his presidency’. Jenkins asked 
that Evans resign his position, declaring it ‘high time’ that he relinquished ‘this purely 
nominal leadership’ in favour of a real nationalist.154
One man, who in the months to come was far more deserving of the title in 
Jenkins’ mind, was Owain Williams. Five days after Jenkins’ letter to the president of 
Plaid Cymru, Owain Williams began the process of taking the militant struggle to a 
higher plateau by raiding the explosives magazine at Crofts Quarries, Llithfaen. 
Williams was accompanied by two regulars to his Espresso cafe in Pwllheli: Edwin 
Pritchard (20) and Robert Williams (18). Both were from Nefyn and each, suspected 
Owain Williams, lacked the necessary emotional rigidity to feature further in his 
plans. His fears proved well-founded. Arrested the following April, each soon 
succumbed to police interrogation; leading officers to many of the detonators removed 
and revealing the identity of their ring-leader.155
Despite Gwynfor Evans’ broad support for the unconstitutional, but non­
violent actions of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg,156 the party leaders’ endorsement did 
not extend to others who advocated the wider nationalist movement adopt a similar 
method of agitation. As such, on 18 November, Neil Jenkins was expelled from Plaid 
Cymru, for what was seen by party leaders as ‘unfair criticism’ over their handling of 
the Tryweryn strike protest. Defiant to the end, Jenkins declared it ridiculous to be 
expelled for merely expressing an opinion which disagreed with the party leadership 
over the Pritchard and Walters question.157 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the episode did 
not prove to be the end of Neil Jenkins as a force in the name of Welsh nationalism. 
As events were to take a more militant turn in the years that followed, Jenkins was to
2005.
153 WM, 19 November 1962.
154 One Wales, October/November 2001.
155 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March 2004.
156 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans 20 August 2003. Gwynfor Evans thought CylG 
‘hindered the party in the short term, but may well have strengthened a feeling of Welshness, and thus 
Plaid Cymru in the longer term’. Furthermore, despite possibly harming Plaid’s immediate 
constitutional prospects, ‘many members had indeed sympathized’ with CylG at both a grass roots and 
senior level.
157 WM, 19 November 1962.
63
become closely allied with others who had found themselves out of favour with the 
party executive.
With an announcement on 22 November that a further two valleys had been 
earmarked for flooding in Wales, Cymru Ein Gwlad, a periodical published by fringe 
elements within Plaid Cymru, upheld the gesture and justification of Pritchard and 
Walters’ action, ‘and any others which might follow’, as an essential way of 
demonstrating Welsh opposition to the English ‘cement and concrete invasion of 
Wales’.158 Interestingly, it also revealed that the Pritchard and Walters protest, was 
not the first such incident at the site; and that a number of other previous actions had 
occurred, of which writers of the periodical had knowledge. For example, an attempt 
had been made to target the brightly illuminated arc lights which aided the erection of 
the dam wall during the shorter-winter days. These lights, it was alleged, had been 
targeted as a possible prelude to further action under the cover of darkness.159
Arson at the Tryweryn reservoir construction site
In the early hours of 19 December 1962, another attempt by ‘two men’ to disrupt 
work at the Tryweryn construction site was attempted. A small fire in a ‘fitters shed’ 
was started and, before allegedly being startled by a watchman, an attempt was made 
to set ablaze ‘the timber compressor house’.160 Speaking in January 2004, one of the 
two men, wishing to remain anonymous for fear of prosecution, recalled the night he 
entered for the first time, the so-called pantheon of Welsh nationalist militant protest. 
It was meant to be a symbolic act, he conceded, ‘along the lines of Penyberth’. It was 
carried out by a group of students based at Aberystwyth, with more than just two 
involved in the ‘actual thing’. News that security on the site had been stepped up, 
following the action of Pritchard and Walters had made little impact. While, news the 
previous month, that more sites were being earmarked for flooding, had been a factor 
in the group’s decision to make a stand.161 He and his accomplice had been dropped 
off at Bronaber, near Trawsfynydd, as the rest of the party continued along the road to 
Bangor. They changed into workman’s clothes and after crossing the mountain and 
finding the old railway track, had followed the line through to the Tryweryn site.
It was raining and windy and yet, despite the conditions and the terrain, their
158 WM, 22 November 1962; also WM, 20 December 1962.
159 WM, 24 December 1962.
160 WM, 20 December 1962.
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journey had been relatively straight forward. With no fence to scale, the two men 
walked unchallenged onto the site. Unable to set one of the sheds alight, and feeling 
that it had not been damaged enough to ‘make it a symbolic action’, they had then 
attempted to set fire to the compressor. The following day, newspaper headlines 
announced the night watchman had grappled with one of the two men. The story was 
dismissed by one of them in 2004 as false; he had merely shouted and they had made 
their escape. It was construed, he believed, solely to discredit them. Yet the job had 
been ‘botched’. They had wanted to ‘finish it’ and possibly get caught; that then 
would have been the end of their protest. They had fled due to their failure to carry 
out the action successfully. Had events been different, it would have been secured the 
symbolic act they intended.
The trek back along the railway line was made all the more uncomfortable 
owing to the cold and persistent rain. En route, they fell upon a parked police car. 
The police must have been notified of the attempted strike action, he added; they must 
also have realised that someone could access the site by following the railway line. 
Subsequently, at a junction where the line crossed the road, each man was forced to 
lie flat on their stomachs in water-bogged marshland, as the unsuspecting police 
officers sat in the warm comfort of a police car, no more than ten yards away. They 
could hear the officers talking. Finally, after apparently having considered themselves 
to be alone in the area that night, they left. Having done so, the two students crossed 
the road and continued along the track to Bronaber.
On returning, they changed back into their regular clothes and buried their 
workman’s overalls in nearby woods. They then waited to be collected by the party 
returning from Bangor. It was well organised, with the alibi being - were they 
stopped by the police - that the group was simply returning from ‘a normal students 
night out’. Inspired by the protest and subsequent action of Saunders Lewis, D. J. 
Williams and Lewis Valentine, 26 years earlier at Penyberth, it had been the 
perpetrator’s intention to hand himself in to the authorities had the plan proved 
successful.162 In contrast to the candour expressed by one of the two men, in 
September 2004, the other man allegedly involved remained resolutely tight-lipped. 
He had, he professed, ‘nothing whatsoever to say on the matter’.163
161 WM, 22 November 1962.
162 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2006.
163 Anonymous interview with WT, September 2004.
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A brief statement released by the Gwynedd Constabulary the following day, declared 
that a small fire had been confined to a wooden bench in the fitter’s shed; that only 
slight damage had occurred and that neither of the two saboteurs had left any clue as 
to their identity; either on site or while escaping. An official of Tarmac Ltd, the main 
contractor in the reservoir’s construction, was also quick to play down the incident; he 
nevertheless conceded that had the ‘compressor house’ caught fire, ‘the damage could 
well have been considerable’. Having stated that the incident had not interfered with 
work in the ‘slightest degree’, the resident site engineer, refused to be drawn on 
whether extra security measures at the site - where 210 men were employed - would 
be taken.
As rumour abounded that each incident at Tryweryn had been the work of the 
shadowy ‘action group’, police denied knowledge of its existence, but confirmed that 
intelligence sources had earlier relayed certain information. This speculated that the 
Prichard and Walters protest, was intended to be only the first in a series of such 
incidents, prompted by the same political motives. Quite possibly, but monitored 
action group members, whether or not aware that those responsible were students 
from Aberystwyth, not unsurprisingly denied any knowledge of the incident when 
contacted by the press.164
On Christmas Eve 1962, a spokesman for Gwynedd police refused to confirm 
that site contractors at Tryweryn had received an anonymous phone call, warning of 
possible further incidents over the holiday period. Whether a coincidence or not, 
having sharply denied the escalation in active resistance was a factor, a site official 
then confirmed that a number of sirens had been installed. These would be heard in 
Bala, some four miles away, should the site be infiltrated. It was also disclosed that 
the number of night watchmen patrolling the area was to be trebled in number from 
two to six and that at least one would patrol with a trained Alsatian dog. The 
increase, he insisted, merely followed the standard procedure at holiday times when 
the work was temporarily suspended.
The timing of the increase in security measures at Tryweryn, coincided with 
media reports that a letter signed ‘Meibion Glyndwr’ (Sons of Glyndwr) had been 
received at the offices of Birmingham Corporation: the authority which had emerged
164 WM, 20 December 1962. An action group member admitted that although an incident over the 
Christmas period was anticipated, he was surprised at the possibility the disturbed protest had been a 
premature independent strike by two o f its members.
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as the likely leading sponsor of a Bill to flood Cwm Clywedog in Montgomeryshire. 
With the authority set to vote on the proposal, the letter alleged that as a protest, 
members of its group had buried 100 bottles of poison in the area earmarked for 
flooding. If heavy machinery was used in the development of the site, the bottles 
would smash and the water poisoned. In response, a police spokesman announced 
that routine inquiries were made into the matter, as was the customary practice 
following a letter being received of that nature.165
The symbolism of the failed arson attack at Tryweryn did not go unnoticed. 
For those on the periphery of nationalist thinking, the mistakes of the action were 
carefully scrutinised. In Aberystwyth, a plan was being hatched which would involve 
a different modus operandi. It was to begin a chain of events, which in the years that 
followed, led to the establishing of a special police unit and a significant number of 
undercover intelligence officers pouring over the border, all in an increasingly 
desperate bid to apprehend those responsible.
Conclusion
T h e  attempted action at th e  Tryweryn R e s e r v o ir  c o n s tru c tio n  s ite , ju s t  before 
Christmas 1962 - so fiercely reminiscent of the 1936 protest at Penyberth - saw the 
conclusion of an extraordinary period in the history of Wales. It witnessed the 
rejection of all attempts to prevent the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn through 
constitutional channels. To those proud of Wales’s cultural identity, such apparent 
contempt was hard to swallow, especially to a younger post-war generation, far less 
prepared to blindly accept the autocratic demands of a seemingly detached central 
government and parliamentary system. Gwynfor Evans had steered the Plaid Cymru 
ship with some aplomb through its troubled waters. Nonetheless, for all Evans’ 
commendable efforts, he had failed to prevent the drowning of Cwm Tryweryn, or 
orchestrate resistance the authorities were wary to inflame. The party’s younger 
element had grown tired of dignified failure. A fresh approach was required. The
165 WM, 24 December 1962. The threat to bury bottles o f poison ‘bore all the hall-marks of British 
intelligence’, believed E. LI. Jones; perhaps undertaken ‘to discredit nationalist action’. Jones’ reason 
for stating such was that ‘it wasn’t the kind o f thing that people did’. Yet, it was possibly just ‘wild 
talk’. Jones emphatically denied phoning the police warning of possible further incidents at Tryweryn 
over the 1962 Christmas period. There were always people like that, ‘playing the heroics’. Interview 
between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 14 October 2005.
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humiliating lessons of Tryweryn would not be forgotten. As further sites for flooding 
were announced; and other causes of Welsh nationalist resentment continued, those 
intent on undertaking militant action vowed do so with a far greater degree of cadence 
and expertise. This time, the party leaders’ approval would not be sought.
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Chapter 2 
'Liverpool - Hands Off Wales'
MAC emerge and Llyn Celyn is opened
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the escalation in militant action at the Tryweryn reservoir 
construction site, its legal aftermath and the emergence and apparent demise of 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. It also addresses the opening of Llyn Celyn, an event 
which coincided with the first public appearance of the so-called Free Wales Army. 
The chapter will also dispel the commonly-held belief, that the initial militant 
campaign was financed by a benefactor, hitherto believed to have been R. O. F. 
Wynne or Hywel Hughes. It also focuses upon the continuing directional conflict 
between the constitutional and non-constitutional wings of Plaid Cymru and opposing 
attitudes of senior party officials to its electoral advance. The chapter demonstrates 
that the rise in militant action was fuelled partly by a belief that centralist government 
policy, through accident or design, was ambivalent, if not indifferent, to Wales and its 
cultural identity. It therefore addresses the political reaction to this suspicion by 
Harold Wilson’s Labour administration.
Attack on the Tryweryn construction site
For Huw T. Edwards, the former chair of Wales and Monmouthshire, the wound of 
Tryweryn still oozed. The story, he declared in January 1963, remained like ‘a scar 
on the consciousness of every Welshman worthy of the name’.1 It was a sentiment 
fervently shared by four young nationalists from different educational and cultural 
backgrounds. One of them was Aberystwyth university student Emyr Llywelyn 
Jones. Early that month, Jones made contact with David Pritchard, who, three months 
earlier, was fined for releasing oil from an electrical transformer at the Tryweryn 
reservoir construction site. Yet, more importantly as far as Emyr Llywelyn Jones was 
concerned, he had been told that Pritchard ‘knew how to do things’. What struck the
1 Meic Stephens, (ed.) A Most Peculiar People (Cardiff, 1992), p. 132.
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young man above all else, was how ‘responsible’ Pritchard was. It was difficult to 
imagine Pritchard undertaking anything which might involve the loss of human life. 
He was a man for whom Jones had ‘great respect’. With the process begun to acquire 
the necessary knowledge to undertake a militant strike action at Tryweryn, Jones was 
faced with another dilemma, as an unlikely obstacle - in the form of the more 
inflammatory Owain Williams - presented itself. That same month, Jones was 
stopped by a policeman for riding two on a bike. The officer was surprised to 
discover the young student in possession of ‘about £50’. The money was intended to 
hire a car, in order to reconnoitre the Tryweryn site that night. The policeman 
accepted the explanation that Jones and a number of other students were in the 
process of hiring a vehicle, in order to attend a social function at another university. 
The arrest was made and the issue of the money forgotten. On 12 January, Jones 
appeared in court in Aberystwyth, having refused to receive the summons for the 
charge in English. He was fined 1 Os.
During the previous autumn, Emyr Llywelyn Jones visited Ysgol Capel Celyn. 
There, he was introduced to a pupil called Tryweryn Evans. The seemingly 
innocuous encounter, Jones revealed in September 2003, had ‘affected’ him. He 
began to wonder what the word Tryweryn might mean to future generations. Would 
it become a term describing an act of betrayal or capitulation? Or would it perhaps 
mean something else? Something more positive, such as strength and honour in the 
face of injustice?4 Only time itself held the answer.
With the thought uppermost in his mind, Emyr Llewelyn Jones made contact 
with Owain Williams, a cafe owner from Pwllheli. He wasn’t involved with Williams 
and his friend and fellow nationalist John Albert Jones at the beginning, but through 
Gwilym Tudur Jones, a fellow Aberystwyth university student from Pwllheli, Jones 
had heard that they were planning ‘something’ independently. Increasingly alarmed 
at the strong use of reactionary language emanating from north Wales, Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones grew fearful that after so much self-preparation, they might do 
something ‘a bit extreme’. This was an idea to which Jones was wholly opposed: not
2
Interview between & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Emyr Llywelyn Jones was unsure 
whether he met Pritchard at the Merthyr home o f Harri Webb, or through Alf Williams or Emrys 
Roberts. Jones had considered contacting Trefor Beasley for similar technical instruction, but on 
reflection, decided against it.
3 Western Mail, 5 April 1963.
4 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
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solely on the grounds that ‘no cause was worth the spilling or shedding of innocent 
blood’, but also because an untempered strike might ruin the whole philosophy of 
carrying out a measured, symbolic action at the Tryweryn reservoir site.5 
Consequently, he decided it would be better to attempt a protest at the construction 
site together. That way, a prior understanding could be reached, as to how a 
successful action might be achieved and what tactics would be needed to ensure that 
all the group’s objectives were met.6
According to Jones, prior to any agreed action, the four men should agree to 
the wording of an oath. He was sure that had Williams and J. A. Jones not subscribed 
to what he had written, he would not have agreed to act alongside them. It had not 
been anything formal, merely ‘to act as a unit with fixed aims and methods’; 
furthermore, it would ensure that the romantic idealism of Owain Williams would be 
curbed. At the bottom of the oath were the words Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru (The 
Movement for the Defence of Wales). However, Jones claimed that it had not really
n
meant anything; he had merely coined the phrase for the purpose of the oath. 
Speaking later, Owain Williams recalled that all three had decided upon the name 
Mudiad Amdiffyn Cymru. With Harold Macmillan installed at 10, Downing Street, 
they had regarded themselves as ‘MAC boys’. Moreover, both he and John Albert 
Jones had felt unease for the oath. Nonetheless, they had decided to go along with the 
it merely to placate Jones.
However, one factor of Jones’s strategy particularly concerned Williams and J. 
A. Jones. They each rebuffed the idea that the group should hand themselves in to the 
authorities following the action. Jones figured that if Saunders Lewis had given
5 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. E. LI. Jones declared: ‘if  we 
undertake one protest w e’re patriots, if  we do more than one w e’re terrorists’. Williams and J. A. Jones 
planned to activate ten explosions at the site. A bridge carrying construction traffic was to be 
destroyed, as would trucks, machinery and the contractors’ stockpile o f petrol drums. It was hoped that 
following the attack, contractors would withdraw permanently from the site. Interview between WT & 
Owain Williams, 23 March 2004; also, Owain Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn (Llanwrst, 1995), pp.24, 25.
Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Fellow student and E. LI. Jones’s 
flat mate Gwilym Tudur Jones, informed him that ‘two chaps from his home town o f Pwllheli were 
going to do something’ and if  he and Jones did not involve them in their action, ‘they were going to 
make a right balls up o f it’. Fearing Williams and J. A. Jones might do ‘something fool-hardy’: both 
for themselves, and others if  acting alone and ‘spoil any symbolic protest’ he and G. T. Jones had 
^planned’, reluctantly, E. LI. Jones ‘agreed to contact them’.
Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Jones felt the oath would ‘hold 
Williams back’ and keep ‘the protest on a realistic and idealistic level’. The oath read: I promise to 
keep the activities of the Movement and the names o f its members secret. I promise neither to kill nor 
injure any man who, as part o f his duty, attempts to prevent me, and I will do everything in my power 
to ensure that no one is injured or killed as a result o f an act on my part. I promise not to undertake any
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himself up, then he should do the same, declared Williams. Both he and J. A. Jones 
shared a great respect for the talisman Lewis, but nevertheless, for Emyr Llywelyn 
Jones to hand himself in was one thing, but it would be impossible and impractical for 
him to do so, as he was a husband and father. If they were going to be caught, then 
the authorities ‘would have to do their homework’. He did not intend to ‘go meekly, 
cap in hand’. In fairness, for the sake of the children, Jones agreed to forget the idea.8
David Pritchard was not required to read the oath. He had, from the outset, 
espoused the importance of cautious action. With the protest planned for the middle 
o f February, Jones admitted to harbouring some feelings of increasing apprehension 
as the date for the planned action drew nearer. Two issues troubled him: Owain 
Williams’ often fiery language and the age and apparent naivety of J. A. Jones. While 
he liked the young man, he had not been comfortable with his involvement. 
However, his position as Williams’ ‘side-kick’ had ensured his inclusion. Some little 
time later, David Pritchard held a ‘training exercise’ on the beach near Pwllheli. It 
was to instruct the three men and most notably Emyr Llywelyn Jones, how to 
assemble and ready an explosive charge by way of a timer. Gwilym Tudur Jones, the 
man assigned to drive the group to the Tryweryn site, drop them off and collect them 
after the device had been planted, did not attend. With Jones ready, the logistics of 
the strike could be finalised.9
The site was mostly watched by Owain Williams and John Albert Jones.10 
Patrols at the Tryweryn site had been stepped up, following the failed arson attempt 
the previous December. The date of a follow-up action was set for a rough period in 
the year, so as to maximise the chance of patrols being suspended owing to the
positive acts without consulting the other members of the movement.
Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Despite Jones’s academic background, 
all three came up with MAC. It caused some amusement, as they wrestled to establish the appropriate 
wording. He and J. A. Jones considered the oath to be ‘useless’. Neither man believed in endangering 
human life. Furthermore, what if  something happened ‘accidentally?’. They would be denounced ‘as 
hypocrites’. By January 1963, Owain Williams had three children.
9 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Jones admitted to having taken 
some time to lower his guard, but on another level, he realised he could trust Williams and J. A. Jones 
‘from the beginning’. He ‘could see they were genuine’.
10 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Williams opined both men walked 
around the site ‘if not hundreds o f miles, then certainly dozens of miles’. They wanted to ascertain the 
sites security: at what time employees arrived for work, had their breaks and shift ended. Every hour 
patrols with dogs were made o f the site. They soon established exactly what time a bomb could go off 
with minimum risk o f  anyone getting injured. One could only minimise the risk, remarked Williams 
starkly, ‘it was impossible to be 100% sure’.
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inclement weather.11
Later that month, a quarry stores south of Aberystwyth was broken into. One
of the three involved in the operation, recalled in January 2006 what happened.
Having used a crow bar to enter the stores, he and his accomplice had removed a large
quantity of gelignite, while the third man, the driver, had remained outside keeping
watch. Having hidden the explosive material in the boot of a car, they then travelled
12to north Wales where it was hidden.
After many months of careful planning and with resolve stiffened by ongoing
plans to flood Cwm Clywedog in Montgomeryshire, Emyr Llywelyn Jones was ready
to embark on a journey which would see explosives used in the name of militant
1 ^action for the second time in Welsh political history. During the afternoon of 8 
February, Jones collected a hire car from Aberystwyth and drove to New Tredegar. 
At the home of Alf Williams, he collected the timing device from David Pritchard. In 
the early hours of the following morning, Jones drove to Pwllheli. Hours later, as 
arranged, along with Owain Williams and John Albert Jones, he waited for Gwilym 
Tudur Jones to arrive. He failed to do so.
While not judging G. T. Jones for his change of heart, speaking in August 
2005, Emyr Llywelyn Jones nonetheless confirmed his non-appearance had thrown 
the plan into a state of some confusion.
I wasn’t supposed to drive. I was to carry the device; it was my job to look after that, to make 
sure that nothing happened; it’s quite sensitive...He chose not to do it and 1 think he was right 
actually, but from his own personal vantage point, I think he regretted it...Even if  he’d 
dropped us off at the site, no way would he have got caught, but.. ..14 
The absence of their agreed driver was greeted with angry indignation by Owain 
Williams and J. A. Jones. ‘Diplomatically’, Williams revealed in 2004, Jones stated 
his belief that his friend and fellow student had been unable to undertake his agreed 
role ‘due to illness’. It was an explanation given short-shrift by both Williams and J.
11 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. E. LI. Jones admitted that had 
Williams and J. A. Jones not agreed to the oath, it would have complicated matters; he needed them. 
‘It wasn’t something that could be achieved on one’s own; for instance, the driving’. Yet, ‘they didn’t 
have any expertise in assembling the device’. Jones reasoned that the December 1962 action was
possibly viewed as a ‘one o f f .
12 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2006.
13Radnor Express & Times, 25 October 1952. The strike - an explosion at Fron Aqueduct near 
Llandrindod - was undertaken by Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (the Welsh Republican Movement).
14 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 16 August 2007. G. T. Jones ‘was supposed to 
meet the three o f us at Owain’s in Pwllheli’. Yet, E. LI. Jones did want to criticize him; he had ‘more 
than played his part in many other ways’.
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A. Jones.15 Later asked to comment on these events, after some thought, Gwilym 
Tudur Jones declined to do so.16
There was one other problem: the weather. For days, Britain had been blasted 
by heavy snowfall. Far from considering aborting the action, the weather, Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones revealed, had initially been viewed as an ‘advantage’. Besides,
when you’ve planned something for six months, you’re not going to call it off because o f  a bit 
o f snow fall are you? And even if people pull out, it’s been synchronised: your nerves are on 
edge, you’ve worked up to this for six months.17 
The weather conditions led Williams to believe that perhaps the protest should be 
postponed, he later admitted, but it had been the group’s lack of attention to detail 
which had proved their biggest handicap. He had been surprised to discover Jones 
driving a red Vauxhall car, hired, ‘from all places Aberystwyth’. If that wasn’t 
incriminating enough, the three were seen leaving Williams’ cafe by a number of 
witnesses.18
En route to the site, the car, driven by Emyr Llywelyn Jones, hit a stone in the 
road and burst a tyre. Unable to find a jack, J. A. Jones and Williams lifted the car, 
while Emyr Llywelyn Jones replaced the wheel.19 The incident and the unanticipated 
weather conditions, only added to their sense of foreboding.20 Aware their intended 
action was now up to an hour behind schedule, the ‘sky was beginning to darken’ as 
Jones parked the car in a schoolyard, approximately three or four miles from the dam 
site. Clambering over hills in the thick blanketing snow, finally, with Emyr Llywelyn 
Jones a little way ahead carrying the timer and Williams and Jones following with the 
detonator, wiring and clock, the three came to within sight of the works, nestled 
brightly and seemingly abandoned in the valley below.
With little more than five hundred yards to the compound area, the rest of the 
journey was completed by crawling. Undetected, they reached the compound area. 
Between them and the target was erected a seven feet tall metal fence. Along its top, 
positioned every few inches, stood twisted spikes of metal. The three had come 
prepared. Owain Williams climbed the fence and laid a blanket across its top.
15 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 16 March 2004. ‘Emyr said he was in bed 
with flu’, declared Williams. ‘But being cynics, John Albert and myself didn’t think her name was flu’.
16 Interview between WT & Gwilym Tudur Jones, 25 August 2004.
17 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005.
1 8
Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
19 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
20
Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
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Instructed to stay well back, both to keep guard and as a safeguard against an 
explosion, J. A. Jones watched as Williams, acting in defiance of the orchestrated plan,
91clambered over the fence to join E. LI. Jones in laying the charge. The implications 
o f Williams’ action, was considered by Emyr Llywelyn Jones in 2005. ‘To actually 
stand there and say “if you’re going to get blown up, I’m going to get blown up” was 
foolhardy, but I admired him for that...It was borne of sheer cussedness, but also very 
brave’. It was a decision taken to show solidarity, Jones added and ‘demonstrated the 
degree of camaraderie that existed’ between them. Nevertheless, Jones admitted to 
feeling annoyed. Williams had a wife and children; furthermore it contradicted the 
agreed plan of action. Fearing it might ‘be the last minute’ of his life and that the two 
would be ‘blown to bits’, were the device wrongly wired, Jones nervously set the
99charge. Williams explained that ‘the clock was hooked on and fixed with two wires’; 
before ‘one or two detonators were pushed into two or three pounds of gelli’. 
Carefully, the device was placed in a biscuit tin, which was then slid into place 
underneath the oil tank near the base of the transformer. The entire process had taken
9 -3
little more than five minutes.
A hurried glance at Jones’ wrist watch, revealed it was shortly after 22.00; the 
device had been set to activate five hours later. With the task completed, Williams 
and Jones scrambled back over the fence and the three, having crawled out of the glare 
of the lights, stood to their feet and stumbled as fast as the conditions would allow 
away from the site. Unable to focus clearly in the dark, while attempting to clear a 
hedge, Emyr Llywelyn Jones lacerated his knee on a strip of rusty barbed wire. 
Attempts to stem the blood flow by tying a handkerchief around the injury proved 
useless. Having finally reached the car, the leg began to stiffen and feel numb. 
Fearful that it might affect his use of the brake, it was decided that Williams should 
drive. If the snowy conditions had increased the likelihood that security at the site 
would be kept to a minimum, it had also greatly increased their chances of detection. 
They had left huge tracks.24
In a decision which ultimately sealed their fate, Owain Williams suggested they
21 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
22 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005.
23
Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. The amount o f explosives used, ‘would 
almost certainly have killed us’, stated Owain Williams.
Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Despite later ‘irritating’ television 
depictions of Jones being carried ‘Vietnam style’ on the back o f one o f his confederates; it did not
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drive over the mountain road, in order ‘to join the A5 towards Cerrigydrudion’. He 
believed this route would minimise their chances of being observed, as due to the hour 
on a Saturday night, he felt certain Bala would be swarming with police. The higher 
they climbed, the greater the snowfall they encountered.25 Travelling ‘too fast’, the car 
swerved to avoid a van - which unable to advance stood blocking the road - and came 
to sudden stop in a snow drift. Assuring his two companions that he would ‘do the 
talking’, Williams approached the young van driver and began ‘to curse in English the 
Welsh weather’. A plan of action was quickly agreed. First the car would be pushed 
out of the drift and turned around to face the direction just travelled and then all three 
would attempt to turn likewise the van. The van driver duly obliged. None, admitted 
Williams, ‘checked to see if he was wearing gloves’. The red Vauxhall Saloon slowly 
sped off in the direction of Bala. Had one of the car’s occupants turned to glance back 
up the road, they might have seen a blood splattered handkerchief which lay on the 
verge.
As the car made its way out of Bala, it passed a police car parked in a lay-by. 
To their alarm, the squad car pulled out and began to follow them. Instructed by Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones to ‘put his foot down’, Owain Williams refused. He would, he 
announced, drive as if the group were ‘out on a Saturday night: neither too fast, nor too 
slow’. The police car followed them almost to Dolgellau, recalled Williams. Finally, 
the police car turned away.27 A quantity of unused detonators lay on the back seat.28 
At 3.15 a.m. the device activated.29 The night watchman, Trefor Evans, patrolling 
another area of the site with his Alsatian dog ran to the compound.30 Activated by an 
alarm system, the police soon arrived. A hurried search of the area was undertaken by 
officers, the watchman, his colleague Cadwaladr Owen Jones and the site engineer. 
No damage was detected. Four hours later, Cadwaladr Owen Jones walked to the 
compound to switch off the site’s floodlight system. It was then he noticed that the 
snow-covered ground around the transformer was saturated with oil and part of the
prevent him walking.
5 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
26 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005.
27 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. ‘He must have thought we were from 
over the border’, stated Williams, ‘because when he spoke, it was in very broken English’. All three
had spoken o f  the police car’s presence, he added, with no one daring to turn around.
28 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. Jones later regarded his knee 
injury as fortunate, as the manner in which Williams subsequently drove when followed was correct.
29 WM, 11 February 1963.
76
<5 1
transformer’s exterior casing had been blown in. The explosion would not have been 
huge, according to Owain Williams, but it was enough to start a small fire, what with 
the oil, and destroy the base of the generator. Having watched in recent years, 
television depictions of the incident, Emyr Llywelyn Jones admitted to harbouring a 
sense of annoyance at attempts to dramatize what was in truth a ‘very controlled’ and
33minimal explosion. Only a very small amount of explosives had been used.
Arriving back at the cafe home of Owain Williams at 3.00 a.m., the trio 
eagerly awaited confirmation that the operation had been successful.34 Finally, after a 
sleepless wait, they received the news they were hoping for. During the mid-morning 
BBC Wales news broadcast, it was announced that the main transformer - supplying 
electricity to the Tryweryn reservoir construction site - had been shattered by an 
explosion in the early hours of the morning. Thought to be an act of sabotage, police
 ^r
had begun extensive enquiries. Emyr Llywelyn Jones declared: ‘We felt elated. We 
had done it!’.36 In Cwm Tryweryn, the action was viewed as ‘very encouraging’.37 
Even The Times adopted a rather sympathetic appraisal, believing those responsible to 
be ‘members of the Welsh Nationalist Party action group’, acting in protest at what
i o
they considered ‘the rape of Tryweryn’ by Liverpool.
The escalation in tactics brought forth a vigorous response from the 
authorities, who then had a lucky breakthrough. The van driver, ‘himself a 
nationalist’, remarked innocuously to his uncle that in the early hours of the previous 
Sunday morning, he had helped ‘three Englishmen in a dark red car stuck in the snow 
near Bala’.39 The young man’s uncle contacted the police. Immediately, all garages 
and car hires in the area were paid a visit. With the net cast ever wider and particular 
attention focused upon university towns, it was not long before Detective Wyn Morris
30
P. Berresford Ellis, Wales: A Nation Again (London, 1968), p. 12.
31 WM, 11 February 1963.
32 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
33 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. ‘Someone standing 400 yards
away might have wondered what the thud was’, he stated.34 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
35 Owain Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn (Llanrwst, 1979), p.43.
36 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005.
37 Telephone interview between WT & Martha Jane Roberts, 16 October 2005. ‘Cwm Celyn was a 
unit, it didn’t anticipate receiving support from anywhere; then out o f the silence came the protest by 
those three brave young men. At last, someone had stood up against the scheme. It gave the people of  
Celyn a great boost’.
38 The Times, 11 February 1963. Despite an increase in security, ‘sabotage experts’ had managed to 
infiltrate the site works and cause ‘devastation’. Bam, 14 February 1963.
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called at Nelson’s Car Hire on Alexandra Road in Aberystwyth. Enquiries as to 
whether a member of the university had leased a red coloured vehicle over the 
weekend of 10 February were soon confirmed. The man in whose name the car had 
been hired, was well known to Morris, involved as he was in the campaign for 
legislative status of the Welsh language. The filthy condition in which the car was 
returned, immediately struck the officers consigned to the case as suspicious. If that 
in itself was not incriminating, evidence that at some point over the weekend, the car 
had been pushed from the back, was soon confirmed with the abundance of 
fingerprints and palm prints located on the boot.
Forensic examinations were also undertaken at the reservoir construction site. 
The police soon deduced that a detonator, dynamite and timing device had been used 
in the attack.40 Furthermore, it had been carried out by someone with good 
engineering knowledge. Experts in explosives from the Forensic Science Laboratory 
in Preston were approached by Gwynedd Constabulary. Inevitably, the media 
spotlight soon shone on Gwynfor Evans. That Sunday evening, Evans informed the 
country’s media that Plaid Cymru opposed direct action ‘as a matter of policy’. 
However, he qualified this by adding, that ‘opposition to such methods did not always 
imply moral disapproval...There must be sympathy for these men’, who were acting 
as they thought right, ‘in the best interests of Wales’.41
Senior Plaid Cymru member Elystan Morgan issued a statement, in which he 
angrily condemned the sabotage action. Such a policy, he declared, could only be 
counter-productive...and result in disillusionment for those who had ‘devoted their 
time and energy towards the attainment of national freedom along constitutional 
lines’.... If it were proved that the incident had any political connection, then one 
thing was certain: Plaid Cymru could not be held responsible. Nonetheless, Morgan 
felt compelled to re-emphasis his absolute disapproval of the action taken by 
Liverpool Corporation. It was, he discerned, ‘an act of depredation and ravage’.42 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Tryweryn incident divided nationalist opinion; with Harri 
Webb fiercely critical of the stand taken by Elystan Morgan. Writing some time later, 
Webb stated that ‘no denunciation had been taken from the enemies of direct action,
39
Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
40
Terfysgwyr Tryweryn, S4C Production. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
41 WM, 11 February 1963.
42 WM, 13 February 1963.
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only Elystan Morgan had done that. By doing so’, opined Webb, ‘he had completely 
ruined him self .43
Emyr Llywelyn Jones is arrested and tried
During the early evening of 18 February, Emyr Llywelyn Jones was arrested at his 
lodgings by Det. Inspector, Humphrey Jones, the head of Gwynedd CID, while 
accompanied by Det. Sergeant Glanmor Hughes. He was taken from Aberystwyth, 
thence to Dolgellau police station. Finally, at 2.40 a.m., Jones was informed by 
Inspector R. E. Jones of Bala, that he was being arrested in connection with the 
explosion at Tryweryn eight days before. The following morning, the 22-year-old 
student was taken by officers to Bala police station; where later that day, he appeared 
in a specially arranged court in the town, charged under the 1883 Explosives 
Substances Act of ‘unlawfully and maliciously causing by an explosive substance, an 
explosion of a nature likely to cause serious injury to property’.44
It had been ‘a deliberate attack’, Inspector R. E. Jones informed the bench, 
resulting in damage ‘thought to be estimated at several hundreds of pounds’. Having 
given details of Jones’ arrest, Humphrey Jones requested that bail be denied. There 
was cause to believe that others had been involved, he stated and that inquiries were 
on-going in a bid to trace the defendant’s accomplices. Asked by John Williams, the 
clerk of the court, if he had any questions to ask Humphrey Jones, the defendant 
replied that he had not. Stating that two sureties had come forward to act as 
guarantors, he then asked to be allowed bail. The request was denied by Chairman of 
the bench, O. M. Jones. E. LI. Jones was remanded in custody, to appear again two 
days later.45 While detained by officers, he had not having suffered any degree of 
physical abuse, Jones declared in 2003, but nevertheless, the process of questioning 
had been intense. While Humphrey Jones had been ‘a gentleman’, Glanmor Hughes 
was more intimidating. It had come, as ‘quite a shock to be treated with such disdain 
and contempt’ 46
43 Meic Stephens, No Half-Way House (Talybont, 1997), p.234. Webb expressed his opinion of  
Elystan Morgan, in a letter to Gwilym Prys Davies in April 1963.
44 WM, 20 February 1963. Jones’s lodgings were on Terrace Road in Aberystwyth. Emyr Llewelyn 
Jones, Eileen Beasley declared warmly, ‘was a very serious young man’. Interview between WT & 
Eileen Beasley, 28 July 2004.
45 Ibid.
46 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Glanmor Hughes was ‘very 
unpleasant’, stated Jones; trying all ways to intimidate him by playing ‘mind games’. He was, added
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News of Jones’ arrest came as a shock, exclaimed Owain Williams. Television news 
pictures confirmed his worst fears. The same news item, featuring a photograph of 
Jones, had also been seen by a regular visitor to Williams’ cafe. His brother was a 
member of the Gwynedd Constabulary. The feeling of shock was soon replaced with 
a sense of sadness and powerlessness.47 It was a reaction shared by John Albert 
Jones. Despite his growing unease, he was sure that his namesake would ‘not break 
down under the pressure’ and betray the identity of his accomplices. The amount of 
evidence found at Emyr Llywelyn Jones’s lodgings, included: maps and photographs 
of Tryweryn and the Bala area, books on explosives and letters to ‘people in Ireland’. 
It amounted to what one ‘might expect to be in the possession of a person intent, or
A O
guilty, of having caused an explosion’, later professed Glanmor Hughes.
The court room in Bala was packed on 21 February, when Jones appeared to 
face the charges against him. He was represented by W. R. P. George of Cricieth, the 
nephew of David Lloyd George. Following an admission that he could not object to 
the request for a further remand, George appealed for his client to be granted bail. All 
gathered knew, he added, that whoever was guilty of the offence, it was not ‘a 
criminal act in the common sense of the word’. It was a line of argument strongly 
opposed by Superintendent John St. David Jones of Dolgellau, who affirmed that the 
police were not in a position to proceed with the case and that he was surprised to hear 
a solicitor of the High Court state that the charge was not a criminal matter. 
Following a brief adjournment, the chair of the bench, O. LI. Jones from 
Llanuwchllyn, declared that the defendant be released on bail in his own surety of 
£100 and two other sureties for the same amount, to appear at Bala magistrates court 
on 14 March. He added however one stipulation: that Jones return to reside at the 
home of his parents in Llandysul.
Under the leadership of Gwilym Tudur Jones, sixty students had journeyed 
from Aberystwyth to support Emyr Llywelyn Jones 49 While he was on bail, the
Jones, ‘the up-and-coming young sergeant, playing the hard man. It was easy to do with a student’.
47 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. A female employee informed him that 
the man whom he had welcomed as a guest to his Pwllheli home, just a fortnight before, had been taken 
in for questioning.
Terfysgwyr Tryweryn, S4C Production. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
49 WM, 22 February 1963. The two sureties were D. Gwenallt Jones, a reader in Modem Welsh 
Literature and Bobi Jones, a lecturer o f education at Aberystwyth University. As Jones stepped from 
the court the students greeted him with cheers and applause. Each student who attended the hearing 
was fined 10s for missing a lecture and for defying the University Principal Tom Parry, who had 
declared the court ‘out o f bounds’. For having twice hired a bus to attend Jones’s two court
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decision was taken by a small number of them to continue the militant campaign. The 
group went as far as to purchase a timing device from a source in London. It had been 
a ‘heat of the moment decision’ one of the group admitted in 2006. The symbolic 
action had been taken; there was no point in taking it any further. Besides, with the 
length of Jones’ sentence still to be determined, to carry out a further attack involving 
explosives would almost certainly have resulted in a somewhat lengthy sentence for 
the perpetrators, had they been caught and found guilty. Had those involved remained 
undetected however, ‘the authorities would have been aware that something was 
afoot: very amateurish and very idealistic’. Nevertheless, the decision not to continue, 
the source declared, had been correct.50
Emyr Llywelyn Jones’s court appearance was widely reported in the nation’s 
Welsh language newspapers; most notably, Baner ac Amserau Cymru, which 
addressed the frustration felt by many of the nation’s youth for the traditional 
adherence to constitutional political practice in Wales. Expressing this view, it 
declared that the democratic process had proved itself ineffective; furthermore, those 
opposed to the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn were now ‘hand tied’. Although the paper 
did not support illegal action, only through breaking the law, it maintained, could 
opposition to the scheme be exercised.51
At Jones’s trial, J. Wood, on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
informed the court that explosives experts now estimated the damage to the 
compound to be £2,600; and that approximately two pounds of explosives had been 
used. Beneath the transformer, a mechanism had been found, of the kind used in 
time-bombs. Nearby, police had also found a red plastic material, pieces of cork, 
greasy brown paper and a small torch bulb with wires attached. The brown paper 
corresponded with fragments of the wrapping of a commercial explosive. The deep 
snow had proved ‘an extremely fortunate matter’ for the police, Wood added, as 
‘three deep and distinct sets of footprints had been found from the compound ridge on 
the dam side, to the transformer and back again’; moreover, the footprints led across 
the fields to the Bala-Ffestiniog road. Crucially, police had been able to deduce that 
the footprints had been made by a pointed shoe, a nailed climbing boot and an 
‘ordinary shoe’. Their imprints led up to the mound behind the transformer, where a
appearances, G. T. Jones was reportedly ‘sent down’ by college officials until ‘the end o f term’.
Anonymous interview with WT, January 2006.
51 Baner ac Amserau Cymru, 28 February 1963.
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two-cell battery torch had been found. Wood then referred to unexplained patches of 
blue stain, which had been located at several points along the route back to where car 
tyre marks had been found. Here, further prints of the pointed shoe and the climbing 
boot had also been detected. Continuing their search along the Cerrigydrudion road, 
police found two coils of white-plastic covered wire and further pointed footprints. 
The wire appeared to be from one or more electric detonators, and had been
S9abandoned or discarded, ‘only a short time before’.
Police-inspector R. E. Jones of Bala, one of the officers who had carried out 
the search along the Cerrigydrudion road, informed the court that officers had 
discovered evidence that a car had left the road and become stuck in the snow. 
Nearby, were more climbing boot prints, a woollen glove and a handkerchief bearing 
the initial ‘E’. The court heard that the car hired by Emyr Llywelyn Jones had been 
returned three days later, having travelled a distance of 641 miles. Swobs taken inside 
the car, had clearly revealed contamination by explosive substances, similar to those 
found at the transformer. Furthermore, debris found within a pocket of a donkey 
jacket removed from Jones’ lodgings, were found to have traces of the same explosive 
substances.
Other material taken from Jones’s lodgings, included license plate numbers of 
Gwynedd police cars and three letters. The)7 were in Welsh and in Jones’ hand. One 
stated that the recipient had heard ‘plenty of brave words’ from him. He urged the 
addressee to wait three months before ‘committing the act’ as that would afford him 
the time ‘to resign’. He still wanted to be involved, as no one was more ‘conscious of 
failure’ than he. Requesting they meet again ‘for a chat’, Jones asked for forgiveness 
for the ‘mistake’ he had made; and offered his blessing and best wishes should the 
receiver decide to ‘go ahead’ on his own. Nonetheless, it was worth remembering 
that he alone possessed ‘the technical knowledge’. The ‘utmost caution was needed’, 
the letter ended, ‘therefore bum all letters, party literature and any list of addresses 
they might possess’. At the foot of each was written in bold letters LLOSGI.
S3(Bum). In April 2007, Emyr Llywelyn Jones revealed that he had sent the letters to 
Gwilym Tudur Jones and other students sympathetic to carrying out a measured
52 WM, 15 March 1963. E. LI. Jones denied deliberately spilling ink intermittently while returning to 
the car. The pointed shoe, he smiled, was worn by Owain Williams; he did not know where Williams 
had ‘got that modem stuff ...but it had proved ‘totally inadequate’. Telephone interview between WT 
& Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 10 October 2010.
53 Ibid.
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protest action at the Tryweryn site.54
The tone and character of the letters found at Jones’ lodgings, reminded Det. 
Sergeant Glanmor Hughes of a ‘South American revolutionary’. So much so, that in 
July 2003, he alleged that Hywel Hughes, the Welsh businessman who had made his 
fortune exporting cattle in Columbia, had financially supported Emyr Llywelyn 
Jones.55 It was a claim dismissed by Jones as risible.56 Nevertheless, in July 2007, 
Owain Williams conceded that Hughes had sent a cheque for $280 to his wife, to help 
with the upkeep of his business and family costs.57 Whatever the extent of his 
involvement, as the decade unfolded, it was not the last time that ‘Hughes of Bogata’ 
was linked to the rise in militant action in Wales.
In court the following day, night watchman Cadwaladr Jones astonished the 
hearing, by first begging the pardon of the court, then declaring himself to be ‘a 
Welshman’. The outburst followed a request by J. Wood, that he describe the 
destruction found at the transformer. As a storm of cheering and applause erupted 
from the public gallery, magistrate O. Llywelyn Jones warned that the court would be
CO
cleared if the noise continued. Cadwaladr Jones was not the only one sympathetic. 
That evening, BBC Wales transmitted a programme entitled Gallery. The programme 
resulted in viewers telephoning the Western Mail, complaining that the programme’s 
content had been both in contempt of court and that as the matter was still sub judice,
54 Telephone interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 15 April 2007. Posted when E. LI. 
Jones worked in Cardiff, they were sent to G. T. Jones, Geraint Jones and Dyffyg Thomas; Owain 
Williams was not included. Jones admitted to feeling some annoyance at his flat mate’s failure to get 
rid of such incriminating material, but it had not really mattered in the end; additional evidence having 
proved ‘over-whelming’.
55 Tetfysgwyr Tryweryn, S4C Production. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
56 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. There was no contact with 
Hughes, stated Jones. They had neither met, nor exchanged written correspondence. In fact, Jones did 
not think that Hughes was ever mentioned in conversation; either among his college friends or with O. 
Williams and J. A. Jones. There existed a good deal o f ‘innuendo’ that Hughes was financing ‘this 
revolution’, stated Williams; it was ‘rubbish’; though he was sure Hughes ‘would have done’, had 
Williams asked. He was ‘someone’ Williams ‘liked very much’, being very charismatic and 
individualistic. Williams later spent time at Hughes’ home on Anglesey when he returned. Telephone 
interview between Owain Williams & WT, 10 July 2007.
57 Ivor Wynne Jones, H itler’s Celtic Echo (Aberystwyth, 2006), p.208; also, telephone interview 
between WT & Owain Williams, 27 July 2007. Hughes sending the cheque ‘was more than a lot o f  
local people did’, remarked Williams. Yet, the business did ‘go down’. One reason was the 
announcement by a local grammar school headmaster, that pupils were banned from going to the cafe.
Williams, the headmaster declared, was ‘a bad influence’.
58 WM, 15 March 1963. The reason the car recorded mileage in excess o f that considered likely for the 
journey undertaken over the weekend, was ‘probably’ owing to him being ‘unsure o f the route and 
taking wrong turns’. Telephone interview between WT & E. LI. Jones, 15 April 2007.
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that those people interviewed were prejudicial to the court proceedings.59 Interviewed 
for the programme, Gwynfor Evans declared that those responsible for the strike at 
Tryweryn had his ‘full sympathy, respect and moral support’.60 He certainly had no 
intention of expelling those involved from Plaid Cymru.61 Having for years slalomed 
carefully through the course of constitutional politics, such remarks typified to some 
members of the wider public, much of what appeared untrustworthy about Plaid 
Cymru. To those vehemently opposed to nationalist politics in Wales, Evans 
appeared little more than the two heads of the same coin. He was, they opined, the 
wily politician, who publicly criticised the use of violence as a political tool on the 
one hand, while being sympathetic with those prepared to use it on the other. 
Especially, if  undertaken to further the political ambitions of Plaid Cymru towards an 
‘independent’ Wales.
Nonetheless, despite Plaid Cymru’s pacifist credentials, anxious government 
ministers attempted to establish whether the party was behind the strike at Tryweryn, 
or, if  not, whether it might be tempted to endorse, or sanction, any such activity. 
Following Evans’ appearance on Gallery, Lord Brecon, the incumbent Tory Minister 
for Welsh Affairs, requested a copy of the transcript. The controller of BBC Wales, 
wrote to one of Brecon’s officials apologising that no recording of the interview 
existed, but sent a memo written by the programme’s interviewer, James Tucker. 
Despite Evans’ assurances that Plaid Cymru would never target the public in a 
campaign of violence, Tucker concluded that three points had made an impression. 
Firstly, if the party executive considered that violence would do the party no electoral 
harm, then it might officially advocate such a policy. Secondly, violent protest could 
conceivably be carried out against people. Thirdly, the leadership was aware that its 
position might be ignored by party members who did favour adopting a policy of
f\0direct action.
59 Ibid. The interview entitled ‘Standpoint’, was recorded between James Tucker and Gwynfor Evans 
21 February 1963. TNA, BD 25/59. Miscellaneous Welsh Bodies: Plaid Cymru 1958 - 1973.
60 Gwynfor: Yr Aelod Dros Gymru? BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005. They 
‘were acting for Wales’, Evans added. Furthermore, they were acting ‘courageously’ and in a way they 
saw as ‘most effective’.
61 WM, 15 March 1963. In 2003, Gwynfor Evans again dismissed any suggestion Plaid Cymru had 
considered engaging in violent protest. While he was a ‘self-declared pacifist’, at the party’s 
conference in Swansea in 1938, a vote was taken never to use violence in pursuit o f its aims. 
Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
62 TNA, BD 25/59. File entitled: Miscellaneous Welsh Bodies: Plaid Cymru 1958 - 1973. The 
government, the report stated, must ‘retain the goodwill of the Nationalist Party in Wales’; recognise 
the importance o f its attempt to work on constitutional lines; and the efforts it had taken in preventing
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The second day of Emyr Llywelyn Jones’ hearing, began with his defence counsel 
contesting the results of forensic tests carried out on a donkey jacket found at his 
lodgings. Police Chief Inspector, A. H. Allen, of the Preston Forensic Laboratory, 
asserted that upon examination, debris found in the pocket was discovered to be 
contaminated with three explosive substances. When asked if a sample had been 
retained, so as to enable the defence to carry out a similar test, Allen replied that he 
had returned the debris to the jacket pocket. He had failed to place it in a container, 
he explained, owing to it having being chemically destroyed during the forensic 
examination. This was not uncommon, he stated; adding that it was not his function 
to invite scientists acting on behalf of the defence to witness his examinations. 
Among other articles removed from Jones’ room, were two pages from the Western 
Mail. These also, stated Allen, revealed contamination with three explosive 
substances, similar to those found on articles located near the damaged transformer.
Notes of a conversation, which occurred at Jones’ lodgings between him and 
Det. Inspector Humphrey Jones, were read to the court by Det. Sergeant Glanmor 
Hughes. Having admitted hiring the red Vauxhall Victor, Jones was asked to outline 
his movements on the night of 10 February. He and a few college friends had 
intended to drive to Prestatyn, he declared, but owing to a flat tyre, they had been 
forced to catch a bus near Corwen. The group had neither suffered further problems 
with the car, nor had it become stuck in snow. They had both journeyed through and 
returned via Bala and at no stage had any of the party been near the Tryweryn site. 
The following day, he was asked if he would like to make a statement, remarked 
Glanmor Hughes. It was a suggestion which saw W. R. P. George interject. While 
the questions already read were inadmissible in evidence, he proclaimed, a dispute 
now existed as to whether his client had been cautioned at that stage in the inquiry. If 
no caution had been issued, then the bench should decide whether further evidence 
should be heard in private. Following a consultation, court-clerk B. J. Williams 
announced that the inadmissibility of evidence concerning the caution and statement 
would be heard and discussed in camera. When the five magistrates returned some 
two-and-a-half hours later, chair O. LI. Jones declared his satisfaction that the accused 
had been cautioned, both at his lodgings and later at Aberystwyth police station.
itself from disintegrating into myriad militant cells. Gwynfor Evans, the memo added, ‘obviously 
wants to avoid a situation which could be embarrassing to the government, to the Welsh people, to 
himself as leader o f the Nationalist Party and to the Nationalist Party as it is constituted at present’.
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Police constable Arthur Jones informed the court that the red Vauxhall Victor saloon 
was observed by a patrol car passing Fidler’s Elbow, Treharris, at 1.33 a.m. on 9 
February. With little more made of the incident, surely Jones was asked, the 
authorities must have speculated why the car involved in the protest had been so close 
to the home of David Pritchard; a collier, with a knowledge of explosives, who just 
six months earlier had carried out a protest at the site. They might well have made the 
connection, he replied, but there had not been enough evidence to implicate 
Pritchard.64 Evidence was also given by 18 year-old, Hugh Llywelyn Roberts, a 
butcher’s apprentice from Cwmtirmynach. Roberts stated that at 12.30 a.m., on 11 
February, shortly after becoming stuck in a snowdrift on the Bala to Cerrigydrudion 
road, a red Vauxhall Victor car had passed him before it too became stuck in a ditch. 
The car had contained three men; all of whom were unknown to him. Two of the 
occupants had got of the car and one of the two had spoken. Roberts had helped push 
the car out of the ditch, by pushing from the rear, in order to redirect it down the road 
on which it had travelled. Sergeant B. O. Shimmins of Liverpool City Police 
fingerprints department, revealed that part of a palm-print found on the boot lid of the 
car was identical with prints taken of Roberts’ palm.65
Emyr Llywelyn Jones now faced an additional charge, that of between 8 and 
11 February, of ‘knowingly having in his possession, or under his control in 
Meirionnydd, an unknown quantity of explosives in such circumstances as to give rise 
to reasonable suspicion that it was in his possession or control for an unlawful 
object’.66 Jones pleaded guilty to both charges; adding quiescently that he did not 
consider his action to have been an offence ‘in the ordinary or accepted meaning of 
the word’. Granted further bail, Jones was ordered to appear for trial and sentencing 
at Carmarthenshire Assizes.
In response to reports that 300 people - from across Wales - were expected to 
gather outside the Guild Hall in Carmarthen, police revealed that access to the hearing
/TO
would only be possible to those who possessed a security pass. Those attending the
63 WM, 16 March 1963. Jones claimed the party left Aberystwyth at 6.00 p.m., arrived in Corwen at 
‘about nine’ and returned to Aberystwyth at 3.00 a.m.
64 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Emyr Llywelyn Jones stated: 
‘...and I wasn’t going to say anything’.
65 WM, 16 March 1963.
66 Ibid. This second charge also came under the Explosive Substances Act, 1883.
67 BaAC, 21 March 1963. Jones’ bail was increased from £100 to £300.
68 WM, 28 March 1963.
trial arrived to discover that nearly 100 police officers, drafted in from Llanelli, 
Ammanford and Aberystwyth, were positioned at strategic points throughout the 
town, while crash barriers stood erected around Guildhall Square. With a mountain of 
evidence against the defendant, Prosecuting Counsel, Tasker Watkins QC, remarked 
that it was not for the prosecution to speculate upon the extent of Jones’ involvement, 
but it was clear that for some time he had decided upon a course of action, the result 
of which was undeniable. The court then heard evidence testifying to Jones’ good 
character from Professor Jac. L. Williams of University College of Wales, 
Aberystwyth and Revd. W. R. Nichols.
The action of the accused, declared counsel for the defence, Elwyn Jones QC, 
had not been undertaken to cause serious destruction of property. This was evident in 
both the small amount of explosives used and that the charge had been placed in such 
a way that there existed no consequential danger. Jones was a brilliant student, yet, 
throughout the previous twelve months, a ‘certain deterioration in his work’ had been 
reported. This, he believed, might have been caused by ‘the agonising decision’ of 
whether to carry out the ‘symbolic act and to embark on this grave illegality’. The 
decision to do so, had caused ‘deep distress and agony of mind’; it had not been 
embarked upon ‘out of sheer bravado’. Jones was a young man of ‘exemplary and 
complex character’; who throughout the torments and doubts of youth, had 
maintained the ‘qualities of spiritual integrity’. Mercy would do more to achieve the 
well-being and peace of Wales, than emphasis on punishment. Having re-stated his 
guilty plea, Jones added quietly that he had nothing to add.69 Speaking in September 
2003, E. LI. Jones revealed why he remained reticent.
Before the trial, Elwyn Jones asked me in the rooms below the courtroom, if  I intended making 
a speech from the dock. When I replied that I was going to explain that we were trying to save 
this community, he said that in that case he would not be able to defend me. If I chose not to, 
then he was confident that he could get a minimum sentence, but if  I insisted, then the Judge 
would have no alternative but to impose a heavier sentence...He had, he said, a son my age and 
that he was trying to imagine how my parents would be feeling...He explained that in legal 
terms I might expect to get perhaps three years. However, if  I pleaded guilty, he thought he 
might be able to reduce the sentence and lessen the suffering o f my family. I decided to listen 
to him: you have to think o f other people’s feelings. I had made my protest; it was enough
69 WM, 30 March 1963. Outside the hearing, Plaid Cymru officials distributed leaflets asserting the 
guilt of Liverpool Corporation and Parliament.
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without acting the individual hero in the dock.70 
A ‘visibly moved’ Justice Barry then passed sentence. With words often ‘barely 
audible’, he declared it to be the most pathetic case he had presided over. Evidence 
suggested that Jones was a young man of the highest character. He had aroused 
considerable sympathy, yet unfortunately, in furtherance of his views, he had 
embarked upon a most serious criminal enterprise, which had resulted in a very serious 
criminal offence. Justice Barry believed that Jones had set forth on this course of 
conduct from no disgraceful motive, but nonetheless, he had a duty to ensure that 
safety of property was preserved. He was therefore impelled to deter any similar such 
action. With what Barry declared to be ‘great reluctance’, he sentenced Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones to a year’s imprisonment. The sentence was received in silence. 
Afterwards, Jones turned smartly and walked deliberately to the steps leading to the 
cells below. Throughout the three months ordeal, from his arrest to his being
71sentenced, he had refused to reveal the identity of his two confederates.
Quietly, the public gallery began to empty. As the crowd made their way from 
the court, unbeknown to them, pamphlets bearing the words of a new song, set to the 
tune of Men o f Harlech, had been distributed by Plaid Cymru. Yet, no one sang. As 
an eerie silence befell the waiting crowd, twenty-four-year-old Gareth Roberts 
summed up the mood. It had been the intention to greet news of the verdict with a 
defiant and rousing chorus of the re-worked Welsh chapel standard, he announced, 
however, on reflection, it had been thought more effective to greet the news in 
silence.
Asked for his thoughts in 2003, on the line of prosecution taken by war-hero 
Sir Tasker Watkins, E. LI. Jones was nothing but complimentary. Watkins, he 
discerned ‘was a gentleman’; who may possibly have admired their protest. He had
7-1
not at all prosecuted in ‘a nasty way’, but rather, had appeared ‘almost sympathetic’. 
Contacted in 2007, Sir Tasker was asked if the moral argument had been with those
70 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005. Prior to his counsel’s advice,
Jones intended to make ‘a big speech from the dock like the Irish do’.71 Carmarthen Journal, 5 April 1963. ‘It never crossed my mind that he would’. Interview between 
WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
72 WM, 30 March 1963; also, Baner ac Amserau Cymru, 4 April 1963; also, WM, 30 March 1963; also,
CJ, 5 April 1963; also Cambria, (Carmarthen, January/February 2006).
73 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. If there was one man on the 
judicial circuit who would understand the moral issue involved, Elwyn Jones informed his client, it was 
Tasker Watkins. He had been, E. LI. Jones conceded, ‘lucky to get him’. Telephone interview 
between WT & E. LI. Jones, 15 April 2007
involved in ‘direct action’? He could not say, yet to his mind the moral argument was 
clear. It was debatable whether the creation and purpose of the dam, outweighed that 
which was being lost. Nature had created a thing of beauty and it belonged to the 
world, and in a more particular sense, the people of the country in which it existed. 
To eradicate forever, something so enriching, seemed at the very least questionable.74
Owain Williams and John Albert Jones continue the MAC offensive; soon 
arrested they are charged and sentenced
If the authorities hoped the Tryweryn explosion was an aberration, or that the 
sentence imposed upon Emyr Llywelyn Jones would act as a deterrent to those 
considering militant protest, they were wrong. On 31 March, at Gellilydan, 
Maentwrog, some fifteen miles from Bala, four explosive charges were attached to an 
electrical pylon carrying power to the Tryweryn reservoir site. Three failed to
nc
detonate. In 2006, a former leading member of Mudiad Amdiffyn Cymru stated that 
‘thankfully, it was a botched job’. He had guessed straight away who was behind it 
and thought it likely the explosives had been miswired, as neither Williams nor Jones, 
to his understanding, had any knowledge of how an explosive charge should be
7 f \assembled. It appeared that the action had been undertaken solely to ‘get caught’.
The explosion was heard by a farmer who, on discovering the damaged pylon 
the following afternoon, notified the police. Unknown to him, officers had also been 
informed of the explosion by the Western Mail. That same Sunday night, an 
anonymous call was received at the paper’s office from someone purporting to be ‘in 
charge of the publicity for the organisation’. The ‘principal suspects’, confirmed the 
Gwynedd Constabulary, were the ‘direct action’ group of Welsh nationalists. A 
spokesman for the Merseyside and North Wales Electricity Board, declared it to have 
been ‘a narrow escape’. The pylon carried a combined 99,000 volt line; had an 
explosion resulted in it toppling, then power would have been cut off over a large
77area.
At 11.00 p.m., on Sunday, 7 April, Owain Williams was arrested at his cafe in 
Pwllheli. His arrest was a ‘series of errors’, he remarked in March 2003. With a theft
74 Telephone interview between WT & Sir Tasker Watkins, 15 April 2007.
75 WM, 2 April 1963.
76 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2006.
77 WM, 2 April 1963.
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of explosives and detonators from a quarry stores in Llithfaen six months earlier and 
the explosion at Gellilydan seven days before, the police felt sure they had found their 
man. It had been a frightening experience, he admitted; but he had pleaded ignorance, 
stalling for time. Williams was escorted the brief distance to the police station, where 
he was interviewed by Humphrey Jones and Glanmor Hughes. While the senior 
officer had ‘acted decently’, his junior partner had informed him starkly that he was ‘a 
terrorist’, who might ‘easily have killed someone’. Having refused to sign a 
statement, which implicated him in the theft of the explosives at Llithfaen, the 
incident at Tryweryn and the explosion at Gellilydan, the police, Williams alleged, 
adopted another tactic. Taken to an upstairs window, which stared directly opposite 
into the upstairs rooms of his flat, there he saw his children, frightened and crying, 
being held aloft by police officers. The strategy worked. He signed the statement on 
the condition that his family be left alone. At the back of the cafe, police discovered a
no
number of detonators. In August 2005, Emyr Llywelyn Jones stated that he was 
saddened to hear that Williams and Jones had been arrested. He had hoped ‘they 
would get away with it’. The explosion had, he believed, been carried out to show 
support for him in prison. It had been ‘very foolhardy’, yet, he had respected them for 
it.79
There was worse to come for 29-year-old Owain Williams. At a special court 
session in Pwllheli the following evening, along with 18 year-old Robert Wyn 
Williams and 20 year-old Edwin Pritchard, he was jointly charged with stealing 2,000 
electric detonators from the explosives store of Crofts Quarries, Llithfaen, between 13
on
and 16 October 1962. The younger Williams and Pritchard - regular visitors to 
Owain Williams’ cafe in the town - were granted bail and instructed to appear at 
Pwllheli Magistrates Court on 22 April; each had been arrested just days before 
Owain Williams. With regard Owain Williams, police Inspector Cledwyn Shaw 
objected to his being granted bail, as he was due to appear in court at Blaenau 
Ffestiniog the following morning, in order to face ‘two serious charges’ with a person
78 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Williams was surprised to see ‘about 
twelve’ officers entering the cafe, ten from the front entrance and two from the kitchen behind the 
counter. Trying hard to conceal his concern, Williams politely informed them he was locking up for 
the night. When none answered, he asked them if  it was cigarettes they were after. It was not, they 
announced: they had come for him. The game, he realised, ‘was up’. Glanmor Hughes, alleged 
Williams, was a ‘hateful, repulsive bastard’. He was not threatened with ‘physical violence', but he
knew ‘they weren’t the boy scouts’.
79 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2005.
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already in custody. The charges came under Section II of the Explosives Substances 
Act 1883.81 The next day, Owain Williams and John Albert Jones were remanded in 
police custody until 18 April.
With the three Tryweryn saboteurs behind bars, opposition to the proposed 
Bill to flood Cwm Clywedog gathered momentum. Yet again, Plaid Cymru was at 
pains to prove its effectiveness as a political force. With three farms, totalling 615 
acres facing submersion, in early April, the Clywedog sub-committee devised a new 
policy. With subscriptions raised by party members, it announced its decision to take 
out a 25-year-lease on 2.6 acres of land at the heart of the threatened valley. Over the 
coming weeks and months, the land was sub-divided into 75 units and rented to some 
200 people from Wales; and others from as far afield as Australia, Canada, Germany 
and the United States hostile to the plan. The reason behind the action was a legal 
stipulation as outlined in the Property and Land Law. This stated that any person in 
possession of land, or property on land desired by a corporation, whether 
occupied/inhabited or not, had to be allowed to voice his or her opinion, either for or 
against a takeover, to a public enquiry; irrespective of the owner’s place of residency. 
This however, was not the only protection it was hoped the law might afford. It was 
also held that leaseholders had a legal guardianship of the land, and as such, 
trespassers could be prevented from gaining access. A legal opportunity to prevent 
unwelcome surveyors access had been granted. Nevertheless, having adhered to the 
letter of the law, an amendment was issued, stating that no longer would there be any 
need to call witnesses and interested parties to the enquiry. For one Welsh nationalist 
from Llangennech, the U-turn summed up the wider nationalist struggle. It was this 
‘callousness’, recalled Denis Coslett in 2000, which prompted his decision to become 
more involved.84
80 TNA, DPP 2/4471.
81 WM, 9 April 1963.
82
WM, 10 April 1963. J. A. Jones was arrested the morning after Williams. TNA, DPP 2/4471.
83 http://www.llgc.org.uk/ymgyrchu/Dwr/Clywedog/index-e.htm. The decision to purchase the land 
was taken by the Plaid Cymru executive in November 1962. Harri Webb, No Half-Way House
(Talybont, 1997), (ed). Stephens, p.235.
84 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 12 December 2000. ‘How’, Coslett asked robustly, could 
you ‘reason with people like that?’. Two days after Pritchard and Walters were fined, it was 
announced that the River Severn Resources Committee intended flooding Cwm Clywedog in 
Montgomeryshire. It was in order to make the ‘river’s waters available to future big abstractors’. LDP, 
5 October 1962.
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Aware of the storm clouds amassing over the Clywedog proposal,85 on 18 April, 
Owain Williams and John Albert Jones appeared in court at Blaenau Ffestiniog. They 
were represented by J. Roberts of Pwllheli. Each faced the charge of being ‘part 
responsible’ for the explosion at the Tryweryn site two months earlier. Despite 
Roberts’ plea for ‘justice and not mercy’, bail was denied. The two accused were
oz-
committed to stand trial in the same court nine days later.
The day before their trial, in an article entitled The Importance o f Welsh 
Water, published in the Liverpool Daily Post, Cledwyn Hughes, the Labour MP for 
Anglesey, addressed the concern that the nation’s youth was being drawn into a 
downward spiral of reactionary violence. He believed that the future of Wales 
depended upon young people who had the ability to draft a good amendment, not
07
those who could handle high explosives. Nonetheless, for Plaid Cymru member and 
future MAC policy advisor, Harri Webb, the issue of exploiting Welsh water was 
recognised as a pivotal moment in the nation’s own political and cultural journey. 
That same month, in a letter to Gwilym Prys Davies, a former member of the Welsh 
Republican Movement, Webb discerned that for men of his generation, there existed a 
remarkable parallel between recent Welsh history and pre-war English history. The 
Munich Agreement, ‘that paper signed by Hitler and Chamberlain in 1938 had 
shamed England’, wrote Webb, and England knew it had been shamed; from then on 
‘the days of appeasement were at an end’. Here in Wales, Webb added intently, 
‘Tryweryn was our Munich. Clywedog may be our Poland’.88
Shortly after midnight on 27 April, police and fire service officers were called 
to a fire at the Tryweryn reservoir site. Despite their best efforts, a laboratory and its 
contents, owned by Liverpool Corporation, was destroyed. Police immediately 
ordered a security clamp-down. When approached for a statement regarding the 
incident, a fire officer at Dolgellau revealed that he had been ordered ‘not to release
85 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Thirty days after Owain Williams was 
imprisoned, the Clywedog Reservoir Bill was passed by Parliament. With the Bill’s Royal Assent a 
formality, work began to ready the valley for flooding. Following a High Court Order, on 13 October 
1965, the first family was evicted from their farm in Cwm Clywedog. WM, 14 October 1965. 
Relocated to a property owned and restored by Birmingham Water Authority, with sobering irony, the 
Evans family discovered the farmhouse, further up the valley, had yet to be connected to the water 
supply. Unwaith Eto, 1965. S4C Production. Screened S4C, September 2002.
86 BaAC, 25 April 1963.07
Liverpool Daily Post, 26 April 1963.
88 Webb, No Half-Way House, (ed.) Stephens, p.233.
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any information’. Later that morning, Owain Williams and J. A. Jones appeared in 
court at Blaenau Ffestiniog. A plea for bail was refused and the case was postponed 
until 7 May.90
Early that same May, after spending little over four weeks in Swansea Prison, 
Emyr Llywelyn Jones was transferred to the prison in Shrewsbury. The reason for his 
transfer, was so that he could be ‘identified’ at the trial of Williams and J. A. Jones in 
Blaenau Ffestiniog.91 On the first day of their trial, John Wood, acting on behalf of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions, astounded the court with the revelation that the 
pair were members of a ‘movement to protect Wales’. Having read the oath of the 
alleged organisation, the court also heard that articles found in Owain Williams’ cafe 
premises, included 21 newspaper cuttings. These related to the Tryweryn explosion 
and the prosecution of Emyr Llywelyn Jones. A number of tape-recorded news items 
of Jones’ trial were also found, along with a home-made Free Wales Army poster.
Under questioning, Williams admitted to being responsible for having painted 
large Free Wales Army slogans on walls near Bangor, and also painting Free Wales 
on the railway bridge at Portmadoc. John Wood further revealed that J. A. Jones and 
Williams had been ‘frequently seen’ with Emyr Llywelyn Jones in the weeks leading 
up to the incident at Tryweryn; most critically, on the evening before the explosion, 
leaving Williams’ cafe in Pwllheli by car. The forensic evidence against the two 
accused, as had been the case at the trial of their accomplice two months earlier, was 
overwhelming. Among new evidence, was the revelation that in early February, Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones had taken one packet of explosives, which Williams and an unnamed 
man had removed in a large box to a site near Nefyn. Loud applause erupted from the 
public gallery, when Emyr Llywelyn Jones was led to the dock. He was then 
positively identified by the manager of Nelson’s car hire garage in Aberystwyth. 
Despite police calls for silence and a warning from the bench, cries of support and 
applause for Jones continued. As court officials began to hustle secondary school 
teacher Ceri Jones from the courtroom, he shouted a defiant ‘Cymru am Byth’ (Wales
89 WM, 29 April 1963. Soon reduced to rubble, the laboratory, used to carry out tests on water 
supplies, was a wooden hut 30 ft by 10ft. Owain Williams dismissed the idea the fire resulted from 
protest action; further believing that no other protest was attempted at the site after that undertaken by 
E. LI. Jones, J. A. Jones and himself. Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 15 April 
2007.
90 BaAC 2 May 1963.
91 BaAC, 23 May 1963.
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Forever).92
Having attempted to establish Williams’ and Jones’ involvement in the 
incident at Tryweryn, Wood turned his attention to the other charge against the two 
accused: the explosion on the electrical pylon at Gellilydan, Maentwrog, on 31 March. 
It had been ‘a symbolic act’, Williams had remarked to the police on his arrest, stated 
Wood. He had not intended to harm anyone; furthermore, he was solely responsible 
and as such, the ‘other two should be released without charge’. John Wood informed 
the court that had anyone come into contact with the pylon on the ground, they ‘would 
have been burned to death’.
When John Albert Jones was arrested at his sister’s home in 
Penrhyndeudraeth, police found locked in a suitcase, two pairs of white Korean 
Combat Overboots. When told that the boots’ tread corresponded with footprints 
found near the pylon at Gellilydan, Jones admitted his part in both explosions. 
Having done so, he too refused to implicate anyone else. The suitcase also contained 
a diagram outlining the apparatus required to carry out an explosion; a map which had 
been marked to highlight the exact position of the pylon at Gellilydan; press cuttings 
of the two explosion incidents and a card bearing the oath of Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru.94 In 2004, Williams explained that he and J. A. Jones undertook the 
explosion at Gellilydan, to both ‘show solidarity’ with Emyr Llywelyn Jones and to 
continue the protest action against the flooding of Cwm Tyweryn. They did not have 
a clock, Williams admitted. He had blown the charge ‘on the spot by flicking two 
wires’ and had taken cover beneath an old stone bridge, just in case it fell headlong on 
top of him. He refuted the claim they endangered hospital services, as was alleged 
and believed the charge was merely an elaborate attempt to discredit their action. 
They had realized the pylons ran across the hills to Bala, and hoped by toppling the 
pylon, that electricity to the Tryweryn site would be halted.95
Evidence was then heard against Owain Williams, Robert Wyn Williams and 
Edwin Pritchard, regarding the incident at the Llithfaen quarry seven months before.
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WM, 8 May 1963; also, The Times, 8 May 1963. The court heard that E. LI. Jones wrote the oath 
some nine months before.
93 WM, 9 May 1963.
94 Ibid. It was also revealed that a car tyre print from Williams’ car matched one removed from near 
the scene o f the blast. TNA, DPP 2/4471. J. A. Jones later denied declaring to officers when asked to 
open the suitcase: ‘If I open it, it is finished’. Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March
2003.
95 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Some five pounds of gelignite was
94
All three pleaded guilty to both charges. Nevertheless, John Wood added that five 
months later, a red box containing 1,200 detonators was discovered buried in a hedge 
by a Nefyn farmer; one of the 12 paper bags containing detonators had been opened. 
Another 800 detonators were recovered from inside a box-like grave adjoining 
Llanarmon Church, near Chwilog. The police, Wood alleged, had been directed to 
these detonators by John Albert Jones.96 Supported by Owain Williams, it was an
07
accusation Jones fiercely denied. Others were found hidden in a refuse tip on the 
site of a nearby holiday camp; in the roof of Williams’ cafe home and among crates of 
coca cola in his garden shed. Another 1,620 detonators were found in an old building 
near Edwin Pritchard’s home in Nefyn and in his garden. The police, Wood further 
maintained, had been informed of these ‘caches’ by Owain Williams. Stolen 
explosives were also found hidden in the grounds of a large uninhabited house at 
Llanystumdwy and a quarry at Llanbedrog. Robert Wyn Williams was fined £25 and 
Edwin Pritchard was fined £40. Owain Williams was informed that the sentence 
against him would be heard at the conclusion of the trial he now faced with John
QO
Albert Jones. The decision to hide the stolen material in a church yard had caused 
quite a stir, in early 1960s, ‘God fearing’ north Wales, smiled Owain Williams. Its 
location had been ‘obvious’ as ‘nobody would suspect such a thing in a graveyard’.99
In March 2004, Owain Williams threw light on why the crate containing the 
detonators was so carelessly discarded. He had given the box to an associate, not a 
member of MAC, instructing him to hide the remaining detonators and ‘bum the crate 
in the gorse bushes’. The man had failed to do so and had simply thrown the crate 
containing its contents in a gorse bush instead. Children playing found the crate and 
took it to a nearby farmhouse. The farmer immediately informed the police, who 
were quickly able to trace the man entrusted to dispose of it. The person in question, 
Williams declared, had actually been involved in the theft, but due to his cooperation, 
was never charged. It had been ‘very difficult’, to acquire the material, Williams
fixed and linked to each leg o f the pylon.
96 WM, 8 May 1963.
97 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Williams revealed that Edwin Pritchard 
informed the police o f their whereabouts. Only Prichard was privy to this information and was 
instructed by Williams to hide them. The police did not even need ‘to call the kennels’, Williams
remarked disparagingly.
98 WM, 8 May 1963. Robert Wyn Williams was given one month to pay, Edwin Pritchard, three 
months. The box was found in the hedge at Nefyn on 2 March 1963.
99 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 27 July 2007. The suggestion by police, that 
Williams directed officers to the hidden detonators, he later rejected as ‘pathetic’.
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added, taking approximately one-and-a-half hours to break through a ‘heavy, 
magazine door’.100
Also speaking in 2004, John Jenkins - who in the years ahead orchestrated a 
campaign of militant action unparalleled in Welsh history - gave his verdict on the 
security of Williams’ operation. It was not the way to conduct sabotage, he remarked. 
Boxes thrown in hedges just gave the impression that those involved were amateurs. 
Nothing succeeds like success, Jenkins added. You had to prove you could do it; and 
it had to be ‘done properly’.101
The following day, William Pugh Roberts of Pwllheli alleged that in response 
to his claim of having recognised Emyr Llywelyn Jones ‘a number of times’ at Owain 
Williams’ home, including ‘one entire weekend’, he had been told by Williams that he 
was mistaken and ‘to shut his mouth’. It was not the only incriminating evidence: two 
tickets were also presented, which it was claimed, proved that Williams’ car passed 
over the tollgate bridge at Portmadoc. One had been issued a few hours before the 
explosion at Gellilydan, the other in the early hours of the following morning.102 
Owain Williams later refuted the charge, insisting that he and J. A. Jones had travelled 
to and from Gellilydan via the ‘back road’. It had merely been ‘a piece of fabricated 
evidence’, he believed, designed to show Glanmor Hughes as ‘the clever detective’. 
Hoping to discredit Williams still further in the mind of the bench, John Wood 
informed the court that police had found two books at his home on the question of
i rnIrish Home Rule. Next to give testimony was farmer Aneurin Jones. He stated that 
having heard a loud explosion near to his farmhouse at 22.30, the following day, he 
noticed ‘yellow wire’ running across the road from his farm. It had been connected, 
he added, to a ‘dry battery’ placed the other side of the railway bridge.104
On 9 May, Owain Williams received the most meagre of good news. The 
bench, he was informed, had amended the charge against him to 3,886 and not 3,920 
detonators stolen from the quarry at Lithfaen. More significantly however, it was also
100 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Back in Pwllheli, the driver realised he 
had forgotten to retrieve a radio he had removed from the car when loading the explosives. Mindful it 
was covered in palm and finger prints, Williams returned with his wife and purporting to be a courting 
couple, retrieved it.
101 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
102 WM, 9 May 1963.
103 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. One book was based on the life of 
Michael Collins, another was entitled The Red Path o f  Glory with the IRA in the Fight fo r Freedom. 
Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn, p.65.
104 WM, 9 May 1963.
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agreed to delete the words ‘to endanger life’, in the joint charge against him and J. A. 
Jones in relation to the pylon explosion at Gellilydan. This mirrored the charge each 
faced in relation to the Tryweryn incident. In an attempt to substantiate the symbolic 
intent of each explosion, the bench further agreed to accept as evidence the oath of the 
‘Movement’.
Nevertheless, John Wood opposed bail. In support of the application, was 
defence counsel for each, John Roberts. After hearing 32 witnesses, examining 54 
exhibits and presiding for nearly 17 hours, Blaenau Ffestiniog magistrates committed 
Owain Williams and John Albert Jones for trial at Meirionnydd Assizes, Dolgellau, 
on 18 June. Bail for each of the two accused was granted, as was an application on 
behalf of Jones to receive legal aid.105
The following day, with unfortunate timing for the still to be sentenced J. A. 
Jones and Owain Williams, Emyr Llywelyn Jones began a hunger strike in 
Shrewsbury Prison.106 Shortly after, Emrys Roberts released a statement from Plaid 
Cymru, which declared that the determination of Jones’s action, demonstrated the 
‘deep and poignant’ feeling in Wales against the actions of Liverpool Corporation. 
Furthermore, a meeting was needed, where it and those local authorities in Wales 
most affected by the scheme, could discuss the suitability of agreeing to a policy of 
joint ownership and co-management of the Tryweryn reservoir. The proposal was 
rejected by Liverpool Corporation. Five days into his hunger strike, having been 
moved to Walton Prison, Liverpool, where hospital facilities were on hand to treat 
those either fasting or intending to fast, Jones called off the protest. He had been
1 07warned that he would be forced fed two days later.
In October, 2005, Emyr Llywelyn Jones stated that he undertook the action, to 
‘raise the profile of the campaign’; and to try and take the protest away from violent 
action, a policy which he was aware might escalate. Having informed the prison 
governor that he intended to fast, his request that his family be notified was declined:
So, I was on hunger strike and nobody knew about it. So I wrote a letter to Gwilym and it was 
coded. Every third word had a meaning...I said ‘number 3 is important in Welsh literature, the 
poetry’s written in triads, so you think o f the letter three, it’s important’. And that was the
105 WM, 10 May 1963. The charge o f endangering human life was dropped, as the pylon was some 
distance from the road.
106 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
107 BaAC, 6 June 1963. E. LI. Jones dismissed any suggestion that the decision to hunger strike was 
taken in response to the circular written by Emrys Roberts on 28 February 1961. It was inspired, he 
declared, ‘by Gandhi’. Jones denied any knowledge o f Roberts’ plan o f action. Interview between WT 
& Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 16 August 2007.
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opening paragraph. And then I wrote the message to read: ‘I AM ON HUNGER STRIKE’. 
He did work it out and so informed the press...The prison authorities must have wondered how 
the news got out. Anything like that they wanted to suppress; the less publicity the better...On 
the fifth day, Bebb, the prison Doctor came to see me and said, “I'm in charge here and I've 
got to do it, and I don’t want to do it. You're putting me in a difficult position. OK”, he said, 
“you’ve done five days: you’ve made your point. What do you want to do eight days? Nine 
days? Ten days? What’s the point?”. So 1 was talked around. I should have gone on with 
that. But this chap Bebb was such a gentleman. 1 don’t regret calling it off now really.108
Emyr Llywelyn Jones was transferred to Exeter Open Prison to serve out the rest of
his sentence. The decision was taken, he believed, due to the authorities being afraid
of people protesting outside Walton Prison.109
On 14 June 1963 at Meirionnydd Assizes in Dolgellau, Owain Williams and
John Albert Jones pleaded guilty to the charges against them. Called to give evidence
on their behalf was Revd. E. Bowen, the vicar of Llanuwchllyn. He apologised to the
court, but asked that he might take the oath in Welsh before taking the stand. His
apology was rebuked by Justice Elwes, who to the delight of the public gallery, added
that the witness was entitled to make such a request; moreover, he was glad that
Bowen was insisting on his rights. Having commended the police for their successfiil
detection of the three men, Justice Elwes then placed John Albert Jones on three
year’s probation. He informed the court that he was doing so, as it was neither in the
interests of justice, nor Jones, for him to remain in custody.110 He urged Jones to
consult people who shared his view and in whom he had confidence. It was a fine
thing to be proud of one’s race and country; and to wish to be independent. Yet, it
was not acceptable to abandon democratic purposes towards that laudable end, even if
those processes did not appear to work very well. It was not in the democratic
interests of Wales, added Elwes, to counter decisions one was opposed to by adopting
such methods.111
Philip Owen, counsel for Owain Williams, declared that his client had acted 
solely from ‘a political motive’; fuelled by the injustice of Liverpool Corporation’s 
acquisition of Cwm Tryweryn and its intention to sell the reservoir water to 
neighbouring authorities at huge profit. In reply, Justice Elwes admitted to being 
‘greatly impressed’ with the thrust of Williams’ argument in mitigation. With an
108 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 16 October 2005.
109 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
110 TNA, DPP 2/4471; also, WM, 2 July 1963. Justice Elwes decided to release Jones, owing to his
‘age (22) and a medical certificate which stated that head injuries sustained in the RAF, rendered him
unable to fully appreciate the outcome o f his actions’.
111 TNA, DPP 2/4471; also, Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn, p.81.
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opaque nod to the unknown threat posed by Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, Justice Elwes 
declared that the recently committed offences were rather like an iceberg; and 
represented the 10 percent which was not submerged. If he could receive in any way 
an assurance that there would be no more resort to criminal offences, in order to 
ventilate what seemed to be a perfectly intelligible grievance, it would make his task 
‘much easier and much less painful’. Even so, he was persuaded to ignore retributive 
punishment in any event. Having heard testimony that Owain Williams’ youngest 
daughter, aged just three months, was gravely ill in a Liverpool hospital following a 
brain operation, Elwes released him on bail to appear again for sentencing on 1 July. 
He had decided upon the unprecedented step of releasing Williams, Justice Elwes
119explained, to calm the rising tide of unrest in Wales Any shared hope by the 
Williams family that their son, husband and father might escape prison was short­
lived, as the following day, undermining newspaper coverage implied Justice Elwes 
had considered militant action over Tryweryn ‘a justifiable grievance’.113 The Daily 
Herald went still further: the Judge, it headlined, ‘hints of deal with saboteur’.114 Any 
prospect of clemency was at an end.
The sentencing opened with an address to the court by Philip Owen, who 
stated that during the adjournment, Williams had appreciated both his family 
responsibilities and had sought scrupulous advice. He was prepared to give an 
unqualified undertaking as to his future conduct, but would not offer any assistance 
regarding the remainder of the organisation. In his summing up, Justice Elwes 
informed Williams that it had been submitted to the court that his crimes represented a 
‘symbolic act’. This, he did not accept. Furthermore, it was important that the court 
did not interfere in the question of whether a grievance, arising from Williams’ 
political views, was indeed just or not. He was previously a man of ‘high character’; 
from the outset, the case against him had caused Elwes ‘very great anxiety’. 
Nonetheless, he wished to remove any danger that Williams had misunderstood his 
remarks when he last appeared in court. He was not concerned to consider whether 
indeed Williams’ grievance was just, even if it did appear intelligible.
The judge commented that the oath of Mudiad Amdiffyn Cymru, found by
112 WM, 15 June 1963. Owain Williams’ daughter Teleri Bethan, was found to be suffering from 
hydrocephalus (water on the brain). Despite surviving for seven more years, much o f  the time she was 
in a coma.
113 LDP, 15 June 1963; also, WM, 15 June 1963.
114
Daily Herald, 15 June 1963; also, Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn, p. 84.
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police in Williams’ home, had caused ‘further anxiety’. He had been invited to regard 
this manifesto, as something which mitigated the offences, but that had not been its 
central purpose. This had been to damage important installations. These were serious 
crimes, which had resulted in the loss of considerable amounts of money. However, 
he had decided not to impose a term of imprisonment longer than that handed down to 
Emyr Llywelyn Jones.115 Following the hearing, Elwyn Roberts informed the waiting 
media that Plaid Cymru would be arranging a rota to help Irene Williams in the 
running of her husband’s business. Moreover, a fund had been opened to meet the 
expenses of the trial and to help the Williams’ family.116
No doubt to many observers, the year’s sentence imposed upon Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones and Owain Williams was a just and proportionate punishment; 
reflecting both the injustice felt by many in Wales to the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn, 
yet also the strong conviction held by the two men for the sanctity of human life. 
Nevertheless, while no doubt united in the belief that every effort had been taken to 
ensure that no innocent blood was spilt in the struggle for Welsh cultural, linguistic 
and political advance, to John Jenkins, speaking in 2004, the action of the three men 
had served only to further portray the Welsh people as subservient, naive and 
honourable. While respectful of its intentions, such action managed only to convince 
Jenkins that the time had come to elevate the nationalist struggle of Wales to that of ‘a 
guerrilla campaign’. In order to undertake an effective war of sabotage, he opined, 
you jumped in, you hit and you came away. In Jenkins’ opinion, if one was to base a 
policy or strategy on the fact, or principle, that ones opponent had a conscience and 
therefore all that was required was to shame him publicly and everything would come 
your way, then one was ‘not going to achieve a damn thing’. It was a lesson learnt by 
the Irish long ago. Not only did Jenkins think that cultural martyrdom and symbolic 
gestures led nowhere, it merely put one further back; by reinforcing the belief that 
Welsh people were ‘very nice; sang nice Welsh hymns, but were not very 
effective’.117
115 WM, 2 July 1963. Williams’ defence that the nation supported such action was an insult to its 
‘ancient and proud’ people, stated Elwes. He also took into account that Williams immediately 
undertook another explosion, on learning o f Jones’s imprisonment. Williams believes that Elwes 
awaited instruction from the Home Office as to what sentence to hand down, and perhaps might even 
have been reprimanded for intimating the sentence was going to be light. Telephone interview between 
WT & Owain Williams, 27 July 2007.
116 WM, 2 July 1963.
117 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004. It was ‘nice to see people standing up to
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It was a view with which Owain Williams concurred. Voicing his thoughts in 2004 
on the campaign undertaken by himself and his two confederates in 1963, Williams 
was quick to declare his ‘huge respect’ for Emyr Llywelyn Jones. Nonetheless, he 
had often wondered why Jones had been so meticulous in his planning and execution 
with regard the explosive device, but yet so careless in other areas of the operation; 
such as hiring a car from Aberystwyth; not changing its number plates; not having the 
car thoroughly cleaned before returning it; not ensuring that incriminating evidence 
had been removed from his flat and both carrying and dropping a handkerchief 
embossed with the incriminating initial ‘E \ His suspicion had intensified, added 
Williams, as Jones had often remarked how he wished to be a martyr like his hero
I 1 Q
Saunders Lewis. Asked to respond to Williams’ postulation, Emyr Llywelyn Jones 
admitted that there had perhaps existed an unconscious desire to get caught. 
Nevertheless, it had been an act undertaken with the ‘impetuosity and enthusiasm of 
youth’; they had not sought to be ‘sophisticated’. They were not ‘trained saboteurs’; 
that was not the intention. Had he deliberately dropped the handkerchief he was 
asked. After some thought, Jones conceded that he ‘probably’ had.119
Media interest in militant Welsh nationalism increases
With Emyr Llywelyn Jones and Owain Williams behind bars, questions were being 
asked. Was this new element in Welsh life, the ‘gelignite blast’, the work of 
individuals or an organised body? A stunt undertaken by disaffected university 
students? A mock IRA? A thousand conjectures now appeared in the columns of the 
country’s newspapers. With Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru and Free Wales Army 
symbols and slogans daubed in increasing numbers, could it be that at the extreme end 
of the protest spectrum, there really was a military style organisation?
It was a question given considerable focus by the Western Mail, in a series of
be counted’, stated Jenkins. But their ineffectiveness was ‘a pity’...What was ‘to be gained by carrying 
out an action, then holding your hands up, admitting your guilt and justifying your protest by declaring 
your moral cause? That should not be the way. The people wielding power have no shame’, he added. 
‘The principles of power had not changed from the time of two men in a cave fighting over a bone. 
Technology had changed; weaponry had changed, but the basic struggle o f power had remained 
constant. Whoever held power, did all they could to retain it. What was the point’, questioned Jenkins, 
‘o f doing something, just in the hope o f getting caught the day after?’.
118 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Williams conceded that often in the 
year’s following the incident, he had speculated that much of Jones’ negligence was perhaps deliberate.
Maybe he ‘left a lot o f clues’, thought Williams. That said, they had all been ‘a bit naive’ he added.
119 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 16 October 2005. ‘We were amateurs’ remarked 
Jones.
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articles penned by Peter Kane, who appeared convinced that MAC and the FWA were 
one and the same. The series opened by speculating who was behind the explosions. 
Despite the Plaid Cymru leadership’s careful effort to ‘distance itself from illegal 
action’ wrote Kane, the FWA had received ‘moral support and encouragement’ from 
certain senior and influential party members. As for the FWA itself, it was ‘a 
ramshackle body, top-heavy and pathetically amateurish’. It was impossible to assess 
the group’s exact numerical strength, but it appeared likely that it comprised of no 
more than ‘30 hardcore members’. Every former and current associate was known to 
the authorities. It was therefore reasonable to assume that they were under constant 
watch. As for its oath, that human life would not be in peril, if a device was set to 
activate at any given time, it was impossible to ensure beyond all doubt, that no one 
would be present when the blast occurred. The police meanwhile were confident the
i onFWA no longer posed a threat. It was a degree of acknowledgement of the group’s 
existence, somewhat at odds with the available evidence, which merely hinged at this 
juncture on slogans and daubings.
Whatever the truth, the confidence of the police was not shared by Peter Kane. 
Unless and until the FWA disarmed, he argued, there existed a potential nucleus for a 
full-scale campaign of violence and terrorism, on the pattern of that waged by the
191IRA. If it was a suggestion dismissed as ‘fanciful’ in most quarters, it was 
nonetheless a premise afforded some credence by the Plaid Cymru activist Harri 
Webb. Not all in the party agreed with the party’s pacifist traditions; or its rather 
‘folksy’ image, he stated. Indeed, there now existed within its ranks, a tougher more 
resolute faction, which was far less inclined to compromise.122 Unapologetic for his 
stance, Webb declared it ‘impossible for any nationalist not to sympathise with those 
involved in the three incidents at Tryweryn’. They were, he believed, ‘fighting in the
120 WM, 2 July 1963. The FWA seemed to resemble the Swiss Navy, stated Kane, in that almost all its 
active members held high rank. During Owain Williams’ trial, Welsh Freedom Army recmiting cards 
were found on a train running between Bala and Liverpool. They urged Welsh people to join 
‘companies’, being ‘formed in your area’. Kane also alleged that at least one member of the IRA had 
visited Wales to instruct Welshmen in the ‘ignoble act o f sabotage’. The Irishman’s presence was 
known to police and he was shadowed by two officers o f Special Branch. Kane then implied the IRA 
operative departed because ‘the FWA weren’t up to it’. As a result, members of the FWA then 
travelled to Ireland for ‘discussions and instruction’. It was a claim dismissed as ‘nonsense’, by Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones and ‘rubbish’ by Owain Williams. All training received had been from Welshmen, 
Williams added, ‘from the south east o f the country’. Telephone interviews between WT & O. 
Williams & E. LI. Jones, 15 April 2007.
121 WM, 3 July 1963.
122 WM, 4 July 1963.
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cause of territorial integrity for Wales’. Unsurprisingly, such sentiments did little 
to endear Webb to the party leadership.124
At the same time, the veteran political warrior, Huw T. Edwards, contended 
that it was time for Plaid Cymru to abandon the electoral battle and reconstitute itself 
as a widely based ‘Welsh National Movement’. This would act as an aggressive 
pressure group, intent on satisfying Welsh-related demands, through forcing 
concessions from the three central parties. Even Lord Ogmore, for so long a 
champion of Welsh cultural expression, recognised that in the previous months a 
dangerous precedent had been set. The use of explosives to further a political ideal, 
he maintained, was a dangerous lunacy. Furthermore, it might result in the death of a
1 9Achild perhaps. How eerily prophetic Ogmore’s words would prove to be by the 
decade’s end. The last word in the series of articles fell to Gwynfor Evans. Peter 
Kane was no ‘objective inquirer’, argued the Plaid Cymru president; he had not 
attempted a ‘serious study’, but had instead sought propaganda for his own inherent 
prejudices. Yet, less partisan observers, Evans continued, would have noted that 
something in addition to dynamite had necessitated the Tryweryn actions: ‘courage’
197had been required; so too ‘selflessness and a rare degree of patriotism’.
Emyr Llywelyn Jones renounces violence and angers Owain Williams
On his release from prison in December 1963, Emyr Llywelyn Jones renounced 
violence.128 To Owain Williams, still languishing at Her Majesty’s pleasure, Jones’ 
remarks smacked of betrayal. Whatever his thoughts, ‘he should have kept them 
private’, remarked Williams in 2004. Jones appeared to be questioning their actions:
190implying that their protest had been wrong. Yet, Jones had decided in prison that 
on his release he would emulate non-violent protest, as followed by Gandhi and
Webb, No Half-Way House, (ed.) Stephens, p. 19.
125 WM, 9 July 1963.
126 WM, 8 July 1963.
127 WM, 10 July 1963.
128 Week In Week Out: The Story o f  the FWA. BBC Wales Production. Screened 3 July, 1969. Jones 
also distanced himself from the suggestion the nation’s youth was being drawn to the ranks o f  the 
FWA. He did not think the group existed. He knew people in Wales who believed in ‘direct action’ as 
a means o f achieving political ends, but they were ‘not organised as an army’. The nomenclature had 
probably been devised by youthful people, anxious to further their cause by ‘painting slogans all over
the place’.
129 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Prisoner 287, O. Williams was held at 
Drake Hall Open Prison.
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Martin Luther King. This was in the belief that the way to achieve ones aims, is as 
important as the aim itself; the methods you use mould the type of person involved 
and the movement itself. He had also, he later confessed, during moments of 
contemplation, realised that ‘any idiot could go out and plant a bomb’. It had been a 
mistake: but when young, one did not consider the implications of one’s actions. Had 
the situation escalated, he would have ‘felt responsible’. Some years later, under the 
chairship of Emyr Llywelyn Jones, a motion to support non-violent protest was
1 30endorsed by Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg. Owain Williams remained 
unconvinced. What they had done at Tryweryn had been right for that time, he 
countered: it was what the situation had called for and ‘somebody had to do it’.
When analysing the situation, Williams said that Jones’ imprisonment had 
coloured his view of their action and that his upbringing was greatly responsible. It 
was a background, Williams believed, at odds with his and John Albert Jones’s 
‘working class backgrounds’. It had, he believed, been ‘very Eisteddfodau, very 
literary and steeped in non-conformist religion’. He felt that such an emotional 
environment had resulted in his co-conspirator being brainwashed and instilled with a 
sense of guilt. He did not mean to say that Jones had been ‘screwed up’ by religion, 
yet, to Williams, it had almost appeared ‘expected’ of Emyr Llywelyn Jones ‘to act 
for Wales’: that he somehow ‘felt dutiful to carry out the action, to get caught and to 
suffer for it’. Jones, thought Williams, had been ‘groomed from the cradle to be a 
martyr by his father’. He had visited Emyr Llywelyn Jones at his home following 
their release from prison, and could, he declared, ‘almost smell the bloody 
righteousness’.131
This suggestion was roundly dismissed by Emyr Llywelyn Jones, who retorted
1 39that while supportive, his family had known nothing of his action until his arrest. 
Nevertheless, Owain Williams added that he too was ‘frog-marched’ to Sunday 
school as a child, but had received more condemnation from those within the 
Christian circle in Wales at the time of his protest, than he ever had from those outside
130 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 16 October 2005; also correspondence between
WT & Geraint Jones, 16 April 2011.
131 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. With a population of just 2.5million in 
1963 and o f those, ‘only a fraction prepared to do something for Wales, the only viable protest open, 
had been the one taken. Welsh Pacifists’, he added, ‘mixed up their New Tredegar’s with their New  
Delhi’s. They believed seeing millions o f Hindus protesting on the banks o f the Ganges would work in
Wales. It simply would not. Nobody’, he stressed, ‘believed in putting at risk anyone’s life’.
132 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
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it. He believed their action had been undertaken to defend the nation’s heritage, its 
language and way of life; its non-conformity being a factor. What hurt him more than 
anything, were remarks endured by his wife during a chapel service during the months 
of his imprisonment. A chief deacon had declared how shameful had been Williams 
involvement and how it was hoped he had learnt his lesson. It was ‘insensitive and 
ignorant’, remonstrated Williams. The chapel authorities, he believed, had no concept
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of what was happening to Wales ‘right under their noses’.
In April 1964, Owain Williams was released from prison. Recalling the 
experience forty years later, he conceded it had not been easy, further adding his 
belief that he was ‘criminalised deliberately and denied political status’. Having been 
placed between a child murderer and a rapist, his Sunday School background had not 
prepared him for the ‘harrowing’ emotional onslaught of imprisonment.134
The Free Wales Army
A further outbreak of slogans daubed along the main roads in Gwynedd, strengthened 
the belief that the amorphous Free Wales Army was being revived. The boldly- 
painted signs, in both Welsh and English, advocating freedom and a parliament for 
Wales, appeared over-night in several places, particularly in the Porthmadoc, 
Penygroes and Bangor areas. Significantly, a further outbreak of signs daubed at 
Tremadoc, Beddgelert and Llanffothen, led to the suggestion that those responsible
1 1C
were deliberately targeting sites at the heart of the tourist industry.
Under pressure, Plaid Cymru strenuously denied any involvement. In a 
statement, newly appointed organising secretary Emrys Roberts claimed the slogans 
and FWA initials, were more likely the work of ‘enterprising, if irresponsible 
schoolboys’. It was strange, he added, that the daubings had received quite 
remarkable publicity, while the solid, substantial work of the party had continued 
almost unheeded. As for the FWA itself, the party believed it was without substance
133 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 16 March 2004. Williams refused to allow 
his ‘action to be clouded with a sense o f guilt’. Why should an action in defence o f Wales be seen as 
wrong in Christian eyes? It was ‘OK for Methodist preachers to recruit from the pulpit; to remain 
miles behind the front line as some poor, illiterate, monoglot Welsh-speaker was dragged to the
trenches to fight and die for the Empire’.
134 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. That Christmas, divorced and alone, 
Williams received many cards and letters o f  support. Yet, one letter he opened was anonymously 
signed ‘a Liverpool Doctor’. It read: ‘I wish your baby was dead. She would be better off than having 
a lunatic like you for a father’. Williams, Cysgod Tryweryn, p.96.
135 WM, 19 August 1964.
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and largely a publicity stunt. The slogan-daubing might affect the party’s image, bui 
when the public realised it was purely an irresponsible action and in no wa> 
connected to Plaid Cymru, it might even do it some good.136
It was at this juncture that Cayo Evans, who for some time had considered 
‘entering the fray’, decided the time had arrived. Despite the popular myth that Evans 
was at the forefront of the Free Wales Army from its conception, speaking during his 
last television appearance in 1995, he recalled the events which had prompted his 
decision to join its fledgling ranks. His first inkling of the Free Wales Army was 
seeing an emblem painted on a wall coming out of Aberystwyth. He was ‘pleased’
I 37and had thought ‘this sounds good’. While sat in Conti’s cafe in Lampeter in the 
late summer of 1964, 15-year-old schoolgirl Gillian Davies’s attention was drawn to 
the activities of one boisterous young man. Cayo Evans, whose appearance and 
conduct would soon become the talk of Cardiganshire and beyond, just ‘wanted to be 
ordinary’, remarked Davies - his future wife - in 2006. Yet, to his great displeasure 
he had been sent away to Abermad, the fee-paying school in Aberystwyth. Having, 
she was sure, ‘run away (from there) a couple of times’, Evans soon found himself at 
the prestigious Millfield Public School in Somerset.138 He soon came to the attention 
of his House Master, a young Polish exile and language teacher, Yanick Helczman.
With the growth of nationalist convictions already taken root, Helczman, the 
well-spring of Evans’s nationalist inspiration, aided its flowering with frank and 
serious discussions concerning the right of all nations to be self-governed. Under his 
tutor’s wing, Evans’ sense of Welsh nationalism looked to blossom. Yet, one integral 
piece of the jigsaw remained unplaced. Following a period at the exclusive 
Agricultural College in Cirencester, in 1955, Cayo Evans, was conscripted into the 
British army and the regiment of the South Wales Borderers.139 Apart from having 
tendered his young pupil’s nationalist ideals, Helczman had also instilled in Evans a 
life-long loathing of Communism. His antithesis of all things considered to be on the 
left of the political landscape, derived from a number of areas, FWA member Lyn 
Ebenezer speculated. Evans firstly considered himself to be a latter day member of 
the Welsh gentry; confirmed in no small measure, by the family home Gian Denys; a
136 WM, 20 August 1964.
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Only Yesterday, HTV Wales Production. Screened HTV Wales, 1995.1 IQ
Interview between WT & Gillian Mary Davies, 15 June 2006.
119 Interview between WT & Dalis & Rhodri Evans, 28 February 2006.
106
turreted Gothic mansion in Silian, two miles north of Lampeter. His experience at 
Millfield had also played its part. However, it was two years in the British army 
which proved the most potent ingredient in Evans’ political thinking. Having been 
involved in military engagements with communist guerrillas in Malaya, albeit in a 
relatively minor degree, Evans now considered his implanted mistrust of the 
communist ideology to have been confirmed.140 Yet, it was to be his meeting with 
Irish Republican sympathisers, both during and after his years of conscription, which 
sealed both Evans’ nationalist beliefs and his political fate. With those who talked of 
their ancestors’ struggle with the Black and Tans, Evans recognised a kindred spirit 
and began to realise it might be possible to challenge the authority o f the British 
unionist state. Towards the end of his service, he considered how small numbers of 
determined insurgents might tie up thousands of regular troops and almost paralyse 
the normal governing and administration of vast areas of a country.141
On Monday, 31 August 1964, the Western Mail headlined that it had received 
a letter purporting to be from the Free Wales Army. Handed to the Gwynedd 
Constabulary, unsigned and neatly-typed, the three page letter stated that the FWA 
had now severed all links with Plaid Cymru; while furthermore, it accepted 
responsibility for the recent outbreak of slogan-daubing in north Wales. Wales was 
‘not a public convenience for the English’; nor a source from which it could receive 
its water at a reduced rate. They had taken Tryweryn, but they would not take 
Clywedog, it would not, the letter added woefully, go under water. Far from being, as 
reported, a resurrected army the missive maintained, the FWA had continued to grow 
through the years. It represented all of Wales and was comprised of independent 
young nationalists. It was ‘an army guarding the nations’ responsibilities’...it would 
proudly defend its interests, however the destruction of property would only be 
carried out as a ‘last resort’.142
Amidst inter-party turmoil over the role of Gwynfor Evans and the direction of Plaid
140 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Evans would later recount tales o f having
been at Franco’s bedside as the fascist leader lay dying141 Interview between WT & Dalis & Rhodri Evans, 28 February 2006. ‘They shipped him off to India 
because he had sympathy with the Germans’ declared Rhodri Evans with regard his grandfather, the 
former High Sheriff o f Cardigan and professor o f  Maths at Lampeter University. ‘He had friends: 
contacts with the Nazi’s. He wanted to join up with them, so they shipped him out...Dad said “he died 
of smoking the pipe and gardening”. He (Cayo) was far closer to his mother’.
142 WM, 31 August 1963.
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Cymru, Saunders Lewis announced to the Western Mail in 1965, that to his dismay, 
just one sad difference existed between the Welsh nationalist party of the 1960s and 
the Welsh Methodists of the 1760s. The Methodists in their day had aroused ‘hatred, 
violence, persecution and prison’. That, Lewis added sombrely, ‘was why they had 
won’.143 While Plaid Cymru offered no clear direction to nationalists who desired 
quick progress, others seemed more bent on action. To the amusement of the 
inhabitants of Lampeter, Cayo Evans had taken to walking through the town in a 
uniform, he proudly announced, was that of the Free Wales Army. He used to make it 
himself, remarked Lyn Ebenezer, ‘he used to boil this bloody great cauldron with 
green dye in it and then throw a coat in and things like that’. With Evans’ skill for 
making badges, particularly the emblem of the movement, the White Eagle of 
Snowdon, the ensemble was complete. Evans was most comfortable in his uniform, 
walking around the manorial family home. His mother took it all with typical sang­
froid '.144 In 1995, Cayo Evans threw light on where the uniform and the emblem had 
originated. Most of those in the FWA were ex-British army, he explained, they had 
simply dyed their uniform green. As for its emblem, it was one of the titles of the old 
Welsh royal family, whom, he added, were ‘murdered by the English’.145
Unknown to Cayo Evans, another young Welshman, some ninety miles from 
Lampeter, had also taken to delighting the people of his home town by walking its 
streets adorned in his dyed green, ex-military uniform. It too, stated Toni Lewis 
proudly, was the uniform of the FWA. He had dyed his former RAF great coat in a 
bath, he revealed, keeping the flashings (collars and cuffs) bright red. A friend in 
Cwmbran, who worked in a factory, presented him with a metal, beautifully hand­
crafted White Eagle insignia. It was immediately positioned in a place guaranteed to 
make the utmost impact. Lewis attached it to the front of his car. He had also 
organised the first Welsh nationalist club. The premises, a rented basement room 
below an Italian cafe in Cwmbran, soon attracted a number of like-minded thinkers; 
who were each intent on purchasing and wearing a khaki ex-military issue shirt. 
Within weeks, a number of organisations had flourished. The first was the Anti-Sais 
Front in South Wales. This was soon followed by the League of the South Wales 
Separatists. It was not long before each group united into the Patriotic Front. Its
143 WM, 13 March 1965.
144 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
145
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ranks were soon filled by Gethin ap Iestyn. This was all, remarked Lewis, before he 
had even heard of Cayo Evans. More than aware of him however were the police. 
The reason, he revealed, for wanting to be part of the FWA had much to do with the 
flooding of Cwm Tryweryn, but it was the Aberfan disaster in 1966, which had 
confirmed his belief that the time had come for the nation to stand on its own two 
feet.146
The opening of Llyn Celyn
On being released from prison, Owain Williams returned to run his cafe in Pwllheli. 
Suffering the effects of his incarceration, six months later, he and his wife Irene 
parted. In March 1965, they divorced. Six months later, in an interview with the 
Western Mail, Williams recalled the sacrifices he had made in the name of Welsh 
nationalism. In spite of personal problems, he had ‘no regrets’. To do so would 
render him no more than a hypocrite. His action may not have caused a political 
impact, but he was sure it had resulted in a psychological impact. It had been 
intended as ‘a shock’...to ‘wake up the sleepers’.147 The slogans, the appearance of 
uniformed men and the actual explosions, all created a tense atmosphere. For the first 
time in the history of Wales, the threat of bomb-blasts became a familiar concern. At 
the National Eisteddfod on 4 August 1965, police raced to the Maes, having received 
an anonymous warning that a ‘bomb had been hidden in the packed Eisteddfod 
pavilion’. Police made a thorough search, but found nothing.148
One man about to answer his country’s call was Cayo Evans. In an interview 
with the Western Mail, Evans announced that the FWA intended to prevent the 
opening of the newly named Llyn Celyn;149 and that a last stand would be taken. An
146 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. The shirts were purchased from an army and 
navy surplus store. Toni Lewis served as a painter in the RAF from 1955 - 57 and joined Plaid Cymru, 
1 October 1959. Free Wales Army and Patriotic Front trial Exhibit 107. The various movements were 
established to combat the increasing Anglicization o f south east Wales. Correspondence between WT 
& Gethin ap Iestyn, January 2008.
147 WM, 2 September 1965. There was nothing to be gained from ‘spilling tears over hymn books’ 
added Williams.
148 WM, 5 August 1965.
149 LRO, Liverpool Corporation Water Committee Minutes, 352MIN/WTR/1/72. p.123; also, Llyn 
Celyn Cuttings, Hq352.6CUT; also, Einion Thomas, Capel Celyn (Llandybie, 2007), p. 127. In 
September 1964, a final letter from the Tryweryn Defence Committee was sent to Liverpool 
Corporation, urging officials to name the reservoir Llyn Celyn and not, as it intended, Llyn Mawr 
Tryweryn (The Great Tryweryn Lake). For once, the English Authority agreed to the Committee’s 
request. The decision however was not taken for reasons o f conciliation, but in order to avert regional 
confusion, as there existed a lake ‘called locally Lake Tryweryn at Cwm Prysor’. On 20 October 1964, 
the Liverpool Daily Post reported that the reservoir was to be named Llyn Celyn.
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FWA spokesman also revealed that it had decided to make the occasion its ‘testing 
ground’; and that a ceremony to open the reservoir would ‘make the rape of Tryweryn 
complete’. It therefore planned to prevent those attending from reaching the dam site, 
by blocking approaching roads with cars and boulders. A card had been circulated to 
followers, urging them to act against ‘the oppressors’.150 It followed an earlier open 
letter from Gethin ap Iestyn, in which he implored nationalists to attend the 
reservoir’s opening.151 Furthermore, the FWA spokesman informed the Western 
Mail, as y Ddraig Goch was not represented on the Union Flag, it would be burned at 
the opening ceremony. One authority oblivious to the alleged threat posed by the 
FWA, was the Gwynedd Constabulary, which confirmed that no specific measure to 
safeguard the forthcoming event had been formalised, as the force was unaware of the 
group’s intentions.
On the same day, Plaid Cymru also announced that it planned to stage an 
organised demonstration, prior to and during the opening ceremony. It followed the 
rejection of a plea by Gwynfor Evans to Thomas Alker, the Liverpool Town Clerk, to 
reconsider the decision to officially open Llyn Celyn. By way of response, Alker 
claimed that it would be impractical and there had never been any question of the 
ceremony being a ‘flaunting of the victory forces’. On the contrary, it was being 
regarded as an opportunity to bury animosities and open the way to friendly co­
operation, among all those involved in a venture which would bring mutual benefits to 
all. The statement cut little ice with Plaid Cymru, whose spokesman angrily 
compared the intended opening to that of ‘a person holding a public ceremony, to 
proclaim the fact that he had stooped so low as to grab the property of his 
neighbour’.152
150 WM, 14 October 1965. Opposition to the opening, by members of the FWA ‘out in force’ would be 
taken, stated Evans. On one side o f the card, the White Eagle of Snowdon was depicted, while printed 
on the reverse, were the words: ‘True Sons o f Wales. For the last time in our history we ask you to 
raise the flag and call you to arms. This time we will not fail’.
151 Plaid Cymru Archive M599. NLW.www.uk. In an open letter dated 12 June 1965, Gethin ap 
Iestyn declared that not satisfied with having drowned Cwm Tryweryn, by insisting on a formal 
ceremony, Liverpool Corporation intended to rub the face of the Welsh people ‘deeper in the mud. In 
opening the floodgates, the Liverpool official’ would ‘be shovelling the last dirt on the coffin o f Wales. 
The influx o f English people into Wales’, he added, ‘and the drowning of its valleys would see the
nation’s language and culture die. Yet, like a dead man, Wales’ would ‘feel no pain’.
152 WM, 14 October 1965. The Union Jack, meant nothing to its members, the FWA spokesman 
added. Thomas Alker was replying to Gwynfor Evans, who in a letter to Liverpool Council, had stated 
that an official opening o f Llyn Celyn would be little more than ‘a distasteful flaunting o f the victory o f  
force in Welsh affairs’. Guardian, 8 October 1965. The leader of the Liberal group on the Liverpool 
City Council, Cyril Carr, also believed the council’s plans for the opening ‘showed a lack o f sensitivity
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A week before Llyn Celyn was opened, Cayo Evans and Lyn Ebenezer appeared on 
Heddiw, the BBC Wales Welsh language news programme. Interviewed by the 
formidable presenter Owen Edwards, against the format of the programme, Evans, 
elected to speak in English. While it was, ‘very unexpected’ Ebenezer recalled in 
2006, it nonetheless exemplified Evans’ lack of confidence to speak his native tongue 
in any formal setting. Heddiw had approached them in the knowledge that Ebenezer 
had no intention of attending the ceremony, while Evans thought differently. The 
programme was broadcast live and in the afternoon a rehearsal was arranged. Owen 
Edwards, believed Ebenezer, was determined to make a fool of the self-styled leader 
of the FWA. Where, he asked, had Evans got the ‘ridiculous idea’ of the White Eagle 
of Snowdonia? Referring to Owen M. Edwards’s academic studies of Welsh history, 
Evans replied markedly: ‘don’t you read your own grandfather’s books?’. The 
grandson of the Welsh historian, who had popularised the myth of the WThite Eagle 
sweeping freely through the mountain massif of north Wales was left for words. 
Unsurprisingly, it was a line of questioning not included in the live broadcast that 
evening. Despite having been ‘a little fairer’ during the televised programme, years 
later, Edwards allegedly admitted some guilt for having been so abrupt in his
i  r - j
questioning of Cayo Evans.
Also that week, to the apparent annoyance and embarrassment of Liverpool 
Corporation, former Capel Celyn villagers publicly declined their invitations to attend 
the project’s official opening. If the decision of the former inhabitants of Capel Celyn 
left an uncomfortable taste in the mouth of Liverpool Corporation, the decision of 
Penllyn Rural District Council to also boycott the event, cemented the authority’s 
fears that local representation at the opening was going to be very thin on the ground. 
Its action, the Welsh council maintained, clearly reflected opinion in Wales: that the 
nation should have control over its resources and that Liverpool had a moral 
obligation to the people of Wales, to pay for the water it received. Nevertheless, the 
following day, it was reported that a dozen members of Meirionnydd County Council 
had accepted individual invitations to attend the scheme’s ceremonial unveiling. 154
for the city’s Welsh community’. Liverpool Echo, 19 October 1965. LRO, Llyn Celyn Cuttings, 
H<p52.6CUT.
Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Cayo Evans, revealed Ebenezer, was out of
uniform during the programme. Ebenezer did not attend the opening, feeling to do so would add to the
insult. He instead decided to ‘let the bastards carry on and ignore them’. It was view shared by others
who stayed away like Owain Williams and Emyr Llywelyn Jones.
154
WM, 18 October 1965. Five years to the month after work at the site begun - and first damned on 1
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On 19 October, Plaid Cymru released a statement declaring its protest would be 
‘orderly, brief, concise and disciplined’. The dictum then turned its attention to the 
Free Wales Army. The group was not connected to Plaid Cymru in any way. It had 
not been invited by the party to attend its demonstration and the party neither yearned 
nor sought any involvement from it. In the years that followed, it was not to be the 
last statement that Plaid Cymru released in an effort to distance itself from the 
increasingly outlandish claims of the Free Wales Army. Nonetheless, with the 
opening of Llyn Celyn looming large and tension beginning to mount, a more 
profitable, if equally troublesome chapter in the life of Gwynfor Evans was about to 
begin.
Out of respect for the memory of Elizabeth Mrowiec, (nee Watkin Jones) the 
secretary of the Capel Celyn Defence Committee and David Roberts, the committee’s 
chair, an appeal was made to Goronwy Roberts, the Minister of State at the Welsh 
Office, to halt the proceedings.155 It was an entreaty Liverpool Corporation refused to 
entertain. With little over 24 hours to go, declared Frank Cain, the chair of the 
English authority, ‘any approach would be little more than futile’.156
On the eve of the opening, it was confirmed that there would be a number of 
notable absentees, among them, the Lord Lieutenant of Meirionnydd, Lieutenant- 
Colonel J. F. Wynne-Williams of Peniarth. None of the three Ministers in the Welsh 
Office had been invited to the ceremony, as the organisers had considered that the 
opening should be confined to those people both involved in the technical aspect of 
the project and those who had been closely affected by the work. More cynical 
observers considered the decision politically inspired. They maintained that the 
Labour administration recognised the enormous damage to its electoral standing in 
Wales, should it be seen to support the project. As a consequence, any attempt by 
Liverpool Corporation to receive government endorsement had been unofficially 
declined; as indeed it seemed was Royal approval.157
September 1964 - Llyn Celyn was full to capacity and finally completed in August 1965. It was, 
proclaimed the Wrexham Leader on 28 August 1964, ‘a new wonder of Wales’.
WM, 19 October 1965.
156 WM, 20 October 1965. Frank Cain could not understand this ‘sudden flare-up’ of opposition to the 
opening ceremony. Liverpool enjoyed ‘cordial relations down there’, he stated. It was all down to 
‘this fellow Gwynfor Evans’, trying to ‘upset the applecart’.
157 WM, 21 October 1965; also, The Times, 21 October 1965. During the Tryweryn Bill’s judicial 
passage, Frank Cain was Lord Mayor o f Liverpool. Farmer Owen Jones, aged 65, who lost 55 acres in 
the flooding, reported that many facing eviction had suffered ill-health and that since the first boor 
holes were sunk in 1959, eighteen people had died. On 20 October 1964, the Liverpool Echo reported
112
On Thursday, 21 October 1965, the culmination of opposition to the opening of the 
Llyn Celyn ended, when the dam’s floodgates were officially declared opened. 
However, there was still time for one final protest. As the fleet of cars arrived, each 
was greeted with bare-fisted thumps and a wall of demonstrators. A number threw 
themselves into the path of the on-coming vehicles, or rocked them in an attempt to 
see them overturned. Other protestor’s hammered on windows with placards, which
1 co
angrily declared that Liverpool had ‘stolen Welsh water’. All were hauled aside by 
police, who having cleared the road, linked arms in order for the cars to pass through. 
In the melee, damage was inflicted. Many cars were left badly marked; some had had 
side panels pushed in, while car aerials and wing mirrors lay strewn across the road.159 
Whether fuelled by defiance, frustration or misguidance, Gwynfor Evans attempted to 
hand David Cowley, the Lord Mayor of Liverpool, a letter which urged the Liverpool 
authorities to agree to a financial settlement. This would prove, argued Evans, their 
stated desire for amicable relations. He was assured by Cowley that the letter would 
be delivered into the appropriate hands. 160
From out of the crowd, three men appeared, dressed in something resembling 
a military uniform. They were, the crowd soon realised, members of the Free Wales 
Army.161 One rather elderly man stepped forward to greet the trio warmly. He was 
Robert Oliver Francis Wynne, from Garthewin Hall in Denbighshire. The 
encounter was to prove the re-emergence of a romantic link with Wynne and the 
struggle for ‘Welsh freedom’; and the belief that the nationalist movement was being 
financed by a wealthy benefactor. The suggestion however was disdainfully rejected 
by Emyr Llywelyn Jones in 2003. Wynne, he professed, belonged to the clique of 
people who admired Saunders Lewis; who saw themselves as ‘the gentry bom to 
lead’. He had risen to prominence by claiming he was going to sponsor this and 
sponsor that; yet his comments belied the suspicion that he lacked real financial
Frank Cain as having said ‘a member o f the Royal Family may perform the opening ceremony’. On 1 
September 1965, the Liverpool Daily Post stated that Prince Philip was unavailable to do so; as was the 
Prime Minister and James Griffiths, the Minister o f State for Wales. Those attending were asked to 
arrive by 11.15 a.m. LRO, Llyn Celyn Cuttings, Hq352.6CUT.
158
Daily Mail, 22 October 1965. Other placards declared: ‘Liverpool - Hands Off Wales’, ‘Stop 
Robbing Wales’ and ‘Liverpool’s Unkindest Cut Of A ll’. Thomas, Capel Celyn, p.123.
159 LDP, 22 October 1965.
160 WM, 22 October 1965.
161 LDP, 22 October 1965; also, The Times, 22 October 1965.
162 WM, 4 November 1965; also, Hazel Walford Davies, Saunders Lewis A Theatr Garthewin 
(Llandysul, 1995), p.389. Wynne stood bail for Owain Williams in 1963.
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clout.163
As Gwynfor Evans appealed for calm, to the chagrin of the 500 protestors, 
positioned at the official entrance to the dam site, the main body of Liverpool 
dignitaries and invited guests were spotted arriving via the old road on the opposite 
side of the reservoir. As the buses began to empty, the angry crowd, defying repeated 
pleas by Plaid Cymru officials for restraint, poured down the side of the escarpment. 
Having swarmed down the shoulder of the reservoir, they massed on its end, 
overlooking the covered platform and the guests grandstand. Within a few minutes, 
following scuffles with uniformed and CID police officers, many of the demonstrators 
had jostled into the grandstand, and stood just yards from the platform. A non-stop 
barrage of booing and chanting reduced the occasion to a brief and barely-audible 
fiasco. To the continuous roar of protest, Liverpool officials attempted to make 
themselves heard as stones were hurled on to the platform, fireworks were set off and 
an attempt was made to bum the Union Jack.164 Whether by accident of timing or not, 
the Plaid Cymru leader was captured by a television news crew, turning his back and 
sheepishly drifting away.165
The barrage of jeers and catcalls rose to a crescendo, as David Cowley and 
Frank Cain, chair of Liverpool Corporation, walked onto the platform, accompanied 
by city officials. Those assembled stood shaken and embarrassed by the unexpected 
reception. After vainly waiting some minutes for the clamour to subside, Cowley was 
greeted with a number of badly aimed stones as he stood to make his speech. He 
raised his voice to challenge the din, but could only be seen silently mouthing his 
appreciation for the creation of the reservoir. His microphone lead had been cut.166 
Prompted by a protestor wielding a loudspeaker, the crowd kept up its continual 
chanting as Cowley continued in vain. The Liverpool Authority, he shouted, had 
nothing to feel ashamed of. It had put its case to the Welsh people and to parliament. 
It had been given the authority to undertake the project. Finally, after turning to the 
mass of demonstrators, he tersely concluded by declaring that it was ‘a privilege and a 
pleasure’ to pronounce Llyn Celyn open. He pressed a control button on the platform
163 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. The suggestion of Wynne’s 
financial support with regard the Tryweryn action was ‘nothing but crap’, stated Emyr Llywelyn Jones. 
Whether rich or not, he did not believe in Wynne’s sort of romanticism. He never met him and would 
not have accepted money even were it offered.
164 LDP, 22 October 1965.
165 Unwaith Eto, 1965. S4C Production. Screened S4C, September 2002.
114
table, releasing a huge jet of water from the reservoir outlet into the Tryweryn river
1 f i lbelow. It immediately drowned the singing of Mae Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau.
If this was meant to signal the end of the hostilities, it appeared only to make
matters worse, as a further barrage of stones was thrown onto the platform. The Lord
Mayor and his party quickly made their exit. The scheduled forty-five minute
1ceremony had lasted barely three minutes. A number of the 100 police officers, 
whom the Liverpool Daily Post noted, had ‘acted with restraint and good humour 
throughout’, stood plastered with mud and dirt as a result of the scuffles. One officer 
had received a black eye, the result of having been hit by a thrown placard. As the 
three uniformed men were escorted from the site by officers, owing to their 
‘involvement in the m elee\X69 members of the assembled media attempted to learn 
more about them. They were, they were soon informed, Cayo Evans, Owen Wyn 
Jones and Dafydd Elwyn Williams.170
At the official luncheon, following the ceremony, Alderman Sefton of 
Liverpool City Council, declared to the waiting media that officials from the city’s 
Council and Water Corporation were ready to discuss fiscal proposals submitted by 
any ‘responsible body’ in Wales. Moreover, it was sincere in its desire to assist north 
Wales ‘in recompense for the neglect it had suffered in the past’.171 As for the 
demonstration, it was expected, David Cowley informed the Daily Mail. It had not 
been directed at Liverpool, added Sefton, but was rather borne of frustration that
1 77Wales was being destroyed.
166 Interview between WT & Dafydd Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004.
167 LDP, 22 October 1965.
168 WM, 22 October 1965.
169 LDP, 22 October 1965. Another casualty was project engineer, Roger Heatherington, who was 
struck on the shoulder by a 12oz piece o f slate. He felt the blow, he later revealed, but it caused little
discomfort.
170 WM, 4 November 1965. In a letter printed in the Liverpool Daily Post on 26 October 1965, Mair 
Cave o f Machynlleth condemned the irresponsible activities and behaviour o f her ‘fellow countrymen’ 
at Llyn Celyn’s opening. Those involved should have been ‘arrested and prosecuted’; a point o f view, 
she added, expressed by many other Welsh-speakers she had met. LRO, Llyn Celyn Newspaper
Cuttings, 1957- 1971. Hq352.6CUT.
171 WM, 23 October 1965. In March 1966, an account o f the opening ceremony appeared in the 
contractors, Binnie and Partners, News Magazine. The ‘Welsh nationalist elements gave the Liverpool 
City Councillors and their guests a really rousing reception’, it declared. ‘Some o f the City 
Councillors, who represent the docks areas of Liverpool, are no strangers to insurgent behaviour and 
could scarcely be restrained from tossing the ringleaders into the stilling basin’. Thomas, Capel Celyn,
p.126.
172 DM, 22 October 1965. Following the ceremony, David Cowley, the Lord Mayor o f Liverpool, 
commented that ‘the Kop would have murdered them’, when asked to comment on protestors. 
Liverpool Weekly News, 28 October 1965. LRO, Llyn Celyn Newspaper Cuttings, 1957 - 1971.
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The opening of the Llyn Celyn Reservoir was a day Toni Lewis never forgot. For one 
thing, it was the day he met Cayo Evans. As Lewis and members of his nationalist 
movement walked through the streets of Bala, approaching in the other direction was 
Evans and his followers. Each of the two groups were kitted out in their respective 
khaki or bottle green uniform. Together, they made their way to the Tryweryn site. 
To a man steeped in the injustice inflicted upon his nation home, the day’s events 
struck a defiant retaliatory chord. When television pictures of the opening were 
broadcast, ‘with the crowd rushing down the bank: that was us, you know’, later
1 7 'Iremarked Lewis proudly.
Glyn Rowlands was also there that day. In the years that followed, he too rose 
to enjoy a position of prominence on the stage of militant Welsh nationalist thinking. 
In March 2004, Rowlands recalled how the events of the day had impacted upon his 
life. It was the first time he had seen Cayo and the FWA. After all the years of 
injustice, this at last, he believed, ‘was the real thing’. Just another angry protestor, he 
felt ‘sad’, not to be a member of the group and begun to ponder how he might contact 
members of the movement.174 Yet, in such a cauldron of animosity, rumours soon 
began to circulate that one or two of the protesters had over-reacted. In 1998, Elwyn 
Edwards, who in 1956 had marched through Liverpool alongside residents of Cwm 
Tryweryn, alleged that in response to one female Bala resident pulling down Welsh 
banners and trampling them into the mud, the trio of FWA had pulled her aside, 
kicking her angrily.175 It was a claim given short-shrift by Toni Lewis. Police 
officers had soon recognised Cayo Evans, he remarked. They had ‘corralled him and 
the other FWA in a comer’; keeping them under surveillance. However, the police 
had not bothered with him and his Tot in Khaki’.176
Hq352.6CUT.
173
Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. The demonstration against the opening was,
declared Lewis, ‘bloody good’.
174 Interview between WT & Dafydd Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004. Rowlands did not speak to the 
FWA, as ‘it was all happening at Tryweryn that day’. It appeared to him the group ‘sort o f appeared 
from nowhere’; before disappearing ‘as fast as they arrived’. As for the disruption, it was ‘brilliant’. 
The anger o f the Welsh crowd ‘totally surprised’ the Liverpool dignitaries, who were ‘caught wholly 
unprepared’. This pleased Rowlands particularly. His most poignant memory was the cutting of the 
microphone cable. The mayor o f  Liverpool could be seen ‘mouthing away’ and yet nobody could hear 
a word. The whole thing ‘was an entire shambles’.175
Unwaith Eto, 1965. S4C Production. Screened S4C, September 2002.
176 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. Gethin ap Iestyn - who later paid a heavy 
price for his involvement in militant Welsh nationalism - failed to make the opening, stated Lewis. 
Having set off together to hitchhike from south Wales, all the group had got lifts. Outside Bala on the 
return journey, an oil tanker approached them. To their amused surprise, ap Iestyn could be seen sat on
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For Cayo Evans, a page in his life had been turned. He believed that the arrival of the 
Free Wales Army at the opening ceremony had galvanised the crowd. Up until that 
point, it had been uncertain of whether to merely observe the event or to actively 
oppose it. Yet, led by Evans and the FWA, the crowd had proved only too eager to 
vent their frustration, he believed. The experience had left him convinced that from 
that day forth, the FWA must step into the limelight and be seen to lead the struggle 
for Welsh freedom.177
Two days after the opening of Llyn Celyn, following a day-long search, a 
police statement refused to confirm or deny that explosives had been found at the site. 
Nevertheless, a workman confirmed that police activity had been confined to a rocky 
section adjacent to the dam’s massive earth and rock bank; furthermore, that security 
surrounding the dam wall had been stepped up, with extra police dog handlers 
patrolling the area. It was further reported, that Gwynfor Evans had accepted an 
invitation to meet with Alderman Sefton of Liverpool City Council to discuss a 
possible way forward. It was, declared Evans, a ‘very hopeful development’. The 
door, he added, seemed to be opening under nationalist pressure. It was the job of 
Plaid Cymru to open it further and to gauge how far Liverpool was prepared to go. 
This, he confirmed, was the first time that any suggestion had been received that the
17kLiverpool authorities were willing to pay for the water.
On Friday, 5 November, police and legal experts stated that any future
179 _ idisplays of the Free Wales Army insignia could lead to prosecution. The 
previously nebulous organisation now boasted membership in west Wales alone of 
some 500. Interviewed by the Western Mail, Cayo Evans proclaimed to having learnt 
a great deal from the hell that Ireland had suffered. Subsequently, he considered 
‘militant nationalism as a matter not be taken lightly’. Another self-styled FWA 
volunteer was Maureen Huws of Anglesey, who euphemistically stated that ‘as a 
Christian’, she would use firearms to defend her home, were the circumstances 
justified. Quick to corroborate her remark, 15-year-old Gwenllian Wynne, the
his ruck sack. Lacking a sense o f direction, added Lewis, he ‘had gone the wrong bloody way’. Owing 
to money shortage, each hitchhiked everywhere. Besides, working on the buses, Lewis did not really 
need a car. It was sold and deemed ‘a luxury’ he could ‘ill-afford, with a wife and two children to
support’.
177 Interview between WT & Gillian Mary Davies, 15 June 2006. It was not until the couple married in 
1966, that Gillian Davies ‘seriously realised what he was about’ and that Evans was ‘inclined 
(politically) like his father’.
1 WM, 23 October 1965.
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daughter of Robert O. F. Wynne, called for a realisation that not all Welsh nationalists 
were pacifists.
It was reported that since the opening of Llyn Celyn, the Free Wales Army 
had been investigated by both the North-West Regional Crime Squad and the forces 
of Gwynedd and Flintshire. It was also revealed that police had been reluctant to take 
action against the quasi-military organisation, for fear of making ‘martyrs’ of the 
group. However, it would in future, seriously consider invoking the Public Order Act, 
should any further uniformed demonstrations take place. In the opinion of ‘several 
police sources’, the three FWA members had already committed an offence against 
the Act, by wearing ‘political uniforms’, something outlawed since the Mosley 
troubles of the 1930s. Merely to wear a badge did not in itself constitute an offence, 
but distinctive clothing did come under the auspices of the Act. As a result of later 
public-order legislation, directed by Henry Brooke, members of the FWA risked fines 
of up to £500 and a year’s imprisonment, or indeed, both.180 Meanwhile,
photographs, names of ‘army volunteers’ and all apparent adherents were being
1 8 1collated ‘for future reference’ by police. As a consequence, it was not the last time 
that leading members of the Free Wales Army were to be reminded of the Public 
Order Act.
Three days later, an article in the Daily Mail announced that the FWA had 
established links with the IRA. ‘Violence’, declared Cayo Evans was ‘the only way’; 
even if it did include ‘hurting innocent people’. Pacifism, he cautioned, had got 
‘Welsh nationalists nowhere’. The Free Wales Army would strike when no one 
expected it and get Wales, the ‘second richest country in Europe’, out of the ‘hands of 
its English oppressors’. The time had arrived to give the Welsh people ‘a country to 
be proud o f . Intriguingly, Evans also disclosed that the group was marshalled by a 
solitary figure, whose identity was known to ‘a chosen few’. If a mobile police 
column in Lampeter was regarded by Cayo Evans as some sort of accolade, it was, a
1 87police source in Carmarthen declared, ‘nothing to do with Evans or the FWA’. If 
so, many wondered, what was it to do with?
Later that month, Gwynfor Evans refused to share a public platform with Cayo
179 WM, 5 November 1965.
180 WM, 4 November 1965.
181 WM, 5 November 1965.
i  Q*y
DM, 8 November 1965; also, The Times, 8 November 1965.
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Evans at a meeting of young Welsh nationalists in Treorchy. One estimate put the 
number of Free Wales Army members present at 50. The warning by the police, that 
it would no longer tolerate the wearing of ‘political uniforms’, had not been heeded. 
Many of the group wore berets or ‘Glengarry’ style hats; while others wore khaki drill 
jackets, or civilian-type windcheaters emblazoned with FWA flashes. On taking the 
platform, the president of Plaid Cymru roundly condemned those on the extreme 
fringe of the nationalist movement, before reiterating the party’s rigid constitutional
183message.
Yet, even among a number of the nation’s police officers, employed to bring 
those responsible for using explosives at the Tryweryn site to book, the action and 
attitude of Liverpool Corporation had left an uneasy taste in the mouth. Had there 
existed ‘just a bit of understanding about Welsh society, as it existed in Tryweryn’, 
former detective-sergeant Glanmor Hughes opined in 2003, there would not have 
been ‘half the trouble’.184 To Emyr Llywelyn Jones, the fault lay firmly at the door of 
the British constitution. That was why he, Owain Williams and John Albert Jones had 
resorted to ‘a desperate tactic of blowing something up; because how else did one 
fight back?’. According to Jones, the state envelopes you: its power is total and its 
hold is absolute. Tryweryn was really about a community versus the modem state, 
with all its absolute power. Although he and his co-conspirators failed to save the 
valley, their action did nonetheless save other valleys: that was the whole point of
IOC
their protest. You can lose the battle, but you might win the fight in the long run.
However, blame could not be laid solely at the door of the British 
parliamentary system, Jones added. Plaid Cymru had betrayed Cwm Tryweryn. It 
had been sacrificed on the altar of the party’s electoral advance. Had the party 
leadership ‘gone there by day’, declared Jones, with regard Plaid Cymru’s failure to 
lead a sit-down protest at the site, ‘we would not have had to go there at night’. Yet, 
paradoxically, the Tryweryn issue had made the party stronger. The irony being that 
as a result of Tryweryn, there was an upsurge in nationalist feeling. Jones did not 
necessarily blame Gwynfor Evans, as possibly those close to the party leader had
183 WM, 15 November 1965. Cayo Evans was invited to speak at the meeting, but Gwynfor Evans’ 
threat to boycott the event, led to the invitation being revoked. Yet, as if  to mark the group’s 
attendance, a road bridge near the town’s railway station was daubed with FWA slogans. Plaid would
‘not consider adopting any other method’ declared Gwynfor Evans.
184
Terfysgwyr Tryweryn, S4C Production. Screened S4C, 13 July 2003.
185 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
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given him ‘the wrong advice’.186 The opening of the Llyn Celyn reservoir ended an 
unhappy chapter in the political journey of Plaid Cymru. To many observers, the 
party’s political sterility had been starkly revealed. As if it to confirm this, Huw T. 
Edwards brought what he later termed ‘the four-and-a-half unhappiest years’ of his 
political life to a close, by leaving Plaid Cymru and returning to the Labour Party. 
The nationalist party of Wales, he declared, ‘'was not the answer for a Socialist’.187
For one man watching ‘horrified’ from the wings of Welsh nationalism, the 
protracted Tryweryn issue had served only to demonstrate the inability of the British 
constitutional system, to recognise the United Kingdom’s unique cultural variegation. 
It seemed to John Jenkins that Tryweryn was squarely based on a false premise: that 
the UK was comprised of one people; all of whom abided by a single set of rules and 
all of whom ‘knelt before the same God’: the same ethnical people; existing with no 
single difference. Given that this premise was correct, then the flooding of Cwm 
Tryweryn was ‘perfectly understandable’. However, according to Jenkins, the 
premise was wrong. The British people were not ‘one people’ and any decent 
democracy allowed for diversity in its approach. He thought that the English idea of 
democracy could be traced ‘back to their Teutonic beginnings’. Jenkins quantified 
this by adding that a facet of the English @nd G e rm a n  m e n ta l i ty  was a respect for 
‘uniformity’: whereby everybody ‘wears the same, looks the same, does the same and 
says the same’. While confidently proclaiming to be both tolerant of diversity and 
democratic, it nevertheless abhorred any effort by those under its control to stand 
alone. Yet, concluded Jenkins, unlike the Irish people, the Welsh had not suffered 
enough at the hands of the English. The conquest of the Welsh people had been 
‘much more insidious’. They had been ‘seduced rather than raped’.188 It was this 
extreme nationalist view - at least as perceived by many - which fuelled Jenkins’ own 
bombing campaign in the years which followed.
Conclusion
The opening of the Llyn Celyn reservoir, marked the end of a controversial ten-year
186 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 16 October 2005. Plaid Cymru would not have 
enjoyed later electoral success were it not for Tryweryn, stated Jones. It had earlier taken similar ‘sit- 
down’ protest action at Trawsfynydd.
187
Butt, Welsh Question, p.92.
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chapter in Welsh history - a period of banner parades, impassioned speeches and 
sporadic sabotage. Both nationalist and unionist opposition to the project had availed 
nothing. Yet, what lessons had been learnt? Had the Tryweryn furore prompted a 
more circumspect approach to water-seeking ventures in Wales and possibly more 
equitable methods for the future? At least the Labour Government appeared to be 
responding favourably to nationalist claims of generic political indifference to Wales, 
having created the post of Secretary of State for Wales in 1964. It was generally 
hoped, across much of the political divide, that this would ensure that resources were 
developed in a way that did not damage the interests of the Welsh nation. Only time 
would tell. With the second half of the 1960s approaching, the country prepared to 
turn another page of its often troubled history. To some, the decision to embark on 
the path of militant action was no doubt defensible. Had not fate contemptuously 
conspired time and again to humiliate the small, but proud Welsh nation? Surely the 
time had come to make a stand? To others however, the country had turned an 
uncertain comer.
188 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
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Chapter 3 
Fantasists, fanatics and kamikaze corgis
John Jenkins seizes control of MAC
Introduction
This chapter addresses the period from January 1966 to December 1967. It considers 
the re-emergence of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru as a militant political force in Wales. 
It focuses upon the first phase of its re-convened campaign, from its strike at the 
Clywedog reservoir construction site in March 1966, to the political fall-out following 
its explosion at the Temple of Peace in November 1967. It addresses the response by 
so-called ‘extremists’, to the perceived, regressive cultural dilution of Wales; so too, 
the Carmarthen by-election in July 1966, won by Plaid Cymru president, Gwynfor 
Evans. Moreover, it examines the rise to prominence of John Jenkins as the self- 
styled director-general of MAC. It identifies that hostility to the impending 
investiture of Charles Windsor as the Prince of Wales, instituted the increase in 
militant activity. The chapter also evaluates the continuing publicity-conscience Free 
Wales Army, clearly identifying that apart from one failed militant action in March 
1967, the group was solely engaged in a ‘campaign of propaganda’.
On 3 January 1966, James Griffiths, the Secretary of State for Wales, announced that 
the Welsh Office proposed to construct a ‘new town’, stretching seventeen miles in 
mid Wales.1 Furthermore, Liverpool City Council unveiled plans to undertake a 
programme of industrial expansion in north Wales. This came in response to the 
meeting - ostensibly to combat the region’s increasing de-population - held in the city
1 Western Mail, 3 January 1966. J. Griffiths agreed with the Economic Associated Ltd report. Six 
months to compile, it recommended ‘a development o f industry and population along a linear pattern 
stretching for 17 miles from Llanidloes to Newtown and embracing Caersws’. It was opposed by 
nationalists on the grounds that the sprawling conurbation would become a dormitory suburb o f the 
densely-populated west Midlands o f England. The proposal was mischievously dubbed ‘Little Ireland’. 
WM, 12 January 1966. The plans were later shelved, with Gwynfor Evans being ascribed much o f the 
credit for the government’s U-tum. WM, 16 March 1967.
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the previous November between council representatives and the president of Plaid 
Cymru, Gwynfor Evans. In a letter to the Liverpool Daily Post, R. M. Hughes of 
Cardiff, outlined what had stuck in the nationalists’ craw. The proposal, whereby a 
number of existing businesses would be transferred from Merseyside to north Wales, 
merely proved Liverpool City Council’s desire to anglicise the area still further. This 
was in order to exploit the region for its own financial gain. Its furtively cloaked 
avarice, flew fiercely in the face of its earlier pronouncement to ‘protect and 
safeguard the regions’ unique cultural and linguistic identity’. Should such a policy 
be approved, Hughes concluded, it would simply undermine the areas solidly Welsh­
speaking status, thus rendering it little more than an English-speaking Liverpool 
‘over-spill’.3
Such events did not go unnoticed by the Free Wales Army. In a press 
statement on 18 February, Cayo Evans, reaffirmed the group’s primary objectives. 
The announcement followed reports that 385 members of the organisation planned a 
‘surprise spring offensive against Carmarthen’. The town had been targeted, owing to 
its ‘failure to support home rule for Wales’. Although Evans denied he was 
responsible for the FWA, he nonetheless disclosed the group did possess an 
‘armoury’, which included ‘assault weapons’. However, both its whereabouts and the 
identity of those involved in the group he would not divulge. Unknown to Evans, 
with such talk of arms, the FWA had ultimately sown the seeds of its own destruction. 
The declaration, roundly dismissed as fantasy, followed skirmishes by female ‘army 
scouts’ over the flying of a Union Flag In the town; their intention to bum the flag, 
being described as ‘barbaric’ by one resident. With Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
expected to go to the country at any time, Gwynfor Evans was quick to distance Plaid 
Cymru from Cayo Evans’ remarks. The party, he announced, had no contact with the 
group ‘in any way’. Such comments failed to help the party achieve its aim of 
obtaining power for Wales through constitutional means and such deplorable
2
Liverpool Echo, 19 November 1965. Liverpool Record Office. Llyn Celyn Newspaper Cuttings, 
1957 - 1971. Hq352.6CUT. During the meeting, some measure of fiscal payment for the water 
extracted from Llyn Celyn was discussed, as was the establishing of a trading estate for light industry 
and the payment for fishing rights. WM, 20 November 1965. Nevertheless, the meeting came the day 
after Gwynfor Evans received notice that the Secretary o f State for Wales, had rejected calls from Plaid 
Cymru to establish a Welsh Water Board. WM, 19 November 1965.
3 Liverpool Daily Post, 18 January 1966. LRO. Llyn Celyn Newspaper Cuttings, 1957 - 1971. 
Hq352.6CUT.
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activities adversely affected the party’s standing at the last election.4
If Gwynfor Evans hoped his public repudiation of the FWA had seen them off, 
the thorn in his side was about to tweak again. The condemnation had given Cayo 
Evans an idea. In private, he now proposed a coalition. Did Plaid Cymru not realize 
by the time it succeeded in having one member returned to Parliament Wales would 
not exist? Time would not stand still to save the nation and time was fast running out. 
To Cayo Evans - and few besides - the way ahead was clear. The party’s 
‘membership and potential support, together with the FWA, could easily win freedom 
for Wales within four years’.5
The Clywedog reservoir construction site is attacked
Three weeks later, on 6 March, Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru re-emerged from the 
shadows. In a telephone call at 12.29 a.m. to the Gwynedd Constabulary at 
Caernarfon, a warning was received that a bomb was timed to detonate at the 
Clywedog reservoir, exactly 16 minutes later. As police from nearby Llanidloes raced 
to the construction site, on time, an 80-foot steel mast, connected to another mast by a 
three-inch thick, 110 foot-long cable, disintegrated, as four pounds of gelignite 
detonated. The explosion, which power station attendant, 28-year-old Harry Thomas 
likened to a ‘terrific clap of thunder’, blew a seven foot hole in the ground and ripped 
through the guy ropes supporting the mast. Both it and the cable, used for carrying 
buckets of concrete and equipment, cascaded down the hillside. The target had been 
deliberately chosen and the resultant damage estimated at more than £30,000. A 
Clywedog Reservoir Joint Authority spokesman declared that without the aid of the 
overhead cableway, work at the £4.5million site would be delayed for up to three 
months.
As speculation abounded as to whether the device was activated by a timer, or 
by way of sending a charge by battery down the telephone cable - which ran from the 
village of Bwlch-y-Gle to the dam site - a detective conceded the explosion had not 
been ‘an amateurish job by any means’.6 Immediately, regional crime squad police
4
Carmarthen Times, 18 February 1966. The FWA wanted to ‘safeguard the nation and its language 
and to ensure home rule for Wales’. Cayo Evans revealed that ‘the leader for the south Wales area’, 
which included Carmarthenshire, ‘lived in Cwmbran’.
5 Plaid Cymru Papers, B 1052, NLW. Undated letter from the FWA to Gwynfor Evans.
6 WM, 7 March 1966; also, TNA, DPP 2/5968; DPP 2/5969. The charge could have been sent down 
the cable by battery from any point along its length, the current detonating the explosives. The caller to
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officers throughout Wales began their search for the saboteurs. Despite police 
admitting they had nothing to implicate the Free Wales Army, or any other 
organisation to the explosion, unsurprisingly, among those first to be interviewed 
were known members of the FWA. One immediate suspect was the perpetrator of an 
earlier attack at the Tryweryn reservoir site, Owain Williams, who having been roused 
from his bed in the small hours, annoyed officers by thanking them for bringing him 
the good news; adding had he been asked to assist in the ‘first-class operation’ he 
would have done so.7
If those in militant nationalist circles toasted the success of the operation, 
many outside its ranks condemned it as ‘totally irresponsible’. It merely 
demonstrated that those prepared undertake such action were ‘hooligans’, lacking ‘all 
sense of proportion’. Furthermore, declared an outraged Western Mail editorial, those 
involved were the victims of a ‘perverted greed for adventure’. To a newspaper proud 
of its unionist traditions, the strike had been wholly unnecessary. Sabotage could, it 
was felt, be a justified political weapon where an effective tyranny barred all other 
means of expression. However, in spite of the inflated language of oppression, as 
erroneously voiced by nationalists, ‘everyone knew’ this barrier to political advance
Q
simply did not exist within the democratic British political system. Nevertheless, to 
Gwynfor Evans, as at Tryweryn three years earlier, blame for the explosion lay firmly 
at the door of the central political parties. It was their indifference to the destruction 
of Welsh-speaking communities and the continuing exploitation of Welsh water 
resources without material return, which symbolized how ruthlessly Wales had been 
treated. Time and again, stated Evans, the Government had ridden roughshod over 
Welsh constitutional opposition. What had happened, he asked, to the solemn 
promise of the Labour Party in its party manifesto to establish a Water Board for 
Wales? The Plaid Cymru representation had been ignored and while the party 
continued to be ‘hampered by suppression on television’, there was always going to
police was male and spoke Welsh.
7 WM, 9 March 1966; also interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March 2004.
8 WM, 7 March 1966. Plaid Cymru’s first political broadcast was in 1965. A proposal by the National 
Broadcasting Council for Wales to allow a series of local party broadcasts, including provision for 
Plaid Cymru was vetoed - with the connivance of the Labour Party - by the government in 1955. It 
decreed that a political party must contest 50 Parliamentary seats before it could be granted air time. 
As there were 36 seats in Wales, a solely ‘Welsh party’ did not qualify to broadcast. Dafydd Williams, 
The Story o f  Plaid Cymru (Aberystwyth, 2000), p.22. By 1970, the rules had been changed. Rhys 
Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot (Talybont, 2008), p.271.
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be those who would become ‘increasingly impatient’.9
Predictably, a stinging rebuke of Evans’ comments was quickly returned. The 
‘childlike’ attempt of the Plaid Cymru leader to hive responsibility for the action onto 
others, remarked an angry Conservative Party spokesman, was ‘the most arrant 
nonsense yet to emanate from the nationalist party of Wales’. Moreover, if Evans 
himself did not ‘shoulder the blame’, then such a failure was indicative of the warring 
factions within the party ranks.10 James Griffiths, the Secretary of State for Wales, 
issued a statement declaring his ‘shock’ at what he termed ‘this stupid act of 
destruction’. He too felt certain such incidents did nothing but ‘harm’. . .particularly at 
a time when the Labour Government was ‘striving by every means to strengthen the 
economy of mid-Wales’.11 Nonetheless, not all were prepared to castigate those 
responsible. While it was reported that local reaction to the explosion was ‘strangely 
non-committal’, one notable exception was farmer William Philip Hughes. His only 
complaint was that the explosion had occurred ‘too late’. There might yet be another 
bomb, Hughes added, and, as with the first, it would be ‘a good thing’, in that it too
19would make the voice of Wales heard. It was a sentiment given some credence by 
the Welsh language media. A week after the explosion at Clywedog, Y Cymro, 
offered a chilling and prophetic warning. Despite the suggestion the action was 
contrary to Welsh popular opinion, there existed ‘a feeling of sympathy with those 
responsible for the explosion’ than was more widely supposed. If politicians 
continued to take no notice of simmering resentment in Wales, the paper proclaimed, 
ominously, ‘a very bloody chapter in Welsh history’ might yet unfold.13
That same day, police announced they were ‘anxious’ to trace the owner of an 
olive green Castro cap, bearing the FWA insignia and motif ‘Gorchfygwn’ (To 
overcome). It had been discovered some 30 yards from the scene of the Clywedog 
explosion. The police also revealed that between 200 and 300 persons across Wales, 
the usual suspects among them, had been interviewed in relation to the action.14 Yet, 
despite intensive and extensive house searches and the deployment of scientific
9 LDP, 7 March 1966.
10 WM, 8 March 1966.
11 LDP, 9 March 1966.
12 WM, 8 March 1966.
13 Y Cymro, 17 March 1966.
14 TNA, DPP 2/5968. In legend, the White Eagle o f Snowdon, embossed on the FWA Castro cap, 
protects Wales from invaders.
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testing, no arrests had been made. Attention now shifted to the more shadowy 
Meibion Glyndwr (The Sons of Glyndwr) who, as at Tryweryn, repeated their 
intention to poison the waters of the Clywedog reservoir.15
As the controversy raged, Maureen Huws a middle-aged mother of seven, 
from Brynteg, Anglesey, accused police of trying to make her turn ‘informer’.16 One 
man increasingly unsurprised by the ‘knock on the door’ was the president of Plaid 
Cymru. The police, Gwynfor Evans later revealed, had ‘more reason than usual’ for 
questioning him in the wake of the Clywedog strike. That evening, Evans had 
addressed a meeting in Caersws, less than ten miles from the construction site. The 
meeting had also been attended by Maureen Huws. Asked to try on the recovered cap 
for size, the police departed, satisfied Evans was not their man.17
One person who escaped questioning following the explosion was Glyn 
Rowlands. Although Rowlands was to rise to a position of some prominence in the 
so-called peripheral nationalist movement, it had taken him some time to make 
contact with the FWA, since having witnessed the group’s notorious attendance at the 
opening of Llyn Celyn five months before. Having sought a number of prominent 
nationalists in the north Wales area, he had eventually been given Cayo Evans’ 
telephone number. Finally, on 1 March 1966, five days before the action at 
Clywedog, Rowlands met other members of the group at a Saint David’s Day 
celebration in Pontrhydfendigaid.18 Toni Lewis, a renowned figure within the FWA, 
also attended. In a police statement, three days after ‘Clywedog’, Lewis described the 
events at the FWA rally. Approximately twenty members of the group gathered to 
discuss future policy, Lewis disclosed. Various topics had been considered, including 
the compulsory adoption of an FWA uniform. This motion had not been carried. 
Another, which suggested Information Officers be appointed was. Lewis himself was 
appointed I. O. for the south Wales region. Lyn Ebenezer had been likewise 
appointed for West Wales. At no time throughout the day, Lewis maintained, had any 
reference been made to the Clywedog reservoir. In the immediate aftermath of the 
explosion, the police statement concluded, Lewis wrote to Ebenezer. Asked to reveal
15 The Times, 10 March 1966; also, WM, 10 March 1966. It was also announced that the contractors 
employed in the construction o f the Clywedog Reservoir - Reed Mallik - had a clause written into their 
contract indemnifying the company against ‘damage by nationalist elements’.
16 P. Berresford Ellis, Wales: A Nation Again (London, 1968), p. 141.
17 Gwynfor Evans, For The Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 1996), p. 191.18
Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004.
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the letters’ contents, Lewis conceded that while there was ‘nothing to indicate the 
involvement’ of the west Wales man, the letter contained ‘words to the effect’ that it 
had been a ‘good show at Clywedog’ and ‘we’ll beat the Sais yet’.19
Under mounting pressure, police soon made an early morning visit to the 
home of Lyn Ebenezer. In 2006, Ebenezer threw light on the incident and why he 
believed his questioning over the Clywedog action had proved inevitable. In the early 
spring of 1966, he and Cayo Evans spent a night at Garthewin Hall, the manorial 
home of R. O. F. Wynne. Evans and Wynne had met at the opening of Llyn Celyn. 
Both men held right-wing political views, were fervent Welsh nationalists and each 
claimed lineage to the landed class of ‘old Wales’. Unsurprisingly, they struck up a
90predictable rapport. Wynne also enjoyed a long-standing friendship with Saunders 
Lewis. Together, each man professed their support for the FWA. As a result of its 
association with Saunders Lewis, the Godfather of modem Welsh nationalism, the 
Free Wales Army was afforded some considerable gravitas: especially in its early 
years.21
Nonetheless, having enjoyed the warmth of their hosts’ hospitality, the two 
west Wales men departed for home. It was not long before adventure of a different 
variety came Ebenezer’s way, as he felt the long arm of the law for the first time. 
Unaware that police had knowledge of the letter from Toni Lewis, he had, he 
believed, been ‘picked out’ for questioning over events at Clywedog, owing to his 
friendship with Cayo Evans. If that in itself was not incriminating, the ‘present’ given 
him by Evans and stored in a drawer in his bedroom wardrobe was. The self-styled 
spokesman for the FWA, Ebenezer explained, had visited him some weeks earlier and 
having nonchalantly remarked he had a ‘present’ for him, had casually placed a brown 
paper parcel on the kitchen table. Engrossed in conversation and Ebenezer unaware 
of the parcel’s contents, the two men decamped to the Black Lion. On returning, 
Ebenezer opened the parcel and found to his surprise and considerable unease, twelve 
rounds of ammunition and an oiled and polished .38 hand gun. Believing to refuse 
the gift would ‘hurt’ Evans’ feelings, he said nothing. It was not the first gun he 
received from Cayo Evans; some time earlier he was handed ‘a very old Spanish .38’.
19
Free Wales Army and Patriotic Front trial Exhibit 107. Toni Lewis was taken in for questioning, 9
March 1966.
20 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
21 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
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Lyn Ebenezer realized with the spring on the weapon broken the gun was obsolete; 
and so, largely unconcerned, he placed it in a down stairs cupboard. As from where 
Evans had acquired the firearms, Ebenezer had ‘no idea’.
As news of the Clywedog explosion occupied news reports, during the early 
hours of one morning, Ebenezer’s home was raided by police. Their reason: to 
discover anything which might link him to the explosion and/or Welsh militant 
nationalism. Having opened the door to the downstairs cupboard, to Ebenezer’s 
astonishment, one of the police officers consigned to carry out the search failed to 
notice the antiquated Spanish gun positioned just feet before him. Such was position 
of the gun, Ebenezer later speculated whether the officer had indeed sighted the 
weapon, but chose to ignore it. Offering to help the officer in the search of his 
bedroom, in order to speed up the process, while the officers’ attention was 
momentarily distracted, the suspect - having removed the drawer and placed it on the 
bed - concealed the recently received handgun under a coat, positioned alongside it. 
Having sifted through the drawer, the officer searched elsewhere in the room. 
Ebenezer returned the gun to the drawer and pushed it shut. Leading the raid was the 
man who would come to be regarded as the bete noire of the FWA, Detective Chief 
Inspector, John Owen Evans. About to leave, having failed to discover anything 
incriminating, ‘almost as an afterthought’, Evans asked the junior officer if he had 
checked Ebenezer’s coat pockets. The officer replied that he had not and on doing so, 
discovered the twelve rounds of ammunition. Also found, was the letter from Toni 
Lewis. Ebenezer was arrested and transferred to police headquarters at Aberystwyth. 
There, outside his police cell, the incarcerated prisoner heard talk that fuses had been 
found and that ‘Cayo Evans was singing like a bird’. It was, Ebenezer recognized, ‘an 
old police trick’. In the dark as to events at Clywedog, he remained sure that officers 
had little with which to charge him. Expanding on the strategy adopted by the police 
during his questioning, Ebenezer remarked that Inspector Vivian Fisher - who was 
later to play a prominent role in the apprehension of the FWA - had played the ‘hail, 
the fellow well met’; ‘one of the boys’: the confidante who could be trusted. Such an 
approach did not wash with Ebenezer. He dismissed it as devious. With the guns 
undetected and able to provide a water tight alibi for the night in question, Ebenezer 
returned to his community ‘a hero’. It had been, he recalled with some amusement,
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‘free pints time’.22
According to Denis Coslett, the FWA at this juncture comprised some twenty 
members ‘in uniform’ with about forty others affiliated. If the movement had 
included more earnest figures, most notably, David Bonar Thomas, a common feature 
shared by those drawn to its ranks, Coslett added, was a heightened sense of mirth. In 
April 1966, the FWA accepted an invitation by Sinn Fein to march during the
tlicelebrations in Dublin to mark the 50 anniversary of the Easter rising. Acutely 
aware that a ‘good Welsh representation’ would reflect favourably on the movement, 
Cayo Evans contacted FWA members and sympathizers imploring them to attend.24 
Despite his letter of invite, future FWA member Glyn Rowlands decided to make his 
own way to Dublin. His reasons for ‘keeping a low profile’, he later explained, was 
in order to evaluate the group and ‘see what score was’.
It was not only Glyn Rowlands who wished to assess the weekend’s events. 
Within a fortnight of his arrest and release without charge, Lyn Ebenezer was 
approached by a policeman who offered to pay all his expenses for the forthcoming 
trip. It was on the understanding he fed back what transpired on his return. Ebenezer 
had even thought to agree, believing it useful ‘to have a foot in each camp’. Believing 
Cayo Evans would share his enthusiasm, Evans had instead taken a very dim view. 
Entreating his friend not to accept, he soberly professed: ‘once you’re in their hold 
they won’t let go’.26
One FWA man determined to make the trip to Dublin was Peter ‘Goginan’. A 
renowned heavy drinker and dubbed by Cayo Evans the ‘chaplain of the FWA’, on 
the ferry crossing from Fishguard, ‘Goginan’ could be found holding court in the 
hospitality suite. At some point, with the harbour lights of Dun Laoghaire honing into 
view, ‘Goginan’ fell asleep under a table. He failed to disembark on arrival and 
returned to Fishguard having slumbered peacefully throughout the entire
22 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Ebenezer was able to prove that he had
spent the evening socializing in Felinfach, some sixty miles from the scene o f the Clywedog blast.
23 The Daily Sketch, 11 April 1966. The march occurred over the weekend o f 10 April 1966. Report 
on the Activities o f  the Free Wales Army. Folder N o 5. Press Cuttings. FWA and PF trial, Exhibit. 9. 
Cayo Evans to Glyn Rowlands, 3 April 1966. Free Wales Army and Patriotic Front trial Exhibit 417.
25 Telephone interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 20 February 2009.
26 Telephone interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 25 April 2010. Ebenezer believes he was not 
charged regarding the bullets, as the police hoped he might turn informer. He is ‘90% sure’ the 
policeman who carried out the search of his home deliberately ignored the gun. Having since got to 
know the retired officer well, neither he nor Ebenezer has ever mentioned it.
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97proceedings. To many observers, such antics only added to the belief that the FWA 
was unable to fully appreciate the seriousness of the nationalist struggle. The 
widening gulf between it and the more ‘orthodox’ movement was highlighted by 
events the evening before the scheduled procession. Having checked into the same 
hotel, Cayo Evans had been outraged to learn that prominent members of Cymdeithas 
yr Iaith Gymraeg planned to attend the official rally and turn their backs on the FWA 
and the unofficial march organised by Sinn Fein. Angrily, Evans had challenged 
Dafydd Iwan and his brother Hugh Caredig to ‘take one more step’ down the hotel 
stairs. Recognising discretion to be the better part of valour, the two men returned to 
their room.28
The following day, Cayo Evans, his cousin Eddie Griffiths and Lyn Ebenezer 
took their place alongside militant nationalist movements invited from across the 
globe. One member of the FWA, dubbed ‘Enrico’ owing to his swarthy appearance, 
spent the day sampling the Dublin brew. While this had been by no means unusual, 
as the day wore on, Ebenezer explained, ‘Enrico’s’ behaviour became increasingly 
erratic. Convinced the party had been assembled to re-storm the post office, the scene 
of the uprising fifty years before, Enrico had asked with increasing agitation, ‘when 
are they going to give us the guns?’ The Welshman was not the only visitor to Dublin 
infused with the spirit of revolution. In the Gresham Hotel, a favourite haunt of 
Michael Collins’ and the ‘illegal government’, an elderly American of Irish decent 
entertained guests in the art of guerrilla warfare. With the aid of furniture and the 
hotel bar, spectators enjoyed pristine manoeuvres and a faultless display of grenade 
launching. That night, sleeping six to a room, the excitement of the day returned to 
haunt ‘Enrico’. Jumping to his feet and screaming ‘they’re coming to get me’, the 
hapless Welshman was placated and returned to his bed where he slept soundly 
through what little of the night remained.29
By coincidence, the commemorative celebrations had been organised to 
coincide with the bi-annual Five Nations Rugby International between Ireland and 
Wales. On the return ferry crossing, the mischievous streak of the FWA was evident
27 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 10 March 2001.
28 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Dafydd Iwan, the
future president o f Plaid Cymru, later described the FWA as ‘not really up to much’. Everyone Held
Their Breath, 25 Years o f  the Prince o f  Wales. HTV Wales Production. Screened, 1994.
29 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. During the unofficial march, the IRA fired a 
volley o f shots over Mountjoy Prison, where leaders of the uprising were executed in 1916.
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once again. Having forcibly removed the Union Jack fluttering over the main deck, to 
cheers and applause y  Ddraig Goch was hoisted proudly in its place. A little while 
later, having ‘stormed’ the captain’s office, an announcement was heard echoing over 
the ship’s tannoy system. The Free Wales Army, declared a west Wales voice, had 
taken control of the vessel. It would ‘now be heading for Patagonia’. The notice was 
greeted with a roar of approval from the thousands of returning Welsh rugby fans. A 
tour of the ships’ decks was then undertaken, where donations for Army funds was 
gratefully received. Yet, perhaps the highlight of the weekend Coslett disclosed in 
2000, was his first encounter with the IRA. Introduced to his Irish contemporary by 
Cayo Evans, the three men were soon driving through the Dublin night en route to a 
destination unknown to the two unsuspecting Welshmen. On arriving at the British 
Embassy, the taxi driver was ordered to stop. Alighting from the vehicle, the IRA 
serviceman approached the building and launched a volley of stones, smashing a 
number of windows. He returned to the car and robustly ordered the driver to leave. 
‘The taxi driver didn’t know what was happening’, smiled Coslett. Neither, he 
admitted, had he nor Cayo Evans.
The ‘Dublin weekend’, he later recalled had been ‘a hell of a laugh’. Yet, if
such recollections were embraced with understandable warmth, feelings of regret
blossomed in Coslett’s later years to overshadow what had been the most colourful
period of his life. Speaking in 2003, the former west Wales commandant of the Free
Wales Army, plaintively recognized that such antics merely provided ammunition to
those willing to castigate the FWA as an embarrassing irrelevance. Despite the
frivolities, both he and all those drawn to the FWA had been imbued with a deep and
genuine love for Wales. They had each shared a longing to see their homeland throw
off its shackles and stand alone. Moreover, they proudly believed that Wales’ unique
cultural identity should be protected and this, Coslett added, had all too easily been
<11
lost in the fog of their notoriety. Although it was an opinion which Glyn Rowlands 
was ultimately to share, the Dublin commemoration had struck a chord. On returning 
to Wales, Rowlands made contact with Cayo Evans and joined the ranks of the Free 
Wales Army.32
30 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
31 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 20 November 2003.
32 Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004.
132
•y-2
As news of another bomb hoax reached the newsstands, Cayo Evans informed the 
nation’s media the ‘army’ was gaining both momentum and strength. Outlining the 
aims and ideals of the movement, Evans stated the FWA had drawn inspiration from 
the IRA and while principally a non-violent organisation, would approve militant 
measures to protect Welsh interests from, what he termed, ‘the incursions of the 
English’. The drowning of Welsh valleys to provide free water to English cities was 
‘robbery of the nation’s natural resources and a travesty of justice’. Therefore, it was 
the ultimate aim of the Free Wales Army, he added, to gain ‘independence and 
sovereignty for Wales as a nation’. As for the Dublin march, it had been ‘one of the 
proudest moments’ of his life. It had been ‘a privilege to march alongside the 
IRA’...and his conscience had been stirred to see Easter lily wreaths laid on the 
graves of those Irish patriots ‘murdered by the English’. What those Irish comrades 
had achieved, ‘the FWA would achieve’.34 The Free Wales Army was comprised of 
columns as dispersed as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Dublin. It totalled 
‘about 2,000’ and would be mobilized to provide physical resistance when and if 
necessary. More intriguingly, and adding fuel to the notion the FWA was operating in 
tandem with the bombers, Evans added the militant nationalist movement comprised 
two groups: those prepared to identify themselves, and those who resolved not to 
reveal their association with the movement.35
Having been galvanised by events in Dublin, the self-styled publicity 
spokesman of the FWA, remarked Lyn Ebenezer in 2006, was now in his pomp and 
seemingly unconcerned with ‘what he said’.36 Evans soon turned his attention to the 
nearly completed Severn Bridge. One morning over breakfast, Cayo Evans received a 
phone call from the Western Mail. Asked to respond to comments by an engineer 
employed in the Bridge’s construction, that only an ‘atom bomb would shift it’, 
unperturbed, Evans replied the FWA had such a weapon and that a pilot friend of his 
called Griffiths had been instructed to fly over the site and discharge it.
33 CT, 29 April 1966. The caller, purporting to be a member of the FWA, stated that an explosive 
device was set to detonate during a busy Saturday lunchtime in the main Carmarthen Post Office. 
Denying all knowledge o f the incident, Cayo Evans declared it ‘a damned silly thing to do’. Police
revealed that it was the second such received hoax call within a week.
34 Cardigan and Teifyside Advertiser, 6 May 1966.
35 CT, 29 April 1966. Former Deputy Chief Constable John Owen Evans thought a more accurate 
figure o f FWA affiliation was ‘50 throughout Wales’. Interview between WT & J. O. Evans, 19
February 2000.
36 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
37 WM, 7 June 1966; also interview between WT & Gillian Davies, 15 June 2006.
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If such statements made for ‘good copy’, as far as the Welsh media were concerned, 
such remarks did nothing to endear Evans to the Welsh police. Their efforts to 
apprehend those responsible for the explosion at Clywedog had reaped little harvest, 
as the identities of those responsible remained elusive. One man developing links 
with the actual culprits, was Sergeant John Jenkins of the British Army Dental Corps. 
Jenkins was then re-adjusting to life in the UK, having returned from a posting in 
Germany twelve months earlier. One of the purchasers of land, subdivided at the 
Clywedog site, he still possessed - albeit a depleting - faith in Plaid Cymru; believing 
the matter of the valley’s drowning might yet be resolved to the satisfaction of the 
nationalist community through constitutional channels. Jenkins did not have long 
to wait. On 5 May, the issue was raised in parliament by Geoffrey Lloyd, MP for 
Sutton Coldfield. In a written question to the newly appointed Secretary of State for 
Wales, Cledwyn Hughes, Lloyd asked to what extent recruitment of skilled men had 
been affected by the explosion at the Clywedog site? Furthermore, was Hughes aware 
that land required in connection with the reservoir had been purchased and sub­
divided so as to ‘delay the acquisition proceedings?’. In reply, Welsh Office 
spokesman, Ifor Davies assured the House that while recruitment had not been 
affected, the government further expected no delay due to ‘land acquisition 
difficulties’.39 To Welsh nationalists the message was clear: the government would 
simply override any constitutional attempt to prolong the process. This unilateral 
declaration of support for the construction of the reservoir, convinced John Jenkins 
that such changing of the statutable goalposts, within a British democratic framework, 
would always render Welsh minority opinion at a serious disadvantage. How, 
nationalists asked, could Wales ever protect its environmental and cultural concerns, 
when central government had sufficient influence to simply amend any legislation to 
advance its own political aspirations? The fact that police investigations in the wake 
of the Clywedog action, appeared wholly pre-occupied with targeting the entire 
nationalist community - whether constitutionally minded or not - did nothing to allay 
fears that anyone who expressed nationalist sympathies was now fair game.40 
Nevertheless, the decision of the government to circumvent any attempts to hamper
38 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
39 Hansard, VoF 727, p. 140. Davies reiterated the legal amendment o f the Property and Law Act, 
which stipulated that leaseholders would no longer be entitled to attend a compulsory purchase enquiry.
40 TNA, BD 11/3947; also, 23 November 1966, Hansard, vol.736, pp, 329-30.
134
proceedings at Clywedog was to have far-reaching consequences, as John Jenkins’ 
efforts to seize directional control of MAC received a significant fillip.
Speaking in 2008, Jenkins threw light on whom he understood to have 
responsible for the explosion, while also revealing his thoughts as to the apparent 
discovery of an FWA forage cap at the site. Although ‘very much a fringe member’ 
of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru at this juncture, Jenkins confirmed the action was 
undertaken by members of the organization. David Walters, who four years earlier 
was charged with criminal damage at the Tryweryn site along with David Pritchard, 
later confirmed that Alf Williams, Trefor Beasley and Pritchard - all MAC members - 
had indeed been responsible.41 As for the FWA emblazoned forage cap, it had been 
deliberately discarded to wrong-foot investigating officers, Jenkins believed. Yet, if it 
was dropped accidentally, it confirmed his suspicion the movement was riddled with 
problems regarding issues of security, strategy and logistics. What was required, he 
reasoned, was a complete re-assessment of the movement’s strengths and 
weaknesses.42
John Jenkins was not the only one pre-occupied with matters of security. A 
proposal by J. Fordham, Clerk of the Clywedog Authority, that the army be brought in 
to safeguard the completion of the reservoir, was dismissed as ‘appalling’ by Home 
Office and Whitehall officials. What was needed, they suggested, was for the site 
authority to work more closely with both R. B. Thomas, the Chief Constable of Mid 
Wales Constabulary and Montgomeryshire County Council.43
Despite continuing criticism of political bias in the undertaking of their 
inquiries,44 and a vehement denial of such,45 the police investigation into the 
explosion at Clywedog soon reaped reward. On 15 March, 23-year-old Owen 
Pennant Hughes of Nebo, Caernarfonshire, was arrested after a search of his farm 
recovered 9 lb of gelignite and 6 detonators. During subsequent questioning, Hughes 
informed officers he had become immersed in the militant struggle, after being 
contacted by Cayo Evans. Moreover, Evans had allegedly suggested Hughes’ remote
41 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
42 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 17 November 2008. It was widely felt within nationalist 
circles at the time o f the action, that the cap had been ‘planted’ by the authorities to incriminate the 
FWA. Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004.
43TNA, BD 11/3947.
44 Sunday Mirror, 10 April 1966; also, Y Cymro, 7 April 1966.
45 TNA, BD 11/3947. Chief Constable, Mid Wales Constabulary, R. B. Thomas, to Arthur Thomas, 
Montgomershire Plaid Cymru official, 12 April 1966.
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farm would be an ideal location to hold FWA meetings and exercises; most notably, 
in the use of explosives. It was a suggestion, Hughes admitted to police, he readily 
complied with. Charged with being in possession of explosives under suspicious 
circumstances, Hughes was granted bail and ordered to appear before magistrates at 
the town’s Assizes on 21 April. There, he was further granted bail and committed for 
trial at the same Assizes on 29 June.
At the commencement of the trial, Owen Hughes entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge against him. It was then revealed he had come to the attention of police as a 
result of two letters they had received. Each, admittedly written by Hughes, 
‘connected him to the FWA’. One, addressed to ‘Llan’ was identified by police as 27- 
year-old David Robert Marcus Gale of Llangollen. The other was addressed to 
‘Tony’. In this second letter, Hughes wrote that plans to recruit youngsters into the 
FWA, was gathering apace, following the success o f ‘after school discussion groups’. 
Furthermore, he could arrange delivery of a radio transmitter, capable of receiving 
messages from a police mobile surveillance vehicle. What was more, he proposed the 
‘sham’ and ‘steam blowing’ image of the FWA be maintained. This, the letter added, 
in order to perpetuate the belief, as held by the authorities, that the threat posed by the 
group was without foundation.
The court heard in the weeks prior to Hughes’ arrest, a meeting of FWA 
associates had been held at his farm. During this meeting, Marcus Gale demonstrated 
how an explosive device could be assembled. This had been achieved with the aid of 
‘a clock, wires, a battery with detonators and gelignite’; of which it was also claimed, 
Gale had in his possession ‘a substantial quantity’. Also allegedly discussed during 
this meeting was the ‘blowing up of both completed dams and reservoirs under 
construction; the shooting of forestry workers and the burning of forestry’. This, the 
court heard, was in order to send a resounding signal to the Forestry Commission, that 
the forestation of Wales would no longer be tolerated.
In mitigation, Hughes’ defending council Eifion Roberts, informed the court 
that ‘any young man worth his salt’ was bound to ‘lament the passing of what he 
thought was best in his national heritage’. Should he to have ‘anything about him’, in 
all probability, an articulation of that protest would be made in some form or other. 
Loyalty and the desire to demonstrate that loyalty, had featured strongly in Hughes’ 
having embroiled himself in explosives. Nonetheless, the defendant accepted that 
while having been ‘on the periphery’ of the movement, he now saw ‘the error of his
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ways’. He was no longer in contact with members of the organisation and ‘his wife 
and son meant more to him than anything in the world’. In his summing up, Judge 
Widgery declared he had ‘no interest for the politics of the accused’, other than when 
it brought him into contact with, what he termed, ‘the ugly, crude violence one 
associates with explosives’. He accepted police assurances that Hughes played no 
role in the Clywedog action and further accepted he had subsequently extricated 
himself from the Free Wales Army. Nevertheless, while recognizing such, he was 
‘speaking as much to his former associates as to Hughes himself, when he said were 
this not an isolated instance, he would be taking a very dim view. Furthermore, if it 
was seen that a pattern of this nature was emerging within this jurisdiction, then the 
court would be bound to use the power which it possessed; and that might result in the 
sending of persons found guilty of such activity to prison for up to fourteen years. 
Judge Widgery concluded with a dark and prophetic portent. Those who dabbled in 
explosives, he remarked gravely, always eventually injured one or more innocent 
persons. He then placed Owen Penannt Hughes on probation for three years.46
Following the questioning of Owen Hughes by police, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions was notified. He informed north Wales officers there was enough 
evidence to warrant the arrests of Marcus Gale and 25-year-old Harry Jones of Cefn 
Mawr, Wrexham. On 4 May 1966, both men appeared before Denbigh Assizes. 
Marcus Gale was charged with being in ‘possession of nine electrical detonators in 
suspicious circumstances’ and receiving and possessing six sticks of mining 
explosives, known to be stolen. Harry Jones was charged with stealing and 
possessing mining explosives, the property of the NCB. Crucially, despite their 
extensive inquiries, police were satisfied that neither defendant had any link to the 
Clywedog explosion. Having heard the charges before them, the defence council 
submitted that the two accused had no case to answer on the charge of being in 
possession of the mining explosives. This, it was maintained, was owing to no 
evidence having been offered which proved their possession was with an unlawful 
object in mind. Nonetheless, granted bail, Gale and Jones were committed for trial at 
Denbigh Assizes on 8 July.
At the commencement of the trial, both Marcus Gale and Harry Jones pleaded
46
TNA, DPP 2/4169; also, WM, 30 June 1966; also, LDP, 30 June 1966. The gelignite was buried in a 
field, the six detonators stored in a refrigerator in an out-building. Those the FWA intended to target in 
their recruitment drive were schoolboys between the ages of fourteen and sixteen.
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guilty. The court heard that while undertaking a search of Gale’s home, police 
discovered a notebook containing diagrams concerning the construction of petrol 
bombs, an extract removed from an encyclopaedia regarding explosives and political 
documents and literature of a militant Welsh nationalist nature. Whilst being 
questioned by officers, Gale allegedly claimed he had been given the explosives by a 
man from south Wales. Moreover, he had attended a meeting at a farm at Nebo, near 
Caernarfon, where the construction of explosive devices had been discussed. At a 
further meeting, Gale added, another man from south Wales brought a quantity of 
detonators with wire attached. He then proceeded to demonstrate to those assembled, 
how to combine detonators in a series from a battery. Throughout the demonstration, 
those gathered were instructed to make diagrams of the procedure. This, Gale 
informed police, was so that ‘the expertise was in place should the time ever demand 
it’. It was then disclosed that with the aid of a printing press, Gale had run off 
hundreds of cards bearing Free Wales Army slogans and further messages of an anti- 
English character. The court also heard that Harry Jones had stolen the explosive 
material when formerly employed at the Hafod Colliery near Wrexham. In pleas of 
mitigation, both men claimed they too had severed links with the FWA. In summing 
up, Judge Widgery repeated his earlier warning that future cases involving the use of 
explosives as a political tool, would result in a stem penalty for those convicted. Such 
activity, Widgery added, was ‘abhorred by all right-minded people’. Requesting his 
summing up be brought to the attention of any judge who might have cause to preside 
over such matters on any future circuit, Judge Widgery placed Marcus Gale and Harry 
Jones on two years probation.47
On 15 May, Parliament met in sombre mood, as the death of the Carmarthen MP, 
Lady Megan Lloyd George was announced. All sides of the political divide relayed 
messages of sympathy for its much-respected former member. Nevertheless, having 
expressed a genuine display of warmth for Megan Lloyd George, political eyes soon
AQ
turned to the vacant parliamentary seat and the impending Carmarthen by-election.
47 TNA, DPP 2/4169; also, WM, 5 May, 1966; also, LDP, 9 July 1966. Asked if  ‘the man from south 
Wales with expert knowledge’ was David Pritchard, John Jenkins replied cautiously, ‘it might have 
been’; adding others from the south also had such knowledge. Telephone interview between WT & 
John Jenkins, 13 December 2008.
48
WM, 16 May 1966; also Gwynfor: YrAelod Dros Gymrul BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, 
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A week later, it was reported that the House of Commons was to discuss the decision 
by the Severn River Authority to survey forty one prospective reservoir sites in 
Montgomeryshire.49 The announcement followed a meeting in Newtown on 20 
March, during which - astonishingly in view of recent events - committee officials 
revealed the Clywedog project would not yield enough water to meet demand in the 
Midlands of England by 1976.50 Immediately, Plaid Cymru began the process to 
counter the measure. At a series of meetings, Gwynfor Evans led speeches 
condemning the attitude of the Severn River Authority; and other like-minded English 
municipal bodies who appeared to believe that Wales existed solely for their benefit.51
The issue of ‘Welsh water’ had now become a divisive and cardinal political 
issue. A conviction held by Plaid Cymru, that it was the subject of disproportionate 
police interest following the Clywedog explosion, received a significant boost at the 
end of May. At the annual assembly of Welsh Methodists in Dolgellau, a motion was 
carried condemning police for the ‘unfair and one-sided’ nature of its investigation. 
The targeting of Gwynfor Evans, the party leader, it was felt, had been particularly 
insensitive.52 Two days later, Cledwyn Hughes, the Secretary of State for Wales, 
attempted to quell the simmering furore, when he announced to the Commons ‘there 
was no question of 30 or more reservoirs being constructed in mid-Wales’. Rather, he 
felt the number to be ‘much smaller’: perhaps ‘two or three in the next 20 years or
e o
so’. If Hughes’ pronouncement was intended to allay nationalist fears, it failed. At 
a rally the following evening, members of Plaid Cymru, the Union of South Wales 
Separatists and the Free Wales Army, were ‘vetted by police’ as they attempted to 
leave. Despite the delegates’ protests that the meeting had been ‘orderly’, arguments 
and scuffles broke out when a nationalist taking photographs of a police photographer 
at work was detained by officers and the film from his camera confiscated. The 
police action, remarked the veteran activist Pedr Lewis, had been ‘rather 
provocative’.54
In readiness for the Carmarthen by-election, the wheels of political machinery 
began to turn. It wasn’t long before the central parties recognized a chink in the Plaid
49 WM, 23 May 1966.
50 Y Cymro, 24 March 1966.
51 Y Cymro, 21 April 1966.
52 WM, 26 May 1966.
53 WM, 28 May 1966.
54 WM, 30 May 1966.
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Cymru armoury, as the alleged link between it and the ‘unsavoury element on the 
militant wing of the movement’ became the subject of scrutiny once again. Right on 
cue, the FWA happily obliged those all too eager to point the finger. On 2 June, Cayo 
Evans was fined £40 after admitting unlawfully wounding 23-year-old research 
student Tudor Thomas. Although adamant that Evans had not instigated the affray, 
Hywel ap Robert, Evans’ defence council, conceded his client had ‘gone too far’, in 
resisting the unprovoked attack against him with the aid of a knuckleduster. Tudur 
Thomas, the court heard, had been rendered unconscious and admitted to hospital in 
Aberystwyth, where he received 25 stitches to head cuts.55
Within days, Cayo Evans was back in the news. Once again, the focus of the 
nation’s media was the Severn Bridge, scheduled to be opened in September. 
Although quick to distance himself from a threat to blow up the bridge,56 Evans 
revealed it had ‘probably’ been issued by ‘one of the five or six FWA columns in 
south east Wales’. Its reason for doing so, he speculated, was in order to highlight 
dissatisfaction at the bridge’s construction, whose real purpose, he added, ‘was to 
bleed Wales dry’. Despite the widespread belief that ‘the Bridge’ was all but immune 
from terrorist activity, a spokesman for Gloucestershire county police conceded 
threats of this nature had to be ‘taken seriously’.57 A fortnight later, with ‘special 
undisclosed security measures’ having been implemented, including an increase in 
patrols and the routine questioning of sightseers, to the acute embarrassment of police 
and security officials, the £8 million Severn Bridge was evacuated. A parcel, thought 
to contain a bomb was discovered on the span.58 Although the cylindrical object was 
later dismissed as harmless, the militant nationalists of Wales had more than proved 
their point.59
Gwynfor ‘goes in’ at Carmarthen
In west Wales, the Carmarthen summer by-election was hotting up. In an interview 
with Harlech Television, Cayo Evans eloquently outlined why he believed the day 
had dawned for Wales to stand aside from the United Kingdom. No other nation
55 TNA, DPP2 4455. Also, WM, 2 June 1966. The incident occurred in Aberystwyth on 22 May. 
Cayo Evans had been carrying the knuckleduster, the court was told, following a number o f threatening 
remarks which had been made against him in the west Wales area.
56 The Times, 7 June 1966.
57 WM, 7 June 1966.
58 WM, 27 June 1966.
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would tolerate a ‘foreign power’ destroying its communities through flooding, such as 
had happened at Tryweryn and Clywedog, Evans declared. And as an organization, 
the Free Wales Army had vowed to take a stand. Welsh independence was not merely 
a pipedream, added Vernon Griffiths, the fellow FWA member and farming cousin of 
Cayo Evans. ‘Economically, Wales was blessed with abundant resources to ensure 
future prosperity’. From a monitory perspective, the capital was there: Wales had 
both the industry and the agriculture. An autonomous Wales was wholly capable of 
being economically viable.
Yet, with feelings running high, others were quick to predict the disastrous 
consequences which would befall Wales, should Plaid Cymru realise its political 
ambitions and gain the nation its independence. Interviews on television, typified the 
fears - as harboured by some - that a Plaid breakthrough would be the first step in 
Wales to that akin to Ireland. It would ‘split the country from top to bottom’.60 In a 
series of articles published in the Welsh and UK media, Cayo Evans did little to allay 
the fears of those convinced that separatism would lead Wales careering over a 
precipice of division and disharmony. The integration of Wales into England must be 
prevented, he announced, and physical force used to defend the movement and the 
nation’s heritage.61 Furthermore, the doctrine of the Free Wales Army was spreading. 
The group was expanding rapidly, with membership of the movement ‘standing at 
upward of 2,000’. Moreover, while a Welsh Republic would be achieved in his 
lifetime, any degree of federalism would be opposed.62
In an interview with John Summers, the freelance journalist whose 
relationship with the Free Wales Army was to prove decisive to its downfall, Cayo 
Evans informed the readers of The Sunday Times that the FWA was merely reacting 
to the demand of the Welsh public. The group, he alleged, having tested the waters of 
popular opinion to determine the extent of support for its objectives. The result had 
been a nationwide call to arms, with as many as 150 cells of the movement in his area 
alone. Nonetheless, the official spokesman of the FWA recognized that strategy was 
all-important. Certain factions within the group, he revealed, had called for guns to be 
used against the authorities at the opening of Llyn Celyn eight months previously,
Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
60 Day o f  Destiny, HTV Wales Production. Screened HTV Wales, 9 October 2006. The interviews 
were recorded at the time o f the election.
61 WM, 11 May 1966.
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‘but’, Evans added, ‘it was the FWA itself who needed martyrs’. Photographs of a 
policeman’s widow would adorn every newspaper and prove counter-productive. The 
decision therefore to demonstrate peaceably had been taken by the commanding 
officer - the identity of whom would remain a secret. Asked by Summers to comment 
on this apparent rise in militant fervour, the police were disparaging. The less 
encouragement the FWA received, a spokesman remarked, the shorter would be its 
revival. Not to be outdone, Cayo Evans then turned his attention to the wider 
nationalist movement. It was, he believed, too fragmented. Cymdeithas yr Iaith 
Gymraeg campaigned for the Welsh language to be afforded legislative status, but 
what, Evans argued, was to be gained by holding a mass sit-down in a Post Office? 
Far better, he believed, ‘to blow it up’. The benefit of direct action to the wider 
nationalist cause, he reasoned, had been demonstrated by events at Clywedog; and 
such acts of sabotage would continue.63
Speaking in 2003, Emyr Llywelyn Jones, the president of Cymdeithas yr Iaith 
Gymraeg at this juncture - and chief instigator of its committal to non-violence - 
suggested why such ‘nonsense’ had done nothing but undermine the serious efforts of 
the Welsh language society to advance the message of Welsh cultural identity. The 
so-called Free Wales Army, he declared, had been ‘a Dad’s Army farce’. Of those 
within its ranks, only Dai Bonar Thomas, he believed - and Thomas had been a 
notable member of Cymdeithas yr Iaith - had conducted himself with any degree of 
‘discernment and dignity’. The rest had brought shame and ridicule on the nationalist 
movement. Such painfully absurd pronouncements - such as those outlined by Cayo 
Evans in The Sunday Times interview - did nothing to augment the Welsh nationalist 
message. Rather, it merely provided unionists within Wales and the English-based 
media, an opportunity to undermine all serious political and humanistic argument.64 It 
was a view vociferously shared by leading Welsh language campaigner Gareth Miles, 
who in 2008, also revealed that a proposal by language activist Neil Jenkins to join 
forces with the FWA had ‘thankfully, been rejected’. Moreover, at a meeting of the 
society at the Belvue Hotel at Aberystwyth, in 1966, Trevor Morgan, an English-
62
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speaker and very much opposed to the pacifism of Gwynfor Evans, had nevertheless 
spoken against using direct action. Yet, not all members of Cymdeithas yr Iaith 
Gymraeg, Miles added, supported Emyr Llywelyn Jones and the policy of non­
violence. For instance, Geraint Jones, the vice-president of the society, had ‘wanted 
to use physical force in a restrained way’; as had others, such as Trefor Beasley. 
Emyr Llywelyn Jones, the society president, remarked Miles, ‘had been appalled’.65 
Nonetheless, despite the adoption of non-direct action to further the cause of 
legislative recognition for the Welsh language, it was not the last time that members 
of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg were linked to militancy, as John Jenkins, the former 
director-general of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru disclosed in 2008.66
Yet, speaking in 2003, Denis Coslett, the commander of the FWA’s Llanelli 
Brigade, conceded that antipathy from Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg towards the Free 
Wales Army had not gone unnoticed. ‘We had respect for them’, he declared, ‘but 
they simply could not see what we were trying to achieve. The campaign of the FWA 
had been one of propaganda, yet they simply couldn’t see it’. Perhaps the academic 
background of the two groups offers some clue as to the apparent gulf between them. 
‘I think they looked down on us’, revealed Coslett. ‘I think they thought us ill- 
educated and uncouth’. In contrast, he added, the FWA considered many of 
‘Cymdeithas’ to be ‘spoilt little college boys’.67 Nevertheless, if many of the early 
FWA’s pronouncements were received with derisory indignation among Jones and his 
peers, there was worse to come before the decade’s end, as the FWA ship of 
dissemination sailed unerringly ahead, with Coslett at the helm, happy to indulge an 
imbibe media.
However, the campaigning in one of the most eagerly anticipated by-elections 
in years was finally over. Shortly after 1.00 a.m., amid scenes of near hysteria, 
Gwynfor Richard Evans was duly elected MP for Carmarthen.68 Addressing both the 
jubilant Plaid Cymru supporters in Carmarthen’s Guildhall Square and stunned 
opponents near and far, Evans proclaimed the result showed that Wales was ‘at last on
65 Interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008.
66 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 17 November 2008.
67 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 20 November 2003.
68 Daily Mail, 15 July 1966. ‘Wales wins Carmarthen’, ran its headline. The result even made 
headlines around the world, including the Soviet Union where it appeared on the front page of Pravda. 
Dafydd Williams, The Story o f  Plaid Cymru (Aberystwyth, 1990), p.24.
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the march’.69 The confluence of genuine warmth for Evans as a local family man, a 
protest vote at the worsening economic crisis, a strong student vote and the upsurge in 
national consciousness, all ensured the Welsh political landscape would never be the
70same again. Yet, not everyone in Guildhall Square was ready to celebrate. ‘Are we 
now going to have road blocks on the borders of Wales’, asked one man, ‘where 
everybody who doesn’t speak Welsh gets shot?’. Why, inquired one woman, did the 
nationalists of Wales assume ownership of the Welsh flag? It belonged to ‘the Welsh 
nation: to the whole of Wales’.71
The Plaid Cymru machine had fought a slick, dogged, well orchestrated and 
relevant campaign. Firmly rooted in the importance of local issues, such as attracting 
inward investment to the area and the need to improve the region’s infrastructure, 
Evans had attracted support across the generational and political divide. The Labour 
Party candidate, Gwilym Prys Davies, dismissed Evans’ victory as a ‘protest vote’. 
Emrys Jones, the Labour party’s chief organiser in Wales went further still. Evans’ 
victory, he predicted, would spell the death knell for nationalist politics in Wales. 
With Evans’ a lone voice in parliament, the electorate would see ‘how useless’ it was 
‘to support these types of policies’.72 He was partly right. But the downfall o f Welsh 
nationalism? Far from it.
Nonetheless, having for so long wrestled with failure and ridicule, the 
nationalist party of Wales now found itself a respectable presence at the centre of the 
Welsh political arena. Those who argued Welsh nationalism was regressive and 
founded on a misconception as to the nature and function of the modem state, were 
now forced to think again. The militant wing within Plaid Cymru had also been 
silenced. A simply stated, though no doubt sincere congratulatory telegram from the 
Penyberth arsonists, Saunders Lewis, D. J. Williams and Lewis Valentine, arrived at 
Evans’ home the day following his election to parliament. In four words, it signalled 
the end of Saunders Lewis’ unofficial patronage over Plaid Cymru doctrine and 
conceded the party he had helped to create, now wrested firmly in the hands of his
69
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73successor. Finally, Evans had won the battle over the future course of medial 
nationalist politics. After years of bitter in-fighting, his position as leader of a largely 
pacifist and rigidly constitutional Plaid Cymru was unassailable.
Saunders Lewis was not the only former ‘irritant’ in conciliatory mood. 
Within days of Evans’ victory, a letter arrived from Neil Jenkins apologising for 
having underestimated Evans’ constitutional message. Expelled from the party in 
1962 for having dared state the unthinkable - that Evans was leading the party into 
oblivion - in 2006, Jenkins conceded the party president ‘had been right all along’.74 
Another former activist prepared to recognise Evans’ achievement was Owain 
Williams. In March 2004, Williams admitted to having been ‘overjoyed’ on learning 
of Evans’ victory. However, like Neil Jenkins, the feeling of goodwill was short­
lived, as he too began to question how great ‘a triumph’ the election victory truly was 
in the long-term.75
Another question hung in the air. Had the policy of direct action, as adopted 
at Tryweryn and Clywedog, been a factor in Evans’ success? The drowning of Cwm 
Tryweryn had not been much discussed on the doorsteps of Carmarthenshire during 
Evans’ electoral campaign.76 Yet, in 2008, David Walters - fined in October 1962 for 
releasing oil from an electrical transformer at the Tryweryn reservoir construction site 
- was in no doubt the use of explosives in the defence of Wales and its resources had 
benefited Gwynfor Evans. Up until 1966, Plaid Cymru had been regarded within 
Wales as a ‘political non-entity’, revealed Walters. As a party activist in the industrial 
valleys, canvassing on the door step for electoral support prior to this period, he had 
been routinely and robustly asked, ‘what is Plaid Cymru?’. The explosion at 
Clywedog had changed this. The policy of direct action both highlighted the 
subjugated position of Wales and consequently transformed the party’s electoral 
fortunes, he believed. For the first time in perhaps a generation, a stand had been 
taken solely to defend the nation’s cultural homogeneity. Even among those who felt 
unease over the use of such tactics, an innate sense of patriotism had been aroused. 
Suddenly, Walters added, Welshmen and women could be seen standing up for Wales 
and its rights; and that alone, he felt, instigated a sense of togetherness and cultural
73 Rhys Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot (Talybont, 2008), p.265. It simply declared: ‘Congratulations and 
heartfelt thanks’.
74 Interview between WT & Neil Jenkins, 22 October 2006.
75 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
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and political unity.
It was a sentiment shared by Emyr Llywelyn Jones. However, rather than 
Clywedog, Jones believed the drowning of Cwm Tryweryn proved the catalyst for 
change. It was ‘quite ironic’, he remarked, that Plaid Cymru, for fear of losing 
electoral support, steadfastly refused to ‘do anything’ over Tryweryn. Yet, the party’s 
fortunes had eventually prospered due to the ‘wave of sympathy’ which arose from its 
drowning; and this, Jones added, with Evans and the party leadership seemingly 
oblivious to the fact. It had been this groundswell of support, which ensured the party 
its subsequent electoral successes. ‘Indeed, had it not been for Tryweryn’, Jones 
insisted, the party would have remained a marginalized protest group. Yet, 
perversely, ‘the party leadership had done its best to dampen hostility to the
no
flooding’. To others however, such detractive comment failed to recognise Evans’ 
considerable political acumen. If timing, opportunism and good fortune doubtless 
played a part in the advance of Plaid Cymru as serious political contender, it had 
nevertheless been Evans’ skilful political manoeuvring which proved its greatest 
asset. This was highlighted, they believed, in comments Evans made in an interview 
with The Times, the day following his election victory. Rather than Plaid Cymru, 
Gwynfor Evans declared, the onus lay firmly with the Wilson administration to end 
the violence. The government, he added pointedly, did ‘not think anyone serious until 
people started blowing up things or shooting others’.79
As Gwynfor Evans basked untroubled in the sunshine of his success, a 
familiar dark cloud hovered on the horizon. Asked to comment on Plaid’s 
breakthrough, Cayo Evans quashed rumours the Free Wales Army intended to call a 
truce to its activities in light of Evans’ victory. On the contrary, remarked the group’s 
self-styled publicity spokesman, ‘the election of a nationalist MP only proved Wales 
supported the call for independence. To suspend its campaign would be tantamount
76 Emyr Daniel, Cofia Dryweryn, Cambria (Carmarthen, January/February 2006).
77 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008. Plaid Cymru canvassers had been 
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to defeat for the movement. Only when every Welsh parliamentary seat was held by a 
nationalist and home rule had been achieved would such a decision be taken. A 
colleague of Cayo Evans who refused to reveal his identity, other than to say he was 
commander of the Rhymney and Sirhowy Valleys column of the group, reiterated the 
message. If the FWA gave up now, he declared stoically, ‘it would be surrender’. It 
would, ‘carry on the fight’.80 A Plaid Cymru statement attempted to put the FWA 
into context. As long as Plaid Cymru failed to make political ground, ‘the FWA had 
some ground to stand on’. However, the election of the party president had ‘taken the 
wind out its sails’. Dismissing the FWA comments as mere ‘bravado’, Plaid Cymru, 
the communique added, was not impressed by what it called ‘the last-ditch stand’ by a 
few extremists who thought themselves ‘Welsh Castros’.81 It was an image, Cayo 
Evans was more than happy to perpetuate. During an interview with the Daily 
Mirror, Evans stubbornly refused to accept the increasing orthodox that the FWA was 
more of a hindrance than a help to the cause of Welsh independence. His only regret 
was the group’s attendance at the opening of Llyn Celyn the previous October. By 
demystifying the group’s ‘legend’, the police had been able to compile dossiers on all 
those drawn to its ranks.82 It was a mistake John Jenkins and the elusive Mudiad
83Amddiffyn Cymru had more than recognized.
However, having fought on a broad local platform throughout the election 
campaign, on 20 July, Gwynfor Evans stood on another platform at Carmarthen 
railway station and boarded the newly dubbed ‘Evans Express’ to London. A new 
chapter in the political odyssey of Gwynfor Evans was about to begin; yet, this too 
would be no less difficult and no less solitary. If the newly dubbed ‘Member for 
Wales’ hoped the troublesome element within the nationalist movement was now 
safely off the radar, on arriving at Paddington station, the spectre of the FWA was 
there to greet him. Asked to comment on the group, Gwynfor Evans played a back 
hand volley worthy of any Wimbledon final. He had, he remarked, met ‘all three 
members of the FWA’. They were ‘nice lads’, but Plaid Cymru had nothing to do 
with them. Moreover, the party had been the victim of ‘a smear campaign by people 
in London’, intent on discrediting the nationalist movement of Wales, through
80 WM, 18 July 1966.
81 The Times, 19 July 1966.
82 Daily Mirror, 25 July 1966.
83 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
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‘mischievously associating’ Plaid Cymru with the violent methods espoused by the
84extremists. The leading mud-slinger, Evans appeared to suggest, was the Labour 
MP for Pontypool, Leo Abse.
At a celebratory Plaid Cymru conference, Gwynfor Evans told hundreds of 
enthusiastic supporters the fate of the nation lay in its hands. Welsh freedom, Evans 
announced, in a calculated attempt to focus the collective vision, could be achieved in 
‘about ten years’. Having urged what he termed ‘the radicals of Wales’ to unite, to a 
standing ovation, the party leader announced that Plaid Cymru would contest every
Of
parliamentary seat at the next general election. It was a decision which would send 
a chill wind whistling through the corridors of power and lead ultimately to the 
security services scuttling to seize control of an increasingly volatile situation. Toni 
Lewis attended the meeting. In 2004, Lewis alleged that Gwynfor Evans had made an 
even more startling admission. Addressing Lewis and the twenty or so uniformed 
FWA associates sat before him in the front row, Evans expressed his gratitude for 
their ‘efforts’ in securing his by-election victory. It was a pronouncement which had 
a profound effect on Lewis and also present Gethin ap Iestyn. Impressed by the party 
leader’s unexpected generosity, each declared that forthwith they would campaign for 
an independent Wales through non-violent means. Notwithstanding the party leader’s 
apparent endorsement however, their decision, Lewis added, coincided with an 
increasing doubt that the Free Wales Army alone could deliver their dream of a free 
Wales. Both he and Gethin ap Iestyn reasoned for the FWA to succeed, it must have a 
political wing running parallel to maximise its political appeal. To this end, Lewis 
and Gethin ap Iestyn formed the Patriotic Front.86
The objective of the party, Gethin ap Iestyn later explained, was to provide a 
neo-political wing to all patriot/republican agencies in Wales. Furthermore, to lead a 
united patriotic effort in the struggle for Welsh independence, at all levels and in all 
fields of operation. Asked to assess Gethin ap Iestyn’s character at this juncture, 
Lyn Ebenezer remarked that the youthful ap Iestyn had struck him as contemplative
84 LDP, 21 July 1966.
85 South Wales Evening Post, 1 August 1966.
86 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
87 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, March 2008. ‘To unite within one organization 
all patriotic movements and societies, affiliated together in an alliance to form a truly national patriotic 
front. The object o f this alliance will be to put pressure on the English government and native quisling 
institutions to reach agreement with the aims o f this patriotic front. The aims being - an independent 
Welsh republic within a confederation o f Free Celtia’. Front, vol.l,No.5, Aug. 1968; also, TNA, DPP
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individual; rather ‘serious and a thinker’: and the police, Ebenezer added earnestly 
‘don’t like thinkers’.88
Nevertheless, with the objective firmly established, both Toni Lewis and 
Gethin ap Iestyn recognized that in order to give the fledgling party as much political 
credence as possible, its first priority was to distance itself from the FWA - albeit 
officially. On 31 July, both men, accompanied by five other Gwent FWA adherents, 
entered Maesteg police station and ‘formally declared’ their dissociation from the so-
on
called Free Wales Army. Lewis later conceded that while the strategy had been in 
part to ‘cock a snook’ at the authorities, it had also lent gravitas to the belief that a 
serious political movement was being orchestrated to take the armed struggle - which 
would continue - onto a firmer political footing.90
These were indeed heady days for the militant wing of the nationalist 
movement. Just days later, an anonymous telephone call was made to the Western 
Mail. The caller, purporting to be a member of the FWA, threatened to assassinate 
the Secretary of State for Wales, Cledwyn Hughes, who was visiting the Eisteddfod in 
Aberafan.91 Unperturbed, in an interview to officially launch the Patriotic Front, 
secretary of the party, Gethin ap Iestyn was in dogmatic mood. The Front, he 
informed The Times, would ‘be out in force’ at the opening of the Severn Bridge 
scheduled for 8 September. Toni Lewis was also buoyant: with the backing of the 
FWA, he declared, the Patriotic Front would ‘soon be stronger than Plaid Cymru’. 
As for Gwynfor Evans, he returned to parliament to be greeted with cries of derision 
by Leo Abse. Why, demanded the Labour MP for Pontypool, had Evans not 
‘condemned unequivocally’ the threat to kill Cledwyn Hughes?93 The Plaid Cymru 
president’s parliamentary honeymoon was over.
John Jenkins enters the stage
In addition to the arrival of the Patriotic Front on the Welsh political stage, another
2/4471.
88 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
89 FWA and PF Trial Exhibit 10.
90 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
9] The Times, 5 August 1966. The threat led to the cancellation of a planned rally by CylG and an 
angry rebuke o f the FWA and the ‘weak headed individual’ responsible by E. LI. Jones. No link with 
the ‘army’, visible or otherwise, he added, was welcomed. D. Coslett later admitted making the 
telephone call. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 20 November 2003.
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The Times, 29 August 1966.
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crucial chapter in the history of the nationalist campaign unfolded at the Plaid Cymru 
summer conference in 1966. In 2004, Toni Lewis threw light on his first unpropitious 
encounter with Sergeant John Jenkins of the British Army Dental Corps. To Lewis 
and his associates, the mysterious taciturn figure, sitting impassively on his ‘bed’, 
while staring intently around the extemporary dormitory, bore all the hallmarks of a 
covert Special Branch police officer. Their suspicions were compounded by Jenkins’ 
catholic short hair and clean-cut demeanour. Finally, following increasingly audible 
threats of violence, Jenkins was approached and malevolently instructed to reveal his 
name, profession and thoughts on a militant offensive. Understandably reluctant to 
disclose his identity, Jenkins eventually placated the group by having his Plaid Cymru 
membership confirmed. He then quietly slipped away.94 Asked to confirm Lewis’ 
account of the incident, Jenkins revealed he had found the episode both amusing and 
somewhat ludicrous. Moreover, this solitary encounter with the unsuspecting FWA, 
all but confirmed his assumption the group was ineffective and wholly incapable of 
successfully carrying the fight to the British state.95 More significantly however, 
Jenkins concluded through his attendance at the Plaid Cymru summer school, that 
despite Gwynfor Evans’ election victory, the party’s umbilical link to constitutional 
campaigning undermined both its political advance and offered no resistance to that 
which threatened Wales and its unique identity. He was now certain that only a 
programme of militant action could both further prevent the cultural dilution of Wales 
and in addition, ensure its political preservation. Through discussions with those at 
the fore-front of the organization, Jenkins discovered he was not alone. Crucially, he 
also recognized that before any such action was undertaken, a complete over-haul of 
the movement was required.
If the preceding eighteen months had been somewhat tumultuous for Gwynfor 
Evans, John Jenkins’ life had also been subject to significant change. In the early 
spring of 1965, Jenkins submitted a written request to the War Office to be posted to a 
camp either in, or within proximity to Wales. It had, he believed, ‘blotted his 
copybook greatly’ as far as the army authorities were concerned. In order to ‘stake
WM, 5 August 1966.
94 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. It was also at the Aberafan Eisteddfod that 
Dafydd y Dug (David John Underhill) first cemented his interest in Welsh cultural matters. Y Cymro, 9 
July 1969.
95 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also Harri Webb, A Militant Muse 
(Bridgend, 1998), p.147.
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his claim’, Jenkins disclosed his reasons for wanting to return. The revelation that to 
do so would ensure his son received a Welsh-language education, more than indicated 
his cultural allegiance. Moreover, it both demonstrated that he was not an ‘Empire’ 
person and suggested he felt disdain for the jingoism which encompassed it. From 
that moment, Jenkins added, there was ‘a hint things were not as they should be’. 
Furthermore, any ambition to proceed his army career had been almost certainly been 
thwarted.96 Yet, unrepentant, Jenkins was delighted when informed the request had 
been accepted. In April 1965, he was transferred to Saighton Barracks, Cheshire. 
Two months later, Jenkins and his family moved to Wrexham, where his son,
07
Vaughan, attended Ysgol Bodhyfryd.
Nevertheless, the posting did not merely address the educational needs of 
Jenkins junior, it also provided Jenkins senior an opportunity to further interests of his 
own. Prior to his return to the UK, John Jenkins begun to strengthen his contacts in 
the all but moribund Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. In 2008, Jenkins confirmed that 
contact with David Pritchard had proved instrumental and the key to his access into 
MAC. Both from the industrial belt of south east Wales, Pritchard’s position within 
the movement had been ‘akin to a GP’: and as such, only with his endorsement had 
anything been possible. Having secured a foothold, on returning to the UK, John 
Jenkins began the process of establishing both his credentials within MAC and 
affirming its logistics and capabilities. He later disclosed how this had been achieved. 
Although a peripheral member of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru at the time of the 
Clywedog explosion, Jenkins had tentatively begun to assess what he believed 
‘needed to be done to put things right’. In order to get a clear understanding of the 
movement’s structure, he traveled throughout Wales gathering information. One of 
the first to meet Jenkins to discuss the offensive merits of the movement at the close 
of 1965 was Marcus Gale. Gradually, it became clear to Jenkins ‘that MAC was not 
just a north Wales movement, but an all-Wales movement’. In addition, he was able 
to ascertain how many people were involved and crucially, the capacity of each
96 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also telephone interview 20 September 
2010. Angered by Tryweryn, Clywedog and a ‘haughty, patronizing’ letter from British Forces Radio 
accusing him o f ‘tribalism’, following Jenkins’ request to hear more Welsh related programmes, such 
as ‘Welsh hymn singing’, Jenkins met David Prichard and David Walters in a pub in Bargoed on 
returning from Germany. A discussion followed as to the movements’ dormant capabilities. ‘Coming
from the next valley, it didn’t take long for us to meet’.
97 Sir Tasker Watkins, Private Papers. Transcript o f interview with John Jenkins, dated 11 November 
1969.
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person’s affiliation. Although a degree of over-lap existed, the movement, he further 
established, was nonetheless composed of two distinct groups. Each, acting in 
support of the other, was to prove essential to the success of the three-year campaign. 
The first group consisted of those prepared to undertake militant action ‘in the field’. 
The second group, of near equal importance to the first, comprised the ‘sleepers’.
These people not only proved a source of much needed revenue for the 
movement, they also provided, what Jenkins termed ‘safe-houses’; namely, food and 
shelter - often for a number of days - for evasive operatives. Furthermore, the term 
‘sleeper’ also constituted those people providing invaluable ‘local knowledge’: an 
essential component when an action was undertaken in an area unfamiliar to those 
actively involved. The role played by the so-called ‘sleepers’ Jenkins stressed, could
QO
not therefore be overstated. Of critical importance from the outset in establishing 
himself, was ‘to be known and trusted’ by those at the vanguard of the militant 
community, Jenkins revealed. The movement, he recalled, had grown tired of those 
willing to do nothing other than ‘preach’ whilst under the influence of alcohol. Those 
who shared his belief that only through militant action could progress be made, had 
reacted favourably to his discerning, sober approach. As his reputation for being both 
trustworthy and pragmatic increased, to Jenkins’ satisfaction, word began to circulate 
that he was collecting ‘information and equipment’. Little by little, a picture emerged 
of how much ‘material or resources was available; where it was stored and the 
condition it was in’. It was at this juncture, Jenkins recalled in 2007, he realized he 
‘was in business’. Finally, after many months of empathic yet careful ‘digging’, John 
Jenkins had all the information and the contacts necessary to orchestrate an 
efficacious underground movement."
Yet, a degree of fine tuning was still required, as a series of factors, essential 
to the protest’s success, stared Jenkins in the face. He firstly believed that only a 
constrained, considered campaign would win the hearts and minds of the Welsh 
public; without the support of whom, he reasoned, early detection was certain. 
Secondly, the newly established director-general of MAC had studied Irish 
Republican history. He was aware that movements such as his, had been routinely
98 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, telephone interview, 30 March 2009. 
Jenkins soon realized that meetings in secluded locations aroused suspicion, subsequently, it was 
‘better to have meetings in busy supermarkets’, he opined.
99 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
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defeated by paid infiltrators, spies and informers.100 To combat the problem, Jenkins 
and Owain Williams, earlier imprisoned for undertaking militant action over 
Tryweryn, devised the four man ‘cell-structure’.101 This, roundly based on the 
principle adopted to successful effect by the FLN in the Algerian War of 
Independence, comprised small teams with all members known to each other. 
Crucially however, only the lead member of the cell would be known to Jenkins. In 
order to further maximize the security of the movement, Jenkins’ identity would 
remain unknown: even to the cell leader. This, Jenkins believed, would ensure a team 
could operate effectively with the minimum fear of infiltration. Thirdly, and most 
sobering of all, Jenkins knew he himself would have to orchestrate any such campaign 
and that control of the organization could only be secured, if he alone assembled and 
distributed the explosive devices. Finally, Jenkins recognized it would be some time
before the restructured Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, would be ready to take the armed
102struggle with the British state to a new and unprecedented level.
The FWA turns its attention to the Severn Bridge
Despite MAC’s development, media attention continued to focus on the FWA. 
Following plans drawn up by ‘the General Army Council of the Welsh Army’ which 
outlined how independence for Wales might be achieved by 1980,103 in an extended 
article for Tit-Bits magazine, beneath the banner headline, There 7/ be a Welcome in 
the Hillside, Cayo Evans was quoted by journalist John Roberts (actually journalist 
John Summers) as having said the group was ‘naturally’ comprised of ‘some 
hotheads’. Furthermore, added Evans gravely, who could tell what they might do if 
the Queen were to step on the Welsh side of the Severn bridge when it was opened.104 
Cayo Evans was unaware that John Summers, to whom he made these comments, was
100 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, telephone interview, 30 March 
2009.
101 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 4 March 2008. John Jenkins was introduced
to Owain Williams by David Pritchard. The cell structure, Williams explained, enabled the movement
to ‘be more resilient’ to external pressure. He could not remember exactly whether it was his idea or
John Jenkins’ idea, but it was something ‘we mutually agreed upon’. O. Williams’ claim to have been
instrumental in establishing the cell structure was greeted with incredulity by John Jenkins. Interview
between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. Algerian nationalists took the name Front de
Liberation Nationale (FLN).10?
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004 & 19 October 2007.
103 Free Wales Army Document Folder, pages 115 - 203. Part 2. Free Wales Army and Patriotic Front 
trial, exhibit 143.
104 Tit-Bits, 10 September 1966. TNA, DPP 2/4455.
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a police informer.105 Denis Coslett later claimed the group had suspected ‘all along’ 
the journalist ‘was up to something’.106 Yet, whether refusing to take heed of their 
instincts, or blinded by the lure of notoriety which the report promised to deliver, as 
part of the article for Tit-Bits, the FWA invited Summers to attend an FWA exercise. 
Papers stored at the National Archives state that John Summers lived in Lulsgate, 
Somerset and was employed as a freelance journalist by the South West News 
Agency. The night before he left to rendezvous with members of the FWA, he 
contacted his police handler, Kenneth Clark, deputy coordinator, No.7 Regional 
Crime Squad, based in Bristol. On returning to the west country, Summers submitted 
a comprehensive report of his encounter with the Free Wales Army. During the two- 
day visit to Wales, declared Summers, Cayo Evans informed him of having, during 
the proceeding week, attended a meeting in Dublin with a leading figure in the Irish 
Republican Army. Moreover, Summers had joined some 10 members of the FWA at 
the Stag and Pheasant Inn, at Pontarsais, between Lampeter and Carmarthen. During 
the evening, talk had turned to the ‘destruction of the Severn Bridge’. It had been 
stated by a person unknown to Summers, ‘that the blowing of charges placed against 
supporting cables of the Bridge would cause the roadway to twist and buckle’. 
Convinced that none of those present had been involved in the destruction of the 
conveyor at the Clywedog Reservoir site, the following morning, Summers joined 
some five members of the FWA on an exercise in the mountains above Llandovery. 
The group, which included an Irishman thought to be employed as a foreman on a 
building site at Carmarthen, consented to having their photographs taken by Summers 
on condition their faces were concealed.
The group was photographed in possession of four 9mm Mauser-Parabellum 
machine pistols and what Summers described as a ‘Czechoslovakian machine gun’. 
This, the police later deduced, was ‘probably a machine carbine’. In addition, 
Summers alleged the group discussed being disposed of a relatively ‘insufficient 
amount of gelignite to make a suitably spectacular explosion’. Yet nevertheless, they 
were, he added, in possession of a ‘considerable quantity of 9 m.m. ammunition’. 
One spent cartridge, Summers claimed to have concealed in his shoe; having 
discovered it in a glove department of a car belonging to an FWA attendee. The 
cartridge, along with photographs taken of the exercise, he later handed to Kenneth
105 TNA, DPP 2/4455.
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Clark, his police handler. In a letter to the chief constable of Gloucester constabulary, 
which was circulated to every Welsh police force and also to No. 8 Regional Crime 
Squad based in Cardiff, Clark drew attention to the fact that one of the prints 
contained an image of a ‘shoe pattern’ which ‘appeared to have been erased’. This, 
Clark seemed to imply, may have been to conceal the identity of the person involved. 
Why the FWA agreed to the article, was also the subject of some conjecture. The two 
most likely reasons, Clark suggested, was in order to obtain publicity for the 
organization, or for payment; a premise suggestion strongly denied by John
107Summers.
The motives John Summers had for informing on the FWA are unknown. It is 
unrecorded whether information he passed to police was in receipt of payment. 
However, if the journalist considered himself to be an invaluable tool in the fight 
against crime, a confidential police report from the period paints an altogether 
different picture. It was widely held within journalistic circles, the report stated, that 
Summers ‘was prepared to say or do anything if it made a story’. He was furthermore 
considered ‘unstable’, likely to have ‘suffered mental imbalance’ and thought a 
‘thoroughly unreliable type’. Nonetheless, he was ‘an intelligent, articulate’, if 
potentially ‘dangerous man’. As for his involvement with the FWA, his Welsh 
‘middle name Owen’ the report added, was not perhaps ‘without significance’.108
Unaware of the police report into his background, John Summers’s article on 
the Free Wales Army appeared in Tit-Bits. Once again with its publication, the FWA 
demonstrated an uncanny knack for media manipulation. New recruits, once having 
successfully passed a rigorous security screening, proclaimed Cayo Evans, were 
‘taken to secret training camps’, where they received lectures in how to ‘handle 
weapons and explosives’. The IRA, he added staunchly, had been ‘a great help’. 
Moreover, links between the FWA and the IRA were such that men from the Welsh 
movement had travelled to Ireland to receive training from their Irish counterparts. 
As for Plaid Cymru, the FWA ‘thought the world of Gwynfor’, and didn’t blame him 
for ‘disowning’ them. Yet, he and the party owed the Free Wales Army ‘a lot’. 
Unsurprisingly, it was not a view shared by Gwynfor Evans. Asked to comment on 
Evans’ remarks, the party president wearily apologised before adding he was ‘tired of
106 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 10 March 2001.
107 TNA, DPP 2/4455. Police Report: Free Wales Army, 23 August 1966.108
TNA, DPP 2/4455. Police Report: John Owen Summers - Free Wales Army, 20 September 1966.
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talking about the FWA’. He could not ‘take them seriously’ and the publicity they 
attracted ‘did no one any good’. However, if Cayo Evans was to regret comments 
attributed to him in the article, it was his cousin Vernon Griffiths, who was to rue the 
day more than most. He knew, he declared ‘how to use a gun’, and would not, he 
added earnestly, ‘hesitate to fire it if ordered to’.109 They were words which returned 
to haunt the unwitting FWA man. Yet, Summers’ involvement with the FWA did not 
end there. In his role as chief conduit for the organisation, the journalist penned a 
number of incriminating articles on the group throughout the next two years. Many of 
these articles were later cited by the prosecution as evidence against them in the trial 
of leading members of the group some three years later.
Just five days before the Queen was due to open the Severn Bridge, the 
Western Mail reported that ‘200 members of the FWA’ had spent a weekend in the 
‘mountains of north Wales’, undergoing ‘specialist training’ in the use of explosives. 
Reputedly organised by the ‘army’s northern command’, the manoeuvre had been 
ordered to prepare for an attempt to ‘blow up the Severn Bridge’. Contrary to Cayo 
Evans’ claim the weekend was ‘very successful’, 110 speaking in 2006, Lyn Ebenezer, 
who attended the meeting, described a very different version of events. The training 
camp had been held on the farm in Snowdonia owned by Owen Pennant Hughes. 
Along with ‘ten or so members of the Free Wales Army’, the meeting had also been 
attended by Marcus Gale. Contrary to assurances made at their trial some six months 
before, that each had turned their back on militant activity, both Hughes and Gale 
remained steadfast in their belief that only through violent engagement could home 
rule for Wales be achieved. Introduced to the gathering by Cayo Evans as ‘the Barnes 
Wallace of Wales’, Marcus Gale proceeded to demonstrate how to assemble an 
explosive device. That night, Owen Hughes, Marcus Gale, Denis Coslett and Cayo 
Evans slept peacefully in the comfort of the farmhouse. The other attending FWA 
members spent an uncomfortable night in an outbuilding. They were not alone, 
placed in a Horlicks tin and left to rest on a table sat ‘the bomb’.
To a man happy to admit his lack of gallantry, Lyn Ebenezer found the whole 
sleepless experience ‘bloody scary’. He need not have worried. The following 
morning, the assembled throng huddled in anticipation behind a wall to see the bomb 
detonate. To the disappointment of many and the considerable relief of Lyn
109 Tit-Bits, 10 September 1966; also, TNA, DPP 2/4455.
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Ebenezer, ‘not a stone moved’ as the device failed to activate. Refusing to be down­
hearted, it was left to Cayo Evans to close the proceedings. It was merely a case, 
Evans remarked resolutely, of going ‘back to the drawing board’. The party then 
travelled to Caernarfon where, after a drinking session in the Conservative Club, Lyn 
Ebenezer and Peter ‘Goginan’ received their pre-signed FWA membership cards. The 
party then dissembled, returning to their various parts of Wales.111 Having decided 
that another source would be needed to provide the movement with its logistical 
expertise, the meeting also proved the parting of the waves between Marcus Gale and 
the FWA. On 8 September, threats to hamper the official opening of the Severn 
Bridge failed to materialize, as amid considerable security, the Queen opened the 
£8million construction without incident. Nevertheless, whether merely a coincidence, 
or borne of concern for Welsh militant action, the official ceremony was held on the
119English side of the bridge. “
Despite police reservations concerning the reliability of John Summers as an 
informant, remarks allegedly made by Cayo Evans of established links with the IRA 
did not go unnoticed. Acting on an anonymous tip-off that an IRA suspect was 
staying at Evans’ home, at 1.30 in the morning of 20 October, police visited Gian 
Denys where they interviewed an Irishman believed to be Rory O’Scanlon. Asked to 
confirm his name and profession, the suspect replied he was Eamon O’Higgins, a 
publicity agent for the Irish publication Slant Publicity. Unconvinced, later that 
morning, the chief constable of the Carmarthen constabulary wrote to the 
Commissioner of the Dublin Garda, requesting information concerning both
•  • 1 1 7O’Higgins and O’Scanlon. Unable to ascertain which of the two men was currently 
in Wales, the Garda’s reply nonetheless revealed that each was a known member of 
the IRA. Moreover, on the description given by the Welsh force, the Dublin Garda 
speculated that Evans’ mystery guest was Eamon O’Higgins. Yet, of equal interest to
110 WM, 5 September 1966.
111 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
112 The Times, 9 September 1966. In the days before the official opening, unspecified FWA slogans
appeared on walls near the bridge link road. WM, 8 September 1966. On the opening’s eve, four
police officers sat in a parked squad car outside the Patriots Rest, the club ran by Toni Lewis and
Gethin ap Iestyn in Cwmbran. Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. Troops from
‘Honiton in Devon’ protected the bridge. Sunday Telegraph Supplement, 6 September 1968.
113 TNA, DPP 2/4455. Letter from Chief Constable Carmarthen Constabulary to Commissioner o f  
Dublin Garda, 20 October 1966. Cayo Evans informed the police that he was an ‘honorary Colonel in 
the IRA’. It was dismissed as spurious by Dublin Garda, as there existed no such rank in the IRA, 
honorary or otherwise.
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the Welsh police force, the Garda chief superintendent disclosed that undercover 
Garda officers had followed an unsuspecting Cayo Evans from the ferry port of 
Rosslare to Dublin some two months before. On arriving in Dublin, the communique 
added, Evans had booked into a hotel, where for a period of some two hours, he was 
joined by Rory O’Scanlon. Cayo Evans had returned to Wales later that evening.114 
The rendezvous only served to strengthen police suspicions the IRA was arming the 
Free Wales Army.
Aberfan and the FWA
The day following the police visit to Cayo Evans’ home, spoil tip number 7 at 
Merthyr Vale Colliery, thundered down a mountainside in a tidal wave of coal waste 
and rock, onto the village of Aberfan. It first destroyed a farm cottage, killing all the 
occupants, before at 9.13 a.m., engulfing some 20 houses and Pantglas Junior School. 
Among the 144 killed, were 116 schoolchildren: all under the age of l l .115 For 
Patriotic Front founder and FWA sympathiser Toni Lewis, the disaster crystallized his 
belief that Wales must stand alone. ‘It was an horrendous day’, Lewis recalled. He 
had been unable to get to the disaster site, but one thing had struck him as forcefully 
as the sight of miners and police officers digging frantically to reach an entombed 
generation. What the country surely needed was an army of its own? That could be 
deployed to deal with such a tragedy: ‘in uniform, as an army for Wales. To do the 
digging, or anything, you know’.116 As the nation mourned, countless numbers shared 
the sense of loss and bewilderment. One man traumatized by the tragedy was John
117Jenkins, whose childhood family home was destroyed in the disaster. That night, 
watching transfixed in Wrexham the grey, grim images from Aberfan, Jenkins was 
said to be ‘insensate with g rie f .118
114 TNA, DPP 2/4455. Letter from Chief Superintendent Dublin Garda to Chief Constable Carmarthen 
Constabulary, 25 October 1966.
115 Ian McLean & Martin Johnes, Aberfan: Government and Disasters (Cardiff, 2000), pp. 10, 23. 
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Six weeks later, Toni Lewis organized the first Cilmery march to commemorate in 
1282, the killing of the last native Prince of Wales, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd by a 
Norman/English invasion force.119 Among those attending was ‘Mandrake’ o f the 
Sunday Telegraph. In an interview with leading members of the Patriotic Front, 
Gethin ap Iestyn revealed how far the party’s message had spread. He had, he 
revealed, recently received a representative from the Jewish Board of Deputies, 
questioning the group’s political aspirations. Informed that the Patriotic Front 
intended to model itself on the way ‘Israel had fought and gained its freedom’, the 
deputation had departed having voiced its support. Another attendee at the rally was 
R. O. F. Wynne of Garthewin Hall. He had, he declared, learned his nationalism from 
the two renowned ‘English writers, Belloc and Chesterton’. A self-professed 
‘traditionalist’, Wynne adhered to the maxim that when all other means had been 
exhausted, it was necessary ‘to throw half a brick’ in the face of an oppressor in order 
to gain his attention. Although not an advocation of violence, Wynne maintained, it 
was nevertheless ‘a fact. Sad, but true’.120 With the close of 1966, the nationalists of 
Wales reflected on a tumultuous year in the struggle for Welsh cultural and political 
advance. The year had seen the re-emergence of the militant campaign and the first 
Plaid Cymru member elected to Parliament. Yet for John Jenkins, the newly 
appointed operational-commander of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, the fight was just 
beginning.
To close the Empire Games in Cardiff in July 1958, a recorded announcement by the 
Queen, stated that with immediate effect, she intended to ‘create’ her son ‘Charles, 
Prince of Wales’.121 At the turn of 1967, the date of the investiture had not been 
decided. However, it is clear from papers at the National Archives, that the Welsh
177Labour Party was keen for the issue to be resolved. Yet, the ebullience of the 
Secretary of State for Wales, was tempered by both the Queen and Prince Philip,
similar tragedy ‘would not have been allowed to happen in Kent or Surrey’, Jenkins later angrily 
declared. Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
119 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
120
Sunday Telegraph, 18 December 1966.
121 Jonathan Dimbleby, The Prince o f  Wales (London, 1994). The Queen, unable to attend due to
illness, further announced she would ‘one day’ present him to the Welsh people ‘at Caernarfon’.
122 TNA, PREM 13/2359. Undated meeting between Cledwyn Hughes and Michael Adeane. The
Secretary of State for Wales was ‘hopeful the date.. .would not long be delayed’.121
TNA, PREM 13/2359. Memo to PM Harold Wilson from A. N. H. Halls, Buckingham Palace, 18 
December 1966. PREM 13/2359. Memo from Buckingham Palace to PM Harold Wilson, 3 August
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who were said to be ‘very reluctant’ the ceremony should occur until the prince 
completed his initial education. For the Welsh Labour Party, still reeling from the 
defeat at the Carmarthen by-election, such a golden opportunity ‘to further strengthen 
the bonds that bind the Principality to the Royal Family’, 124 if not to say more 
cynically, its own political fortunes, was too great to ignore.
However, the Queen and Palace officials did recognize the importance of 
Charles being more informed as to the political and cultural background of his 
‘principality’. To this end, in February 1967, the Queen agreed to a proposal by 
George Thomas, the Minister of State at the Welsh Office, that Prince Charles be 
briefed as to what the Palace delicately termed ‘some current problems of Welsh
• 19^significance’. The timing of the briefing was prescient. Unaware that plans for the 
Royal investiture were underway, during the evening of 27 February, leading figures 
in the Free Wales Army placed an explosive device in the pipeline which carried
1 9Awater the 84 miles from Cwm Elan to Birmingham. The occurrence marked a 
transition - albeit temporary - in the behaviour of the FWA, whereby it actually 
undertook militant action, as opposed to merely intimating its responsibility. 
Throwing light on the operation in 2000, Denis Coslett admitted the site near 
Crossgates had been reconnoitred over a period of weeks. Furthermore, a manhole 
cover near the Fron Aqueduct had been removed and 40 taped sticks of gelignite 
attached to a mini-car inner wheel tube. The assemblage was then lowered by rope 
until it reached the water flowing below. The gelignite was wired to two torch 
batteries and a clock. These were placed on the stone surround of the man-hole cover. 
The rope, connected to the inner tube, was tied to a tree and the group, consisting: 
Denis Coslett, Dai Bonar Thomas and Peter Lambert made their escape. Primed to 
explode at 3.00 a.m. the following morning, in order to adorn the nations’ front pages 
on St David’s Day, the group eagerly awaited news the device had activated.
It failed to do so. Believing a news blackout regarding the explosion had been 
enforced, an anonymous and impatient Denis Coslett contacted the Western Mail on 8 
March, demanding to know why the paper had failed to report the pipeline blast. 
Completely in the dark as to what the FWA activist was referring, the conversion
1965.
124 Dimbleby, Prince o f  Wales, p. 144.
125 Dimbleby, Prince o f  Wales, p. 144. Queen’s Private Secretary, Michael Adeane, to the Permanent 
Under-Secretary at Welsh Office, 10 February 1967.
126 WM, 14 March 1967.
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soon ended, with the journalist convinced he was subject to yet another - albeit 
increasingly transparent - Free Wales Army hoax call.127
Four days later, farmer Tom Powell discovered the device. Having contacted 
the police, the ‘bomb’ was removed by Captain Clive Green of Western Command 
Ordnance Depot. It was, he soberly proclaimed, the ‘most dangerous job’ he had ever 
tackled. Shortly after, an army order arrived at Saighton Barracks in Chester. It 
was marked ‘battle honours for an officer’ and read by John Jenkins. News that Clive 
Green had received the ‘GOC’s recommendation’, for bravery, added to Jenkins’ 
sense of alarm. The ‘wires had been so badly crossed’, that the dissembling of the
190device had taken no small degree of courage.
Unknown to Denis Coslett and the FWA, the device had been assembled by
11rtJohn Jenkins. It had been handed to Cayo Evans by a senior figure in the militant 
movement from the Gwynedd area. In 2004, Jenkins revealed he had been 
approached by the intermediary, with the request to construct a device for an 
unspecified source. It was a little while later that Jenkins learned it was intended for 
the FWA. Having assembled and circulated the package, he too began the uneasy 
wait to hear news of its activation.131 Speaking in 2007, Jenkins summed up the sense 
of frustration he felt as the failure of the operation became known. It had been, he 
remarked ‘a dead easy job’, yet the group had ‘made a mess of it’. Jenkins had 
nonetheless, learnt a valuable lesson. The debacle had convinced him of the need for 
stringency. Never again would a group or individual operate outside the director- 
general’s absolute control. From that moment, Jenkins revealed, he held the 
movement in a ‘tight grip’. He would forthwith hold ‘all the resources’ so ‘nobody 
could do anything’. In a stroke, the ‘wild man business’ was ended. Only he had the 
wherewithal; and only he would decide when it could be used and whom would be 
entrusted to use it. It was, Jenkins deduced, the only way of ensuring discipline; and
127 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. The intention of the FWA to ensure 
the safety o f the local inhabitants by exploding the device along the pipeline, was dismissed by a 
former senior Welsh police officer as ‘very chivalrous’. Moreover, ‘any support or sympathy’ which 
might have existed within police ranks for the group and its objectives ‘would have been lost once 
explosives were used’. Through such action, ‘they upped the stakes and alienated themselves more and 
more’. Anonymous interview with WT, October 2000.
128 WM, 14 March 1967, p .l; also TNA, DPP 2/5971.
129 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. 
no
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 23 November 2003.m
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
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119furthermore, he added somberly, ‘it worked’.
In 2003, Denis Coslett revealed why the device failed to activate. In their 
haste to set the charge, he conceded, the group failed to prime it correctly. Moreover,
he added, the episode was the only time the Free Wales Army undertook a militant
111operation in the name of Welsh Independence. How had he enjoyed the experience 
he was asked? To a ‘baby boomer’ such as himself, it had been reminiscent of a 
covert attack on the German wartime forces, Coslett announced. He had, he 
confessed, found it ‘really exciting’ and indeed, considered himself a ‘freedom 
fighter’ and an exponent of ‘guerrilla warfare’.134 Nevertheless, whether humbled by 
its own inefficiency, or grateful for having survived unscathed, the FWA 
subsequently decided to concentrate its efforts on its own inimitable ‘war of 
propaganda’. Yet, perhaps unsurprisingly, when questioned following the incident, 
Cayo Evans denied the responsibility of the FWA. Such an operation, he brashly 
informed police, would have been a formality for the group’s ‘qualified
technicians’.135
In April 1967, the FWA heralded news that ‘sweeping changes’ had been
made in its ‘high command.136 While it was also announced that the Clywedog
137reservoir was to be denied an official opening due to the threat of a disturbance; and 
that the Anglesey home of Cledwyn Hughes had been threatened with a bomb 
explosion. It was all too much for the Western Mail which castigated the
1 3Q‘minority’ whose ‘enmity’ had rendered Wales ‘a place of violence’. The
Liverpool Daily Post went further still. It was time, the paper argued, to see James
132
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
133 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 23 November 2003. Coslett earlier claimed the timing 
mechanism short-circuited due to its immersion in water. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14
December 2000.
134 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. Guerilla warfare was part o f Welsh 
history, added Coslett, citing the Owain Glyndwr uprising.
135 WM, 15 March 1967.
136 Cardigan and Tivyside Advertiser, 7 April 1967. It was also reported that an unnamed professor had 
been approached to translate the newly established FWA oath into a form o f Welsh acceptable to the 
‘different dialects o f north and south Wales’. The oath read: I promise to dedicate my life to the cause 
of liberating my country from foreign domination and that I will uphold the discipline and honour o f  
the Free Wales Army. I will honour the sovereignty and rights o f my country, people and flag, its 
language, traditions and culture. I solemnly swear in the name o f God and o f our dead patriots, that I 
will never reveal any secrets o f our organization, even if  I am captured and tortured. If I betray this 
faith, I shall deserve the punishment o f death as a traitor and may eternal contempt cover me.
137 WM, 19 April 1967.
138 WM, 5 April 1967.
139 WM, 20 April 1967.
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Griffiths return to the political fold as Secretary of State for Wales. Cledwyn Hughes, 
though a ‘patient and understanding man’ lacked both the ability to counter the rise of 
Welsh nationalism ‘as a political force’ and the ‘mesmeric appeal’ of his predecessors 
platform oratory; who the paper believed, would have ‘demolished devastatingly’ the 
nationalists of Wales.140
To Gwynfor Evans, heartily sick of continued media and political speculation 
that Plaid Cymru and militancy were inextricably linked, the time had come to turn 
the tables. In a letter of reply to the Llanelli Star, Evans angrily questioned the 
‘nature and purpose’ of the so called Free Wales Army, most notably, its relationship 
with what Evans termed ‘the Establishment’. The timing of many of its apparent 
actions, Evans declared, had routinely occurred during periods of political uncertainty. 
For instance, the explosion at Clywedog was just days before the General Election, 
while the apparent threat to target the Severn Bridge, which, if official sources were to 
be believed, had been received immediately prior to the Carmarthen by-election. 
Moreover, despite all his ‘condemnation of force’, events in recent weeks suggested 
that a programme of discrimination was still at work. To quantify the point, Evans 
cited the device discovered at Crossgates which coincided with the Rhondda by- 
election and the threat to demolish the home of Cledwyn Hughes, which was, he 
suggested, intended to coincide with County Council Elections. The very nature of 
these attacks raised the suspicion that ‘people working for the government’ may be 
responsible. Particularly, Evans concluded, ‘as the Establishment’ appeared to have 
no ‘convincing, rational case’ to combat Plaid Cymru’s policy of Welsh freedom.141 
Intriguingly, the accusation made by Gwynfor Evans that an altogether different 
‘rogue element’ might be a-foot, received some credence when ‘four English people’ 
were fined in Caernarfon for daubing Free Wales Army slogans on a disused building 
in the area. Despite rigorous checks by party officials, none were found to be 
members of any Welsh branch of Plaid Cymru or its London counterpart.142
Yet, unknown to Evans, the ‘establishment’ was about to play its most 
effective card to date. On 17 May, to the delight of Cledwyn Hughes and British 
unionists, it was announced that Charles Windsor was to be invested Prince of Wales
LDP, 11 April 1967.
141 Llanelli Star, 13 May 1967. Gwynfor Evans wrote in response to an article entitled ‘Our best town 
in Wales say the FWA’, published in the Llanelli Star, 15 April 1967.
142 LDP, 11 July 1967.
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at Caernarfon Castle on 1 July 1969. Responding to the announcement, Gwynfor 
Evans phlegmatically declared he was ‘unenthusiastic’ about the event.143 Equally 
unenthused was Gethin ap Iestyn. In a letter to Owain Williams, ap Iestyn stated it 
time Welsh militant nationalist action emulated the IRA and went ‘the whole hog’. 
What was more, ‘complete aggression with England was required’, coupled with the 
adoption of a more ‘secretive outlook’. Existing groups, he discerned, such as 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, the White Eagle of Snowdonia, Meibion Glyndwr and the 
FWA, operated mainly ‘on a regional basis and independent of one another’. 
Admittedly, this made it ‘more difficult for the authorities to clamp down on them’, 
but, ap Iestyn concluded, ‘if co-ordinated by a central office they could thrive’.144
However, if  the leader of Plaid Cymru had thrown down the gauntlet to the 
British state, he was also mindful that only by presenting a united front could the 
party’s ascendancy survive the expected unionist onslaught of a royal investiture.145 
Consequently, it was decided to take the fight to those on the periphery of the 
nationalist movement. On 11 July 1967, Elwyn Roberts, the Plaid Cymru Organising 
Secretary, angrily attacked Cayo Evans and the FWA for having enabled the 
opposition parties to ‘discredit Plaid Cymru’. An executive committee motion, he 
announced, condemning in the strongest terms the Free Wales Army and its activities, 
would be debated at the party’s conference the following month. Should known 
figures within the group be recognized, or attempt to disrupt proceedings if in 
disguise, they would be asked to leave and forcibly removed by police if necessary.146
Over the summer, Plaid Cymru’s assault on what it termed ‘the inimical FWA 
doctrine’ continued unabated.147 At the party conference in August, it was time for
143 LDP , 18 May 1967. The first formal ceremony occurred in 1483, when the regicide Richard 111 
saw the investiture o f his son Edward, as an opportunity to entrench his parlous monarchal dynasty. 
The second investiture subject to a state occasion, took place in 1911. It was the brainchild o f the 
Liberal Chancellor o f the Exchequer, David Lloyd George; its intention, to stymie the growth o f the 
Labour Movement in Wales. Perhaps in light o f a prevailing wind, it witnessed some measure of 
dissent - although not on the scale o f 1969 - with questions asked as to the historical validity o f ‘an 
English Prince o f Wales’. Both the political overtones o f  1911 and the qualitative attempt by Lloyd 
George to present himself as the de facto  leader o f the Welsh people, was not lost on the Queen, who 
considered each previous state occasion to be ‘not really good auguries’. Richard Weight, Patriots 
(London, 2002), p.417; David Walker, Medieval Wales (Cambridge, 1990), p. 190; Emyr Price David  
Lloyd George (Cardiff, 2006), pp.193,194; Observer Supplement, 22 June 1969, p. 18; John S. Ellis, 
Investiture (Cardiff, 2008), p.320; TNA, PREM 11/4441.
144
TNA, DPP 2/4471. Correspondence between Gethin ap Iestyn & Owain Williams, 14 May 1967. 
The letter was later found by police when searching Williams’ home.
145 Telephone interview between WT & Dafydd Evans, 9 February 2007.
146 LDP, 11 July 1967.
147 WM, 24 June 1967. It did so, as slogans stating: ‘Death to Prince Charles’; ‘Go Home English
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the show-down. In their absence, the Free Wales Army and Patriotic Front were 
routed by a near-unanimous resolution of scathing excommunication. All Wales, 
stated Plaid Cymru vice-president Edward Millward, was ‘sick’ of the ‘effete 
publicity seekers and paper tigers’. In a blistering broadside launched by Barrie Cox 
of Cwmbran, the FWA were castigated for its contacts with ‘various fascist 
movements’ and ‘knife carrying, LSD and psychedelic activities’. It was a synchronic 
line of attack greeted with understandable derision by FWA spokesman Cayo Evans. 
Having utterly refuted the allegations, the group, Evans countered, had never
148criticized Plaid Cymru per se, only its capacity to pass fatuous resolutions.
Nonetheless, as Gwynfor Evans and the Plaid Cymru hierarchy toasted its 
victory, the party was about to face an even greater challenge to its prestige as the 
great protector of Welsh cultural and political interests; and there to steel its thunder 
was the Free Wales Army. Within months of the Aberfan disaster, anguish had turned 
to bitterness. Despite the irreproachable stance of the National Coal Board, it was 
widely felt the tragic slaughter had occurred not from an act of God, but rather as a 
result of the greed and negligence of man. It was a sentiment shared around the 
world. Within months, £1.75 million had been donated to the appeal fund. Yet, such 
was the rage and controversy the distribution of money provoked, the issue was coldly 
entitled The Second Disaster.149 At an organized rally by the Aberfan Parents 
Association, placards denounced Plaid Cymru as ‘traitors to the Aberfan dead’, for 
having failed in its apparent pledge to secure a financial settlement through 
parliamentary and external pressure.150
Over the coming weeks the issue rumbled on. Typical of many, for one father 
the ‘torment’ was further heightened by the fact that those he now sought ‘justice’ 
from, were what he termed his ‘own people: a Labour Government, a Labour Council 
and a Labour-nationalized Coal Board’.151 Despite the Disaster Fund Management 
Committee’s protestation that it was constrained by precedent, the insensitivity of the 
National Coal Board’s insurance department was later revealed. Memorandums from
Bastards’ and the FWA emblem, appeared in north and west Wales. WM, 29 June 1967; also, TNA, 
DPP 2/4471.
148 The Times, 7 August 1967; also, WM, 7 August 1967.
149 Patrick Hannon, Wales and the Wireless (Llandysul, 1988), p.65.
150 WM, 14 August 1967. Placards also carried the slogan, ‘Plaid Cymru has let us down’.
151 McLean & Johnes, Aberfan: Government and Disasters, p. 13. Claims by Lord Robens that an 
underground spring beneath the tip had been unknown to NCB surveyors, was angrily denied by the 
local community, who provided Ordnance Survey maps to prove its existence, pp.28,29.
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1967 not only urged the president of the NUM, Lord Robens, to resist any increased 
demand, it also considered £500 to be ‘a good offer’. Moreover, it monstrously 
claimed that ‘only a hard core’ (of bereaved parents) were ‘trying to capitalize’.152
Amid this atmosphere of angry recrimination, Fred Grey, the Secretary of the
Aberfan Parents Association, approached Welsh language activist Neil Jenkins. A
teacher at Merthyr Vale at this juncture, having heard firsthand the frustrations of the
bereaved, Jenkins responded favourably to a suggestion the FWA be contacted and
gave Grey, Cayo Evans’ telephone number. Evans had then, Jenkins claimed, issued
an ultimatum stating that unless the money was released to the families within a week,
explosives would be used to demolish Methyr Tydfil Town Hall and ‘all the 
1councillors inside it’.
Contemporaneously, at a further meeting of the APA, a petition was launched 
demanding each bereaved family receive £5,000.154 Later, Denis Coslett discussed 
the events which he subsequently came to regard as ‘the proudest achievement’ of his 
life. He had, he revealed, been contacted by Evans urging him to ‘go up to Aberfan 
and try to help the people get the money from the trust fund’. Consequently, having 
entered into exploratory discussions as how best to proceed, Coslett had agreed the 
FWA should attend an impending rally in Merthyr Tydfil.155 Also contacted by Cayo 
Evans, imploring him to make use of his printing press as a means of informing FWA 
members as to the approach from Fred Grey, was Toni Lewis.156 Papers later 
submitted as evidence in the trial of the FWA, reveal that journalist John Summers to 
be a factor in the group’s involvement. Having responded positively to assist, 
Summers declared in a letter to Coslett, the ‘stock of the FWA in Aberfan could not 
be higher’. Parents, he claimed, had offered themselves as tools in the militant 
struggle if necessary, while the attendance of the FWA at the forthcoming rally would
152 Ibid, p. 161. Having received expert assurances the coal tip was ‘absolutely safe’, George Thomas 
then received a delegation from Aberfan. Their ‘un-manufactured and genuine fear’ resulted in him 
informing Harold Wilson he could not tell the community ‘it had to stay’. George Thomas, Mr. 
Speaker (London, 1985), p. 101. Yet, it was later revealed that G. Thomas regarded the community’s 
angry insistence the coal tips should be removed as ‘irrational’. Aberfan, ITV Wales and S4C 
Production. History Channel, 1 December 2009.
153 Interview between WT & Neil Jenkins, 22 October 2006.
154 WM, 31 August 1967.
155 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. Talks were held with Fred Grey and
Harry Wiltshire, both o f whom had lost children in the disaster.
156 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
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ensure both its hero status and its perceived maturity in the eyes of the nation.157
Yet, despite later claims by those sympathetic to the Free Wales Army that a 
threat of militant violence had been issued and that members of the group had 
marched in support of bereaved parents and their demand for pejorative recompense, 
contemporary media coverage of the rally paints a somewhat different picture. 
Despite an appearance by Denis Coslett and ‘a dozen FWA men’, the march had been 
cancelled at the last minute due to an overall lack of attendance. Whether the 
ultimatum was indeed issued is also a matter of some conjecture. As with a number 
of actions credited to the FWA, a certain degree of mythology appears to envelope the 
incident. Yet, the fact remains that within a week of militant action having been 
allegedly threatened, following a four hour meeting of the funds management 
committee, it was announced that each family was to receive £5,000.159
In gratitude for the support received from the Free Wales Army, the Aberfan 
Parents Association purchased ‘two gold watch chains’, 160 with the intention of 
presenting one each to Cayo Evans and Denis Coslett. In 2008, Coslett’s wife Avril 
disclosed her husband had declined the gift on the grounds of sensitivity. He had 
considered accepting such an offering from those who had suffered so much to be 
morally reprehensible.161 Having perhaps reasonably deduced that to decline such an 
offer to be an insult to the memory of those who had perished, Cayo Evans, his son 
Rhodri revealed in 2009, had accepted his gift.162 Whether legislation and precedent 
did indeed tie the hands of the NCB remains unclear, as does the exact role played by 
the FWA in resolving the furore. Yet, nevertheless, to a nation often ready to 
castigate and deride the Free Wales Army, its apparent salutatory involvement in one 
of the most shameful episodes in the nations’ recent history should at least be
157 Free Wales Army Document Folder, pages 115 to 203. Exhibit 64. Despite assurances from former 
FWA combatants, that an ultimatum threatening direct action was forwarded to council officials and 
journalists, such a declaration (allegedly printed by Toni Lewis) is not included in the article written by 
John Christopher in the Daily Express regarding the bereaved parents’ demand for adequate 
recompense. 31 August 1967. Neither does such an ultimatum appear in the Merthyr Express, 1 
September 1967.
15 WM, 28 August 1967.
159 WM, 9 September 1967. ‘What we achieved’, declared an unnamed father, ‘was from the Free 
Wales Army entirely’. Film entitled Welsh Nationalism. Compiled, September 1968. Exhibit 81. 
Trial o f the FWA and anti-investiture campaigners.
160 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. A letter from Mr. Grey expressing 
gratitude for the FWA’s support was viewed by WT at the home of Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
61 Interview between WT & Avril Coslett, 10 November 2008.
162 Telephone interview between WT & Rhodri Evans, 5 March 2009. It was also revealed that the 
watch had later been stolen in a burglary at Evans’ manorial home.
167
considered.
1 f\%Later that month, flushed with the success of its perceived endeavours at Aberfan, 
members of the Free Wales Army marched through Machynlleth to commemorate 
both Glyndwr’s War of Independence and to express dissatisfaction with the situation 
in Wales. They were joined by members of the Patriotic Front, its ancillary Young 
Patriots League, the Anti-Sais League and a number of more militant members of 
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg. It was open to question how much these groups 
enjoyed shared objectives and a shared membership. Leading the procession, armed 
with a stave and his Alsatian Gelert at his side, was Denis Coslett. Planned as an all- 
Wales rally of ‘nationalists and patriots to show solidarity for the cause of Welsh 
freedom’, the event, despite significant media interest, was attended by just 30 
people.164 One of those was Glyn Rowlands. In 2004, Rowlands explained that he 
had hoped a strong attendance would signal the dawn of republican support in Wales, 
akin to that in much of Ireland. Indeed, the principle within Irish Republicanism of 
establishing various distinct societies to nurture and advance its political message and 
traditions, had served as the blueprint for the Young Patriots League and other ad hoc 
organizations soon to be established.165 Yet, despite Rowlands’ anticipated optimism, 
he had been left to explain to the Welsh-language media the apparent lack of interest 
the event had generated.166 There was worse to come. Not only did the march fail to 
receive the support of the towns-people, later that evening, having congregated 
beneath the town clock to hear a series of speeches in support of independence, the
167marchers had been frequently heckled by a number of Saturday night revelers.
It was not a good weekend for the nationalists of Wales. On the same day as 
the Machynlleth march, the nations’ Secretary of State, Cledwyn Hughes, launched a 
febrile attack on Plaid Cymru. Having been stung by fierce criticism from both 
within his own party and the unionist media for having failed to combat the nationalist
The Times, 20 October 1967.
164
WM, 18 September 1967; also TNA, DPP 2/5970. Denis Coslett was now styling himself Dafydd 
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threat with appropriate vigour, Hughes lambasted the party for its ‘anti-English,
i z o
wicked and un-Christian’ doctrine. Determined to show clear water between it and 
the militant fraternity within Wales, Plaid Cymru responded to the charge by 
expelling Owain Williams from the party. It had done so, party secretary Elwyn 
Roberts revealed, for both comments expressed by Williams at the Machynlleth rally 
deemed ‘incompatible’ with party policy and his conviction in previous weeks for 
FWA slogan daubing.169 Nonetheless, the decision of Plaid Cymru came as much of a 
surprise to Owain Williams as anyone. He had, he retorted, ‘forestalled’ the party 
hierarchy, by having tom up his membership card some weeks before in protest at the
1 70party’s dilution of ‘true nationalism’.
John Jenkins, Frederick Alders and Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant
A fortnight later, the nation awoke to news that the militant struggle in Wales had 
taken a new and decisive turn. During the early hours of 30 September, an explosion 
ripped through one of the four pipes which emerged briefly above ground at 
Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant. Each carried water the 70 miles from Llyn Vymwy to 
Liverpool.171 Contacted within hours by both the nation’s media and police, figures
1 77from Welsh nationalist ‘extremist’ circles were immediately ruled out. Speaking 
some years later, John Jenkins described the events which saw him undertake a 
militant operation for the first time and his sense of sadness at having felt the protest 
to be necessary. He had, he revealed, reconnoitered the target area ‘alone 
extensively’. Its picturesque location had proved a factor in its choice as a target site,
173having perfectly enabled any such monitoring to be dismissed as sightseeing. 
Nevertheless, the laying of the charge had involved Frederick Ernest Alders, a 19- 
year-old, television aerial-rigger and Territorial Army cadet from Rhosllanerchrugog,
168 WM, 18 September 1967.
169 TNA, DPP 2/4471. At Pwllheli Magistrates Court on 26 July 1967, Owain Williams was convicted 
on five counts o f ‘spoiling property’, fined £25 pounds and ordered to pay £5.5.0d advocates fee. In a 
letter to Williams dated 28 July 1967, Gethin ap Iestyn suggested the following slogans be daubed in 
protest at his and FWA expulsions from Plaid Cymru: Gwynfor is not God; Bullets Not Words; Plaid
Quislings; Pacifism - Cowardice and Up the Republic.
170 LDP, 20 September 1967. At the Machynlleth rally, Owain Williams became the vice-president of  
the Patriotic Front.
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near Wrexham. Jenkins recalled that since meeting the younger man some eight 
weeks prior to the action, they had enjoyed an often fractious connection. This had 
been owing, Jenkins added, to what he termed his playing ‘devil’s advocate’. He 
berated Alders in order to assess and determine his attitude to Wales, the nation’s 
perceived position of suzerainty within the ‘English’ political system and any 
considered opinion he may possess as to a retaliatory militant response. The two men 
had met owing to their shared interest and enjoyment of military music: Alders having 
become a member of the Drum and Fyfe Band in Wrexham, of which Jenkins was 
attached as drum instructor. Little did Jenkins realize how crucial this component was 
to feature in their detection and apprehension some two years later.
However, having finally established Alders’ worthy credentials as a ‘kindred 
spirit’, it was decided he should join Jenkins and strike a blow in the name of Welsh 
freedom. Yet, before any such action was possible, two more imperative pieces of the 
jigsaw needed to be addressed: how the objective might be achieved without risk of 
injury to either an individual or property of a local inhabitant; and how to obtain the 
necessary explosives. To Jenkins’ considerable satisfaction, information received 
from a ‘healthy’ local source ensured the first criterion was met. A house, situated 
within an uncomfortable distance of the target, he was informed, would be vacated at 
the end of September owing to a family holiday.
The second quandary was answered by David Pritchard. Days before the 
intended strike at Llanrhaeadr, Jenkins and Pritchard rendezvoused at Rhaeadr Gwy 
(Rhayader). There, Sergeant John Jenkins of the British Army Dental Corps was 
handed the device.174 It is believed it was assembled by Alf Williams.175 It 
comprised a Vennor time switch and 14.5 lbs of gelignite, the condition of which 
immediately caused Jenkins grave concern. It was, he later remarked, ‘dripping like 
hell’ and highly dangerous. Moreover, even innocuous physical contact with the 
explosives resulted in a violent headache.
Despite the obvious dangers, Jenkins was determined to press ahead. The time 
had arrived, he believed, to take militant action in Wales to an unprecedented and 
more adroit, dexterous level. He considered all actions previously undertaken in the 
name of Welsh extremism ‘very amateurish’. Self-sacrificial gestures, whereby
174 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; 19 October 2007; 17 November 2008; 13
December 2008 & 19 February 2009.
175 Anonymous interview with WT, March 2009. Ironically, Williams received instruction as how to
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operatives handed themselves over to police in order to maintain the moral high 
ground, had rendered such protests all but futile. Such a policy had, he suspected, 
been greeted with derision by the authorities and lay in stark contrast to the response 
afforded the IRA and its more ‘proficient’ approach. Whatever the truth, with the 
logistics of the impending operation all but considered, Jenkins began to finely tune 
its more subtle details. Uppermost in his mind was security. If, as Jenkins now 
proposed, the Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant action was to signal the start of a sustained 
and well-orchestrated campaign of violence, their detection, he knew, must be 
avoided.
A little before 8.30 p.m., Jenkins entered the sergeant’s mess, ordered a drink 
and settled himself in a comer of the bar. Content his presence had been noticed, he 
gingerly sipped at his pint before quietly getting up and leaving. Outside in the car 
park, sat waiting in his car, was Frederick Ernest Alders. In the ever encroaching 
darkness, they soon arrived at the site. As instructed by Jenkins, Alders parked the 
vehicle on the wide grass verge near a gateway leading to the pipes. The two men 
made their way across the field to the target area. Having handed Jenkins the bundle 
of taped gelignite he had been carrying, Alders was instructed to move away, as 
Jenkins wedged the gelignite between a concrete support pillar and one of the four 48 
inch diameter pipes. He then inserted two detonators, tested both and connected each 
to the clock. After also testing the timing mechanism, the charge - left to rest on the 
concrete support - was set to detonate at 2.00 a.m. The entire operation had lasted 
barely ten minutes.
On returning to Wrexham, Jenkins returned briefly to his home, removed the 
sodden clothes he had been wearing - which he later burned - returned to the 
sergeant’s mess and finished his pint: still placed, despite his near two hour absence, 
where he had left it. In the days thereafter, Jenkins now confesses, he was consumed 
with a tangible sense of sadness that it had ‘actually come to this’, that he had been 
forced to act ‘in order to draw attention to a democratic deficit’, in Britain, Jenkins 
stressed, ‘supposedly the mother of all democracies’. As a member of the British 
armed forces, he was to all intents and purposes a ‘respected...establishment figure’. 
Furthermore, the whole socializing process into which he had been immersed from 
birth disappeared that day. Having struck against the state, he was forthwith, ‘an
assemble an explosive device while in the British Army.
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outlaw’. Moreover, he did not like explosives and far from having found the
1 ' j / r
experience exhilarating, he had found the entire episode wholly unnerving.
To many observers, the Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant action had been executed 
with laudable precision. Yet, papers held at the National Archives suggest perhaps a 
different view. Contrary to Jenkins’ claim that security had been uppermost in his 
mind and a clinical component to the success of the protest, a number of people 
interviewed - it must be acknowledged - after his arrest, purport to have been aware of 
Jenkins’ intentions prior to the operations’ enactment. One of them is Brian Richards, 
who along with Frederick Ernest Alders, joined the Territorial Army on 22 June 1967. 
Within weeks of doing so, states Richards, Alders became ‘very friendly’ with John 
Jenkins. This, he suggests, provided the stimulus for Alders’ increasing interest in 
‘Wales and Welsh nationalism’. Sat one evening in the All Ranks mess, Jenkins had 
allegedly approached Richards and Alders and after some time asked Alders ‘if he 
would like to do something?’. When challenged as to what by Alders, Jenkins had 
remained tight-lipped, adding should they be caught they would be imprisoned. 
Alders and Jenkins had then sat at an adjoining table and appeared engrossed in a 
conversation unheard by Richards. When Jenkins left, Alders returned to join 
Richards. On being asked to divulge what they had discussed and the contents of a 
piece of paper he had been handed by Jenkins, Alders replied it involved ‘the Free 
Wales Army’. Some little while later, Jenkins returned and asked Richards if he too 
would be interested in involving himself in the matters he and Alders had discussed.
1 77Richards replied he would not.
An initial police statement by Frederick Ernest Alders also offers a somewhat 
conflicting view to that later provided by John Jenkins. It had been, he said, the tragic 
events at Aberfan which had ‘finally convinced’ him that ‘something should be done 
for the Welsh cause’. Following a later conversation with Jenkins in the all ranks 
mess at Wrexham Barracks, Jenkins had pressed him for opinion on the ‘aims of 
Welsh nationalists’. When told of his ambivalence, Jenkins had reputedly replied that 
he had expected such a reaction. However, Jenkins then added that he had observed
176 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; 19 October 2007; 17 November 2008; 13 
December 2008 & 19 February 2009. He and Alders, Jenkins revealed, nearly came to blows as a 
result o f his sustained ‘sniping’ and anti Welsh, pro unionist/royalist rantings. Furthermore, Alders 
was ‘absolutely amazed’ to learn o f Jenkins’ true intentions. Only one pipe was targeted, as it was 
realised any increase would imperil the homes o f the nearby villagers. Yet, it was reported that 
windows in five houses had been shattered. WM, 2 October 1967.
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Alders closely for ‘some weeks’ and felt certain he felt more strongly for Wales than 
his outward appearance might suggest. From that point, Alders added, ‘a common 
aim’ had developed between the two men and a shared belief that only through 
‘political militancy’ could independence for Wales be achieved.178
Nevertheless, in a later statement, Alders was more forthcoming. He had, he 
declared, been aware of Jenkins’ ‘strong Welsh nationalist views’ just ten days after 
joining the Territorial Army, when he and other members of the Drum Corps took a 
trip to Rhyl. Whilst en route, ‘four or five’ passengers on the bus had engaged in a 
discussion regarding Welsh nationalism, during which, Jenkins had allegedly 
remarked that ‘time bombs were the means by which most propaganda could be 
achieved’. A package positioned under Jenkins’ arm had instigated ‘a fleeting 
thought’ it might be a bomb. As had a developing sense that ‘there was something 
unusual’ about Jenkins and that he might be involved in the Free Wales Army or 
some other like-minded movement. On arriving at Rhyl, Jenkins had asked Alders for 
directions to the Queen’s Hotel, informing the younger man that he had arranged to 
meet a relative there. Alders then confirmed the series of events as outlined in the 
statement provided by Brian Richards. Of the conversation unheard by Richards, 
Alders disclosed that Jenkins had enquired whether he would like to join an 
‘organization’, he had referred to as MAC. Despite having harboured some initial 
thoughts of incredulity, Alders had taken a sworn oath of allegiance to the movement. 
Written on a piece of paper produced by Jenkins, the oath had included an acceptance 
to carry out in secrecy, the orders of a senior operative ‘on pain of death’.
The conversation had then turned to the impending protest Jenkins planned for 
the pipeline at Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant. Having assured Alders that he would take 
‘full responsibility’ should they be apprehended, his involvement, Jenkins added, 
would be appreciated as his own mode of transport he considered ‘too conspicuous’. 
Alders was then informed by Jenkins that gelignite would be used. Still apparently 
unsure as to whether he might be the unwitting victim of military style badinage, 
Alders asked ‘for proof. On vacating the Mess and arriving at Jenkins’ garage, the 
boot of his car was opened to reveal some ‘20 half pound sticks’ of what Alders 
immediately recognized - having worked at Gresford Colliery - to be gelignite. 
Finally convinced that Jenkins meant business, the two men agreed to meet outside
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the gates at the back entrance to the Barracks the following evening at 17.30. 
Incredibly, considering Jenkins’ later assertion that matters of security had been 
stringently enforced, having been asked by Alders how he might explain his absence 
that evening to his girlfriend, Jenkins had apparently replied that prior to any such 
action being undertaken, it was first necessary to fully inform her of his intentions. 
But that Alders should only do so, if he felt sure she would reveal nothing of his 
involvement.
According to Alders, the following evening at the pre-arranged time, Jenkins 
appeared ‘carrying a hold all’ and informed him they must leave early in order ‘to 
case’ the site. This, Jenkins added, was in order to verify the information he had 
received from a villager. En route to Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant in Alders’ black 
Austin A30, Jenkins revealed that the pipeline was being targeted in protest at Wales’ 
unjust economic position with regard the flooding of its valleys and the payment 
received for its water. As the car made its way through the wet, grey night, Jenkins 
also disclosed that Mudiad Amddifyn Cymru was headed by a south Wales man 
known simply as MAC. When asked as to the numbers involved and his own 
experience in such matters, Jenkins replied that while ‘there were hundreds’ involved 
in providing the necessary resources, most notably ‘colliery workers’, only a ‘handful’ 
were prepared to carry out such actions and that he himself had received training in 
the handling of explosives. On arriving at the village, Jenkins instructed Alders to 
follow the road on to the Pystyll Rhaeadr waterfall. Here, they remained until night 
fall, following which they returned to a position along the road near the position of the 
water pipes and carried out the protest. Despite having been passed by a car and a 
couple of walkers, the two men were confident their action had gone unnoticed. On 
returning to Wrexham, having ‘dropped Jenkins off at the Mess in the barracks’, 
Alders drove to the home of his girlfriend, Ann Woodgate. There, having stated that 
he would accept her decision to end the relationship if  she so chose, he confessed his 
earlier conduct. Her reaction, he later declared, was one of anger, upset and
1 7Qdisgust. Alders’ increasing candour requires some comment. It would appear that 
increasingly aware of his judicial position following his arrest, the cold realization he 
now faced the full weight of the law precipitated a need to shift much of the 
responsibility in the direction of Jenkins. His later actions during the trial of the two
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men would appear to bear this out.
Yet, perhaps most revealing of all, is the witness statement of Ann Woodgate. 
Although, Alders’ girlfriend at the time of the Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant protest, 
crucially to his and Jenkins’ eventual detection, Woodgate was later to become 
Alders’ fiance. She too retracted an earlier statement in which she denied prior 
knowledge of the incident. Alders had, she later admitted, informed her of having laid 
the charge on his return. She had remonstrated with him as to the likely consequences 
such a course of action might entail. He was, Alders had insisted, fully aware of the 
risks involved. The following day, she read news of the explosion in the Liverpool 
Echo. Asked to reveal the source of her partner’s nationalism, Woodgate stated his 
meeting with John Jenkins had apparently prompted Alders’ subsequent ‘extreme 
political views’ and belief in ‘direct action’.180
The witness statements provide a fascinating insight into the events 
surrounding the explosion at Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant. Furthermore, it must be 
acknowledged that this episode occurred over 40 years ago, during a period celebrated 
latterly as relaxed in ‘atmosphere’. With the horrors of Northern Ireland yet to 
unfold, it is conceivable that an awareness of security issues was not as stringently 
considered as might be expected. This may in part be owing to the rather elementary 
capabilities of the security forces at this juncture; certainly when compared to the 
technical advantages and forensic awareness it enjoys today. What also must be 
recognized is the timing of these statements: divulged a full two years after the 
explosion. However, whatever the truth, the security measures implemented by John 
Jenkins to re-convene the campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru appear at least 
questionable. Yet, worse was to come.
Nonetheless, the explosion more than signaled Jenkins’ arrival onto the stage 
of militant action. From then on, he later revealed, he was ‘able to speak with much 
more authority’.181 Asked to comment on Alders’ disclosure to police, that he had
i o?
regarded MAC operatives in south Wales to be ‘too irresponsible’, Jenkins 
confirmed he had indeed voiced such a concern. It had come in response to the 
suggestion that the movement should ‘kill politicians’ to advance its cause. Such 
‘wild ideas’ had convinced him that while an understanding of ‘cause’ might be
1 80
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appreciated by MAC personnel, little was understood about the ‘political 
consequences’ of such action. It was however, Jenkins conceded, understandable: 
these were the ‘Young Turks’ and the injustice of Tryweryn had caused ‘bitterness 
and fury’. It had resulted in ‘all sense of reason’ being Tost’. Yet anger, Jenkins 
recognized, must be properly ‘challenged and directed’.183 Such was the extent to 
which Jenkins was forced to ‘rein in the hot-heads’, that his later portrayal, as 
maintained by the British media and security services, as ‘the callous extremist’ had 
caused him some wry amusement.184
However, in contrast to the strangely ambivalent villagers of Llanrhaeadr-ym- 
Mochnant, one of whom expressed support for the ideals of the militants, if not their 
methods, 185 the nation’s media was quick to take an altogether hostile view of the 
incident. An editorial in the Western Mail angrily denounced the action as ‘a 
deplorable disservice to Wales’, which would only ‘ossify existing division’. The 
Liverpool Daily Post likened the ‘degenerate act’ to that akin to the mediaeval 
practice of poisoning the wells of one’s enemy. As for the water itself, as it fell from 
the heavens it was surely ‘more God’s than taffy’s’.187 Yet, with little to implicate 
any known figure or movement to the blast, the identity of those responsible became 
the focus of considerable conjecture. Moreover, recognizing that it would face the 
invariable question of its links to Welsh militancy, when approached for a statement 
in response to the detonation, Plaid Cymru quickly saw an opportunity to undermine
1 RRthe Free Wales Army. The ‘stupid action’, it believed, was the work of the IRA; 
the assumption being based on its ‘greater experience in such matters’.189
The Free Wales Army steps up its publicity campaign
To the FWA, still humbled by the lack of attendance at the Machynlleth rally, the 
explosion at Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant was greeted with predictable garrulous cries 
of intimated responsibility. In a series of newspaper articles, the movement’s well- 
oiled publicity machine disgorged additional spurious claims. All water supplies to
] 83 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 February 2009.
184 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
185 WM, 2 October 1967.
186 T, . , e- Ibid, p.6.107
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188 WM, 3 October 1967.
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England, declared Denis Coslett, would be ‘crippled’ within six months if a Welsl 
Water Board was not established to ensure adequate fiscal recompense for watei 
piped from Wales. Moreover, dogs with primed magnetic explosives strapped to theii 
backs, had been trained to destroy an approaching tank by affixing itself.191 
Furthermore, armed to the hilt, the group now comprised ‘7,000 men, ready to fight tc 
the death to win home rule’.191 Presumably, its stock of arms included the ‘foui 
heavy machine guns’ delivered by trawler and landed near Aberaeron. Possibly one 
of a number of ‘secluded places’ where those who had broken the oath of allegiance
1 Q?to the movement were summarily executed. As for the Patriotic Front, it comprisec 
‘4,000 members, with branches in the US, Canada and Australia’, so stated its vice-
1 03president Owain Williams.
How, Denis Coslett was later asked, did he feel being the architect of claims 
so outlandish they stood little chance of surviving even the most nominal measure o1 
investigative scrutiny? The campaign of the Free Wales Army, he replied trenchantly, 
had been one of ‘propaganda’. Indeed, he had been instructed by Cayo Evans tc 
orchestrate such a campaign, owing to his recognized ability to embellish and cause 
reaction. The media, he added, had bent over ‘backwards to talk’ to leading figures 
within the movement. It had simply been a case of Tying to them’ in order tc 
propagate the myth. With regard to perhaps Coslett’s’ most memorable utterance: 
that dogs harnessed with explosives would be used to destroy tanks, he was 
unapologetic. It had been, he stressed, *purely propaganda’. As a dog lover, he 
would never entertain the thought of actually harming an animal.194
Nevertheless, despite his considerable ability to capture a headline, even 
within the ranks of the FWA, members had often bristled as another Coslett 
arrogation hit the newsstands. Speaking in 2004, Glyn Rowlands, while ready to 
acknowledge much that Coslett brought to the nationalist arena, conceded his 
‘weakness’ for fabrication had been recognized.195 Moreover, while perhaps
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oblivious to Cayo Evans’ directive, it was the manner in which Coslett had seemingly 
basked in the limelight which stuck in the craw of those nationalists who favoured a 
more understated approach.196 As for the claim that many thousands had swelled the 
ranks of the movement, it was likely, Glyn Rowlands thought, that senior members 
had included all those who had routinely gathered in various pubs to watch Cayo
1 07Evans play his accordion.
Wales and militancy was hot news. Quick to recognise their value as a 
newsworthy phenomenon was the ever-astute David Frost, who invited the FWA onto 
his weekly, late-night television show. If leading members of the group anticipated a 
stolid forum in which its ideals and intentions could be properly aired, they were to be
10Rvery disappointed. Having been introduced by Frost as ‘one of the most celebrated 
armies’ in Britain, the host approached Denis Coslett and asked what the Free Wales 
Army symbolized. It was, Coslett replied, a non-pacifist ‘militant’ organization 
‘prepared to fight’ for its ‘freedom’. Against whom, inquired Frost? ‘The imperialist 
government’, returned Coslett; who, along with Liverpool Water Corporation, was 
guilty of stealing - with no recompense - Welsh water. What action had the group 
taken in protest? It had damaged the pipelines, revealed Coslett. How had this been 
achieved? By having placed ‘plastics’ on the pipelines of the ‘establishment’ and 
‘blasting away’, the Welshman declared.199
Despite his misgivings, to Gethin ap Iestyn, earlier chastised by Coslett for not 
having an FWA uniform to wear for the occasion, the Llanelli man had ‘handled it 
pretty well’.200 Yet, to many others, an increasing sense that the group was being laid 
bare for the amusement of the nation had begun to dawn. One attendee, alarmed at 
the sight of Coslett in full FWA regalia was Glyn Rowlands. Following the 
broadcast, Rowlands confronted Frost as to why Coslett had come in for so much 
attention. It was, Frost replied with typical authoritative posturing, common
quite honestly’, later admitted Dafydd y Dug. Interview with WT, 20 May 2004.
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journalistic practice to ‘hone in on the weakest link’.201 Later asked to comment, 
Coslett conceded the decision to wear his FWA uniform had been a mistake. He had 
resembled, he stated comically, with no little degree of self-effacement, ‘Overmeister 
von-Reichenstein’. As for their host, he had shown the group ‘no respect at all’ and 
indeed, had ‘tried to lower’ their ‘moral’. Why, Coslett was asked, had Cayo Evans, 
renowned for his public speaking ability, remained a background figure, seemingly 
content to allow his second-in-command steal the limelight? In reply, Coslett 
confirmed that Evans had indeed said ‘nothing’. Yet, he had not objected and 
moreover had been unconcerned with the responsibility. It was, he added, necessary 
on such occasions to express ‘your opinion and anger’ and to defeat shyness and 
introspection.202
One member of the FWA who did not attend the recording was Lyn Ebenezer. 
It was at this juncture, he disclosed in 2006, he had decided ‘enough was enough’. In 
agreeing to appear on the programme, the group had been at the mercy of a seasoned 
professional: quite capable of leading both the interviewee and its subject in any 
direction he chose. Watching the broadcast at home in west Wales, Ebenezer had felt 
pained watching men he both liked and admired reduced to derision on national 
television. It had been, he was sad to concede, ‘embarrassing’.203 It was a sentiment 
shared by an equally disconsolate Owain Williams who considered the group to be 
‘out of its depth’.204 Yet, not all were prepared to take the insult lying down. In 2004, 
Toni Lewis revealed how some indignant and departing FWA attendees, in protest at 
the slight afforded the party, consoled themselves by tipping the grand piano 
belonging to the studio’s resident band off the stage.205 Nevertheless, also watching 
the broadcast was David John Underhill. Also asked for his thoughts in 2004, he had 
felt, he replied, ‘thoroughly ashamed’. It had been apparent that this was an 
organization not deserving of serious consideration. Moreover, the FWA had 
‘allowed itself to be ridiculed’ by not demanding of Frost a more respectful attitude:
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906through physical threat if necessary. One man who missed the programme’s 
screening was the director general of MAC, John Jenkins. That night, Jenkins 
delivered a package to a contact in south Wales, which in the coming weeks, would 
resolutely announce the militant response to the investiture.207
The attack on the Temple of Peace
While the FWA was basking in the media spotlight, in Wrexham, unbeknown to all 
outside the smallest of inner circles, John Jenkins had formulated the movement’s 
long-term strategy. Henceforth, in direct confrontation to the investiture, every time a 
member of the royal family, or those employed in planning the ceremony stepped into 
Wales, there would be an explosion. The inevitable overreaction from the authorities, 
Jenkins believed, would undermine both its prestige among the ‘ordinary’ populace 
and consequently lead erstwhile ambivalent members of the Welsh community to 
support his cause.208 The by-now overall-commander of the movement, did not have 
long to wait to test his theory.
On 10 November, the newly established Office for the Investiture of the Prince 
of Wales, sent a memorandum to Buckingham Palace seeking royal approval for the 
arrangements it proposed for the investiture. These, the directive added, were to be 
discussed at an inaugural conference of the organizing committee to be held at the 
Welsh National Temple of Peace and Health in Cardiff s Cathays Park, seven days 
later.209 However, apparently unknown to Palace officials, also on 10 November 
1967, Burke Trend, the Secretary to the Cabinet Office, wrote to Goronwy Daniel, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Welsh Office, informing him that an assessment 
entitled: The Subversive Threat in the United Kingdom had been prepared by Dick 
Thistlethwaite, Director of F Branch, the counter-subversion division of MI5. The 
relevant extract, which Daniel was implored to bring to the attention of Secretary of 
State for Wales Cledwyn Hughes, was the ‘activities of Welsh extremists’ which had
910been considered ‘sufficiently important to rate a place’ in the summary.
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Nonetheless, news of the inaugural conference of the investiture committee had 
circulated. Three groups, all opposed to the ceremony, intended to protest the VIPs’ 
attendance: Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg, the Patriotic Front and Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru. In 2004, John Jenkins discussed the events which sent a shock wave 
resounding through the corridors of the British Establishment. Following several days 
of surveillance, a MAC ‘active unit’ based in south Wales decided to act. A little 
after 22.30 on 16 November, the fifteen pound explosive device, which it is believed 
Jenkins delivered a fortnight before, was pushed to the rear of the lintel above the 
door of the Temple of Peace. At 4.04, it detonated, causing extensive damage.211 
Immediately, roads out of the city were sealed off. Within an hour of the blast, known 
extremists throughout Wales had been roused from their beds for questioning. After a 
police forensic team had sifted through the debris, a frantic effort was made to prepare 
the building for the meeting; which, with the conference room unaffected, was 
scheduled to go ahead at 11.30. Having been appointed to co-ordinate the investiture, 
Lord Snowdon arrived at Cardiff Central Station to be informed that both he and the 
conference was the subject of a ‘maximum police security operation’.
The royal party was escorted by police outriders to the Temple of Peace, 
where during the conference, the Secretary of State for Wales, Cledwyn Hughes, 
condemned the attack as ‘deplorable’. The damage, he added, to a building 
‘dedicated to the cause of peace and international understanding’ would cause ‘deep 
distress throughout Wales’. He hoped that those responsible, whom he believed, to be 
‘a small element’, would soon see ‘the error of their ways’. At the close of the 
seminar, the delegates were greeted by a crowd of 250 chanting protesters. Many 
wielded placards denouncing the investiture and calling for Wales to be declared a 
Republic. Having declined to comment, or be drawn into the controversy, before 
reaching his waiting car to be sped away, Lord Snowdon was booed and heckled as he 
made his way through the crowd. What happened next is the subject of considerable 
conjecture, with protestors claiming police responded with calculated over-reaction. 
Whatever the truth, later that afternoon, thirteen people appeared before Cardiff 
magistrates on charges relating to public order offences.
Minister Wilson’s Downing Street security confidante.
211 The Times, 18 November 1967; also TNA, DPP 2/5973. The total estimated cost o f the damage 
was put at £10,000. WM, 18 November 1967; also, Sun, 18 November 1967. It is thought among
nationalist circles, that the action was carried out by a two man active unit.
212 WM, 18 November 1967; also, Sun, 18 November 1967. The officials were greeted by a small
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Among those arrested were Emyr Llywelyn Jones, Toni Lewis and Gethin ap Iestyn. 
Charged with foul and abusive language, Emyr Llywelyn Jones later gave his version 
of events. As a prominent member of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg, he had been 
approached by a police inspector who had robustly informed him that he had ‘got’ 
him ‘at last’. Turning to a reporter standing just feet away, Jones inquired as to 
whether the officers’ ribald tirade had been heard. Before receiving a reply, Jones 
was allegedly ‘thrown into the back of a Black Maria’. Such is the nature of the 
arrests, that Jones is adamant a deliberate policy to discredit the language movement
o i - 5
in the eyes of the Welsh public was employed. It is an intriguing view. The 
charges against those arrested ranged from obstruction, assaulting the police and using 
obscene language. Might the charges have been chosen with prior calculation?
The thoughts of Emyr Llywelyn Jones are given credence by Gethin ap Iestyn 
and Toni Lewis, the founders and strategists behind the Patriotic Front. Arrested for 
both assaulting a police officer and using obscene language, ap Iestin denied any such 
conduct in 2007: indignantly countering that police had been ‘heavy-handed’ and 
‘provocative’. Nevertheless, he had, he affirmed, concealed eggs in his pocket, 
intending to throw them at departing officials. In the melee surrounded his arrest, the 
eggs were smashed. Having also been bundled into the back of a Black Maria, to the 
chagrin of arresting officers, ap Iestyn smeared across the van’s inner windows the 
eggs. This, he then used as a cohesive to attach anti-investiture posters. The situation 
soon descended into farce, with officers removing the posters as quickly as ap Iestyn 
could affix them.214
As for Toni Lewis, notwithstanding his opposition to the investiture, he had 
attended the protest owing to his status within the organisation. That afternoon, he 
was due for interview at the Cardiff College of Music and Drama, in relation to a 
teaching post. It was an appointment Lewis failed to keep. Arrested on a charge of 
obstruction, he later complained this constituted his having allegedly ‘sat on a 
pavement’, something, which owing to the inclement weather and his wearing of a 
suit, Lewis vehemently denied. However, at a later court hearing, there occurred a 
very unexpected development. Police officers, Lewis maintained, admitted a list had
crowd o f demonstrators on their arrival. The placards proclaimed that ‘Wales pays 2.5m for English 
Prince’, ‘Republic not Royalty’, ‘No Englishman as Prince o f Wales’, ‘Not wanted Charlie’ and
‘Charlie the Greek go home’. Protestors chanted ‘No Prince’.
213 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2004.
214 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 17 March 2008; also, 26 January 2008.
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been circulated containing the rnames of those to be arrested should they attend.
• • 215Irrespective, it seemed, of whether those individuals actually committed an offence.
Nonetheless, first in the dock to state his case was Emyr Llywelyn Jones. 
Confident the matter would be resolved in his favour, Jones was frustrated to learn 
media coverage of the protest, including video film apparently containing the voice of 
the arresting inspector, had been deemed inadmissible. Offered the chance to plead
• 9  1 /L
guilty, pay a £1 fine and see the matter ended, Jones accepted. Yet, Toni Lewis, 
angry at what he considered the injustice of the both the charge against him and the 
manner in which the police had marshalled the event, refused to accept the plea 
bargain. Moreover, he enquired as to whether police had been lawful in their 
demanding of him to clear, with the aid of his scarf, the egg smeared over the 
windows of the Black Maria by Gethin ap Iestyn. No explanation was forthcoming. 
However, informed by Magistrate John Rutter that he had ‘no doubt made a 
confounded nuisance’ of himself, the charge against Lewis was dismissed. Having 
been the sole arrestee to refuse the magistrates’ offer, only Toni Lewis was found not 
guilty. Nevertheless, it should be noted that such ‘fun and games’ did not extend 
solely to officers of the law. Arrested before 1.00 p.m., the detainees realised they 
were legally entitled to receive a meatl. After the stratagem of such had been 
addressed: including the erecting of trestle tables, officers were informed the food was 
no longer required as all were now on hunger strike.217
If the militants in Wales toasted the success of the operation against the 
Temple of Peace, even among many of the nation’s populace considered to be 
acquiescent in their support of the bombi ng campaign, the target of the attack had left 
an unpleasant taste in the mouth. The Temple of Peace, opened in 1938, was financed 
by Lord Davies, the grandson of the nineteenth-century industrialist David Davies. 
Considered ‘a gift to Wales’, it was also the first building in Britain to be ‘expressly 
dedicated’ to the cause of international harmony. The majestic Portland stone 
building housed the nations’ Book of Remembrance, which, kept on a black marble
215 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. Lewis believes the case was deliberately 
protracted, in his case having to appear before Cardiff magistrates three times, in order to penalise so-
called offenders through lost wages.
216 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 28 August 2004.
217 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. A response from those in support o f the 
investiture was not long in coming. Such a condemnatory attitude, declared the Bosworth Society, was 
‘a deplorable manifestation o f an inferiority complex’. WM, 24 October 1967. It was established in 
1962 to commemorate Welshman Henri Tudor’s (later Henry V I 1) seizure o f the crown o f England,
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pedestal, honoured those who had paid the ultimate sacrifice.
Yet, such was the location of the conference, that some have suggested its very 
siting was deliberately chosen. This was in the belief that those spearheading the 
militant campaign would consider the venue’s target potential as ‘beyond reproach’. 
However, such supposition was greeted with caution by John Jenkins in 2009, who, 
while believing it was indeed possible, considered it ‘too cynical a view’. It was more 
likely he felt, that the Temple of Peace had been decided upon, owing to its 
convenient centre position within the capital. Nonetheless, of one thing Jenkins was 
certain: that the meeting was little more than a demonstration of English political and 
cultural oppression of Wales. By undertaking such action, the British Establishment 
had ‘thrown down the gauntlet’; subsequently, he and his colleagues in the militant 
movement had ‘picked it up’.219
In 2007, John Jenkins remarked that the Temple of Peace operation - in strictly 
combative terms - to have been ‘a nice one’. The strike, he revealed, had been 
undertaken with two things in mind: to show the authorities that Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru ‘meant business’ and to make Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg realise what the 
Welsh nationalist movement was truly up against. Namely, the British state, which 
could be ‘very, very nasty when it wanted to be’, as had been revealed in its handling 
of the anti-investiture protest. Up until that point, Jenkins added, a lot of people had 
seen the campaign for Welsh nationhood as ‘more a squabble for the moral high 
ground’. Having witnessed, for the first time, police aggression: both verbal and 
physical, a realisation had dawned. The erstwhile policy adopted by Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg - of staging rather doleful if well-intentioned sit-down protests in Post 
Offices - had resulted in a relatively restrained response from police. Its response to 
the demonstration at the Temple of Peace, Jenkins added pointedly, ‘was different’.
Informed of the allegation made against the police inspector by Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones, Jenkins remained impassive. Many of those attending the protest 
had been accompanied by their parents, Jenkins declared, half of whom were 
Ministers of religion. These people, he believed, had been ‘utterly shocked’ by what 
had transpired, never having previously ‘seen anything like it’. An entrenched, warm 
premise of the policeman ‘as a friendly old bloke down the road’ who, with good
following victory at the Battle o f Bosworth in August 1485.
218 WM, 18 November 1967.
219
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 30 March 2009.
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humour, chastised children for ‘scrumping apples from trees’, had been ruthlessly 
dispelled. Never had respected members of Welsh society witnessed the police in 
such a polemic role. As a result of police action, both the offspring and more 
importantly their parents had been ‘politicized’. The demand for Welsh cultural and 
political recognition, they now recognized, was a game no longer.
In response to the speculation that the operation had been undertaken with 
considerable forethought, Jenkins confirmed this indeed to be the case. Primarily, a 
degree of uncertainty had existed as to whether the enterprise could be successfully 
achieved, owing to the size, weight, thickness and bronze adornments which 
constituted the ‘massive’ Temple of Peace doors. Blowing them up, Jenkins 
reasoned, ‘was going to take a bit of doing’. However, having recognized the 
enormity of the task, information received that Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg intended 
to hold a demonstration, had tipped the scales in favour of taking action. It was, 
Jenkins concluded, ‘too good a chance to miss’.220
Yet, contrary to the somewhat ‘efficient detachment’ of John Jenkins, many 
considered the militants of Wales to be dancing with the devil. Hours following the 
blast, Detective Chief Superintendent David Morris, head of Cardiff CID, declared his 
optimism that those responsible would soon be apprehended. Further announcing the 
inquiry into the explosion was making ‘satisfactory progress’. Two crucial pieces of 
evidence had been recovered and each it was hoped, would provide vital clues as to 
the identity of the perpetrators: the damaged canvas hold-all into which the device had 
been placed and the remains of the timing device. Although police sources quickly 
admitted ‘the time-switch’ used to be ‘very common’, having been hastily re­
assembled by forensic experts, the mechanism nevertheless proved to be of similar 
design to that deployed in the attacks at Clywedog, Crossgates and Llanrhaeadr-ym- 
Mochnant. A stark pattern was now established.221 Nonetheless, despite the bomb
‘799 #
damage and the insinuated involvement of its party members, Plaid Cymru held its 
Christmas Fair at the Temple of Peace the following day. Cited as ‘one of its most 
important financial events of the year’, its decision to proceed, announced party
220 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 October 2007.
221 WM, 18 November 1967. Throughout the day of the explosion, Cardiff police dealt with a rash o f
bomb hoaxes. The sixth and last, occurred that evening during a banquet at the City Hall attended by
the Chancellor o f the Exchequer, and Cardiff South MP, James Callaghan. WM, 18 November 1967.
222 WM, 11 December 1967. In a searing attack, Merlyn Rees, the Under-Secretary of State for 
Defence, stated Plaid Cymru’s ‘narrow, inward-looking nationalism to be an anachronism’. It bred the
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general secretary Elwyn Roberts, surely proved the party’s innocence.223
In the years since the MAC campaign, the identity of those responsible for the 
Temple of Peace explosion has attracted considerable speculation. In 2007, a leading 
member of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru - during its first incarnation - expressed his 
belief that the blast ‘had all the hallmarks of a Dave Pritchard action’. Only Pritchard, 
it was stated, had ‘the capability of undertaking such a professional operation’.224 
Approached to comment, both John Jenkins and David Walters, fined alongside 
Pritchard for damaging a transformer at the Tryweryn Reservoir, refused to be
99 Sdrawn. Likewise approached was Toni Lewis. He confirmed knowing the identity
99 Aof one of the saboteurs, but similarly refused to divulge any further information. 
Yet, in 2009, an erstwhile leading figure in the Free Wales Army, while refusing to 
reveal the identities of others involved, confirmed that one of those responsible was a
997senior member of the Patriotic Front. Asked to express an opinion with regard the
explosion, Gethin ap Iestyn, formerly at the vanguard of the Patriotic Front, refused to
228comment.
Nevertheless, as the events unfolded, the police and security services appeared 
resolutely in the dark as to whom was responsible. Within days of the explosion, 
Goronwy Daniel, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Welsh Office, replied 
by letter to Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, with regard the extract outlined in the 
subversion paper concerning Welsh militant activity. Daniel revealed that the 
Secretary of State for Wales, Cledwyn Hughes, had for some time felt ‘increasingly 
concerned’ with events in Wales; all the more sharpened by the ‘bomb outrage’ just 
days earlier at the Temple of Peace. Had the timing device functioned a few hours in 
arrears, Daniel added, ‘very serious loss of life’ might have occurred. Moreover, the 
fact a bomb was deployed to protest ‘a meeting arranged to prepare for the investiture 
of the Prince of Wales’ carried with it the threat the same means of protest would be 
used again as arrangements for the ceremony proceeded. The consequences of which,
‘worst feeling’ which gave rise to ‘bomb outrages and the like’.
223 WM, 20 November 1967. Within days, 100 people had been interviewed in connection with the
explosion.
224 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2007.
225 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 October 2007; also, telephone interview, 30 March 
2009; also, interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
226 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
227 Anonymous interview with WT, March 2009.
228 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 26 January 2008.
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could be ‘very serious indeed’. As for those responsible, whom Hughes hoped ‘every 
effort’ would be employed by the security and police services to detect, they appeared 
‘to be a small group with expert (perhaps ex-Army) knowledge of bombs’. 
Furthermore, they appeared to have ‘access to explosives’. Contrary to the suggestion 
proffered in the subversive report, that Welsh mines appeared to be the source of the 
explosive material, as these were now few, large and subject to careful control, it was 
more likely the explosives derived from quarries. It was believed, the report 
concluded, that the ‘overwhelming majority of Welshmen would welcome news of 
the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment’ of those responsible; and that crucially, 
they would not remain ‘at large during the period leading up to and including the 
Investiture’.229
The report by Goronwy Daniel, soon found its way - via government 
departmental channels - to Box 500, the code name for MI5 and its anonymous chief 
of staff, Sir Martin Fumival Jones. He responded to fears raised, by stating police and 
security forces were ‘fully alive’ to the risk posed by Welsh militants to the 
investiture and ‘were taking all possible steps to anticipate it’.230 Yet, in a later letter 
to Burke Trend, Fumival Jones appeared more cautious: clarifying MI5’s position 
within the wider British internal security network. The ‘protection of members of the 
Royal Family’, he declared, was the responsibility of the police. As for MI5, it would 
give protective security advice to all the ‘appropriate authorities’ concerned and 
moreover, was willing to advise to this end, police forces involved with the investiture 
should it be approached to do so.231
Martin Fumival Jones did not have long to wait. The perceived threat to the 
investiture and more succinctly, the safety of Prince Charles, was attracting 
considerable unease. Following a preliminary discussion between the Chief
Constable of Gwynedd, Lieutenant Colonel William Jones Williams; the Earl 
Marshall - the Duke of Norfolk, appointed to oversee the investiture - and Eric St. 
Johnston, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary,232 a further covert inter-departmental 
memorandum confirmed a meeting of ‘chief constables in Wales and the Security
229
TNA, CAB 164/389. Report: Welsh Extremists, by Goronwy Daniel to Burke Trend, 20 November
1967.
230
TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from Sir Martin Fumival Jones to Burke Trend, 27 November 1967.
231
TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from Sir Martin Fumival Jones to Burke Trend, 30 November 1967.
232 TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from Philip Allen, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, to Burke 
Trend, 13 December 1967.
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Services’ had been scheduled for 18 January. Convened in order to ensure ‘an 
effective organization’ was established ‘to collect and sift intelligence’, it was further 
stated that John Parkman, Head of the Regional Crime Squad in Cardiff, had been 
assigned to investigate those incidents which had already occurred and was diligently 
collating ‘information about the activities of organizations’ deemed possibly 
involved. One of those who attests to having been the focus of security interest at 
this juncture is Owain Williams. What is more, Williams is certain the security 
services were prepared to adopt latent means to safeguard the impending investiture. 
He quantified this by claiming that following the explosion at the Temple of Peace, he 
was approached by a tall Liverpudlian calling himself ‘Parry’, who purported to be a 
former French Foreign Legionnaire and impassioned Welsh nationalist. Imploring 
Williams to discuss disruptive measures, it was, the mysterious figure announced: 
‘time to plan for the investiture’. Owain Williams has little doubt that ‘Parry’ was in 
fact an undercover Special Branch or MI5 operative.234
Nevertheless, seemingly oblivious to the machinations of state security, that 
same month, a feature on the FWA entitled Who’s At War With England? appeared in 
the monthly pictorial Town magazine. Depicting a series of photographs of the group 
‘on exercise’, it proved the organizations’ most inflammatory press article to date, 
with many of its claims reading like a litany of provocation. The group was credited 
with the explosions at Clywedog and Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant. Additionally, it had 
‘very nearly succeeded’ in disrupting the water supply to Birmingham the previous 
March. Yet, most contentiously, Denis Coslett reportedly threatened the life of 
Secretary of State for Wales Cledwyn Hughes and Liberal Party MP for 
Montgomeryshire, Emlyn Hooson.235 Outraged at the group’s perceived assassination 
threat, Hooson raised in Parliament whether there existed grounds for possible 
proceedings under Section 2 of the 1936 Public Order Act. Horace King, the Speaker 
in the House, ruled the article had indeed ‘constituted a prima facie breach of 
parliamentary privilege’ and referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges for
233
TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from Philip Allen, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, to the
Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, 18 December 1967.
234 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Parry’s unlikely non-deplume o f  
‘Owen Glendower’ aroused Williams’ suspicious. He also believes that Parry, who disappeared when
leading FWA men were on trial, later stole money from FWA funds.
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TNA, DPP2/4455. Coslett claimed the FWA had ‘dossiers on all the traitors’ who had ‘sold Wales 
out to England’. The article appeared in the December edition o f Town magazine. Alongside the 
photographs o f the FWA exercise were dramatic strap-lines including, ‘the weapons are real’ and ‘IRA
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investigation.236
Subsequently, the article came to the attention of Scotland Yard. Interviewed 
was Bryn Griffiths, the freelance journalist responsible for organizing the review. 
Following ‘some initial reluctance’, Griffiths gave what Sergeant Tucker of the 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch Division considered a ‘frank and free version of 
the events leading up to publication’. This included Griffiths’ uncertainty as to 
whether weapons used in the exercise were authentic and his disclosure that some of 
those involved had been recruited solely for the purpose of the feature. Asked to 
divulge his ‘general impression’ of the group and its leading figures, Griffiths 
believed the FWA warranted little serious attention and considered Cayo Evans, 
although equable, ‘anxious’ to gamer publicity and money for both himself and the 
movement. However, Denis Coslett he considered more sinister: believing him 
‘potentially dangerous’ and ‘given to outbursts of uncontrolled temper’ which might 
lead to his ‘indulging in acts of violence or sabotage’.237
Yet, with regard the content of the article, of the more arrant remarks 
attributed to the FWA, was an expression of anger from Denis Coslett for recently 
‘enforced’ homosexuality legislation and his glowing support for Adolf Hitler, whom 
he regarded as having ‘all the answers’. As for the Fuhrer’s invective diatribe Mein 
Kampf it was, Coslett believed, ‘a great book’. These were sentiments seemingly 
shared by Cayo Evans, who further stated the defeat of the German Military in 1945 
to have been a ‘sad day for Wales’. As for the FWA’s ever-expanding armoury, it 
now reputedly included ‘a heavy machine gun’ smuggled from Dublin and a ‘3.5 
rocket launcher’.238
Acting on reports presented by the Metropolitan Police, a memorandum was 
compiled by the Director for Public Prosecutions, in response to the charge that the 
FWA had contravened the 1936 Public Order Act in the Town article. It considered 
two possible grounds for prosecution. The first concerned the wearing of military
tactics turn up in Wales’.
236 The Times, 25 November 1967. The 1936 Act was introduced to combat the threat posed by
Oswald Mosley and the British Union o f Fascists.
237
TNA, DPP2/4455. Metropolitan Police Special Branch report, 11 December 1967. Claims by 
Cayo Evans that membership o f the FWA totaled 1,700 was dismissed by Griffiths as ‘absolute
rubbish’.
238 TNA, DPP2/4455. The persons responsible for the feature were Stan Gebler Davies, who penned 
the article; photographer Jurgen Schadeberg and researcher Bryn Grffiths. The latter had on previous 
occasions arranged press and television interviews with the Cayo Evans, including the FWA’s 
appearance on the Frost Show.
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uniforms in a public place. However, this did not apply, as those attending the 
‘exercise’ had worn fatigues - albeit adorned with FWA insignia - on private property: 
Cayo Evans’ farm. The second point concerned the aspect of training. The FWA, it 
was felt, could have violated the act, if members were being ‘organized and 
trained...for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of 
physical force in promoting a political object’. Yet, this aspect was also thought to be 
‘somewhat sketchy’ as the article was ‘a staged show and that eight of the persons 
shown...had been recruited to pose for the photographs in uniforms loaned them for 
the purpose’. The findings therefore concluded against ‘taking the organization’s 
activities too seriously’; adding to do so would lend it ‘unmerited importance and 
publicity’ which its leaders plainly desired. It seems likely the decision not to 
proceed with the charge against the FWA satisfied another motive: that through 
monitoring the group, the identity of those truly responsible might be revealed.240
Nevertheless, it is intriguing to consider police reports concerning Evans and 
Coslett, collated to assist the inquiry undertaken by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Cayo Evans, it was thought, possessed ‘an underdeveloped personality’ 
and a mental age of ‘about 12 years’.241 One of those instrumental in compiling the 
report was Detective Chief Inspector John Owen Evans. Through his having called at 
Evans’ home routinely during this period, he had, he later revealed, been able to 
establish Cayo Evans’ emotional make-up and the true extent of his militant 
involvement. J. O. Evans concurred with the belief the FWA commander was 
emotionally and intellectually callow, quantifying this by adding that Evans enjoyed 
firing pistols in order to watch the smoke dissipate above him. Nonetheless, the 
retired police officer added, Cayo Evans was approachable and not without charm and 
warmth.242 It is a view shared by many of those close to Evans throughout his life. 
One of whom, Lyn Ebenezer, considered himself extremely fortunate to have known 
the FWA figurehead. Despite some initial misgivings, owing to Cayo Evans’ 
colourful reputation, having got to know the man, there was, Ebenezer remarked, ‘no
239 TNA, DPP2/4455. Memorandum by Sir Norman Skelhom, Director o f  Public Prosecutions to Law 
Officers’ Department, 25 January 1968.
240
TNA, DPP2/4455. Letter from Tony Hetherington, Law Officers’ Department, 26 January 1968, to 
Sir Norman Skelhom, Director o f Public Prosecutions. The Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones QC, 
suggested that police monitoring o f known FWA activists be stepped up.
24 TNA, DPP2/4455. Report on William Edward Julian Cayo Evans. C.R.O. No.43958/66.
242 Interview between WT and John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001.
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one nicer and no one kinder’.243
However, a police report regarding Denis Coslett suggests an altogether 
different character. Coslett, it declared, was ‘an unbalanced personality’: in the sense 
that ‘he is a crank and seems to have ideas of grandeur’. Moreover, he could be 
‘violent’ and was an object of ‘derision and fun’ in Llangennech, where he received 
‘little support’. Yet, most damning of all, Coslett was considered ‘cruel to his 
family’.244 Contacted to respond to the charge was Coslett’s wife for over forty years, 
Avril. They had, she countered, ‘argued like any other family’.245 Nevertheless, 
despite the stinging police appraisal, there are those ready to offer an alternative view. 
Denis Coslett, Lyn Ebenezer maintains, was ‘a hell of a character...extremely 
amusing’ and a man ‘you’d want alongside you in the trenches’.
Following the interview in Town magazine, media interest in the Free Wales 
Army subsided. Cayo Evans, declared Lyn Ebenezer in 2006, ‘had pushed it too 
far’,246 leaving few - if any - in little doubt the joke had worn irredeemably thin. Yet, 
with the investiture of Charles Windsor as Prince of Wales beginning to bum ever 
brightly on the horizon and the authorities no nearer to apprehending those truly 
responsible for the campaign of direct action in Wales, it would not be long before the 
media spotlight shone once again on the ever ebullient FWA.
Conclusion
The period between January 1966 and December 1967 was one of transience: both in 
a domestic context and on the wider international stage. It saw a rise in militant 
nationalism on a scale never before witnessed in Wales. The FWA had dipped its toe 
into the icy waters of militant protest with derisory consequences. It would 
henceforth concentrate its efforts on its ‘war of propaganda’. In comparison, Mudiad
243 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Cayo ‘was a fantastic guy, much under­
rated...might have been the ‘Welsh Garibaldi” . Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 26 
January 2008.
244
TNA, DPP2/4455. Denis Coslett, C.R.O. No. 100762/65. Retired senior police officer John Owen 
Evans said o f Coslett, ‘he was more o f  a worry... the more dangerous... and hot-headed... the one more 
likely to shoot you if  he could; you just didn’t know what he was capable of... I wouldn’t want to turn 
my back on him’. Interview between WT and John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001.
245
Telephone interview between WT & Avril Coslett, 8 March 2009.
246 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Having ‘got up’ his nose, ‘in the 60s for 
verity o f reasons’, G. ap Iestyn admitted that on getting to know Coslett ‘post ’72’, he considered him 
‘salt o f the earth and true Gwerin’. Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 26 January 2008.
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Amddiffyn Cymru had reconvened its sabotage campaign with precision. Moreover, 
with the scheduled Royal investiture deemed an open sore by the country’s nationalist 
community, the situation was about to get decidedly worse; despite the efforts of the 
security forces to apprehend those responsible for the campaign of ‘direct action’. 
Yet, unbeknown to the nation’s law enforcement agencies, their militant Welsh 
nemesis was operating right under their noses, shielded to some considerable degree, 
within the unsuspecting world of the British army.
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Chapter 4 
Peace talks aboard a coracle.
The campaign of violence increases, as the FWA’s 
downfall is assured
Even by life’s fraught standards, 1968 was discordant. War raged in Vietnam. 
Religious bigotry looked set to ignite Northern Ireland. Czechoslovakia was invaded 
by the Soviet Union. There was an anti-war demonstration of unprecedented violence 
in London’s Grosvenor Square and much of the Left Bank in Paris was left 
smouldering. To add to this misery, Enoch Powell delivered his inflammatory ‘rivers 
of blood’ speech in Birmingham, igniting a race relations crisis. In Spain, the Basque 
separatist movement ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) began its bloody struggle for 
independence. In the United States, Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, each 
champions of the civil rights movement, were assassinated; and moreover, Richard 
Nixon - already presciently regarded by many as a ‘crook’- was elected president. 
The world was a place of discord: capitalists and communists, nationalists and 
unionists, Americans and Viet-Cong, Protestants and Catholics, police and protestors. 
Amid this cauldron of national and international turmoil, Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru 
increased its campaign of direct action in Wales.
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the period from January to December 1968. It addresses the 
on-going campaign of so-called ‘direct action’ undertaken by Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru, highlighting what fuelled the group’s militant activism. To this end, it 
considers the interview in May 1968, when three hooded figures, purporting to be 
leading members of the movement, held a clandestine meeting with three journalists 
near Chester. Most notably, it focuses on attempts orchestrated by the director- 
general of MAC, John Jenkins, to de-rail public support for the impending investiture 
of Charles Windsor as Prince of Wales. In addition, the paper looks at the re- 
emergence of the so-called Free Wales Army as a media interest. It also considers the
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government’s response to the campaign o f ‘direct action’ in Wales: demonstrating that 
the safety of Charles and the success of the investiture, ensured the responsibility of 
apprehending the perpetrators was taken out of the hands of Welsh police, to become 
an investigation co-jointly undertaken by the UK’s wider law-enforcement/security 
agencies; specifically with the formation of the renowned Shrewsbury unit.
The MAC offensive escalates
MAC did not wait long to re-emerge from the shadows. Five days into the new year,
at 4.50 a.m., an active unit based in north Wales exploded a 41b bomb at the
Snowdonia Country Club at Penisarwaun; a village five miles from Caernarfon.1 It
was undertaken to highlight the perceived ‘cultural rape’ of Wales, John Jenkins, the
groups enigmatic former leader revealed in 2004; and ‘to ensure’, the ‘culture
vultures’ could see MAC was ‘on their side as well’; that the movement did not
approve of ‘incomers’ purporting to be ‘getting away from it all’, while in fact,
‘bringing it all with them’. These people, a vexed Jenkins declared, ‘had come from
Manchester and wanted to build a nightclub in the middle of a little Welsh village for
# ^
God sakes: up in the foothills of Snowdonia’.
Yet, crucially Jenkins added, it was local opposition to the scheme which 
ensured MAC’s involvement. This came from a number of quarters, including the 
region’s Temperance Society and from villagers who considered both the local 
infrastructure to be inadequate and that such a venue would attract only existing 
incomers and additional migrants to the area. It was ‘deliberately decided’ that a 
relatively small amount of explosives would be used in the operation, owing to the 
proximity of the club to the owners’ house. Had ‘the usual size of bomb’ been 
deployed, Jenkins stated ruefully, the club ‘would have gone and so too the house 
with him in it’. That would have resulted in injuries which would have proved ‘very 
counter-productive’. The explosion, Jenkins maintained, ‘was a token: a symbol to 
show them that we (MAC) are about, we’re watching and we don’t like it’.3
1 TNA, DPP 2/5975.
2 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
3 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008; also, TNA, DPP 
2/4471. The club was owned by 54-year-old Englishman Jack Nix, a successful wholesale fruiterer, 
who retired to Penisarwaun with his wife four years earlier. Witness statement by Jack Nix, 10 January 
1968. 2-5 lbs o f blasting explosives were used, activated by a Venner B43 5 amp time switch. The 
explosion caused £1,500 damage. Witness statement by Major C. M. Jeffries, Senior Ammunition 
Technical Officer, Western Command, Chester.
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Nonetheless, Rona Rowlands, a villager of Penisarwaun and a prospective employee 
at the venue, dismissed the notion the explosion was politically motivated, claiming 
‘some of those’ who had expressed support for the scheme in the area were Plaid 
Cymru members. However, ‘half the villagers had signed a petition of protest, she 
added; further conceding ‘the main objection was the likely road congestion’, upon a 
road system unsuited to the expected increase.4
It was not just Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru who were determined to herald in 
the new year by grabbing the headlines. In an interview with the Sunday Express, the 
Patriotic Front also reminded the country of its political ambitions. It would be 
‘proved before the eyes of the world that Wales was a nation’, a prepared statement 
announced, ‘when they have to move in armed troops to invest Charles as prince of 
Wales’.5 The statement, in all its cloaked intention, could not have been clearer.
Nevertheless, the local rumour mill soon linked the explosion at the 
Snowdonia County Club to the Free Wales Army. Shortly into their inquiry, police 
arrested Edward Hope Wilkinson (43) and Robert Griffith Jones (37). Both were 
known in north-west Wales for holding views deemed in support of the Welsh 
militant struggle. Consequently, a search for incriminating evidence was executed at 
the home of each man. At the Llanllyfhi home of Edward Wilkinson, police found 42 
feet of slow fuse, a pistol, one round of .45 ammunition and 49 rounds of .22 
ammunition. Also discovered, was a quantity of literature referring to the FWA. At 
the Groeslon (Caernarfon) home of Robert Jones, investigating officers found 
fourteen feet of slow fuse and a diary containing references to the FWA. It included 
an entry which read ‘Owie from Llithfaen is another one’.6
Both Wilkinson and Jones were arrested and charged with ‘unlawful 
possession of explosive substances’. While in police custody, each gave a statement 
claiming the explosives had been supplied by quarryman Arfon Jones. This, their 
statements continued, they passed to Owain Williams, who five years earlier, had 
been imprisoned for undertaking protest action over the Tryweryn issue and whom 
Wilkinson and Jones now referred to as ‘the receiver’. If that was not incriminating 
enough, they further alleged that late one evening, a week before the explosion at 
Penisarwaun, they had accompanied Williams to the Snowdonia Country Club, where
4
Western M ail, 6 January 1968.
5 Sunday Express, 7 January 1968.
6 TNA, DPP 2/4471. The Queen against Owen Williams: Summary o f Facts; also undated witness
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he professed the venue ‘should be got rid o f. Moreover, just a few days before the 
blast, each handed Williams approximately ‘twelve sticks of gelignite and a match 
box full of detonators’. Also mentioned in the police statement by Edward Wilkinson
n
was John Gwilym Jones. Brought in for questioning, J. G. Jones gave a written 
statement to the effect that ‘on instruction from Owain Williams’, he collected 
‘thirteen sticks of polar-ammon gelignite from ‘Robin’(Robert Jones); this he alleged 
to have passed onto Williams on 3 November 1967. The following evening, Jones
o
maintained that Williams introduced him to Gethin ap Iestyn at a party in Llangefni.
Enticingly, if Jones’ statement is to be believed, this occurred just a fortnight before
the explosion at the Temple of Peace in Cardiff. Asked in 2009 if he recalled the
incident, Gethin ap Iestyn, claimed not to remember.9
J. G. Jones had more to reveal. A week before Christmas, 1967, he took an
FWA oath of allegiance at Wilkinson’s home. It was allegedly administered by
Owain Williams, while Jones held ‘a point of a dagger’ to his own throat. Also
reputedly present and similarly initiated were Wilkinson and Robert Jones. J. G.
Jones also claimed that Owain Williams suggested a shot be fired through the car
windscreen of Secretary of State for Wales, Cledwyn Hughes; following which, an
anonymous phone call to Hughes’ home would cite Denis Coslett as responsible. It
was hoped, J. G. Jones declared, that these chain of events would lead to Coslett being
expurgated from the FWA, owing to his ‘undesirability’. Nonetheless, the idea, J. G.
Jones added, ‘was abandoned’. The most intriguing and dramatic aspect of Jones’s
statement, concerned remarks apparently attributed to Owain Williams, whereby he
allegedly suggested a raid be undertaken at Saighton Army Barracks near Chester, in
order ‘to procure arms for the purpose of the organization’. This, Jones added
beguilingly, Williams had said was to be ‘an inside job’. Furthermore, J. G. Jones
also claimed to have links to the IRA, via a friend of his within the movement named
‘Sean’.10 Yet, crucially, despite having admitted his involvement in supplying
. ,  -------
statements from Edward Hope Wilkinson and Robert Griffith Jones.
7 TNA, DPP 2/4471.
g
TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement from John Gwilym Jones, 11 January 1968; also 6 August 
1968.
9 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009.
10 TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement from John Gwilym Jones, 11 January 1968; also 6 August
1968. As a result o f the statement given by Jones, Denis Coslett was interviewed with regard the 
explosion. Asked if ‘Sean’, was prominent IRA figure Sean MacStiofain, with whom Owain Williams 
was to develop close contact, Williams replied: ‘Definitely not him. He would have been arrested had 
he arrived in Britain at this stage’. Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 7 April 2009.
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explosive material to Owain Williams, John Gwilym Jones was not charged with any 
offence. This was owing to his incriminating Williams and his assurance to 
investigating officers that he would testify against him when Williams came to trial. 
Also unknown to Owain Williams however, having acted upon testimony provided by 
Edward Wilkinson and Robert Jones, police approached the proprietor of a hotel near 
Penisaurwaun. He gave a statement positively identifying the three men as having 
called for drinks during the evening the apparent reconnoitring of the club was 
undertaken. 11
It was, a police report of the inquiry reveals, ‘abundantly clear’ that Owain 
Williams was ‘one of a small group of men behind the explosions in different parts of 
Wales’. Although not given to ‘parading in uniform’, he was considered ‘constantly 
active in a clandestine manner in support of his beliefs’. Subsequently, Owain 
Williams was regarded as ‘the most important’ of those questioned and charged. So 
much so, police suggested the charges against Wilkinson and Robert Jones be
1 9dropped, in return for their appearing as witnesses against him. Yet, perhaps fearing 
the two men might renege on their assurance to assist police when the case against 
Williams came to trial, 13 Wilkinson and Robert Jones were summoned to appear 
before Justice Lane at Caernarfon Assizes on 28 February. There, despite a police 
statement by Wilkinson professing to be ‘the leader of the FWA in the Caernarvon 
district’ and his intention to continue as a regional recruiting officer for the group, 
each man’s testimony - that the explosives and fuse wire were obtained to ‘poach 
salmon and smoke out rats’14 - was accepted by the court. Both received twelve 
months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.15 As for quarryman Arfon Jones, 
the source of the explosives obtained by Robert Jones and Edward Wilkinson, he 
admitted stealing the material from his place of work.16 Nevertheless, satisfied his 
actions had not been politically inspired, police accepted his claim the theft was
17 •undertaken for financial gain. In court on 15 February, Arfon Jones pleaded guilty
11 TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement from Maldwyn Parry.
12 TNA, DPP 2/4471. Statement given by Detective Sergeant R. G. Owen, 18 January 1968.
13 TNA, DPP 2/4471. The Queen against Owen Williams: Summary of Facts.
14 WM, 29 February 1968.
15 TNA, DPP 2/4471. Summing up statement given by Judge Lane. Defence council for Wilkinson 
and Jones claimed their clients had disassociated themselves from the FWA. WM, 29 February 1968.
16 TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement by Arfon Jones, 10 January 1968.
17 TNA, DPP 2/4471. The Queen against Owen Williams: Summary of Facts.
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and was fined £15.18 Considering the political climate, the three could consider 
themselves fortunate not to have received far more stringent sentences. It was borne 
of fear that a less restrained judicial response, might only serve to inflame an already 
unpredictable picture.
John Jenkins later adamantly denied that G. T. Jones, Edward Wilkinson or 
Robert Jones were members of MAC, the group actually responsible for the attack. 
Furthermore, contemporaneously unaware of the nature of the police investigation, 
Jenkins also conceded to having felt increasingly uneasy the three men might be 
wrongfully implicated. Yet, any approach to the authorities to inform of their 
innocence, was, he recognized, not feasible. However, Jenkins also revealed a MAC 
sympathizer living in Penisaurwaun provided information the venue was being 
developed without villagers’ support. This information, he added, was acquired 
through extensive surreptitious monitoring of attitudes in places of communication, 
such as: the local pub and post office. Crucially, it was only when it was clearly 
established that locals opposed the venue, that the decision was taken to undertake the 
protest.19 John Jenkins confirmed that MAC activists George Taylor and Alwyn 
Jones from Abergele were responsible for the explosion at the Snowdonia Country 
Club. Nonetheless, despite Jenkins’ insistence, it is a suggestion fiercely dismissed 
as ‘absolute rubbish’ by George Taylor’s daughter Jennie Evans.21
In 2004, Owain Williams revealed that the enigmatic John Gwilym Jones had 
‘harassed’ him ‘for months wanting to do something for Wales’. This included 
numerous visits to Williams’ home, where he had divulged apparent knowledge of 
further individuals ready to take up arms against the British state; the whereabouts of 
an arms cache; and where guns could be appropriated from a military barracks on 
Anglesey. Such information soon convinced Williams that nineteen-year-old J. G. 
Jones was both mentally unstable and moreover, deliberately attempting to infiltrate 
the movement with the aim of imparting knowledge of the groups’ activities to police.
Questioned as to the events surrounding his arrest on 14 January 1968, 
Williams stated that four days earlier - and five days after the explosion at
18TNA, DPP 2/4471. Wilkinson claimed to have paid an unnamed source, ls.3d for the explosive fuse
and a stick o f gelignite, WM, 29 February 1968.
19 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
20
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
21 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 13 August 2009. Both G. Taylor and A. Jones 
were later killed when apparently planting an explosive device on the eve of the investiture.
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Penisaurwaun - he parked his father’s car at Rhyl railway station and journeyed by 
train to London with the intention of buying a red Volvo sports car. Before returning 
to Wales, he bought a copy of the London Evening Standard. Its front page bore news 
‘that three men had been arrested in north Wales on explosives charges’. An 
immediate phone call to his mother confirmed his fears: fourteen police officers, he 
was told, were positioned throughout the farm awaiting his return. Having purchased 
the vehicle, Williams drove back to Wales. On reaching the Rhyl area, he contacted 
Enys Roberts, a female acquaintance and stayed at her home in Henllan for a couple 
of days. He then spent a few days at Garthewin Hall near Abergele, the manorial 
home of R. O. F. Wynne, as guest of his daughter Gwenllian. Together, they travelled 
to Rhyl railway station where they discovered the wheels on Williams’ father’s car 
were deflated. Owain Williams is convinced that police officers were responsible. 
Early the following evening, he returned to his parents’ deserted farm near Nefyn. 
There he was informed by his mother that John Hughes, the head of Gwynedd CID, 
‘wanted a word’ with him. Owain Williams phoned Caernarfon police station. 
Advised to first eat his supper, he was asked to present himself for questioning later 
that evening. Williams did not return home for a month. He arrived at Caernarfon 
police station to find it in darkness and apparently empty. On calling out, the lights 
were switched on and a number of officers converged on Williams bundling him up 
the stairs where he was questioned.
He was thrown and pushed around the room from one shouting officer to 
another, Williams alleged. Having repeated they now had ‘the big fish’, Williams 
soon realized that investigating officers considered John Gwilym Jones, Edward 
Wilkinson and Robert Jones peripheral to their inquiry. It was he, Williams deduced, 
that police considered the principal player and their principal target. Having denied 
being a member of the FWA, refused to comment on the claim the group’s oath of 
allegiance had been administered to J. G. Jones, Edward Wilkinson and Robert Jones 
‘at the point of a dagger’, Owain Williams was asked to respond to the charge that 
along with Wilkinson and Robert Jones, he visited the Snowdonia Country Club prior 
to the explosion. He conceded having done so, but only as a preliminary measure to 
purchasing the premises, believing it to be shortly up for sale.
Before being transferred to Risley Remand Centre, Owain Williams was 
charged on three accounts of being unlawfully in possession of gelignite and 
detonators. Finally, after five court appearances, and five days into a hunger strike,
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on 8 February, a weakened and shaking Williams was inexplicably granted bail, to 
appear for trial at Caernarfon Assizes on 6 March. Legal advice attained from his 
solicitor, that a guilty verdict would ensure a sentence of ‘at least ten years’ 
imprisonment, began to play feverishly on Williams’ mind. With the court date 
approaching, he considered his options. A belief that nitro-glycerin samples, taken
from his father’s parked car in Rhyl, were obtained illegally by police - in order to
22record a positive trace of gelignite - all but decided Williams’ next course of action.
Nevertheless, it is necessary at this juncture to more fully consider the beguiling 
witness statement given to police by John Gwilym Jones; certainly when viewed 
through the lens of its impact on the liberty of Owain Williams. Crucially, Saighton 
Barracks in Cheshire (the alleged site of a proposed arms raid and John Jenkins’ place 
of employment) as mentioned by J. G. Jones, is a specific location; some 90 miles 
from Owain Williams’ former home on the Llyn Peninsula. If contemporary opinion 
is accepted,23 it seems abstruse that police did not probe more deeply into how such 
intimate knowledge was acquired by Williams. Jones’ statement followed a number 
of high-profile explosions in Wales, surely such information warranted at least a 
nominal degree of further investigation; if only to determine if being fed from a 
sympathetic ‘inside’ source. However, the belief that police failed to follow-up this 
line of inquiry is dismissed as lacking credibility by Raymond Kendall, a junior 
member of the Shrewsbury office; the police intelligence unit, later assembled to 
ensure the safety of the royal party leading up to and during the investiture period.24
Yet, John Jenkins attests that only once prior to his eventual arrest in 
November 1969 was he questioned at the barracks by investigating officers, and this 
occurred some two months earlier, as police pieced together information being 
received. Interestingly however, the link between Saighton Barracks and militant 
activism at this juncture, was further highlighted in 2009, when a former south Wales
22 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 20 March 2004. Williams was charged with unlawful 
possession of 13 sticks o f gelignite on or about 3 November 1967; unlawful possession o f gelignite 
between 1 and 25 December 1967 and unlawful possession of twelve sticks of gelignite and an 
unknown quantity o f detonators between 25 December 1967 and 6 January 1968. Owain Williams’ 
father’s car was examined by Dr. J. D. Mullen from the North Western Forensic Laboratory, Preston. 
Williams admitted exaggerating the effects of his hunger strike in order to draw sympathy from 
magistrates. Williams’ last appearance in court before absconding was 29 February 1968. TNA, DPP 
2/4471.
23 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 August 2009.
24 Written correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 9 August 2009.
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cell member of MAC revealed a covert IRA team had also during this period 
reconnoitred Saighton Barracks as a possible source for procuring weapons. Having 
gained access to the site with the aid of ‘inside assistance’ the proposal was
25apparently rejected - presumably by the IRA chief of staff - on grounds of security.
However, for all the ‘success’ of the Snowdonia Country Club action, a 
subsequent examination of the episode, most notably the disclosure that Saighton 
Barracks was now on police radar, suggests the earnest security measures 
implemented by John Jenkins may have inadvertently revealed a chink of light. Yet, 
it was not long before an opportunity to re-tighten his grip on the reins of the 
movement revealed itself. Within days of the explosion at Penisaurwaun, the 
director-general of MAC received news that the sale of Venner time switches 
(formerly used by Jenkins in assembling the devices) was being monitored by sales 
assistants and inconspicuous members of Special Branch. The importance of adapting 
an innovative time delaying mechanism, he realized, was paramount to the group’s 
continued ‘progress’. Following a series of prototypes, all fashioned with the aid of 
intricate technical drilling equipment at the Dental Centre at Saighton Barracks, an 
alarm clock time system was finally unveiled. Nonetheless, John Jenkins’ later
0 ftassertion to have personally ‘worked that one out’ conflicts with a police statement 
by senior MAC operative, Frederick Ernest Alders.
Approached by Jenkins to rectify the issue, the ‘problem’, Alders deduced, 
was one of ‘breaking and connecting an electrical circuit, by using a time delay’. 
This, he suggested, could be achieved with the aid of ‘a battery, clock, bell-push and 
bulb’. Having established what was needed, Alders then devised a means of 
producing an effective timing system. This was achieved, by removing the second 
hand from an alarm clock and threading wires through holes drilled in the clock face. 
An explosion could then be effected, when the hour hand made contact with the 
detonator wire. Altogether, Alders added, he and Jenkins assembled ‘eight or nine’ 
such timing devices.27 Crucially, Jenkins stated in 2007, prior to connecting the 
charge, a means of testing whether the circuit was functional was also devised. This,
25 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009. Saighton Barracks was at this juncture ‘open’, with 
little, if  any, security measures in place. Asked if  the IRA personnel had included Sean MacStiofain, 
the interviewee replied: ‘Definitely not him. Well, not to my knowledge’.
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. At this juncture, retail outlets such as 
Woolworth’s sold Venner time switches. A similar mechanism could also be obtained from those lamp 
posts not yet upgraded by Electricity Boards.
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‘fail safety device’, operated by way of first inserting a light bulb rather than the 
detonator. If the circuit was operational, the light would activate. Therefore assured 
the connection was ‘there’, the explosives could then be ‘plugged in’.
Apparently flushed with the success of their enterprise, Jenkins and Alders 
now sought to remedy another problem: the movement’s all but depleted source of 
gelignite. Having ‘plenty of detonators’, on 23 January 1968, the two men raided the 
explosives magazine at Hafod Quarry near Wrexham. This single acquisition - ‘some 
lA of a ton’ of materials - enabled the organization ‘to carry on’ until their ultimate 
detection nearly two years later. Jenkins later confirmed the operation was aided with 
‘inside’ help, adding that an employee at the site provided both a map of the 
magazines’ location and relayed information regarding its security. Namely, that 
when opened, the door to the explosive’s stores activated an alarm, which both 
flashed and sounded in the quarry’s main office. To obviate the problem, Jenkins 
declared, the ‘sleeper’ placed a rubber band between the circuit’s contact points. This 
prevented the hammer striking the circuit, thus activating the alarm. Armed in the 
belief this information would prevent their detection, Jenkins and Alders gained 
access by breaking the door. They then relieved the magazine of much of its contents. 
Following the raid, the sympathetic employee returned and removed the rubber band. 
Jenkins had remained confident such ‘inside information’ would withstand the likely 
strenuous probing by police. ‘The miners of Rhos’, he stated emphatically, ‘were not 
known for their pro-police activities’. Investigating officers, he felt assured ‘would
JQ
not have got much sense out of them, particularly in a matter like this’.
Yet, statements stored at the National Archives, suggest a conflicting version 
of events. Frederick Ernest Alders maintained he and Jenkins scaled a perimeter wall 
surrounding the explosives store and attempted to force open the steel door ‘with a 
crowbar, hammer and chisel’. Having failed in their endeavours, Jenkins then placed 
a detonator between the door and its frame. It was inserted near the point of the lock; 
the location of which, the two men had partly prized open. Frustrated with the 
detonators’ lack of success, the door was eventually accessed, by ‘applying leverage’ 
and a gradual inch by inch ‘working of the lock’. Having gained entry, they were 
greeted with sight of the alarm system. Fearful police had been aroused, Alders 
alleged he and Jenkins retreated ‘for about half-an-hour’ until convinced their entry to
27 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement Frederick Ernest Alders. Exhibit 132.
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the store had gone unnoticed. They then returned and loaded into the back of Alders’ 
car, ‘about eight boxes of explosives’. The haul was immediately taken to Saighton 
Barracks, where it was placed in the dark room within the Dental Centre. It was a 
store room to which, ordinarily, only Jenkins had access.
Also questioned following the raid was Hafod Quarry employee William 
Roberts, who at 12.35 the following afternoon discovered the break-in. Contrary to 
John Jenkins’ claim that some 2501bs of explosives were taken, Roberts recorded that 
‘100 lbs of Polar Ajaz and 50 lbs of Dynagex explosives’ were unaccounted for. The
•3 i
total cost of the haul was £14.3.4d. On returning to Wrexham, Frederick Ernest 
Alders - in what retrospectively appears a breathtaking disclosure and breach of 
security - allegedly informed his partner and confidante, Ann Woodgate, of the theft.
The question of both the security measures exercised and the notable disparity 
surrounding the recollection of events requires further comment. It is perhaps 
inevitable that conflict should arise when numerous police witness statements are 
accessed. For example - and somewhat intriguingly - Frederick Ernest Alders appears 
to have been kept in the dark as to some of the operation’s finer details. Having 
admitted to police that Jenkins informed him of having received a map bearing the 
location of the Hafod magazine from a colliery worker, Alders denied knowledge of 
the disengaged alarm system. This, police alleged, was revealed by Gordon Wyn 
Jones, who crucially, later appeared in their inquiry.33 Asked to throw light on the 
discrepancy, John Jenkins remained adamant the security alarm system had indeed 
been de-mobilized, adding it was possible that Alders was either protecting the 
individual concerned, or had not been party to this information.34
Nevertheless, other than MAC’s on-going ‘success’, Frederick Ernest Alders 
had another reason to celebrate in January 1968. That month, he and Ann Woodgate 
were engaged. It was a development which some in the Welsh militant community - 
most notably Owain Williams - believe had far-reaching detrimental consequences for 
the militant campaign. Yet, whether burdened with the added responsibility of
28
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
29
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders. Exhibit 132.
30
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
31 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by William Elwyn Jones Roberts.
32 TNA, ASS 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969.
33 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement Frederick Ernest Alders. Exhibit 132.
34 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 February 2009.
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preparing for married life, increasingly concerned by his involvement in MAC, or 
frustrated by the loss of his perceived ‘freedom’, the decision to advance their 
relationship appears have acted as the catalyst for change in Alders’ temperament. 
Shortly after the announcement, Woodgate later informed police, the attitude of the 
man she referred to as ‘Ernie’ changed towards her and he gradually became ‘more 
moody’.35
However, whatever the truth surrounding these events, unknown to John 
Jenkins, the week before the break-in at Hafod Quarry, the scheduled meeting of chief 
constables in Wales - and other interested parties - had gone ahead. A letter from 
Philip Allen at the Home Office to Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet Office, 
outlined its outcome. A ‘sharp increase’ in the monitoring of known Welsh 
extremists had been proposed. To this end, John Parkman, the head of Cardiff 
Regional Crime Squad, was to continue to coordinate ‘a special unit’ assembled to 
collect and collate intelligence. This team was to be headed by an inspector, 
employed in this capacity on a full-time basis. Within each of the Welsh police 
forces, one officer was to be deployed - also on a full time basis - to sift through 
intelligence received at local level. Others assigned to ‘closely’ monitor events were 
the security services and the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. Assigned to act as a 
liaison officer between all concerned, was Eric St. Johnston, the Chief Inspector of
•j/:
Constabulary. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, was soon informed of developments 
by Sir Burke Trend; who, assured matters were in hand, proposed a meeting be held 
‘in a few months’ to review the position.37 Nonetheless, both the lack of urgency and 
Burke Trends’ perceived circumnavigation of the Home Office did not go unnoticed 
by Downing Street civil servants. In response to Trends’ memo, the Prime Minister 
was reminded that responsibility of the investiture lay within the authoritative remit of 
the Home Secretary. As such, it was ‘important’ that ‘responsibility should properly 
lie and be seen to lie with him’. Moreover, in a further note of caution, if ‘anything 
were to go wrong’, Wilson was warned, the Home Secretary might ‘possibly take the
35 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement from Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969. The engagement 
and relationship lasted until January 1969.
36 TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from Philip Allen to Burke Trend, 26 February 1968. The meeting was
held on 18 January 1968.
37 TNA, CAB 164/389. Memorandum from cabinet secretary Burke Trend, to Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson, 28 February 1968.
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line’ the Prime Minister had ‘assumed responsibility’ for security arrangements.
Senior Downing Street mandarins were not alone in feeling matters were not 
moving quickly enough. In Parliament, on 15 February, James Callaghan, the newly 
appointed Home Secretary, was asked by the Conservative MP for Hereford, David 
Gibson Watt, if  the police inquiry into the explosion at the Temple of Peace had 
resulted in criminal proceedings being taken against any individual. No action, 
Callaghan conceded, had yet been taken.39 It was not the only embarrassment for the 
authorities. A £30,000 appeal to finance renovations at the bomb damaged Temple of 
Peace also proved less than forthcoming. Despite the nation being ‘appalled by the 
wanton act of destruction’, two months after the appeal was launched, just £555 had 
been raised, mainly from industry.40 The nation’s outrage did not extend so far as to 
meet the cost of repairs it seemed.
During the evening of 1 March 1968 - arguably the most influential and cardinal date 
in the combative struggle in Wales - Owain Williams met John Jenkins at 
Loggerheads in north Wales. It was between two performances given by Jenkins’ 
military band to celebrate Saint David’s Day. There, Williams informed MAC’s 
director-general of his intention to abscond the following day.41 Yet, for all the 
apparent cordiality of the conference, it is a meeting enveloped in much conjecture 
and which more recently, has led to a degree of tension between the two men. This is 
owing to the fact that Jenkins attends this meeting led to his arrest 20 months later 42 
It is a claim robustly challenged by Williams 43 However, the ramifications of the 
incident were yet to be felt, as six days later, Owain Williams failed to report to 
Caernarfon Assizes to face the charges against him. Magistrates responded to 
Williams’ absence by issuing a warrant for his arrest and instructing police forces 
throughout Wales to receive notice of his description.44 Unknown to the nation’s law 
enforcement agencies, Williams was in Brittany, where just days before he was
TNA, PREM 13/2903. Internal Downing Street memorandum to Harold Wilson, 1 March 1968. At
the 1911 investiture, 20,000 troops and 2,000 police officers were deployed.
39 Hansard, vol 758, c400W. 15 February 1968. James Callaghan was appointed Home Secretary, 30 
November 1967.
40 WM, 13 January 1968; also WM, 7 March 1968.
4] Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
42 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
43 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 20 March 2004.
44 WM, 7 March 1968.
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welcomed by the newly established FLB. In 2004, Owain Williams explained that 
while attempting to avoid detection or arouse suspicion, he journeyed by train from 
north Wales to London. There he took another train to Newport and the south west of 
England, from where he caught the ferry to Cherbourg.45 At this juncture, Harri 
Webb, the Plaid Cymru activist and covert MAC policy advisor, was in talks with the 
Breton movement as to possible collusion between itself and Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru. Following a series of proposals as to how this might be advanced however, 
all militant co-operation suggested was vetoed by John Jenkins on the grounds of 
security.46 Nevertheless, in 2009, Owain Williams denied that Harri Webb had acted 
as the liaison between himself and the Front for the Liberation of Brittany.47
With Williams’ disappearance deemed a mystery, a fortnight later, during the 
early hours of Sunday, 24 March, a 101b bomb exploded at an office of the Inland 
Revenue in Llanishen, Cardiff. The blast was heard half-a-mile away at Llanishen 
police station, from where, officers arrived within minutes to find debris and 
documents strewn across the area. Outraged by the explosion was the constituent MP, 
Ted Rowlands. This, he remarked, perfectly capturing the sense of anger apparently
48felt by many across Wales, was ‘Cardiff, not Chicago’. Quick to add its voice in 
condemning the action was the Western Mail. Such a ‘distorting effect’ on the 
climate of Welsh politics, it declared, undermined all legitimate political pressure to 
see further power devolved to Cardiff; while moreover, it raised doubt as to the 
nations’ readiness to assume such responsibility.49 Yet, the very fact that militant 
nationalists were engaged in a campaign of direct action owing to what they 
considered the ‘distorting effect’ of the centralist political agenda toward Wales, 
appeared to escape the nation’s ‘national newspaper’.50
Used for the first time in the explosion, was one of the timing devices recently 
assembled by Frederick Ernest Alders and John Jenkins. Both Jenkins and Alders 
reconnoitred the site some weeks before. It was a journey to south Wales, the two
45 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 20 March 2004. On the train to London, Williams 
recognized a man from north Wales, who approached him to engage in conversation. Williams
implored him not to mention having seen him. This, Williams added, he proceeded to do.46
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also 20 November 2008.
47 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 7 April 2009. The Front for the Liberation of 
Brittany was formed in 1967.
48 WM, 25 March 1968; also TNA, DPP 2/5976.
50 Ib id 'Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 11 April 2009.
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men undertook ‘three or four times’ over the coming months.51 John Jenkins later 
claimed he and Alders drove alone one Saturday morning from his mother’s home at 
Aberfan, where they had stayed the previous night, to the Cardiff home of Anthony 
John Hiscocks, an insubordinate in the Dental Corps based with Jenkins at Saighton 
Barracks, Cheshire. Moreover, living two miles from Jenkins in Wrexham, the two 
men and their wives, Jenkins revealed, had often socialized together. Crucially, both 
Hiscocks and Jenkins soon identified common ground. In particular, a shared belief 
that only through armed insurrection could Wales be granted Home Rule. 
Furthermore, he shared Jenkins’ angry despair for Aberfan. This proved not the only 
music to the ears of John Jenkins. He also learned that prior to joining the Army 
Dental Corps, Hiscocks was employed at the tax office in Llanishen; the site of which 
was a mere stone’s throw from his parent’s Cardiff home.52
Nonetheless, in a statement to police, Alders suggests another series of events. 
Namely, that he and Jenkins collected - in his van - another man from ‘a village 
outside’ the Welsh capital. The three then travelled to Llanishen and the home of 
Hiscocks.53 Having there established the tax office was not subject to security patrols 
at the weekend, the four men, if Alders’ later testimony is to be believed, travelled the 
short distance to the rear of the premises. There, they parked the van and with Jenkins 
and Hiscocks leading the way, they walked across the undeveloped field to the tax 
offices’ perimeter fence. Having discounted accessing the site via this direction, 
Hiscocks suggested the group drive through the main gates and, while utilizing Ann 
Woodgate’s L plates which adorned the vehicle, purport to be engaged in a driving 
lesson. As learner drivers in the area made use of the premises for such a purpose, 
Hiscocks assured the party it would not arouse suspicion. As Alders practiced a series 
of vehicle manoeuvres, Hiscocks pointed out the Nissan hut in which he had worked 
prior to enlisting in the army. Having assured Jenkins the hut contained tax files, the 
party exited, dropping off first Hiscocks and then the fourth unidentified man.54
In 2008, a former south Wales MAC activist during the period of the group’s
51 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders. Exhibit 132. Alders 
later informed investigating officers that as the explosion dominated radio and television news 
bulletins, Jenkins impassively informed his junior insurgent the device had been ‘one o f ours’.
52 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; 20 November 2008 
and 11 April 2009.
53 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders.
54 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders. Alders stated that the 
reconnoitre had taken place ‘at the end of February’. Moreover, at the home o f the unidentified fourth
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inception, and crucially, prior to John Jenkins operational directorship, revealed 
Trefor Beasley - later identified as being involved in the explosion at the Clywedog 
reservoir site in March 1966 - to be the enigmatic ‘fourth man’. It was he, the source 
revealed, who both travelled with Alders and Jenkins to the home of Hiscocks; and 
Beasley who then perpetrated the operation.55 Nevertheless, it is a claim both 
stringently and routinely denied by John Jenkins; who further rejected the suggestion 
that he, Alders or Hiscocks, were responsible in later planting the device. As director- 
general of MAC, Jenkins - in visiting the site - ensured his unassailable authority and 
‘rubber stamped’ the tax office as a ‘legitimate target’. Only having first deemed the 
target ‘viable’, had Jenkins handed over the explosive device.
John Jenkins revealed the explosion was undertaken by a south Wales active 
unit; one of whom gained access via an open window. The device - concealed in a 
rucksack - was then placed against an interior door. The window was not left 
deliberately unsecured in readiness for the strike, Jenkins added; but information 
received that - for what was assumed to be reasons of ventilation - a window at the 
rear of the hut was frequently kept ‘slightly ajar’, had been capitalized upon. This 
vital segment of information had been received from an employee, Jenkins stated, 
although not one connected with the attack. It did however, he continued, ‘accurately 
reflect the degree of intelligence’ that MAC was receiving at this juncture. The date 
of the strike was also significant, Jenkins revealed, as it was timed to coincide with 
the Wales/France Five Nations rugby international; at 2.00 a.m. (the time of the 
bomb’s activation) Jenkins added capriciously, officers would finally be settling down 
after one of the busiest dates in the Cardiff police’ calendar. Moreover, it would 
provide the MAC operatives responsible both ‘a good alibi’ and an opportunity to 
utilize the bustling city streets to make their escape.56 Yet, in conjunction with other 
discrepancies surrounding the MAC offensive, this factor was later denied by 
Frederick Ernest Alders as prefatorily reached, but rather, an aspect of the operation 
which Jenkins only mentioned in retrospect.57
Asked whether her husband supported the combative struggle, retired school
man, a lady had answered the door who appeared by her manner ‘to know Jenkins’.
Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009. The two south Wales men had also reconnoitred the 
site alone, with only Beasley then allegedly involved in planting the device.
56 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; 20 November 2008;
11 April 2009 & 10 July 2009.
57 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders.
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teacher Eileen Beasley affirmed her husband ‘believed in taking action’. Had this 
included his personal involvement in militant activity, she was asked. It was a point,
CO
Eileen Beasley felt unable to clarify. Yet, an indication of the true extent of Trefor 
Beasley’s contribution to the militant campaign, was later given added clarity by John 
Jenkins, who confirmed that Beasley had acted as the group’s south Wales Quarter 
Master. This extended to his having information and immediate control of the buried 
arms dump ‘in woodland near his home in the Pontypridd area’. It was one of ‘three 
or four’ underground depots, containing - ‘in a safe condition’ - the explosives and 
materials buried across Wales. Crucially however, both knowledge of a particular 
location and the authority to remove its stores, had resided strictly and solely with 
John Jenkins. Trefor Beasley had not been party to the Llanishen Tax Office strike, or 
indeed, any impending action; moreover, Jenkins added emphatically, he knew ‘better 
than to ask’. Having first called at Beasley’s home prior to ‘collecting the necessary 
material’, information as to why was neither sought nor offered. The whole structure, 
the former operational commander of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru concluded, ‘was run 
on the lines’ that ‘the fewer’ those informed ‘the better’. It was why, he declared 
trenchantly, ‘we lasted so long’.59
As for Anthony John Hiscocks, the once self-confessed ‘fiery patriot’, he later 
shed light on the Llanishen action, in statements made to police after Jenkins was 
arrested. Whether in an attempt to save his own skin, or by way of candid 
assessment, Hiscocks claimed that John Jenkins was ‘a fanatic’, with both political 
views tangential to his own and from whom he had endeavoured to distance himself 
by way of a requested camp transfer. The damning disclosure assured him few 
friends in the militant community. Particularly when it was further revealed that 
Hiscocks had relocated to the first of a number of subsequent camps in England, a full 
thirteen months before the Llanishen Tax office strike.
Yet, Hiscocks was not finished there. He further stated the mysterious fourth 
passenger in Alders’ van had revealed his wife to be ‘a teacher’, thus implicating 
Trefor Beasley. Furthermore, that Jenkins had instructed him to surreptitiously 
ascertain - through conversation with pub regulars - the security arrangements and 
number of personnel employed at the nearby water pumping station in Huntington,
58
Interview between WT & Eileen Beasley, 20 January 2009.
59 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; 20 November 2008; also, telephone
interview, 21 January 2009.
209
Cheshire. Also, that Jenkins endeavoured to get representation from the Free Wales 
Army to view a scaled model of the Huntington site, in order to detect its most 
vulnerable point; this with the aim of severing the water supply to Liverpool. 
Moreover, that a series of trips to the site had been undertaken by Jenkins, himself 
and a certain John Humphries, who despite not being regular army personnel, often 
visited Jenkins at the Dental Centre at Saighton Barracks. Also, having reconnoitred 
a building containing the generator at the Huntington site, Jenkins had declared it ‘an 
easy place to knock over’. Furthermore, Hiscocks claimed that Jenkins had confessed 
to almost being apprehended, when police, having allegedly received information of 
buried gelignite and a description of a white Cortina, believed it might in fact be 
Jenkins’ white Ford Taunus. In addition, Hiscosks said that a car he hired had been 
loaned to Jenkins in order for him and John Humphries to visit a farm on Lleyn 
named ‘Guinness’. It was regarding ‘activities’ involving the FWA. Yet, and perhaps 
most accusatory of all, Hiscocks alleged that Jenkins attempted to reveal the workings 
of a timing device and had also instructed Hiscocks to be mindful of the word MAC 
should Jenkins contact him by telephone. This, Hiscocks was led to believe, was in 
order to demand a response as to whether the ability existed for the two men ‘to talk 
freely’ with regard the militant campaign.60
Needless to say, Hiscocks’ somewhat evocative testimony was later greeted 
with palpable unease and disappointment by those in the militant fraternity.61 
Nonetheless, if  Jenkins himself harboured any annoyance toward his former 
underling, he masked its symptoms well. In 2008, when discussing these events, 
Jenkins greeted news of Hiscocks’ revelations with typical sang froid. Three pieces 
of evidence demanded consideration, he declared. First, at the time of the Llanishen 
action, Hiscocks more than passed the Jenkins litmus test. He had, through articulate 
and reasoned debate, met the criteria deemed necessary to enter the elusive ranks of 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru; albeit as a ‘fellow traveller’ rather than bona fide member
60 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement given by Anthony John Hiscocks, 16 December 1969. The 
Llanishen tax office action was the only time Hiscocks was involved in the militant campaign and this 
solely owing to his ‘inside knowledge’, confirmed John Jenkins. Hiscocks, Jenkins added, had 
certainly not gone through the same process o f determination as had Alders. During a reconnoitre o f  
the Huntington site, Jenkins and Alders were nearly apprehended when a police patrol car arrived as 
they walked across an approaching field. Dropping ‘immediately to the ground’, an ‘uncomfortable 
three hours was spent face-down’ in the increasingly dank grass. The plan to target the site was later 
abandoned. Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, TNA, ASS 84/577. 
Witness statement Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969.
61 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009.
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of the group. Moreover, Hiscocks’ subsequent expose occurred when the supreme 
commander of MAC was already arrested and facing almost certain conviction. Any 
attempt to ensure his own liberty had surely to be acknowledged and understood. 
Finally, much of the so-called disclosure, Jenkins suspected, was fabricated by 
Hiscocks ‘at the behest’ of investigating officers. This assumption, he remarked, 
being based on the fact that much of Hiscocks’ testimony was entirely without 
foundation. Such as, the apparent early inclusion of Jenkins’ car in the police inquiry 
and the additional claim that two boxes marked ‘gelignite’ were in Alders’ van. 
Yet, whatever the truth surrounding Hiscocks’ witness statement, not all shared 
Jenkins’ charitable quantification; particularly when it further emerged that 
Hiscocks, in the court-room at Ruabon Magistrates, positively identified Frederick 
Ernest Alders as having driven to Llanishen Tax Office.64
However, by drawing attention to the timing of Hiscocks’ disclosure to 
investigating officers, Jenkins’ assertion - that only following his arrest did those 
linked to him impart information - holds water. Certainly when papers stored at the 
National Archives are scrutinized. Yet, what is not so transparent, is how and when 
those subsequently interviewed entered the inquiry? Were these statements given 
voluntarily, in a possible attempt to pre-empt an approach by police? Or were these 
individuals contacted by investigating officers, following discussion with Alders and 
most notably, Ann Woodgate, each of whom later provided officers with statements 
which proved paramount in Jenkins’ conviction. One factor which is certainly 
supported by available evidence at the National Archives, is that John Jenkins 
divulged nothing of the campaign during police questioning.
Nevertheless, why such little contemporaneous information reached the ears of 
investigating officers may be more complicated than perhaps first realized, with what 
Jenkins elusively terming ‘the threat of sanctions’ holding the key. John Jenkins 
offered the case of Anthony John Hiscocks by way of example. Hiscocks, Jenkins 
explained, was married: a situation immediately recognized by the director-general of
62 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 29 December 2008, also, 14 January 2009. Asked to throw 
light on the identity o f John Humphries, as mentioned by Hiscocks, Jenkins replied he was not in 
MAC, but a friend in the TA. Jenkins also confirmed he and Humphries had visited Owain Williams at 
his farm Guinis on Lleyn, but he and Williams had communicated in double entendres. Humphries, 
Jenkins felt assured, ‘would not have known the content o f their conversation’. The journey was 
undertaken ‘about a year before investiture’, Jenkins added. From then on things ‘became really tight’.
Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009.
64
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement given by Anthony John Hiscocks, 16 December 1969.
211
MAC as advantageous; as those in such a position had ‘more to lose’ should their 
involvement in the campaign be identified. Furthermore however, such a predicament 
shifted the balance of power between Jenkins and the individual firmly in Jenkins’ 
direction, in that ‘a subtle degree of pressure’ could - if necessary - be exerted. This 
‘pressure’ taking the form of a prior, mutual understanding of the home location of an 
operative’s family, Jenkins proclaimed; although at pains to further establish that such 
an implied threat existed only if a ‘worst case scenario’ of disclosure appeared 
imminent. As it transpired, Jenkins added genially, such a course of action was never 
called upon to be exercised. Nonetheless, such recognition of the apparent milieu, 
Jenkins believed, no doubt ‘helped someone be a bit circumspect about any double- 
crossing they might want to do’.65 Suffice to say, security amid the group appeared 
water-tight; an ipso facto , later identified by Raymond Kendall, a member of the 
hand-picked police Shrewsbury unit, as instrumental in ensuring the group’s 
longevity.66
Yet, what was also conspicuous by its absence at this juncture, was an 
assurance by Home Secretary James Callaghan, that those responsible for the 
Llanishen Tax Office strike, the most recent ‘deplorable and wanton act of violence’, 
would be quickly brought to book.67 The lack of success in pursuing the bombers, 
was now an aching source of frustration for both the police and the government; and 
for each, certainly within circles on the periphery of society - such as anarchist groups 
- an increasing cause for ridicule.
MAC gives a press conference
The news of another bomb blast in Wales was greeted with palpable alarm in 
Whitehall and the government looked for ways to stem the rise of Welsh nationalism. 
One solution was to replace Cledwyn Hughes, who was sympathetic to nationalist 
aspirations, with George Thomas, the Cardiff West MP, who was not, but sought 
promotion. Speaking in 2000, William Edwards, the former Labour MP for
Hiscocks positively identified Alders on 28 November 1969.
65 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 29 December 2008, 14 January 2009 & 14 March 2009. 
Ann Woodgate claimed that both she and Thelma Jenkins were threatened with ‘sanctions’ should they 
divulge any operational information heard spoken by Jenkins or Alders. Each were routinely warned 
‘someone would get us’. TNA, ASSI 84/577. Ann Woodgate witness statement 15 December 1969.
66 Written correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 8 August 2009.
67 HC Deb, 28 March 1968. Hansard vol. 761, cc 310-1W. Statement in the House of Commons by 
James Callaghan in response to a written question by Labour Cardiff North MP, Ted Rowlands.
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Meirionnydd, declared Thomas ‘a nasty piece of work’. His ‘story telling to Wilson 
that Cledwyn Hughes was pandering to nationalism’ was designed with calculation; 
so too, his fevered oratory in which he ranted his desire ‘to release the dogs of war’ on
/TO
nationalists. Whatever the background circumstances, on 5 April 1968, George 
Thomas was appointed Secretary of State for Wales.69 It was a decision greeted with
70support by the Western Mail and Liverpool Daily Post, who each believed the 
plodding parliamentary approach of the albeit ‘respected’ Cledwyn Hughes had run its 
course. A more dynamic, scintillating and dogmatic advance was needed they 
attested; and George Thomas, they confidently declared, fitted the bill.
Nevertheless, the newly appointed government minister made a faltering start. 
In a television interview to announce his arrival to the nation, Thomas resolutely 
declared his belief ‘the period of violence’ had ended.71 If Thomas’ imprudence 
registered on the radar of the state, so too did it blink menacingly upon the screens of 
the south Wales cell of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, who now determined the 
government minister should eat his words.
On 2 May 1968, just weeks after nouveau arrive George Thomas was
79informed by Harold Wilson he would forthwith be responsible for the investiture, 
three members of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru emerged briefly from behind the 
group’s smokescreen of anonymous subterfuge. In an interview with three journalists 
- Ian Skidmore, Emyr Jones and Harold Pendlebury - the incognito John Jenkins 
anatomized a political creed which sought to galvanize the Welsh electorate into 
recognizing its need for greater political autonomy. For those unable to fathom what 
fuelled Welsh militant action, it was a reactionary force, Jenkins declared, borne of 
desperate outrage for the disaster at Aberfan and Wales’ subjugated position within
7 '3
the union of British nations.
68 MI5 ABER A ’R ARWISGO. Cambrensis Production. Screened S4C, July 2000. Thomas regarded 
Hughes’ Welsh version o f Labourism to be ‘sheer treason’. Richard Crossman, The Diaries o f  a 
Cabinet Minister, Vol.2, 1966-8. (London, 1976), p.771.
69 WM, 6 April 1968.
70
WM, 6 April 1968; also, LDP, 6 April 1968. Also telephone interview between WT & John
Humphries, former editor o f Western Mail, 10 November 2008.
71 Sunday Telegraph Supplement, 6 September 1968.
72 George Thomas, Mr. Speaker (London, 1985), p.l 15. G. Thomas later conceded that at this juncture, 
he envisaged no ‘problems’, believing the investiture process would prove ‘a very pleasant occasion’.
Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Timewatch Production. Screened July 2009.
73 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008. At this juncture, Ian Skidmore 
operated on a freelance basis; Emyr Jones was employed by the Wrexham Leader and Harold 
Pendlebury by the Daily Mail.
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In 2004, John Jenkins revealed that the press conference was designed to cultivate the 
belief that should the investiture go ahead, ‘the safety of the prince could not be 
guaranteed’. The threat had no substance, Jenkins admitted, adding ‘could you 
imagine the reaction from the mothers of Wales?’. Indeed, Jenkins had soon 
recognized that any degree of militant activity which remotely threatened the safety of 
both the prince and the royal party, would prove hugely ‘counter-productive’ in 
political terms. Rather, Jenkins added crucially, ‘the idea was to send a signal to the 
authorities - via the journalists - that a threat nevertheless did exist’. MAC may have 
‘secretly lacked’ the intention to harm Prince Charles, but nonetheless, Jenkins 
wanted it understood it had the ‘means’ and was ‘willing and able’ to do so. Further 
in line with MAC strategy, it was hoped this information would lead to an 
overreaction from the authorities: both in the build up to the investiture and on 
investiture day itself; turning Wales into what Jenkins hoped would resemble to ‘an 
armed camp’. However, he also conceded that not all within the groups elusive ‘inner 
circle’ had considered ‘restrained action’ appropriate, with such persons, in contrast to 
the director-general, regarding a combative attack on the prince as entirely ‘justified’.
Nevertheless, it was necessary for MAC, comprising for the occasion: John 
Jenkins, Frederick Ernest Alders and Alders’ step brother, John Roberts, to convince 
the journalists that those before them were indeed responsible for the militant 
campaign; and this had been established, Jenkins revealed, through disclosing hitherto 
unreported factors surrounding the wider bombing operation, such as, ‘a cream 
coloured alarm clock was used as the timing mechanism during the Llanishen Tax 
Office action’.74 The official police record regarding the quantity of explosives 
removed from the magazine at Hafod Quarry some three months earlier was also 
highlighted. ‘You see’, Jenkins continued, ‘media sources greatly underestimated 
how much was taken. The figure we gave the journalists precisely matched that stated 
in the undisclosed police report’; the contents of which, Jenkins had come by through 
one of the two ‘friendly contacts’ within the north Wales police service. With Jenkins 
hoping the journalists would publish the true figure, its corroboration by police 
officers, he realised, would then be made. This, he predicted, would set alarm bells 
ringing through the corridors of power, by confirming the fears of Special Branch,
74 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; 20 November 2008 
& 21 January 2009. Jenkins wanted to convey to the journalists that MAC was ‘a fully-fledged militant 
organisation’. TNA, ASSI, 84/577. Witness statement by Harold Pendlebury 5 December 1969; also,
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that Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru was being fed invaluable information from at least 
one enigmatic source within the Welsh police force. The intention of which, Jenkins 
declared ruefully, he gleefully sought. These fraternal ‘contacts’ had not been 
personally known to him, Jenkins stated, but rather the information was relayed via a
nc
MAC sympathiser known to the officers.
However, having established why the meeting was convened, it is important at 
this juncture to establish how the conference came to be held. In a police witness 
statement, compiled a month after Jenkins’ and Frederick Ernest Alders’ arrest, John 
Richard Lewis Roberts (Alders’ step-brother) outlined his involvement in the ‘event’,
76later described by Sir Tasker Watkins QC, as ‘almost strange and rather macabre’. 
Having been instructed by John Jenkins to collect and transport Emyr Jones from a 
Wrexham address to Chester, John Roberts then drove to Picton Hall.77 Some three 
miles north-east of Chester, it was to be the venue of the meeting and was crucially 
the manorial home of Ian Skidmore; who later explained that Emyr Jones had met him 
and Harold Pendlebury at the Talbot Hotel in the city. In due course, Jones had taken 
a telephone call, following which, he had informed his contemporaries they were to
no
make their way to Picton Hall.
Having been instructed by Jenkins to adopt a ‘business like’ demeanour, the 
balaclavad John Roberts and Frederick Ernest Alders greeted the journalists on their 
arrival by instructing them to ‘get out’ of the car and handover the keys. They then 
escorted the expectant journalists into the house. In the drawing room they were 
searched and asked to remove the contents of their pockets. This they did, placing 
keys, cigarettes and lighters on a table. Following a thorough search of the house, a 
call was put through to a telephone box in nearby Mickle Trafford. Some moments 
later, a car was heard in the drive and a man - later identified as John Jenkins - entered 
the room. The meeting, by the meagre light of a down-turned reading lamp, was then 
convened. Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, the men were told, represented a complete 
cross-section of the community. It was governed by a ‘Supreme Council of five and 
an Executive Committee of three’. The man before them, he announced, was the
Ian Skidmore, 17 December 1969.
75 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; 20 November 2008 & 21 January 2009. 
Interestingly, the figure stated in the official police report was ‘itself inaccurate’ Jenkins revealed. It 
too under-recorded the amount o f  gelignite removed by some 100 lbs.
76 WM, 9 April 1970; also, telephone interview between WT & Sir Tasker Watkins, 15 April 2007.
77 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by John Richard Lewis Roberts, 5 December 1969.
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group’s ‘Director of Operations’. Asked to crystallize the movement’s raison d ’etre, 
it was, the mysterious figure proclaimed: ‘to re-awaken the national conscience of the 
Welsh people’. This it sought to achieve, ‘through propaganda and by action with 
explosives’. Although opposed to violence on the grounds of humanity, the group 
was nonetheless responding to the violence to which the Welsh nation had been 
subjected by a provocative and insidious English-dominated central system of 
government.
Yet, for all its ruthless efficiency, one proposed action was aborted, the 
spokesman announced, owing to the proximity of a targeted water installation to a 
village. The ‘Welsh people’ he discerned, ‘had suffered enough’. It was not the
70group’s intention to subject its people to added misery. The target, Jenkins later 
revealed, was the aqueduct over the village of Cnwclas in Radnorshire. As for 
English inward migration, only those who attempted to integrate into Welsh cultural 
life would be tolerated and considered a non target. Of the other groups in Wales 
similarly campaigning for autonomous Welsh political recognition, the Free Wales 
Army was derided as ‘top of the shit parade’. As for Plaid Cymru, it was chastised 
for being ‘too saintly’. Without an established militant threat to underpin its message, 
y Blaid would achieve nothing; being forever rendered ‘naked’ within the ‘conference 
chamber’. On a more sinister note, the assembled party was informed that within 
MAC there existed an ‘assassination squad’, although the movement did not ‘propose 
wholesale armed insurrection’. Asked about the impending investiture, it was 
sombrely announced that MAC intended to see ‘the bloody fiasco’ cancelled. 
Moreover, should it indeed go ahead, someone within the movement’s ‘lunatic 
fringe’, imbued with ‘patriotic ideals’, might perform a ‘Lee Oswald’, the spokesman 
ominously declared; referring to the tragic events in Dallas in November 1963, when 
President Kennedy was assassinated. It was time, it was chillingly announced, the 
Queen began to consider more responsibly ‘her duties as a mother’. As for the 
decision ‘to send Prince Charles to Aberystwyth University’ to prepare for the 
ceremony, it was, Jenkins attested, ‘the final insult...a mockery...and a nonsense’. 
The English prince was coming to Wales not ‘as its friend’, but rather ‘as a political
78 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008.
79
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Harold Pendlebury 5 December 1969; also, Ian
Skidmore, 17 December 1969.
80 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. It was targeted in 1967 at the start of  
the re-convened MAC campaign, Jenkins confirmed.
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overlord into his inheritance by right of conquest’.
Having discussed former protests, intended targets and outlined the group’s 
objectives, the anonymous Jenkins then concluded the interview with the tantalizing 
declaration that ‘MAC’ was in fact an older, male figure. Moreover, it was he who 
determined directional policy. In 2004, Jenkins confirmed the elusive figure was 
fictitious; merely introduced to propagate a desired mythology. It would, he believe, 
wrong-foot investigating officers into focusing their attention in a single direction, 
having all but confirmed the apparent perceived notion as harboured by Special
Branch, that an elderly eponymous figure-head pulled the movement’s combative
01
strings.
Contrary to speculation that he dismissed the interview as a half-baked 
political diatribe,84 he had, Ian Skidmore later confessed, ‘rather enjoyed’ the 
somewhat ‘bizarre’ four-hour colloquy. As a tenacious journalist, he had considered 
any opportunity to meet Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru as potentially ‘a bloody good 
story’. To this end, he had let it be known through media outlets - primarily in north 
Wales - that should the opportunity arise, he would be ‘thoroughly interested’ in 
speaking with the group. Subsequently approached by Emyr Jones with news MAC 
proposed a news conference, Skidmore had gratefully agreed to attend. Although 
clearly ‘a fanatic’, he had ‘liked Jenkins’, being particularly struck by his verve and 
sincerity. It was quite clear, Skidmore added, ‘they were genuine’. Furthermore, the 
hooded trio had indeed cut a plausibly menacing presence, he conceded. Yet, to a 
man also renowned for his comic dispensation, the occasion had not entirely lacked 
mirth. Forewarned he would receive the ‘ultimate penalty’ (death) should he contact
81 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Harold Pendlebury 5 December 1969; also, Ian Skidmore, 
17 December 1969. ‘Wales’ reportedly ‘cheered the announcement’ that Prince Charles was to spend
the 1969 summer term at UCW Aberystwyth. WM, 2 November 1967; also, Observer, 29 October 
1967; also, TNA, PREM 13/2359. While there, it was intended the prince should study ‘the history, 
language and problems o f Wales’.
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Harold Pendlebury 5 December 1969; also, Ian 
Skidmore, 17 December 1969. Having put the call through to the telephone box in Mickle Trafford, 
Alders declared, ‘OK MAC, move in’. The movement, Jenkins stated, had taken its present form since 
mid-1967. The Tryweryn outrage had inspired the campaign. Yet, the group too closely resembled the 
‘boy scouts’ initially. Moreover, MAC were ‘peaceful men’, as in the way o f ‘an outraged father’. 
Only ‘extreme violence’ would ensure the authorities believed the group ‘meant business’. Jenkins 
dismissed the suggestion MAC received instruction from the IRA. Rather it was MAC whom the IRA 
‘regarded with envy’. O f the MAC actions undertaken, the Penisaurwaun strike was to highlight the 
elevated status o f Welsh cultural life in the face o f the English-inspired ‘Blackpool and Bingo’ influx, 
Jenkins declared.
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; 20 November2008.
84 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009.
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the authorities, Skidmore protested on the grounds of having been ‘threatened with 
violence’ by his wife, but ‘never strangers’ in his ‘own drawing room’. Mildly 
disconcerted, Skidmore, who along with all those present had drunk several glasses of 
wine, asked to be excused to use the toilet. Instructed to accompany him was 
‘Number 1 ’ (Alders). Momentarily realizing that before reaching their destination the 
two men would have first to navigate a glass vestibule in which his sleeping blood 
hound lay, Skidmore - more borne of a desire not to wake the dog than concern - 
nonchalantly advised his custodian ‘to be careful’. Alarmed at the news of the 
slumbering canine, Number 1 nervously enquired as to whether the dog might bite
oc
him. This, Skidmore colourfully proclaimed, was his ‘executioner’.
John Jenkins later claimed that Skidmore and Harold Pendlebury (who was the 
only journalist to take notes during the encounter) had encouraged the hooded figures 
to carry out further actions. Skidmore asserts he ‘encouraged them to talk’ because 
that was his job. They were ‘encouraged to boast and they boasted’. Yet, a certain 
degree of ‘banter’ had ensued, he admitted. Asked by Jenkins what he might like 
‘blowing up’, Skidmore replied the Income Tax Office seemed a reasonable 
proposition. It was a suggestion endorsed by Jenkins, who assured his host the tax
07
office in Chester would be targeted.
Emyr Jones was contacted in the first instance and instructed to liaise with 
Skidmore and Pendlebury, Jenkins revealed, owing to his burgeoning journalistic 
reputation of being ‘professionally sympathetic’ and prepared ‘to give all a fair crack 
of the whip’. Despite the suggestion that an increasingly seasoned and respected 
enquirer would have recognized the value to his own journalistic standing of landing 
such a ‘scoop’, Jenkins further confirmed the approach to Emyr Jones was undertaken 
in the knowledge that other journalists would need to be involved in order to loan the 
occasion a certain authoritative and consultative status.88 Nonetheless, seemingly 
unaware of Jenkins’ mandate, Ian Skidmore is convinced he was contacted by Emyr 
Jones for another reason: namely, ‘there was more money in it’. Owing to its greater 
audience area, inclusion within a national daily newspaper, Skidmore explained,
85 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008.
86 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
87 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008.
88 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 February 2009; also, 19 October 2007 and 20 
November 2008. Emyr Jones was renowned for ‘recognizing there existed more than one side to a 
situation’, Jenkins stated.
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would ensure increased payment when compared to a regional or weekly publication.
As for the veracity of the statement concerning the welfare of Prince Charles, 
it had not concerned him, Skidmore declared. If the interviewee elected to voice as 
much, it was his prerogative. The pronouncement, Skidmore added characteristically, 
‘was a bloody good line’. However, for all the readership potential surrounding the 
piece, a hill detailed feature failed to materialize, as Skidmore was instructed by the 
news editor of the Daily Mail to forward his full transcript to Special Branch. If 
Jenkins had again deftly anticipated the reaction of the authorities to the conference, it 
was nevertheless an episode which had far-reaching consequences for Ian Skidmore. 
To his considerable alarm and displeasure, he was now considered ‘a suspect’ and 
interviewed robustly by officers who steadfastly refused to accept his denial of 
influence within the movement. It resulted in his ‘agency’ of contacts within the 
police and legal profession being decimated and his phone being ‘tapped for at least 
eighteen months’. To add to his woes, failure to see the submitted article published
on
resulted in non-payment for each journalist.
Emyr Jones, the Wrexham Leader journalist, cut an uncomfortable figure 
during the conference; and was ‘upset’ over the lack of money which followed it. 
Both Pendlebury and Skidmore later revealed to investigating officers, that Jones had 
appeared ‘edgy and nervous’ throughout the meeting.90 This, Skidmore later 
disclosed, he attributed to the tone and nature of the interview, adding he felt Jones to 
have been ‘out of his depth’.91 Perhaps so, as Jenkins claims that Emyr Jones was 
subject to ‘black mail and sanctions’. It had been more than pointed out to him what 
would happen ‘should he contravene the agreement and contact the authorities’.92
QQ
Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008; also, TNA, DPP 2/5977. ‘An 
explosion at Picton Hall, Mickle Trafford on 8 May 1968’ is believed by Skidmore to have been carried 
out by MAC in frustrated response to the interview not being published. In 2009, John Jenkins denied
all knowledge o f it. Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 21 January 2009.
90 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Harold Pendlebury 5 December 1969; also, Ian Skidmore,
17 December 1969.
91 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008. In response to the meeting, the 
Home Office announced it was orchestrating ‘the biggest security network ever established in Wales. 
It was to be both the ‘most prolonged personal protection job ever undertaken in Britain’ and was 
intended, by its overwhelming size, to ‘discourage extremists from planning attacks’. Daily Mirror, 31 
July 1968; also, Observer, 6 July 1969. ‘We should do all we can to identify the terrorists, their 
supporters, their sources o f finance’...and (to ensure) the ‘security organisation’ ‘is tightened to the 
Doint o f maximum efficiency’. TNA, PREM 13/2903. PM to Home Secretary, 1 August 1968.
2 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008. The interview 
ensured a vigorous response from the authorities, remarked Jenkins, especially those England-based 
members o f the police and security services. ‘After this interview’, he remarked, ‘they came over in 
their droves’.
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Whatever the cause of Jones’ reticence, his failure to co-operate with investigating 
officers earned him the rebuke of Tasker Watkins QC during the trial of John Jenkins 
and Frederick Ernest Alders some two years later.
Yet, intriguingly, both Emyr Jones’s reservation and ‘upset’ may have been 
fuelled by reasons over and above a lack of financial recompense for the interview. 
Material stored in the National Archives suggests an altogether different reason; and 
moreover, reveal the security measures surrounding the interview may well have 
lacked the stringency later rigorously outlined by John Jenkins. For, not only did 
John Roberts collect Emyr Jones from Wrexham and transport him to the rendezvous 
point in Chester, following the conclusion of the meeting, Roberts later informed 
police, Jones returned to Wrexham in Alders’ van accompanied by Jenkins and 
Alders.94 Asked to reveal why Emyr Jones was not subject to the same degree of 
security imposed upon Skidmore and Pendlebury, John Jenkins conceded the lack of 
protective measures implied sanctions were not considered necessary. Could it 
therefore be deduced that Emyr Jones enjoyed a position of some confidence within 
the group, Jenkins was asked. Having refused to state whether Jones ‘was in MAC or 
not’, it may well, he replied beguilingly ‘have been the case’.95
Whatever the truth regarding Emyr Jones’s involvement in the militant 
campaign, in the weeks after the conference, Frederick Ernest Alders implored Ann 
Woodgate to avoid all acknowledgement with the Wrexham Leader journalist. One 
evening at the cinema in Wrexham, Alders surreptitiously drew Woodgate’s attention 
to the man (Jones) sat some rows before them. He was, Alders informed her, being 
monitored by Special Branch and on no account was she to him engage in 
conversation.96
Nevertheless, whatever the thoughts of central government and the authorities 
concerning the militant offensive, recruitment into the elusive ranks of Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru had not proved difficult, John Jenkins professed; at least not in 
terms of those wanting to join. What had proved somewhat more problematic
93 LDP , 21 April 1970; also, Sir Tasker Watkins private papers.
94
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement o f John Richard Lewis Roberts, 5 December 1969.
95 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 January 2009. A Wrexham journalist 
supported ‘his ideas for obtaining Home Rule for Wales’, John Jenkins allegedly told Gordon Wyn
Jones. TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by G. W. Jones.
96 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Ann Woodgate witness statement 15 December 1969. Asked by Alders if she 
knew Jones, Woodgate stated her employment duties included regular visits to the Wrexham branch o f  
Lloyds Bank, there she had occasionally seen the man she knew to be a journalist on the Wrexham
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however, was discerning if an individual possessed the necessary intellectual and 
emotional attributes. Explaining the process of selection, Jenkins revealed that ‘word 
would filter back’ to him of someone deemed ‘healthy’ in ‘social, cultural and 
economic terms’. After ‘much consideration and deliberation’, the decision would be 
reached as to whether contact should be made with this individual. If so, it occurred 
somewhere they felt ‘comfortable’; for instance, ‘their local pub’. Unaware of his 
status as the director-general of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, Jenkins would then 
engage them in a passionate debate about Wales. He would, he later outlined, ‘play 
the Aunt Sally; the devil’s advocate’ and as such, ensure a reaction. John Jenkins 
wanted ‘to hear what sort of philosophy underpinned their attack’. If their sole 
conceptualism proved emotion based, such as, ‘we’re going to drive them into the 
sea’, he ‘did not want to know’. Rather, Jenkins desired an idealism which ‘burned 
much deeper than that; something with a bit more feeling; more analytical’. Having 
argued them ‘into the ground’, the operational-commander of MAC would gauge 
their response to determine their suitability. Only he, Jenkins stated, was involved in 
the recruitment process to this degree. ‘It was how’, he added, he had recruited ‘all 
those involved; it was the same sort of thing’.97
Nonetheless, it had occasionally, Jenkins admitted, proved a somewhat 
precarious induction strategy, whereby he and the potential target had ‘almost come 
to blows’. Yet, such a response registered positively with Jenkins, who then 
considered their ‘heart to be in the right place’. Left to ponder the verbal altercation, 
MAC’s principle strategist would get ‘back in touch in due course’. What must be 
remembered, Jenkins stressed, was this individual ‘knew nothing about me’. He had 
no knowledge of ‘where I was from, where I lived, or my profession...I’d simply 
said I was passing through on my way somewhere’. Consequently, even had the 
potential recruit been offered a financial incentive, he would have been unable to 
direct the authorities to the haughty, bellicose figure. This approach, John Jenkins 
realized early into his directorship of MAC ‘was the safest, indeed, the only possible 
way that recruitment into the organization could work’. It had to be run on such 
autonomous grounds; a democratic system was perilous. In fact, Jenkins added 
peremptorily, its ‘strength was its weakness’: in that - with no other combatant 
capable nor possessed of the ‘wherewithal to assemble and distribute the devices’ -
Leader.
97 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 May 2009.
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his arrest ensured the demise of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.98 Yet, as the bombing 
campaign intensified, questions were asked as to whether a less scrupled rogue 
element was also ‘in the field’.
However, if  it was decided to proceed, the new addition would be instructed 
‘to remain anonymous’. Moreover, what awaited them, they were informed soberly, 
was ‘either death or imprisonment. There are’, Jenkins added, ‘not many who 
subscribe to that brochure. But there are some; there are always some. And in those 
people lay the future’. A factor which John Jenkins recognized as essential for the 
campaign of combative action to succeed, was the need to position trusted and 
effective units ‘in each comer of Wales’. Those directing operations, ‘could not of 
course be everywhere’, so it was vital there existed individuals who could be 
entrusted to deliver a message, or deliver materials, in order that those instructed 
could undertake a particular action. Nevertheless, had these ‘cell units’ not proved 
susceptible to potential breaches in security, Jenkins was asked. The cell leader - 
whom Jenkins had appointed - would only recruit ‘a very select number: say one or 
two’, Jenkins disclosed; ‘and only those he trusted implicitly’. Such as, close 
personal contacts who had expressed - over a sustained period - similar misgivings 
regarding Wales’ cultural and economic position. Only towards ‘the end of the 
campaign, when things were really bad’, Jenkins conceded, had he ‘cut a few 
comers’. Although at pains to add this breach in the erstwhile ‘water tight’ approach 
to security did not lead to his detection, but rather ‘the comers that somebody else 
cut’. Nonetheless, this lax had only transpired when the matter of orchestrating a 
conflict of militant subterfuge was ‘really getting on top’ of him. Asked to clarify 
when this occurred, Jenkins confessed towards the conclusion of the campaign, when 
he was subjected to ‘degree of pressure’ hitherto and subsequently unprecedented in 
his life.99
Yet, for all John Jenkins’ earnest, if legitimate, pronouncements regarding 
insular cell structures, there are those convinced the MAC campaign - as marshalled 
by Jenkins - comprised only him and David Pritchard. ‘They were acting in tandem’, 
a former prominent figure in the militant struggle declared in 2004: ‘there was 
nobody else; nobody. Simply Jenkins operating in the north and Pritchard in the
98 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
99 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. There was no age restriction of those in 
MAC, stated Jenkins; as long as ‘the necessary criteria was met’. Nonetheless, the ages suggested of
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south’. What is more, Pritchard, he believed, ‘was more responsible than Jenkins in 
many ways’; which if perhaps ‘inaccurate’, was certainly his ‘impression’.100 Asked 
to comment, Pritchard’s former close associate David Walters stated ‘as far’ as he 
was ‘aware, those involved in the Llanishen Tax Office explosion were responsible 
for alV protests undertaken in Cardiff. However, Walters refused to be drawn as to 
whether this cell comprised David Pritchard, Trefor Beasley, Alf Williams and a 
senior figure in the Patriotic Front.101 Claiming not to ‘have a clue’ as to the veracity 
of those suggested, the former General Secretary of the PF, Gethin ap Iestyn, 
moreover refused to confirm his personal involvement.102 Also reticent when 
approached to discuss MAC membership was John Jenkins. To reveal the identity of 
those involved, Jenkins declared, would ‘open the floodgates’. Furthermore, it would 
‘undermine’ his ‘reputation for not being a grass’ and compromise his ‘ability not to 
divulge’. There ‘may well have been’ a degree of overlap between MAC, the 
Patriotic Front and the Free Wales Army, Jenkins remarked, ‘but to what extent’, he 
was not ‘prepared to say’.103
Yet, just how far MAC’S reputation for radical activism had spread, was 
highlighted in the weeks following the press interview, when an unlikely alliance was 
proposed by the then notorious ultra-Marxist German agitator Rudi ‘Red’ Dutschke. 
In London to attend a student political conference, Dutschke eluded his British 
security surveillance team and boarded a train for Swansea. Word soon reached John 
Jenkins that should he agree to Dutschke’s proposals, MAC would be assured almost 
limitless financial assistance from the East German administration to further its 
cause. However, in return, members of MAC would travel to East Germany to 
receive innovative technical instruction. Despite any benefits such a policy might 
exact, it was an approach rejected out of hand by Jenkins. One did not, he later 
postulated, ‘exchange a master in London for one in Moscow’. It was not the only 
disappointment Dutschke experienced on his visit to Britain. On returning to
20-50, was ‘not too wide an age range’.
100 Anonymous interview with WT, August 2004. John Jenkins utterly refuted the assertion that only 
he and David Pritchard were responsible for the bombing campaign. ‘If anyone seriously believes just 
two people could carry out all that lot they need their head examined’, he remarked. Moreover, within 
south Wales was positioned ‘more than one cell’, he declared; adding ‘there was one in the north, 
south, east and west o f Wales’. Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009.
101 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
102
Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009.
103 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 February 2009.
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London, his application for political asylum was rejected and Dutschke deported.104
Nonetheless, Rudi Dutschke was not alone in trying to locate the elusive 
Jenkins. Desperate for a breakthrough, investigating police officers compelled Ian 
Skidmore and Harold Pendlebury to provide any clue as to the identity of the group’s 
enigmatic spokesman. Duty bound to assist, Ian Skidmore informed them that he had 
spoken ‘in a pedantic voice; rather like a schoolmaster; or at least someone used to 
instructing others’. Of ‘medium height’, bearing ‘fair and even features’ and inclined 
to blow smoke rings when emphasizing a point, he had furthermore appeared ‘very 
self-possessed’; being ‘very much in command of the situation’.105 It proved an 
impressive supposition. In 2008, Skidmore was asked to elaborate. Both he and 
Harold Pendlebury, Skidmore remarked, had each deduced the mysterious figure - 
owing the manner in which he conducted himself - must have had ‘a military 
background; perhaps an ex-squaddie’. Nevertheless, he had been astonished to learn 
the accuracy of his conjecture on Jenkins’ arrest. Despite the negative impact on his 
professional efficacy, Skidmore bore Jenkins no ill will; nor indeed did he regret 
becoming embroiled in the controversy. On the contrary, he and Jenkins had 
exchanged ‘friendly nods’ when he later attended Jenkins’ trial.106
John Jenkins however remains unconvinced. His position within Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru - and what the group sought to achieve - had ‘nothing’ to do with 
his ‘military experience’, he protested. Others, he continued, had also incorrectly 
drawn a parallel: citing the use of explosives for example. Yet, he had no experience 
of explosives in the army, nor for that matter had he received instruction concerning 
‘sabotage’ or subversion. The British army, he added sardonically, ‘was the last
1 fi7place’ one would receive such efficacious intelligence. The army had however, 
instilled ‘the usefulness of punctuality, discipline and organization’.108 That said, 
Jenkins added pensively, he was certain these attributes he honed before joining the
104 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004. The approach to MAC by the secret East 
German police, the Stasi, was similar to the patronage of succour and shelter the regime later extended 
to terrorist organizations Bader-Meinhoff and the Red Army Faction. In 1968, Dutschke survived an 
assassination attempt. T. Ali & S. Watkins, 1968: Marching in the Streets (London, 1998), pp.77,78.
105 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Harold Pendlebury 5 December 1969; also, Ian 
Skidmore, 17 December 1969.
106 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008; also, John Jenkins, 20 
November 2008.
107 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
10R
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
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British Army.109
More bombs are planted by MAC
Following the announcement that another Welsh valley was being proposed for 
flooding by an English water authority, 110 on 25 May, the Cardiff cell of Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru made good its vow to clip the wings of the new Secretary of State 
for Wales. At 3.28 a.m. - despite police patrols in the area having been increased 
following the blast at the Temple of Peace six months earlier - an explosion rocked 
the main administrative block of the Welsh Office in Cathays Park, Cardiff. The 
choice of venue - Thomas’s headquarters - did not go unnoticed. The following day, 
the hapless head of Cardiff CID, David Morris, confirmed that six minutes before the 
explosion, police officers at Cardiff central station received a telephone call informing 
them of a ‘shooting’ in another part of the city. It had, the anonymous voice 
exclaimed with austere solemnity, resulted in ‘murder’. Moments after officers were 
hurriedly dispatched to the scene, the device at the Welsh Office activated.
Also speaking in response to the explosion the following day, a furious 
George Thomas declared ‘the nationalists of Wales’ had ‘created a monster’ they 
could ‘not control’.111 If indeed this proved the most effective charge in Thomas’ 
tenure as Minister for Wales, his prodigal reassertion that no plan existed ‘to seek the 
help of Scotland Yard’112 to capture the saboteurs, nonetheless earned him a mild 
rebuke from Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. Apparently alarmed at Thomas’ 
sweeping obduracy, Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, was instructed to quietly 
‘indoctrinate the Secretary of State for Wales’ as to the ‘activities of the police and 
security services’ deployed to combat the militant Welsh nationalist threat. A better 
understanding, it was hoped, might prevent Thomas uttering a comment
• 110‘inadvertently unhelpful’. As for Gwynfor Evans, Thomas’s rush to castigate the 
entire nationalist community was a blatant attempt to exploit the explosion ‘for party
109
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007 & 10 May 2009.
110 WM, 6 May 1968. Considered ‘one o f the county’s outstanding beauty spots’, Cwm Dulais, in 
Montgomeryshire, was targeted by the Severn Water Authority.
LPD, 27 May 1968. ‘It was not the nationalists o f Wales who created a monster they could not 
control, but an English ‘controlled’ UK political system’. Interview between WT & Eileen Beasley, 29 
July 2004. It is believed some 151bs o f gelignite were used in the attack. The devastation resulted in 
£5000 worth o f damage.
112 WM, 27 May 1968.
113 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Letter from Harold Wilson to Burke Trend, dated, 29 May 1968.
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political ends’. Moreover, while it ‘sounded fantastic’, such activity was not beyond 
the realms of the British security services. Asked to provide evidence to support his 
premise, Evans conceded that with the Caerphilly by-election just weeks away, it was 
based on little more than empiricist ‘deduction’ on his part.114 It was an avenue of 
supposition which proved ultimately fruitless for the leader of Plaid Cymru and one 
which provided easy ammunition for his political detractors. Yet, the nationalist party 
president’s assertion that George Thomas was intent on a course of pre-determined 
circumstantial assumption, for reasons of party political self-aggrandizement, was a 
view, which to the surprise of many, received a degree of countenance from the 
unionist leaning Western Mail. It was time, the paper attested, the Labour Party 
recognized its own culpable contribution to the resurgent rise of nationalism, both in 
Scotland and in Wales.115 Even Thomas’ erstwhile platform the Liverpool Daily Post 
urged the Secretary of State ‘to play it cooler’. There ‘was no purpose’, its editorial 
declared, ‘in aggravating the situation’ through comments likely to have been uttered 
‘in the heat of the moment’.116 It was an appeal for restraint echoed by the South 
Wales Voice who urged both sides to end the ‘hysterical mud slinging’.117
Nevertheless, at 2.45 a.m. on 27 May, a further explosion rocked the base of a 
stone and concrete support carrying an emergency water pipeline from Llyn Vymwy 
in Montgomeryshire to Liverpool. The seat of the explosion was some 20 yards 
below the dam and immediately above the village of Llanwddyn. Later that day, in 
the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Wales once more vented his spleen. 
It was clear, George Thomas declared, the explosions were committed for ‘political 
reasons’. Both the House and the people of Wales, he felt assured, would ‘roundly 
condemn this attempt at political terrorism’. Keen to distance the Labour Party from 
the failure of the police and intelligence services to apprehend those responsible, 
Thomas appealed for vigilance from the public. It was an appeal greeted with loud 
cries of derisory laughter from opposition benches, who delighted in the mental image 
of the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, with deer-stalker, curved pipe and magnifying 
glass in the role of Sherlock Holmes. Yet, in no mood for frivolities, Thomas 
reproved opposition MPs for what he considered their unfathomable deriving of
114 WM, 27 May 1968.
1 I b i d .
LDP , 28 May 1968. Prior to his appointment, G. Thomas wrote a weekly column for the paper.
117 South Wales Voice, 8 June 1968. For his comments, Evans had revealed himself ‘a silly man’,
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amusement over the issue. Attitudes within the House, would certainly have been 
sharpened had the explosions occurred in England, Denis Coslett later suggested.119
It was however, to Gwynfor Evans and Plaid Cymru on whom Thomas turned 
to full throttle his accusatory attention. The party’s historic suggestion, that those 
responsible for the bombing campaign had ‘merely tried to express the wishes of the 
Welsh people’, had ‘laid the foundation’ for the ‘perpetration of these outrages’. Talk 
of separatism, Thomas remonstrated, had both fostered ‘anti-English hatred’ and 
created an atmosphere in which violence was more likely. Having countered that it 
was in fact the Labour Party which had ‘brought havoc to Wales’, the belief that anti- 
English propaganda had induced the young people of Wales to undertake such action 
was a line of attack angrily repudiated by Gwynfor Evans as utter ‘nonsense’. Yet, 
next in line to attack the solitary political figure of Gwynfor Evans, was the 
flamboyant Labour MP for Pontypridd, Leo Abse. Deflective claims that MI5 might 
be responsible for the spate of bomb attacks in Wales, he spat, were the suggestions of 
a ‘lunatic’.120
Later asked to discuss the explosions which rocked the Welsh political 
landscape in May 1968, John Jenkins stated the first action had been undertaken by an 
active cell unit based in the greater Cardiff area. It had been carried out as way of 
providing a ‘welcoming committee’ to George Thomas. In essence, an invitation to 
the newly appointed minister which said “‘hello, we’re still here, now what do you 
intend to do about it?”’. Moreover, with Jenkins’ two-reason approach ever to the 
fore-front, information received that Princess Margaret - accompanied by George 
Thomas - was to officially open the newly constructed glass-fronted civic centre in
191Mold, more than ensured the existence of a vital second criteria. Yet, for all 
Jenkins’ headline grabbing acumen, it was not to be. What is more, following reports
that perplexed detectives speculated why the ‘expert’ gang of saboteurs used both an
122insufficient amount of explosives and had appeared to target the wrong water pipe, 
Jenkins admitted the Vymwy ‘action’ was ‘botched’.
stated the Caernarfon and Denbigh Herald, 31 May 1968.
118 Hansard, HC Deb, 27 May, 1968, voT 765, pp. 1229-34; also, Hansard, HC Deb, 20 June, 1968, 
vol‘ 766, pp. 1287-8.
119 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
120
Hansard, HC Deb, 27 May 1968, vol’ 765, pp. 1229-34; also, Hansard, HC Deb, 20 June 1968, voT
766, pp. 1287-8.
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Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008. The Welsh 
Office action was not undertaken by the Swansea MAC unit, he confirmed.
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John Jenkins admitted that an uncustomary ‘communications mix-up with the south 
Wales MAC cell’ to have been responsible for undermining the protest. A 
‘spectacular’, he added was planned, whereby the two simultaneous explosions would 
ensure Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru maximum publicity following the interview with 
the three journalists some three weeks earlier. However, the explosion at the Welsh 
Office occurred two days in advance of the original schedule. A reconnaissance trip 
to Mold later that Saturday afternoon confirmed Jenkins’ fears: ‘the place was 
crawling with Special Branch and regular police officers’. It was his intention, 
Jenkins explained, for he and Alders - during Sunday afternoon - to adorn workman’s 
overall’s and travel to the target area in a van decorated for the occasion with flowers 
and shrubs. There, having previously established the buildings lack of security, the 
director-general’s intention of casually depositing either side of the civic centre’s 
main entrance two shrubbery pots - each containing a concealed and primed device - 
was thwarted by the daunting spectacle which now greeted him. The operation 
aborted, it was decided to alternatively target the pipeline at Llyn Vymwy. This, 
Jenkins later confessed, was a target ‘very much down the list’ of MAC objectives. 
John Jenkins also admitted to having been ‘annoyed’ by the confusion. ‘Imagine 
what a coup it would have been’, he mused. It was certainly ‘a missed opportunity’, 
MAC’s former operational-director lamented. 123
Llyn Vymwy was reconnoitred by Alders just weeks before the protest. One 
Sunday evening, under the auspices of a driving lesson, he and Ann Woodgate drove 
the 40 or so miles to the site. There, on noticing the two large pipes emerging from 
the base of the reservoir, Alders had remarked he would have to inform Jenkins. 
Certain she had ascertained Alders’ tme reason for visiting the area, Woodgate 
rounded on her fiance and the couple had argued. On later hearing of the explosion, 
Woodgate again challenged Alders. His reaction, one of disappointment at the failure 
of the action, had left her decidedly uneasy.124
122 The Times, 28 May 1968; also, WM, 28 May 1968; also TNA, DPP 2/5978.
123
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008. Jenkins also 
disclosed that while ‘local conditions’ dictated the exact timing of an attack, it was nonetheless 
intended the joint action would occur during the same night. Asked to comment on the charge that 
having planted the device at the Welsh Office, the three MAC operatives responsible (the planters of  
the device and the getaway driver) took refuge in the home of a Cardiff sympathizer for two days until 
the ‘hullabaloo’ subsided, John Jenkins stated ‘while that may well be true’, he did ‘not wish to 
comment’. Suffice to say, ‘it would have been extremely foolhardy to try and leave the city straight 
away’.
124
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Ann Woodgate witness statement 15 December 1969.
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Questioned in 1969 as to his involvement in the militant campaign, 24-year-old John 
Richard Lewis Roberts stated he and Frederick Ernest Alders had met some five years 
earlier when his father married Alders’ mother. The two men had often discussed 
Welsh politics and a burgeoning belief that Plaid Cymru through ‘democratic means’ 
could ensure ‘some measure of self-government’, resulted in Roberts joining the 
party. He had realised a constitutional approach was ‘the proper course’, following a 
subsequent encounter with John Jenkins. Introduced by Alders ‘in mid-April’
1961968, Roberts was surprised to learn that Jenkins and his step-brother were actively 
involved in the militant campaign. Apparently funded by ‘wealthy Welshman who 
now lived in south America’, MAC, he was told, was ‘highly organised’ and 
comprised ‘many men’ throughout Wales. In addition, Jenkins and Alders now 
proposed to target the water pipeline at Llyn Vymwy and needed a driver. Apparently 
bome of fear for his family should he refuse, Roberts had felt compelled to agree.
Having been instructed to drop the box-carrying Jenkins and Alders at a point 
pre-determined, Roberts continued along the road towards Llanwddyn in Alders’ van, 
before turning around, waiting ‘a few minutes’ in the darkness and returning along the 
road just travelled. Presently, he came across Jenkins and Alders walking towards 
him. The entire operation had taken barely 10 minutes. It was not the first time 
Roberts agreed to support the militant campaign, weeks earlier he had played a 
prominent role in the meeting with the three journalists. It was however, despite 
Jenkins’ later efforts to utilize Roberts, the last occasion Alders’ step-brother actively 
partook in illicit protest in the name of Welsh freedom. It was a summary of events 
endorsed by Alders’ in a later police interview, save one subtle discrepancy. Alders 
considered his step-brother ‘ideal’ recruitment potential, owing to his enthusiasm for 
the bombing campaign and the impression he presented of wishing to be involved. 
Obliviously expressed to a disparaging Alders, it was this, Alders revealed, which 
resulted in Roberts being approached by Jenkins.
Nonetheless, for all Jenkins’ admission of failure at Llyn Vymwy, the 
explosions ensured the re-emergence of media interest in the Free Wales Army. On 
the ITN late evening news, Denis Coslett and the commander of the Swansea Brigade,
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TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement o f John Richard Lewis Roberts, 5 December 1969.
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders.
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TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement o f  John Richard Lewis Roberts, 5 December 1969.
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TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders.
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the intractable Vivian George Davies, once more garrulously intimated the group’s 
responsibility. In a written statement, Coslett began by announcing that ‘unless 
negotiations’ were made ‘for self-government for Wales within three weeks’, there 
would be ‘more violence and possibly insurrection’. The matter of whether this might 
be yet be averted, rested solely with Harold Wilson. Wales, Coslett added, was a 
nation, which would not rest until the centre of gravity was within itself. There would 
be ‘a lot more explosions’ announced a resolute Davies. Moreover, the deliberate 
targeting of civilians, he added portentously, was a development he favoured in the
1 90militant struggle. Unsurprisingly, news of the interview was soon relayed to the 
Attorney General, who pledged a transcript of the interview would be given the 
appropriate attention. As for George Thomas, the country he informed the Commons,
i inwould have ‘noted with concern’ the remarks.
It was not only elected political figures outraged by the FWA’s posturing. In
an unpublished letter, Gethin ap Iestyn implored the Western Mail to highlight the
ignominy felt within the militant community. Such pernicious utterances, as voiced
by Coslett and Davies, remarked the General Secretary of the Patriotic Front, could
111‘only do great harm to the cause of Welsh freedom’. Nevertheless, it was not only 
senior Labour Party figures such as George Thomas who suspected the nationalist 
movement in Wales took the form of Cerberus throughout the 1960s. Speaking in 
1999, Royston Jones, a former FWA sympathizer, stated many in Wales believed a 
three tier system was in place: with Plaid Cymru providing the political thrust; 
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg being the cultural wing and an intertwined MAC and 
FWA orchestrating militant action and the propaganda campaign. Indeed, evidence of 
such was provided by frequenting ‘any Plaid Cymru function’, Jones continued, 
where, despite predictable denials voiced by the party leadership, many attendees
1 39supported ‘unconstitutional methods’ to further the nationalist agenda.
129 Trial o f the FWA, PF and Anti-investiture lobbyists. Exhibit, 63. Denis Coslett papers.
130 Hansard, HC Deb, 27 May, 1968, vol 765, cc 1229-34. An attempt by the Labour MP for 
Abertillery, Clifford Evans, to quote directly from Coslett’s statement, was over-ruled by the Speaker 
on the somewhat judicious grounds that ‘no quotation was allowed in a supplementary question’. 
Hansard, HC Deb, 27 May, 1968, vol 765, cc 1229-34; also TNA, DPP 2/5974. Later asked to 
comment on the apparent interjection, it was, Coslett believed, more likely fuelled by a desire to 
prevent the group being afforded publicity, owing to its mention in parliament. Interview between WT
& Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
131 Trial o f the Free Wales Army and Patriotic Front. Document Folder, part II, p.l 16. Denis Coslett 
papers. Letter dated, 28 May 1968.
13 FWA: I'r Gad! Zenana Production. Screened S4C, 1999; also correspondence between WT & 
Royston Jones, 20 February 2010. According to Greek mythology, the three-headed dog Cerberus
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Whether such ‘methods’ included the lengths that Vivian George Davies appeared
prepared to go however, was an entirely different matter. When later discussing the
notorious Vivian George Davies, Denis Coslett declared the Swansea scrap metal
worker to be ‘crazy’. Even within the ranks of those considered on the edge of
political extremism in Wales at this juncture, Davies, had cut an alarming presence.
He and Cayo Evans, revealed Coslett ‘had a hell of a job holding him back’; prepared
to ‘do anything’, it had been necessary to ‘rein him in all the time’.133 In answer to
those who suspected that a fair degree of bravado might have been at work, a former
member of the FWA speaking in 2009 thought not; further adding that Vivian George
Davies with a bomb ‘didn’t care thinking about’.134 Approached to comment on
whether Davies was a member of a south Wales cell of MAC responsible for any of
the actions undertaken in the region, John Jenkins categorically denied his
involvement. Moreover, of all those affiliated to the Free Wales Army, most of
whom he did ‘not trust’ as far as he ‘could throw’, only Glyn Rowlands and Gethin ap
Iestyn had impressed him as being somewhat possessed of the necessary attributes
required for militant activism; yet, Jenkins added, nether ‘were involved’.
Nonetheless, both men - along with Dai Bonar Thomas, Toni Lewis and Dafydd y
Dug - had been ‘wonderful publicists’; although quite ‘what they were publicizing’
1Jenkins was still unsure.
1Contrary to later claims by Cayo Evans, there was ‘no contact whatever’ 
between Evans and he during the MAC campaign, Jenkins declared. Furthermore, he 
resolutely rejected the suggestion the campaign of propaganda, as undertaken by 
FWA, had ensured vital resources and man-power was diverted from those truly
1 “XIinvolved in militant activism. Did anyone seriously believe the authorities 
considered the Free Wales Army responsible? Jenkins proclaimed. It is a view 
sanctioned by former Shrewsbury unit member Raymond Kendall. Nevertheless,
guards the entrance to the underworld.
133 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 10 January 2001. In 1981, the West Glamorgan coroner 
returned a verdict o f suicide on Vivian George Davies, after an inquest heard he shot and killed his 
wife Ann, before turning the gun on himself. The Times, 20 October 1981. Despite stating ‘trespassers 
will be filled in’ on the Davies garden gate, Denis Coslett remained convinced the charge against V. G. 
Davies was groundless. This he based on the eye-witness account o f the incident, as given by the
couple’s son Dylan.
134 Anonymous interview with WT, August 2009.
135
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
136 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
137
Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
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despite the FWA being considered ‘pretty much of a joke’, there was still the 
possibility, Kendall added, that ‘one or two of those within its ranks had feet in both
139camps. Such conjecture ensured those at the vanguard of the FWA - in line with 
the recommendations outlined following the meeting of senior police and security 
personnel four months earlier - now became the focus of routine surveillance. The 
measures had not gone unnoticed by Denis Coslett. It had been common knowledge 
within FWA circles, he revealed, that certain individuals were subject to covert 
monitoring. As to the extent this had been evident, telephone lines, he added, were 
‘tapped’, postal mail intercepted and opened, and car journey’s regularly accompanied 
by a tailing unmarked police car. Not uncharacteristically, such attention soon proved 
the source of much levity, with Coslett and Evans peppering telephone conversations 
with meaningless dates and locations. He and Evans, recalled Coslett, had enjoyed 
sending eves-dropping officers on ‘a merry goose chase’.140
However, it was not only prominent members of the FWA police were 
interested in. On returning by train to New Tredegar the day following the explosion 
at the Welsh Office, at a point in the journey which afforded a view across the valley, 
David Pritchard observed with alarm a significant police presence outside his home. 
Alighting from the train at the next stop, Prichard re-boarded the train to Cardiff 
where he remained for the next few days. He was not alone: the man arrested 
alongside Pritchard at Cwm Tryweryn in September 1962, also recalled how 
increasingly chagrined officers targeted those ‘with form’. Approached as he and his 
wife sat in the cinema in Bargoed, David Walters was taken in for questioning. It was 
a pattern which soon took a predictable course, Walters added, with officers 
demanding he reveal his whereabouts following every explosion. Similarly 
interviewed, Pritchard, Alf Williams and Walters, soon decided upon a strategy 
designed to hinder the police inquiry. Forthwith, they would refuse to co-operate by 
divulging any information as to where they had been at any given time. In future, the 
three men reasoned, the police would have to establish the facts themselves.141
138 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 9 May 2009.
139 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 6 August 2009.
140 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also with Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 
2004. ‘Cayo had a fondness for saying “we led them a merry dance” and it was true’. Telephone
interview between WT & Rhobert ap Steffan, 9 August 2009.141
Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
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Security procedures are revised, as the MAC offensive continues
Yet, one man noticeably un-amused by the antics of the FWA, was the Secretary of 
State for Wales, George Thomas. Having been apparently brought up to speed by the 
Secretary to the Cabinet Office, Burke Trend, as to the security effort underway to 
combat the bombers, it was reported that chief constables in Wales were to hold a 
summit meeting to discuss the recent explosions.142 If it was hoped a breakthrough 
might be imminent, the wider Welsh public may have been surprised to learn the 
attempt to apprehend those responsible was being hampered by existing police 
practice and a somewhat laissez-faire approach to police matters by central 
government. It was a problem Shrewsbury unit member Raymond Kendall was soon 
to become all too familiar with. For at this juncture, he explained, chief constables 
throughout the UK enjoyed considerable independent autonomy. As if to demonstrate 
their fiercely guarded position, many - as earlier instructed - had failed to appoint the 
liaison officer so essential to the success of the anti-sabotage team headed by John 
Parkman at the Regional Crime Squad.143
The situation had indeed proved problematic, conceded a retired senior officer 
in the Dyfed Powys Constabulary, having resulted in a widespread reluctance to share 
intelligence. This apparently debilitating practice - which permeated police operandi 
at this juncture - was fuelled not merely by competitive resentment for a neighbouring 
force, but also as it was deemed possible adjacent officers may themselves have been 
sympathetic to the nationalist agenda; and as such, it was feared any disclosed 
development in the inquiry might find its way to those perpetrating the bombing 
campaign.144 It was not merely the wider Welsh police force with whom a reluctance 
to cooperate was rife however. It also extended to MI5 and Special Branch, with 
neither prepared to divulge its security concerning the investiture with the Welsh, for 
fear their sources might be compromised.145
Following the four hour meeting at Cardiff Law Courts on 31 May, of chief 
constables, Special Branch and the heads of investigating CID and Regional Crime
WM, 29 May 1968.
143 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 9 August 2009. ‘Officers’, stated Kendall,
were perfectly entitled to hold nationalist views’.
144 Anonymous interview with WT, February 2009.
145 HO, 325/119. Letter from Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office, to 
Home Secretary, James Callaghan, 10 June 1968.
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Squads,146 the Home Office recognized little alternative but to ensure is own 
instrumental and volitional presence in Wales. Henceforth, the appointee, Frank 
Williamson, HM Inspector of Constabulary (Crime), would report directly to the 
Home Secretary. Days later, following another top level review of the investigation 
by MI5 and Special Branch operatives in London on 7 June, Waddell advised 
Callaghan to stamp his authority on the recalcitrant Welsh forces, even if it touched 
‘on a number of delicate relationships’ and aroused ‘the susceptibilities of some 
Welsh chief constables’; it was surely time to take the matter ‘in hand’.147
Nonetheless, despite the apparent and somewhat astonishing paralyzing effect 
of inter-police politic on the security effort to apprehend the saboteurs, even within 
the higher echelons of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg, the identity of those responsible 
was a mystery. Speaking in 2008, Gareth Miles, the former leading language activist, 
recalled his first inauspicious encounter with John Jenkins. The night following the 
Llyn Vymwy action, Miles attended a meeting of the local branch of Plaid Cymru in 
Wrexham. Having traversed its rather typically tedious course, the meeting’s end had 
been enlivened by a man unknown to school master Miles standing up and being sure 
all present ‘had read the Liverpool Post that day’, announcing that ‘we as a party’ 
should ‘dissociate ourselves from explosions and the destruction of property’. 
Somewhat taken aback by the strangers pompous and assured effrontery, an irritated 
Miles enquired after his identity. It was, he was informed, ‘sergeant John Jenkins of 
the British army’. To his animated surprise, Miles later learned that Jenkins had in 
fact ‘planted the bloody thing’. He was, Miles conceded with no small degree of 
admiration, ‘a very cool customer’. Nevertheless, in the short-term, ‘that little 
outburst’ confirmed Miles’ increasing belief that Plaid Cymru ‘was wholly ineffectual 
in its political campaigning’. He thought, ‘my God, if it’s attracting people like 
that!’.148 It was a revelation which may well have proved instrumental in deciding 
Miles’ subsequent avenue of protest, as archival material stored at the National 
Archives suggests their paths were yet again to cross, with Miles and Jenkins soon 
apparently singing harmoniously from the same hymn sheet.149
146 WM, 1 June 1968. No statement was later released of what transpired.
147 HO, 325/119. Letter from Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office, to Sir 
Philip Allen, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office, 10 June 1968; also, Waddell to James
Callaghan, 28 June 1968.
148 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008.
149 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Gordon Wynne Jones; also, witness statement
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A prime suspect in the bombing campaign and a figure police were desperate to locate 
was Owain Williams. On the run since failing to appear at Caernarfon Magistrates 
court on 6 March, Williams had travelled by ferry from Weymouth to Brittany, before 
reaching Eire by fishing boat some days later.150 Before travelling on to Kinsale, 
Williams stayed in Navan, County Meath, at the home of prominent IRA figure Sean 
MacStiofain. Williams later confirmed he and MacStiofain discussed the introduced 
MAC cell structure, having debated the merits of ‘such a cell system as opposed to a 
battalion type pattern’.151 The association between Welsh militants and the IRA at 
this point is open to speculation, with Pedr Lewis admitting the link was established 
when he spent eighteen months in Stafford Prison with renowned IRA activists Cathal
1 S9Goulding and Sean MacStiofain. Although possible, it is a suggestion denied by
Williams as being instrumental to his own connection; with Williams having garnered
1 ^his own IRA contacts during his numerous visits to Eire. Interestingly, despite 
Owain Williams’ lack of clarity, there are those in the former Welsh militant 
community who steadfastly believe Pedr Lewis proved the necessary bridge.154 Yet, 
asked to comment, John Jenkins also rejected the claim, adding to the best of his 
understanding, rather than Lewis, the connection was established by David 
Pritchard.155 It is a theory endorsed by Prichard’s confidante David Walters, who 
confirmed Pritchard had journeyed to the Republic ‘a number of times’; receiving 
‘information and expertise’ from the IRA.156 It now appears likely, that along with 
those contacts established by Cayo Evans, Welsh and Irish militants were actively 
engaged. The extent of this collaboration was revealed in 2009, when a former Welsh 
insurgent confirmed that a number of IRA sympathizers in Wales had played a
by Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969.
1 0 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
151 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 7 April 2009. It ‘did seem plausible’ 
Williams and MacStiofain discussed the cell system, John Jenkins later stated. He could ‘not speak
with certainty’ because he ‘wasn’t there’ and he and Williams ‘never discussed it as such’.
152 Interview between WT & Pedr Lewis, July 2009. On 14 May 1953 at Caernarfon Assizes, Peter 
(Pedr) Lewis was imprisoned for being ‘suspiciously’ in possession o f 200 high explosive detonators. 
While imprisoned, Lewis and Goulding ‘worked together making mats’, during which they routinely 
discussed Welsh and Irish Republicanism. Cathal Goulding, Lewis remarked, ‘didn’t think much us’. 
(Welsh Republican Movement). On his release from prison, Lewis delivered a letter from Goulding to
an address in Belfast.
153 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 7 April 2009.
154 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009.
155 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 9 May 2009.
156 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008. Wishing to discuss these visits to 
Ireland without being understood, Pritchard and Walters commonly referred to the IRA as ‘snowmen’.
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significant minor role during the early years of the ‘Troubles’, delivering ‘messages 
and other materials’ to and from Eire.157 However, while conceding that ‘Welsh 
extremists’ had approached them for ‘training and technical instruction’, the IRA later 
denied having assisted on the grounds that ‘co-operation might endanger its 
security’.158
Nonetheless, such was the resolute police effort to find Owain Williams, that 
officers from Interpol searched the home of Cayo Evans’ mother, in the Spanish resort 
of Marbella.159 Its officers also approached the Columbian hacienda of Welsh 
expatriate and fervent nationalist Hywel Hughes. Despite the conjecture, in a letter to 
Y Cymro, Hughes denied Williams was his guest. He had ‘never heard of the man’, 
he declared. However, ‘if Mr. Williams did happen to drop in at anytime’, he would 
be made ‘most welcome’.160 Officers also considered Williams might be in ‘Canada’ 
and crucially as events transpired ‘Ireland’.161
When later discussing the period he absconded, Owain Williams revealed that 
having reached Kinsale in County Cork, he spent much of his time in a tent on the 
beach. Yet, having grown a beard, fashioned ‘quite a cultured Cork accent’ and
purporting to be ‘Phil McBryde of Irish descent’, he returned to Wales ‘two or three
* 162times’; on one entertaining occasion ‘disguised as a female’. Despite its comic
value however, his reason for returning was devoid of humour. On Y Mynydd Ddu in
Carmarthenshire, Williams met the Welsh insurance millionaire, Trefor Morgan, to
discuss the trial he now recognized as inevitable. Asked to assist, Morgan assured
Williams he would finance his legal costs.163 It has long been suggested that Trefor
Morgan, the founder of Cwmni Undeb, the Aberdare-based company, financed Welsh
militant activism. It was a claim given considerable credence by Cayo Evans, who
157 Anonymous interview with WT, July 2009.
158 The Times, 4 January 1982.
159
Interview between WT & Rhodri Evans, 25 July 2000.
160 Y Cymro, 9 May 1968. Despite Hughes claiming not to know Williams, in 1963 he forwarded a 
significant amount o f  money to Williams’ wife Irene during Williams’ period of imprisonment. It 
followed his protest at the flooding o f Cwm Tryweryn. In 2009, John Jenkins, irrefutably denied that 
Hywel Hughes funded MAC. He had ‘never had any dealings with him’, he declared. Telephone 
interview with WT, 19 February 2009. Yet, it flew in the face of intimations made to investigating 
officers by Alders’ step brother John Richard Lewis Roberts in December 1969.
161 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 28 December 2008.
162 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Williams claimed to be a Rhodesian 
fugitive, wanted by the UK authorities for supporting Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence.
163 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 28 December 2008.
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earlier informed the Western Mail the Free Wales Army was controlled by ‘a wealthy 
businessman’.164 Later asked to confirm, John Jenkins denied Morgan had dealings 
with the FWA or MAC.165
Whatever the truth surrounding Trefor Morgan4 s involvement in the militant 
offensive, if the Vymwy action was deemed an irksome failure by John Jenkins, the 
group’s next target unequivocally re-established MAC’s credibility as a combative 
force to be reckoned with. Just days after the Home Secretary was urged to call for a 
police report on the whereabouts of Owain Williams;166 two bomb hoaxes were
167reported; it was announced that George Thomas was to receive a bodyguard when 
he opened the newly constructed Abergele by-pass;168 and the FWA was derisorily 
denounced as 4the Vietcong of the valleys’, following its reported declaration to 4blow 
up Caernarfon castle’ when The German prince’ took The panoply of the principality’ 
the following year, 169 John Jenkins turned his recalcitrant attention to the Hapsford 
pipeline in Cheshire and the impending royal visit to Wales.
Following reassuring reports by the journalist John Christopher, that those 
believed responsible for the Cardiff attacks were being systematically monitored with 
arrests expected 4in the next few weeks’, 170 on 28 June - accompanied by his father, 
the Duke of Edinburgh - Prince Charles arrived for what was billed his 4 first royal 
tour’ of Wales.171 To those at the vanguard of the anti-investiture campaign, the 
opportunity to protest the prince’ arrival was an opportunity too good to ignore. As 
the prince left the Welsh Office in Cardiff, he was greeted by a crowd of 300; a 
section of whom were vocally inimical. Leaving his police escort and exercising what 
George Thomas later professed to be 4a great deal of moral courage’, the prince 
approached those bearing anti-royalist banners and placards. Pointing to one which
WM, 11 May 1966.
165 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 13 December 2008.
166 WM, 29 May 1968.
167 Ibid. The first telephone hoax delayed the Swansea to Paddington train by some 25 minutes. The 
second resulted in the evacuation o f the Board o f  Trade and Industry in Cardiff.
168 WM, 31 May 1968.
169 Wolverhampton Express and Star, 1 June 1968. ‘Someone may be killed...a political assassination 
perhaps...But whose fault’ would ‘it be?’, stated Cayo Evans. ‘All nations’ were ‘agreed what a
traitors death should be’.
170 Daily Express, 24 June 1968. The article entitled: Royal Bomb Alert, confirmed police had five
persons under surveillance, claimed Christopher.
171
WM, 29 June 1968. During one demonstration, Welsh language activist Ffred Francis knelt before 
Prince Charles in a mock gesture o f reverence. He was later allegedly informed by a police officer, ‘it 
was lucky you didn’t do anything, we had you in our sights’. Telephone interview between WT &
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recalled the death of ‘Llywelyn the Last’, Charles enquired as to its significance. He 
was informed by Welsh-language activist Murray Jenkins, that it urged the Welsh to 
remember their last true prince, who was ‘massacred by the English’ in 1282. Having 
replied he ‘knew nothing about that’, owing to his being ‘not too well up on Welsh 
history’, he was further informed by Jenkins this revelation he would accept, on the 
grounds the prince was ‘not very brilliant’. Quick to champion his charge, a hastily 
arrived George Thomas remarked that to be untrue, on the basis the prince attended 
Cambridge University. It was a riposte the unabashed Jenkins returned with interest. 
‘Yes’, he agreed. ‘He got in on two poor A levels’. Whether in an attempt to salvage 
something from the encounter, or genuinely in the dark, the prince, having apparently 
noticed that ‘Llywelyn was spelt in various ways’, enquired as to whether Jenkins was 
‘quite sure’ about the spelling. Before he had time to respond, two smoke bombs 
exploded nearby as scuffles broke out between demonstrators and loyalists.172 One 
was thrown by Gethin ap Iestyn.
In 2009, ap Iestyn discussed the events which saw him arrested a second time 
for protesting against the forthcoming investiture. He had been part of a three-man- 
unit, comprising Philip Jeffries and his wife, Gwenllian; the daughter of R. O. F. 
Wynne of Garthewin Hall. Intending to disrupt Charles’ departure, the three had each 
put a smoke bomb down their trousers. Immediately targeted by Special Branch, the 
diminutive ap Iestyn lit its fuse with the aid of a cigarette and hurled it in the direction 
of the prince. Equally successful in reaching their target were his co-conspirators. 
Robustly seized by the burly officer positioned behind him, ap Iestyn, while allegedly 
being ‘thumped like hell’ by a score of officers, returned ‘one punch’ before being 
unceremoniously hurled into a Black Maria.173 Charged under the Public Order Act, 
(1936), with ‘using threatening behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace’, 174 all
Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 19 September 2010.
172 WM, 29 June 1968. On arriving in Cathays Park, the first car in the royal motorcade was hit by an 
egg. A 16-year-old boy was charged and later fined for the offence. ‘Never’, later declared George 
Thomas, had he ‘felt more ashamed o f someone with a Welsh accent’ for having ‘spoken so regretfully 
to a young man who politely approached him’. He was certain ‘ninety-nine-point-nine per cent o f the 
Welsh people’ would repudiate such ‘rudeness’. WM, 1 July 1968; also, WM, 5 July 1968. The fact 
there existed in Wales those who regarded the prince’s ignorance of such a pivotal figure in Welsh 
history as diaphanously tragic, seemed entirely lost on the ‘appalled’ Mr. Thomas. Letters ‘of disgust’ 
at the ‘shoddy...abusive behaviour’ of the ‘louts’ and ‘irresponsible oafs’ who protested Prince
Charles’ visit, were printed in the WM, 8 July 1968.
173 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009.
174 WM, 1 July 1968.
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1 7Sthree were later fined. Nonetheless, the ‘successful episode’ had taught ap Iestyn a 
valuable lesson concerning street agitation. He now ‘focused much thought on
1 lf\causing “chaos Caernarfon’” .
Yet, the strong-arm tactics allegedly adopted by police when arresting Gethin 
ap Iestyn at the Welsh Office, may have been partly fuelled by events some thirteen 
hours earlier, as John Jenkins and Frederick Ernest Alders, successfully targeted a 
section of the water pipeline which emerged above ground at Helsby near Hapsford in 
Cheshire. Crossing the main rail route between Chester, Liverpool and Manchester, 
the activation of 171bs of Polar Ammon dynamite ensured a ‘twelve inch gash in the 
pipe’, ‘a jet of water’ was ‘shot 300 feet into the air, five million gallons’ cascaded 
down the railway embankment and Liverpool’s water supply was ‘cut by h a lf .177 
Jenkins later disclosed that the target - essentially because of the rail link - was 
diligently considered before the operation was undertaken. Its subsequent success, he 
later opined, was particularly satisfying on three accounts: first, the pipeline was part 
of the network constructed following the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn; second, it had 
been announced the crossing was afforded ‘round the clock’ security surveillance; and 
furthermore, it was posthumously admitted the pipe - comprising two inch solid steel - 
was deemed un-breachable. Indeed, such was the confidence of Liverpool engineers, 
the concrete abutment positioned to secure the bank during the crossings completion - 
and on which the device was ‘perfectly placed’ - was left following the construction’s 
completion.178 Nevertheless, for all those ready to marvel at the dexterous audacity of 
the attack, there were many more eager to castigate those responsible. Especially 
when it was revealed just four minutes elapsed between the saturated embankment
] 75 WM, 16 July 1968. Arrested ‘partly for his own safety’, ap Iestyn pleaded guilty and was ordered 
to pay £20. Jeffries and his wife were penalized £5. Called a ‘silly girl’ by the magistrate, it was, 
stated Gwenllian Wynne, ‘a typically English remark’. Daily Mail, 9 July 1968; also, Observer 
Supplement, 22 June 1969.
Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 August 2009. In part, this comprised ap 
Iestyn and Lewis forming the Anti-Investiture Campaign Committee.
177
WM, 29 June 1968; also, TNA, DPP 2/5979. Following the blast, David Summerton, Liverpool’s 
deputy water engineer appealed for city dwellers to ‘use as little water as possible’. The explosion 
occurred at 2.45 a.m. The 25 mile, 60 inch pipe, carried 30 million gallons o f water a day from a 
treatment works on the river Dee at Huntington, three miles south o f Chester, to the Liverpool pumping 
station at Prescot. WM, 29 June 1968.
i  no
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008. The target was 
allegedly discussed in the presence o f Alders’ step-brother. TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by 
John Richard Lewis Roberts, dated, 5 December 1969. ‘There was a driver who transported me and 
Alders’, declared John Jenkins, ‘but it was not Roberts’. Telephone interview between WT & John 
Jenkins, 20 November 2009.
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1 70slipping and blocking the track and a goods train passing along the route. An
official response to the recent events was not long in coming, as it was announced
surveillance along water pipelines from Wales to England was to be increased with
180the aid of a police helicopter. Nonetheless, despite the ‘deep unease’ felt by many
1 ft 1within the Labour movement following the Caerphilly by-election, and its 
‘irrefutable proof that all-Wales was finally awakening to the call for
i o9
independence’, the Labour party recognized the ace within its axiomatic unionist 
pack was yet to be played: the impending investiture of Charles as Prince of Wales. 
However, in readiness for the ceremony, a collective - if conflicting - nationalist 
response was already underway. If notice were needed of the intent of those on the 
periphery of the Welsh political divide to disrupt the ceremony, literature, produced 
and distributed by the Anti-Investiture Campaign Committee, intercepted by Special 
Branch and forwarded to the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, made it crystal clear. 
Ominously declaring: ‘The Pretender...Charles Windsor Shall Not Pass’,183 Whitehall 
bureaucrats, wishing to avoid the noxious hot potato of ‘political interference’, sought 
to reassure Welsh chief constables that Frank Williamson, HM Inspector of 
Constabulary (Crime) would have no operational responsibilities. Williamson’s 
appointment, it was affirmed, was purely in an intermediary/liaison capacity between 
the Home Office, the security services and constabularies and regional crime squads 
in Wales.
Yet, remarkably, despite the ‘special circumstances’ (explosions) which 
necessitated the introduction of these ‘exceptional arrangements’, 184 (Williamson’s
] 79 WM, 29 June 1968. The difficulty in both establishing the identity of those responsible and 
repairing the damage, was compounded by the heaviest rainfall in 40 years the following day. 
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
180 WM, 1 July 1968; also, WM, 5 July 1968.
181 Y Cymro, 25 July 1968. The view was expressed in an article written by Labour’s defeated
Parliamentary candidate in the 1966 Carmarthen by-election, Gwilym Prys Davies. The Caerphilly
by-election occurred amid the greatest terrorist campaign Wales has witnessed, the Plaid Cymru
candidate, Dr. Phil Williams, ‘hoped no explosions would occur during campaigning’. South Wales
Echo, 12 July 1968. Williams came within 1,875 votes of landing Plaid Cymru its electoral holy grail:
parliamentary representation in the industrial valleys. K. O. Morgan, The People’s Peace (Oxford,
1999), p.288.182
Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008. Much of the credit for Plaid’s
success was afforded The Miners Support Group fo r Plaid, which successfully targeted colliers who,
increasingly sympathetic with the nationalist agenda, were also disaffected by the Labour Party’s
‘distrusted, communist’ candidate.
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HO, 325/119. Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary, Home Office, to James Callaghan, 28 
June 1968.
184 HO, 325/119. Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary, Home Office, to Colonel William
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mandate) the decision to appoint Williamson continued to be a source of onerous 
resentment; most notably by the chief constable of Gwynedd, Colonel William 
Williams, renowned for being intensely suspicious of any attempt to usurp his
1 RSauthority. In a letter to the august chief constable, Sir James Waddell, Deputy 
Under Secretary at the Home Office, delicately urged Col. Williams to accept and 
support Williamson’s appointment.186 Five days later, Sir James Waddell received a 
reply from Colonel William Williams, the chief constable with the nineteenth century 
attitude to twentieth century policing. He would ‘of course meet and brief 
Williamson’. However, it was not the ability of the Gwynedd Constabulary in 
question, but rather, Col. Williams believed, the lenient way in which the regional 
Assize Courts had dealt with those brought before them on explosives charges. Had 
more ‘sterner measures’ been adopted, Williams confidently concluded, ‘we would
1 87not have this trouble today’. If it was a opinion with which many in Wales
1 88subscribed, for those people and ‘the old man of the Welsh mountains’ there was 
more of the exasperating same to follow.
Nonetheless, at a meeting in Cardiff on 16 July, attended by Ferguson Smith 
(Commander Metropolitan Special Branch), Tom Roberts (MI5), Charles Simkins 
(MoD, Security Division) and E. Brampton (F2, Home Office Police Division), Frank 
Williamson submitted his findings. The only way to crack the conspiracy, he opined, 
was to establish a special unit with its operational headquarters just over the border in 
England. It would be led by officers from the Metropolitan Police experienced in
1 8Qcounter-terrorism and be accountable only to him. For the Welsh police service,
Williams, Chief Constable o f Gwynedd, 28 June 1968. Williamson was instructed to take control; and 
ascertain what how best to apprehend the saboteurs in order to ensure the safety and success o f the
investiture.
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HO, 325/119. Letter from Neil Galbraith, HM Inspector Constabulary Wales, to Sir Eric St. 
Johnston, HM Chief Inspector o f Constabulary, 17 June 1968.
186 HO, 325/119. Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary, Home Office, to Colonel William 
Williams, Chief Constable o f Gwynedd, 28 June 1968.
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HO, 325/119. Colonel William Williams, Chief Constable o f Gwynedd, to Sir James Waddell,
Deputy Under-Secretary, Home Office, 3 July 1968.188
HO, 325/119. Letter from Neil Galbraith, HM Inspector Constabulary Wales, to Sir Eric St.
Johnston, HM Chief Inspector o f Constabulary, 17 June 1968. ‘The old man o f the Welsh mountains’,
wrote Galbraith, was inordinately conscious o f any apparent attempt to ‘subordinate the autonomy o f
the Chief Constable to external influence, Home Office or otherwise’.
189 HO, 325/119. Frank Williamson, HM Inspector (Crime), to Eric St. Johnston, HM Chief Inspector 
of Constabulary, 17 July 1968; also, Waddell to Home Secretary, 19 July 1968. The meeting was held 
at Hayes House, Cardiff. Raymond Kendall, seconded to the unit, also suggested Shrewsbury was 
deliberately chosen for reasons o f security, the risk o f antagonizing Welsh officers by insinuating their 
inadequacy and to prevent it being viewed as an alien force o f occupation.
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the decision to form the unit and to locate it free from the undermining influence of 
inexpedient Welsh chief constables, was, few could dispute, a humiliating realization 
their efforts to apprehend the saboteurs had failed. Moreover, their chastened 
indignity was complete, with knowledge the security services would forthwith be 
primarily entrusted to combat nationalist agitation in Wales.
Unaware of these developments, at an anti-investiture meeting on 6 July, in 
the Glyndwr Hall at Machynlleth, campaigners congregated to hear a succession of 
speakers denounce the forthcoming event as a ‘charade and insult to Wales’.190 Billed 
its ‘principal speaker’, the highlight of the afternoon was a tape recorded message 
from Owain Williams. Having apologized for his absence and reaffirmed his 
innocence, 191 Williams called upon those gathered to ‘organise an effective campaign 
to combat this circus which the English Establishment’ intended to foist ‘on the 
people of Wales’. Asked where his clarion call was committed to tape, Williams 
confirmed it had been achieved while ‘crouched behind a tree in woodland’ on his 
father’s farm.192 It was then handed to Glyn Rowlands, who ensured its safe delivery
1 03the following day.
One man ‘suitably unimpressed’ by the days proceedings - and Owain 
Williams’ ‘battle cry for freedom’ - was freelance journalist Ian Skidmore. He was 
‘all but instructed to attend the meeting by police’; in order to verify if the recorded 
voice matched any of those heard during the clandestine meeting with MAC two 
months earlier. This was owing, Skidmore added, to the absolute conviction held by 
the authorities, ‘that Owain Williams was behind the bombing campaign’. Yet, it was 
the sight of Cayo Evans ‘and the other idiot Denis Coslett’, vying with each other to 
see ‘who was the biggest terrorist’, when interviewed ‘by Linda Blandford for the 24 
Hours programme’ which, he believed, summed up the occasion.194
190
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 20 November 2003.
191 WM, 8 July 1968. It was rumoured that Williams was to attend and then give him himself up to 
police. However, attendees were informed Williams was ‘out o f the country’.
Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 19 December 2008. Despite being under 
surveillance, Guinis Farm ‘was quite big, 420 acres’. This, Williams added, enabled me ‘to hide’. 
Furthermore, ‘technology at this time’, he declared, lacked the sophistication it now enjoys. Both his 
parents, he conceded ‘were aware’ he was there at the time.
193
Telephone interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 20 October 2008. When in Eire, Williams, 
the vice-president in absentia o f the Patriotic Front, also wrote a letter which was collected and read
out by Gethin ap Iestyn during a PF meeting in Wales.
194 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008. Skidmore gained entry to the 
meeting by claiming to be a journalist for the Daily Mirror, dispatched to cover the story. Following 
the Machynlleth meeting, the FWA undertook manoeuvres for a TV crew in the surrounding hills.
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It was a sentiment shared in some measure by others who attended that day. 
Certainly, such vainglorious posturing did little to assuage Glyn Rowlands’ increasing 
doubt he had ‘joined the wrong group’. Although comprised of a ‘great bunch of 
boys’, the risible antics of the Free Wales Army and more specifically their ‘love of 
the limelight’ sat uneasily with the more earnest Rowlands. The decision to adorn the 
uniform of the FWA had also, he realized, curtailed any hope of joining the covert 
ranks of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Rowlands - the man memorably dubbed by 
Cayo Evans ‘the lone wolf of Corris’ - was, he now plaintively recognized, ‘too 
exposed’.195
Owain Williams is arrested, tried and acquitted
It was at this juncture, with the police ‘desperate’ to discover Williams’ whereabouts, 
that an attempt to compromise Glyn Rowlands’ involvement in the nationalist 
campaign was allegedly fostered. Approached by R. G. Owen of Gwynedd CID, 
Rowlands was asked how he would respond if  Owain Williams arrived on the 
doorstep of his Corris home. He would, Rowlands replied emphatically: ‘put a meal 
in his belly, a pound in his pocket and help him on his way’. Adopting another tactic, 
R. G. Owen then allegedly handed Rowlands a number of pre-addressed envelopes 
and a postal order for 10 shillings. This was done with the tacit understanding that 
any information regarding Williams’ whereabouts would be sent through the post. In 
2004, Rowlands confirmed he knew Williams was travelling back and fore to Eire. 
Although information ‘only a small circle’ was privy to, through ‘word of mouth’ he 
had received this information ‘from the north’, which, in turn, he in mid-Wales 
‘passed on to those in the west’.196
However, somewhat surprisingly, news of this fiscal advance by police caused 
distrust and even suspicion within the ranks of the FWA, leading to whispered 
accusations that Rowlands was an informant. ‘We thought why him? Why have the 
police only contacted him this way?’, remarked Toni Lewis in 2004. ‘He kept telling 
us to be on our guard, but...I don’t know...there were other things as well which
1 07didn’t add up’. It was however a charge dismissed out of hand by Cayo Evans’ son 
Rhodri. A lot of this ‘nonsense began when Glyn Rowlands’ son joined the police
195
Telephone interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 20 October 2008.
196
Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 21 March 2004; also, 16 October 2008.
197 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
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force’, countered Evans, ‘but his son is as much a nationalist as his father’.198 Asked 
to comment on the charge that some had questioned his commitment to the cause, 
Rowlands replied he would ‘not be surprised if the police’ circulated the rumour. 
Such tactics were common within its practice. ‘They were’, he added, ‘always trying 
to stir animosity between us’.199
Yet, retired Deputy Chief Constable and Shrewsbury unit figure John Owen 
Evans, quickly refuted the allegation that officers routinely paid for such 
correspondence. Unlike other forces, he stated, no fund existed within the Gwynedd 
Constabulary Special Branch for such purposes. Furthermore, information received 
via such channels was notoriously unreliable and ultimately counter-productive. 
Consequently, intelligence was gathered on an individual only through transparent 
means.200 Glyn Rowlands was not alone in claiming that lucrative benefit awaited 
those prepared to divulge information however, with both Denis Coslett and Toni 
Lewis, each stating that Avril Coslett had been assured a new bungalow in return for
communication leading to her husband’s arrest in relation to the bombing
001campaign. If indeed these claims are accurate, the increasingly vacillate Welsh 
political climate and the desperation of investigating forces to detect the saboteurs, 
was surely not aided by Saunders Lewis, who precariously announced during a BBC 
interview that ‘the only language the English government’ understood was 
‘violence’.202
Nonetheless, contrary to the swashbuckling FWA, someone very much 
involved in the bombing campaign was Frederick Ernest Alders. Later asked by 
investigating officers how her fiance responded to news of the explosions, Ann
IQfi
Interview between WT & Rhodri Evans, 28 February 2006.
199 Telephone interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 18 September 2006. Glyn Rowlands 
confirmed his son to be a proud Welsh patriot. ‘Rumours’, he added, ‘were rife at the time. Nobody 
knew anything about anybody else did they?’.
200 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 April 2009. ‘We did not pick up 
anybody like that’, stated Evans. ‘There was no bargaining; we just collected information on lifestyle. 
That’s how we would determine if  they were involved. If they were ‘spouting’. Glyn was someone
whose name was coming up’.
201 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also, between WT & Toni Lewis, 20
May 2004. Lewis claimed he was offered ‘a car, phone, house’ and ‘money in the bank’ on the
condition’, a senior police officer remarked, ‘you move where we want you to move to’. Lewis
declined. ‘Some people’, Lewis believed, accepted similar police offers. Following the Machynlleth
anti-investiture rally, C. Evans and D. Coslett alleged officers assured each £10,000 if  they revealed
Owain Williams’ whereabouts. Coslett also claimed he was approached by an MI5 operative with a
cheque made out for the same figure, if  he ‘gave up the FWA and revealed names’. Each suggestion
was dismissed by a west Wales detective as ‘rubbish’. WM, 8 July 1968.
202 BBC Cymru interview between Saunders Lewis & Meirion Edwards, 9 August 1968.
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Woodgate revealed Alders’ reaction had ranged from ‘laughter’ and ‘unconcern’ to 
the angry retort ‘that he was doing it for Wales’. Moreover, for the twelve month 
period up to Christmas, 1968, she and Alders had often baby-sat for John Jenkins and 
his wife Thelma. These visits had often involved Jenkins and Alders studying ‘maps 
of Wales’ and their discussing various topics. These ranged from: Welsh history, 
their opposition to the water pipeline issue, preventing the investiture by killing 
Prince Charles and Wales gaining independence. The latter, an eventuality they had 
proclaimed, which would result in ‘Jenkins becoming Prime Minister and Alders 
Minster of Defence’. On one occasion, they had also attempted to acquire ‘a timing 
mechanism from the light in a telephone kiosk’; returning to Jenkins’ home empty 
handed, their efforts curtailed by the volume of traffic.204
Whether deliberately basking in the introverted knowledge of his nocturnal 
activities, or genuinely unable to mask his pleasure that Wales was ‘taking revenge 
against England’,205 Alders’ behaviour had also caught the benevolent attention of his 
work and TA colleague, Brian Richards. Yet, crucially, it was only after Jenkins’ and 
Alders’ arrest that he too informed investigating officers that a ‘half-smiling’ Alders, 
gave the impression of being ‘somehow involved’; this, based upon the somewhat
AAZ
‘boasting’ manner in which Alders discussed the explosions.
Nevertheless, in July 1968, both the general public and indeed the police and 
authorities, were still roundly in the dark as to the identity of those truly responsible. 
If any of the nation’s populace believed the explosions to be the work of the FWA, N. 
H. Taylor, in a letter to the Western Mail, provided something by way of solution. 
Why, Taylor enquired, was Denis Coslett not charged for contravening the Public 
Order Act (1936) by wearing the uniform of the FWA at the Machynlleth meeting?207 
A reply, by a certain ‘Revd. Idwal Lloyd-Price’, sprang to the defence of Coslett by 
quoting with convincing eloquence nothing less than Article 17 of The Geneva 
Convention and The United Nations Charter. The au courant prose, dripping with 
well-crafted sentiment, ensured the commencement of a healthy exchange in the 
Western Mail letters page and a lighter moment in the continuing saga of the Free 
Wales Army. For, unknown to all but a select few, the enigmatic and unlikely Revd.
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969.
204
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Ann Woodgate.
205
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969.
206 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Brian Richards, 27 November 1969.
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Idwal Lloyd-Price of Talsam, was in fact, Cayo Evans.208
The police operation to apprehend those responsible for the bombing campaign - and 
the nagging inference of its tangible incompetence - was given a considerable fillip on 
27 August, when Owain Williams was arrested at Birmingham airport. He had 
arrived from Cork accompanied by Kathleen Quaid, the ‘supervisor’ at the Trident 
Hotel in Kinsale and with whom he had begun a relationship. Attempting to explain 
to a customs officer their dearth of luggage, Williams’ infelicitous attention was 
drawn to two furtive, yet intently staring faces. Eventually, having apparently 
convinced the airport official they were in Britain ‘to attend a conference’,209 the two 
travellers were approached by Detective Constable, Geoffrey Allman and Detective 
Sergeant, James Cuthbert.
Asked if he was ‘Owen Williams’ Williams replied to the affirmative. 
Immediately, there was a noticeable police presence. Pushed against a wall, frisked 
for a firearm and informed an arrest warrant had been issued in response to his failure 
to ‘appear before Caernarvon (sic) Magistrates’ on 6 March, on a charge of 
‘unlawfully possessing explosives’, Owain Williams was then arrested and cautioned. 
Protesting his ‘moral’ innocence, he was transferred to Hobs Moat, Police Station in 
Solihull. En route, officers claimed Williams soberly remarked: ‘it will be six months 
in a few days since I left. I had enough and wanted to come back to face what’s 
coming. I would rather that than be persecuted all the time. I was going to hand 
myself in after first seeing my children’.210 It is however, an allegation fiercely 
refuted by Owain Williams as ‘utter rubbish. As if ,  Williams added, he ‘would 
return after such a length of time and say that\ He believed that anticipating his 
judicial position, police fabricated the remark, recognizing - through Williams having 
discerned he could not escape the long arm of the law - it would ‘sound better for
WM, 10 July 1968.
208
WM, 15 July 1968. Also, interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 13 December 2000; also 
between WT & Rhodri & Dalis Evans, 28 February 2006. Legend has it a cub reporter was dispatched 
to west Wales to interview Revd. Lloyd Price. On arriving at the address, he discovered the house
dilapidated; a tree growing out o f the chimney and it home to a family of owls.
209 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March 2004. Owain Williams chose Birmingham 
airport believing it would be ‘OK’. Having befriended Williams, Kathleen Quaid proved a source o f
much welcome hotel food, including chicken, bread and wine.
210
TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement by Geoffrey Allman, 4 September 1968; also, undated 
witness statement by James Cuthbert. Allman claimed he approached Quaid and her companion, as he 
looked ‘identical to Owen (sic) Williams’. Also, WM, 14 September 1968.
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911them’ when he stood trial. The evidence against Owain Williams was soon 
processed. He held, north Wales detective Robert Gwynne Owen opined, ‘strong 
militant views’...which supported ‘the use of force’ to establish a ‘Welsh Republic’. 
Furthermore, Williams had ‘adversely influenced’ a ‘number of young men’ in north 
Wales, who, it was felt, were both fearful of him and the ‘organization’ he 
represented.212
Speaking in 2004, Owain Williams claimed that he was arrested while 
carrying a ‘little diary...all in code...with addresses and numbers’, which was
1 <3
intercepted by officers as he ‘passed it’ to Kathleen Quaid. The notebook, he later 
conceded, by way of clarification, had merely contained the names - admittedly 
encrypted - of ‘one or two girls’ he had met since absconding. He did not want 
‘anyone knowing’ his ‘business, never mind the police’. Did anybody ‘really think’ 
he ‘would put telephone numbers of IRA and/or MAC contacts in a pocket book?’. 
He would not, Williams added, ‘be walking free today’ had he done so. Moreover, 
the police would have been ‘round the next day to mop up’ those listed. To prove his 
point, Owain Williams drew attention to subsequent events: with his arrest having 
occurred some ‘fifteen months before the arrest of John Jenkins’.214 Whatever the 
accuracy surrounding this episode, the next day - following the release of Kathleen 
Quaid - officers from Caernarfon arrived and within a convoy of three cars, Owain 
Williams was conveyed to north Wales. There, on 29 August, he appeared in court.
91 5Owain Williams was remanded in custody, his bail application denied.
The manner of their co-agitators unexpected arrest, had indeed raised a 
quizzical eyebrow among the nationalist periphery, admitted Glyn Rowlands. It was 
even thought before leaving Ireland, Williams ‘tipped off the authorities as to where 
he was going’. Rowlands quantified this by adding: ‘it would have made a big 
difference to his sentence. In the climate of the time, it was expected he would get hit 
very hard, if found and brought to trial’. No one - at least to Rowlands’ knowledge -
211 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March 2004; also, telephone interview between WT
& Owain Williams, 19 December 2008.
212
TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement by Detective Robert Gwynne Owen, 22 October 1968.
213 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March, 2004; also, John Humphries, Freedom 
Fighters, p.91. Williams’ ‘precious codebook’ contained ‘the names o f contacts’.
21 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 19 December 2008; also, TNA, DPP 2/4471. 
According to archival material, the notebook, Exhibit 5, contained only a poem entitled: I  Came as a 
Stranger to the Land o f  the Free, written in Williams’ hand.
215 WM, 30 August 1968.
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confronted Owain Williams with these suspicions. To do so would have raised the 
uncomfortable speculation that Williams was ‘a coward’. Yet, Rowlands ruminated, 
‘it did seem odd he flew into Birmingham; and a policeman just recognized him out 
of the blue’.216
Owain Williams now believes it likely he was subject to a surveillance 
operation. In the bar at the Trident Hotel, ‘there was’, he recalled, a ‘stocky, middle 
aged, bespectacled guy, always propped on a bar stool reading a Times newspaper’. 
Without being able to put his finger on it, ‘something about him’, Williams added - 
along with a ‘number of others’ who frequented the bar - all but convinced him he 
was being monitored. He was certain the police had suspected his whereabouts. 
After all, Williams pondered, ‘Ireland was rather an obvious choice...Interpol’, he felt 
sure, ‘would have found’ him ‘eventually’. Asked what he believed transpired, 
Owain Williams thought the phone in the bar was tapped: more specifically, ‘a phone 
call’ he made on the eve of his return to ‘an acquaintance in Wales’ was 
‘intercepted’.217 Whatever the circumstances surrounding his detention, Owain 
Williams rejected as ‘ridiculous’ the suggestion he ‘tipped off the authorities as to the 
specifics of his return in a pre-arranged plea-bargain to reduce his sentence. ‘That’ he 
added trenchantly, was ‘not’ his ‘style’.218
Whatever the truth surrounding these events, beginning 5 November and 
culminating three days later, Owain Williams stood trial at Caernarfon Assizes on a 
charge of illegally possessing explosives.219 He had been charged with such, 
following his arrest in the aftermath of the Penisarwaun explosion ten months earlier. 
Despite incriminating testimony from John Gwilym Jones and police forensic
990results, Owain Williams was acquitted. He later explained why the police evidence
216 Telephone interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 18 September 2006. ‘We were surprised 
when he just turned up’, remarked Rowlands. It was believed, he had earlier ‘informed’ the authorities
‘where he was going to go and what was he going to do’.
217 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March 2004. Williams believes the man was an MI5
agent. He was returning to keep abreast of his defence campaign.
218 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 22 September 2006. On 13 September, at 
Caernarfon Assizes, Owain Williams was further remanded in custody and committed for trial. WM,
14 September 1968.
219 WM, 5 - 9  November 1968. Williams claimed his only contact with the IRA was when he met an 
unnamed member in a Dublin pub. WM, 8 November 1968; also, Caernarfon and Denbigh Herald, 15
November 1968.
220 TNA, DPP 2/4471. Witness statement by J. G. Jones, dated 6 August 1968; also witness statement 
by J. G. Jones, dated, 11 January 1968; also undated witness statement by J. G. Jones. Also, witness 
statement by Superintendent Islwyn Jones, dated, 18 January 1968. On 15 January 1968, positive 
traces o f nitro-glycerin ‘were found on various parts’ o f Williams’ ‘Vauxhall car’ by Doctor J. Mullen,
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- so crucial to the prosecution - fell apart. Throughout the period he absconded, 
Williams remained confident police acted illegally in obtaining positive nitro-glycerin 
samples from his car. This, he attributed to an over-heard conversation between 
Detective Chief Inspector John Hughes and a junior officer. On being informed that 
traces of explosives had recorded a negative reading, Hughes, Williams alleged, 
robustly instructed a further sample to be taken until the desired reading was 
achieved. Moreover, in the apparent expectation of locating traces of explosives, rags 
containing nitro-glycerin were smeared upon the car’s door handles, horn, windows, 
boot and steering wheel. Yet, remarkably, officers failed to take a sample from the 
handbrake or the indicator. The oversight proved decisive, as Williams was cleared of 
the charge against him .221 Kathleen Quaid, Williams’ travelling companion at the 
time of his arrest at Birmingham airport, failed to hear the verdict. Having instructed 
two female jurors she approached in the toilet to find Williams not guilty, she was 
ordered not to attend.222 Owain Williams was non-committal when later asked if was 
actively involved in the militant campaign. On the grounds he was not prosecuted for
99 Tany such charge, he would remain tight-lipped.
Abergwesyn
Three days after Owain Williams’ apprehension at Birmingham airport, over the 
August bank holiday weekend, some 50 members of the FWA attended a training 
exercise near Abergwesyn. Jointly organized by Gethin ap Iestyn and Cayo Evans, in 
2009, ap Iestyn outlined why the decision had been reached to ‘undertake manoeuvres 
in the Welsh mountains’. It was, he declared, two fold: ‘to draw volunteers together’ 
and to hopefully ensure ‘in the very least, a cadre’ would be equipped to ‘undertake 
disruptive and wrecking’ measures at the investiture the following July. Asked to 
develop the point, ap Iestyn added that attending combatants had received instruction 
regarding the basic principles of urban warfare. This had included how to assemble 
and successfully launch missiles such as stones, bottles and smoke and petrol bombs.
of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Prestatyn.
221
Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 March 2004.
222 WM, 6 November 1968.
223 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 7 April 2009. On leaving court, Williams 
approached Det. Chief Inspector John Hughes his hand extended in a gesture o f conciliation. It 
followed an earlier pronouncement by Hughes, that whoever won the case, the other should accept the 
decision. To his credit, Williams remarked, ‘Hughes shook my hand’. A junior colleague refused to 
do likewise.
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Yet, of one thing Gethin ap Iestyn remained steadfast: the focus of this agitation 
would be the procession itself and not members of the public.224 The principle was 
roundly endorsed by another prominent figure in the anti-investiture lobby, Dafydd y 
Dug. Having been instrumental in organising Cymdeithas Llywelyn (The Llywelyn 
Society), y Dug nevertheless considered ‘violence against the person’ to be wholly 
‘unjustifiable’.225
However, despite his best intentions, Gethin ap Iestyn failed to arrive. This, 
he remarked witheringly, had been the fault, he believed, of his co-organiser. Having 
temporarily put aside his scepticism for the FWA, he had suggested Cayo Evans make 
the necessary arrangements and surreptitiously contact those likely to be interested in 
attending. Evans had set about his task with military zeal, so much so, that he might 
‘as well have placed an advert in Y CymroV, ap Iestyn discerned sardonically. His 
energy’s had ensured an inevitable heavy police presence in the area. A fact, ap 
Iestyn soon recognized, when picked up hitchhiking en route for Abergwesyn by two 
men he quickly established were inconspicuous Special Branch officers. Wishing to 
wrong-foot his hosts as to his true reason for being in mid-Wales, ap Iestyn asked to 
be dropped off some ten miles beyond Llanwrtyd. There, he had intended to take the 
mountain road to Abergwesyn. Forced to retrace his journey, he arrived to observe 
from the vantage point of a pub window, ‘loads of uniformed officers being picked up 
in the town square’. When ‘the coast was clear’, he walked in the direction of the 
camp site, before, Tost in the dark’, he abandoned the idea and ‘slept rough’. The 
following morning, having hitchhiked to Cayo Evans’ home, Gethin ap Iestyn was 
regaled with ‘the epic tale’ of the FWA’s ‘retreat from the camp site’ while followed
99 Ain hot pursuit by police.
Later, Denis Coslett revealed an attempt to infiltrate the gathering had been 
made by under-cover police officer Jack Lavery. Pristine camping gear had 
immediately aroused the suspicion of the FWA, who had inimically enquired after the
224 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 24 January 2008; also, 20 August 2009. The 
group held an earlier exercise in the Brecon Beacons.
25 Interview between WT & Dafydd y Dug, 20 May 2004.
226 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 24 January 2008; also, 20 August 2009. Cayo 
Evans distributed notices imploring ‘prepared...volunteers of the Army to report to Llanwrtyd Wells 
on Saturday, 31 August...at 12 noon’. They were instructed ‘to walk along the Abergwesyn road...on 
which they would be approached by ‘Special pick-up drivers’... Attendees would be asked ‘the way to 
Abbey Cwm Hir’, to which they would reply: ‘Llewelyn rest in peace’. Above all, volunteers were 
urged ‘not to arouse suspicions or draw attention’ to themselves. Anti-investiture literature received by 
WT from Gethin ap Iestyn. The group’s retreat from the camp, was, ap Iestyn declared, arguably ‘the
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strangers’ identity. He was, they were informed, ‘from Cardiff and ‘in Geth’s 
column’. As talk around the camp fire turned to hanging the unfortunate Lavery, he 
made good his escape by claiming he would leave and return with ap Iestyn in order 
to authenticate his presence. Not unsurprisingly, he failed to return. Indeed, the next 
time, Coslett and the FWA saw Jack (dubbed by Cayo Evans ‘Lavatory’) Lavery, was 
the following April, when the police officer appeared as a prosecution witness during 
the so-called ‘Free Wales Army trial’.227
The Abergwesyn training course was dismissed as ‘a farce’, by attendee 
Dafydd y Dug, while Glyn Rowlands ‘stayed away’, having ‘finally decided to
99Qdistance’ himself. Another who declined his invitation to attend was Lyn 
Ebenezer; who in 2006, explained he was ‘no longer running around’ with the FWA 
at this point. His decision was fuelled by a prior realization that the ‘atmosphere had 
changed’. Where once, he believed, the FWA had been indulged and tolerated as an 
ineffectual oddity, the impending investiture had sharpened attitudes. Henceforth, the 
authorities, he suspected, were more than willing to remove from the nation’s streets, 
any perceived threat to its likely success. His subsequent efforts to draw Cayo Evans’ 
attention to the ever expanding hole the group was digging for itself was robustly 
rebuffed. Consequently, the collision course between the Free Wales Army and the 
British Establishment was set for its inevitable conclusion. Moreover, all the 
evidence required to take leading figures of the group to trial, was provided by an 
article in the Sunday Telegraph. ‘It was all there’, Ebenezer exclaimed ebulliently. 
Its publication ensured the arrest of prominent FWA figures was ‘just a matter of 
time’.230
In the Sunday Telegraph feature, compiled by attendee John Summers and 
entitled Time Bomb Ticking in Wales, the FWA demonstrated its ability to construct 
bombs and trotted out its hackneyed threats and claims. Nonetheless, there was new 
material to add to its ever-expanding police dossier. It now belonged to the 
International Celtic Army, with links to the IRA, the Quebec Liberation Front, the 
Breton Liberation Movement and ETA. Furthermore, with the advent of its 
sophisticated Hurricane Bomb’, no government office or installation - including
FWA’s greatest moment’.
227
WM, 30 April 1969; also, interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
228 Interview between WT & Dafydd y Dug, 20 May 2004.
229
Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004.
230
Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
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those ‘in Whitehall’ - was ‘safe’. Those politicians intent on ‘killing Wales’, warned 
a foreboding Denis Coslett, would be ‘assassinated’. As for the investiture, the Free 
Wales Army, Summers was grimly informed, had ‘plans’ which would ‘make the 
whole world hold its breath’. However, unable to conclude the interview with John 
Summers without a modicum of frivolity, Denis Coslett called upon Harold Wilson
991‘to hold peace talks aboard a coracle on the river Teifi’. Unknown to Coslett, or the 
FWA, a police surveillance team photographed the training manoeuvres. A 
comprehensive record of the weekend’s events later appeared as evidence for the
999prosecution at their trial.
Approached to comment on the police enquiry, an un-named senior Welsh 
Crime Squad officer cited the Welsh public as posing the ‘greatest difficulty’; having 
continually failed to provide invaluable ‘evidence’ as to ‘the movements of known 
extremists on the night of a bomb outrage. It did not’, the officer declared sombrely, 
‘auger well for a guilty conviction, should those responsible be tried before a Welsh 
jury’.233
It was a claim given significant credence by John Jenkins, when in 2007, he 
recalled on returning with Alders to Wrexham following a militant operation, their car 
had unexpectedly ‘stalled to a halt’. Their increasing anxiety was heightened when a 
young couple stopped to assist them. However, to their surprise and considerable 
relief, the couple failed to come forward when police subsequently appealed for 
information regarding strangers or noteworthy incidents in the area. Moreover, 
Jenkins added, although ‘never reported; at least in Wales’, he and Alders were ‘seen 
on a number of occasions’ when undertaking reconnaissance missions.234
Following media reports of the Abergwesyn training weekend, concern was 
raised at the very echelon of government administration as to how the FWA might be 
legally addressed. Yet, as Home Office advisers began to scour judicial precedent as 
a means to discover how an assault on the group might be deployed, a key event about 
to unfold in the campaign of Welsh militant activism ensured its inevitable down-fall.
231 Sunday Telegraph Supplement, 6 September 1968.
232 WM, 8 August 2009.
233 Sunday Telegraph Supplement, 6 September 1968.
234 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
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Pembrey
If a solitary event all but ensured the demise of the Free Wales Army, it occurred 
Monday, 9 September 1968, at RAF Pembrey in Carmarthenshire; when forty-two- 
year-old Warrant Officer William Houghham, received significant injuries, while 
attempting to remove a suspect device. Placed in a shoe-box on the table in a ground 
floor radio room, it was found by twenty-one-year-old, Senior Aircraftsman, Marshall 
Grey. Having telephoned his superior officer to inform him of his discovery, Grey 
directed Officer Hougham to the package, before declaring his intention to leave the 
room. As he reached the door, the silence was shattered, as the device activated on 
being picked it up by Officer Hougham. Despite sustaining appalling injuries to his
937hands, face and chest, William Hougham was fortunate, declared retired Deputy 
Chief Constable, John Owen Evans, ‘in that as he picked it up, he held it upside down 
and the explosion went away from him’. Nevertheless, admitted to hospital in 
Carmarthen, surgeons admitted it unlikely any more than ‘two fingers might be 
saved’.
As police appealed ‘for help’ and conceded the attack appeared ‘well 
planned’, it also speculated the bomb was planted by a couple who walked across the
239sands from the direction of Cefn Sidan, before breaking a window to gain entry. If 
some questioned the logic of removing by hand such a device,240 many more 
recognised the airman’s bravery and the connection - albeit unproven - of the link 
between the explosion and Welsh nationalism.241
The perpetrators, denounced George Thomas, were ‘a cowardly bunch’, who 
crept ‘up in the night to do their dirty work’. Yet, the decision of the Secretary of 
State to both embark on a helicopter flight from St. Athan to the RAF station, just
235 WM, 10 September 1968.
236 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 April 2009. ‘To my knowledge, it 
(explosion at Pembrey) was nothing to do with the FWA’. Telephone interview between WT & 
Vernon Griffiths, 23 June 2009.
237 WM, 10 September 1968. In the explosion, doors in the ground floor o f the No.2 Control Tower
were ripped from their hinges and windows, furniture and radio equipment shattered.
238
Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 April 2009.
239 WM, 10 September 1968. The station was closed at the weekend. ‘It was almost impossible for
anyone to see them’ declared a police source.
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. Despite regretting Hougham’s
injuries, they were Coslett added, ‘his fault’.
241 WM, 10 September 1968. ‘He must have realized the dangers’, remarked a police spokesman; ‘only 
a brave man would attempt to take it out o f the building’. Also, The Times, 12 September 1968. Plaid 
Cymru feared ‘the connection will be fairly soon established’, between the blast and nationalism, 
claimed The Times editorial.
253
hours after the unfortunate William Hougham sustained his injuries and to later visit 
him in hospital,242 was greeted with derisory calls of ‘repugnant’ hypocrisy by 
nationalists. How often, later remarked a disdainful Gwynfor Evans, had Thomas 
taken it upon himself to visit the home of a miner injured underground? But then, 
Evans added pointedly, in such circumstances the Labour Minster was unable to 
‘blame Plaid Cymru’. Nonetheless, for all the predictable political detraction, 
extremists shared their revulsion at William Hougham’s tragic predicament.243
As an official Plaid Cymru statement declared ‘all responsible’ Welsh people 
would ‘react with disgust’ to the explosion at Pembrey; that those responsible were 
attempting to ‘rule by terror’ and should be ‘turned over’ to the authorities,244 within 
hours of the blast, several members of the FWA were questioned by police at 
Carmarthen. On his release, in an interview with the BBC, Cayo Evans attempted to 
distance both himself and the broader nationalist movement from the incident. The 
explosion, he believed, was ‘non-political’ in nature; the entire aspect of the incident 
was completely at odds with any action previously undertaken; including, as far as 
Evans could ascertain from media reports, the construction of the device itself. He 
was subject to such a lengthy interview by police, owing to the position he enjoyed of 
knowing the ‘pattern of nationalism’ and the contemporary ‘political feeling’ in 
Wales. Notwithstanding, less sympathetic observers opined, the fact that Evans had 
hitherto appeared happy to take much of the credit for erstwhile attacks. 
Nevertheless, the police, Evans added reposefully, established from the earliest stages 
of the questioning that neither he nor his ‘organization’ was involved.245
What Cayo Evans failed to mention, was that he had been interviewed by Jock
242 WM, 10 September 1968. Both in the UK and when stationed in Aden, William Hougham had 
‘handled unexploded bombs’. WM, 13 September 1968. George Thomas refused to contemplate the 
suggestion the investiture might be marred by violence. ‘We must not let this situation develop’, he 
announced. ‘Violence will not determine policy...the investiture must go on’. There was ‘growing 
evidence’, Thomas declared earnestly ‘the investiture was popular with the overwhelming majority of  
Welsh people’. If so, others appeared less certain. ‘Opposition’, declared the Mayor o f Cardiff, 
‘should not be underestimated’. TNA, PREM 13/2360. Minutes o f Investiture Committee Meeting 
(3rd), 9 October 1968. Despite William Hougham’s misgivings, a fund orchestrated by the mayor of  
Kidwelly reached £100. CJ, 4 October 1968. Warrant Officer Hougham was discharged from hospital
over the weekend, 20 October 1968. CJ, 25 October 1968.
243 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. Also interview between WT & 
Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; between WT & Dafydd y Dug, 20 May 2004; between WT & Glyn
Rowlands, 22 March 2004 & between WT & John Jenkins, 15 May 2009.
244 Carmarthen Times, 11 September 1968.
245 BBC News, 10 September 1968; also, CT, 11 September 1968. ‘It is a senseless act...which we 
deplore’. Evans told journalist Richard Whitmore. ‘The FWA was as surprised as anyone when news 
of the explosion broke’.
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Wilson, the head of the newly convened Shrewsbury unit. Although the decision to 
assemble the squad had been taken two months earlier, following the proposal by 
Frank Williamson, HM Inspector of Constabulary (Crime) - which called for a hand- 
picked police unit with its operational headquarters just over the border in England, to 
be led by officers of the Metropolitan Police experienced in counter-terrorism - the 
need to implement Williamson’s recommendations were brought sharply into focus 
by the explosion at RAF Pembrey. It was, the authorities were painfully aware, the 
ninth sabotage incident to rock Wales in the past two-and-a-half-years.
Asked to identify the Shrewsbury unit’s ‘terms of reference’, Raymond 
Kendall, the squads junior officer, declared its main objective - with the forthcoming 
investiture very much in mind - was to establish, collate and evaluate centrally, 
information and intelligence being received concerning individuals considered likely 
involved in militant activism.246 To this end, Welsh-speaker John Owen Evans had 
primarily liaised with Welsh-speaking colleagues throughout Wales.247 However, 
Raymond Kendall also believes it was the explosion at Pembrey, which first saw John 
Jenkins enter the police inquiry. The Shrewsbury unit, Kendall revealed, received 
‘from an informant, information that this guy existed and that he was connected to the 
military; because up until then we didn’t really know’. Yet, ‘on the basis of that 
information it didn’t seem significant. Of course, as we now know’, Kendall added 
ruefully, ‘later on that was not the case’.248 If it appears that Jenkins’ military 
credentials ensured he was ‘above suspicion’, his emergence in the police inquiry at 
this juncture is nonetheless a suggestion disputed by John Owen Evans. He claims 
police suspected nothing of Jenkins’ involvement until after the investiture; remarking 
that only then was Jenkins ‘on police radar’.249
246 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 9 August 2009. ‘Unlike the Welsh regional 
crime squads, the Shrewsbury unit’, Kendall added, ‘did not have an independent investigative role’. 
Furthermore, the number o f personnel did not permit it. Consequently, it performed more o f a 
‘support’ function. Despite Jock Wilson being granted ‘certain powers in relation to incidents’, he did
not have ‘total authority for all investigations’.
247 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001; also, telephone interview, 23 
March 2006. ‘I was’, remarked Evans, ‘the senior Welsh-speaking officer in Shrewsbury. I would act 
as a liaison officer with the forces involved in the interest o f  a particular person. For instance, I might 
go and speak to someone in North Wales police about a particular individual on their patch. 
Shrewsbury was in essence a collating centre. If a particular region wanted or had information on a 
particular individual, we would analyse the information and pass it on to the force concerned’.248
Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 2 August 2009. According to his 
‘recollection’, it was following ‘the Pembray (sic) incident’ that information was received ‘from an
informant’ that Jenkins ‘was possibly o f interest’.
249 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 August 2009.
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Two days after Cayo Evans was questioned at Carmarthen Police HQ with regard the 
explosion at RAF Pembrey, police divers from the Glamorgan Police sub-aqua team 
recovered arms and munitions from Maesllyn near Tregaron.250 Surprised at their 
discovery, Denis Coslett was informed by Cayo Evans that he had ‘made a deal with 
Jock Wilson about the Pembrey bomb’. Evans claimed that Jock Wilson had 
threatened unless he co-operated and gave up the group’s weaponry, ‘he would be put 
in jail for life’ and ‘everything’ taken ‘off him including his farm and his children’. In 
a bid to save face, it was allegedly agreed the FWA’s leading spokesman would ‘place 
the arms in plastic bags and throw them in the lake’. In return for doing so, despite 
Evans not knowing ‘anything’ about the blast, he was allegedly assured the Free 
Wales Army would not be ‘charged’ or considered ‘responsible’ for the explosion. It 
was, Coslett informed his friend and co-conspirator: ‘a silly thing to do’; the 
authorities, he continued gravely, would ‘be coming one morning to arrest’ them ‘all’. 
Quietly, Evans responded that he was aware of the likely outcome of his action. They 
now had, Coslett added, ‘all the evidence to commit us to trial’. The decision by 
Cayo Evans to undertake this strategic course, did not cause ill-feeling between them, 
but Evans ‘shouldn’t have done it’. On the other hand, by doing so, Coslett declared, 
it ensured the group’s arrest and its ‘place in history'. The issue of a ‘deal’ was later 
to play a pivotal role in the trial of the FWA, with Jock Wilson dismissing out of hand 
Coslett’s claim he ‘went back on his word’.251
Unsurprisingly, the suggestion of plea bargaining is rejected as fanciful by 
former Shrewsbury Unit figure, John Owen Evans. Present when Cayo Evans was 
questioned, the ‘story’ had evolved, he believed, because ‘a day or two’ following 
Evans’ interview, ‘a telephone call was received stating if we looked in a certain lake 
we would find the arms’. However, John Evans added, ‘there was no ‘deal as such; 
because that implies you give something in return, like not to prosecute’. The 
location of the weapons was of obvious importance, but officers were unaware who 
‘made the call’. There were, the former detective thought, ‘two or three others who 
knew where the arms were, so any one of them might have’. It was possible Cayo
250 The Times, 13 September 1968; also, WM, 13 September 1968. The weapons included: a Sten sub­
machine gun, a Mauser Parabellum machine pistol, a Service-type .38 revolver, plus 31 rounds of  
ammunition.
251
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also, 10 March 2001. Allegedly 
dubbed by Cayo Evans and Jock Wilson, Operation Arthur, Evans had thrown ‘the weapons in the lake 
as Arthur threw his sword in the lake’. It was, Coslett believed, ‘the Celtic way’.
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Evans had instructed one such confidante to do so. As the call was also made from a 
kiosk, it was impossible to establish the identity of the person responsible. It was 
likely it had been declared ‘anonymous’ within police records.
In answer to the claim that Cayo Evans was subjected to a degree of ‘pressure’ 
when questioned, John Owen Evans was again disparaging. It was well established in 
police circles, Evans declared, ‘that Cayo and Denis Coslett would make up stories 
afterwards, bravado that sort of thing, about how they’d been treated’. Regarding the 
interview following the Pembrey explosion, Cayo had been ‘interviewed as any other 
criminal would be interviewed’. As serving officers, it was their duty to ask:
“where are the arms?”. It is possible Jock Wilson said: “come on now Cayo, you’ve had a 
good run; stop now before someone gets hurt or killed”. But there would be no point in 
leaning too heavily on a suspect, because if  you made ‘threats’, you could not produce the 
evidence.
It was essential to the inquiry, Evans continued, ‘to recover evidence in a fair way’. 
Photographs of the weapons had been included in the Sunday Express article just 
weeks before. Despite his initially denying the group possessed weaponry, during his 
interview with investigating officers, Cayo Evans had been shown these photographs. 
The fact ‘we located the arms then became evidence’, Evans explained, although, he 
could not recall if it was ultimately ‘proved the arms did belong to the Free Wales 
Army’.252
Subsequently embroiled in the incident was Lyn Ebenezer. The age-old 
Anglo/Norman policy of ‘divide and rule’ was alive and well, as police, Ebenezer 
maintained, in an attempt to fragment opinion and undermine trust, circulated 
rumours that he notified officers of the weapons whereabouts. Knowing ‘full well 
that Cayo had done if ,  he did not give ‘a damn’.253 Yet, if some sympathized with 
Cayo Evans’ unenviable position, to others, FWA claims of an apparent Quid Pro 
Quo ‘deal’ with Jock Wilson, simply exemplified the group’s naive failure to grasp 
the full implications of its actions and to understand how the machinations of state 
policing functioned. Interestingly however, it was not only those sympathetic to the 
FWA who alleged shadowy compromises, as the Sunday Telegraph reported a ‘secret
252 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 23 March 2006. ‘I don’t know if  it was 
Cayo who telephoned to say about the arms. I don’t think it was’, Evans remarked. One photograph in 
the Sunday Express article featured a tree J. O. Evans recognized as being at Strata Florida. It was this
which ensured the link.
253 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 18 June 2006. He too believed ‘Wilson stitched them up’. 
Cayo Evans later claimed Jock Wilson’s exact words were: ‘if  you throw the guns in the lake we won’t
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deal’ was reached.254 It was a development in the investigation into Welsh 
militanism, which John Owen Evans later regarded with unease. This was because all 
subsequent suggestions of ‘a deal’ and speculation of ‘a fix’ abounded, due to the 
establishment of the Shrewsbury unit and Jock Wilson’s secondment and involvement 
in the inquiry. On reflection, John Owen Evans surmised, ‘it might have been better 
if the local force had taken it on’.255
Also apparently in the dark as to the precise chain of events was the FWA’s 
Swansea commandant, Vivian Davies. In an interview with BBC Radio Wales, the 
impetuous Davies announced an ‘enquiry’ would be held to determine the identity of 
the person responsible for ‘giving up’, the movement’s arms. If found guilty, he 
would be ‘brought to Justice’ and dealt with accordingly. As to the degree of 
disciplinary action to be employed, it would, Davies added solemnly be ‘instant 
death’. Furthermore, this threat extended to ‘all members’ of the group, irrespective 
of seniority.256
Asked to throw light on his father’s actions, Rhodri Evans declared it possible 
that Cayo was ‘frightened; scared what they (authorities) might do. He always said he 
threw them in the lake to show their strength. That such was the quantity they 
possessed, ‘they could throw that lot of old stuff away’. Nevertheless, his father’s 
interest in guns had perhaps been a factor. He liked to ‘do them up’ Rhodri Evans 
disclosed. ‘It was a hobby he had’.257 It was an interest which soon caught the eye of 
roving detective John Owen Evans. A regular visitor to Gian Denys, ‘just to have a 
little chat about how the army was progressing’, John Owen Evans also revealed that 
Cayo Evans enjoyed repairing and firing ‘starting pistols, just to see the smoke go up’. 
It was a fascination which led the police officer to deduce that ‘in many ways’, Cayo 
Evans possessed ‘a lower mental age’ than his 31 years might suggest.258 As for his
arrest you; that’ll be the end o f it’.
254 Sunday Telegraph, 29 September 1968.
255 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2000. Intimating that Welsh police had 
discounted a link between the blast and the FWA, regional officers, Evans added, ‘had spoken to these 
people (C. Evans and D. Coslett etc) before’. Yet, the Shrewsbury unit’s involvement enabled ‘people 
to .jump to conclusions’.
BBC Radio Wales, Good Morning Wales, 13 September 1968. Interview with FWA member, 
Vivian George Davies. Trial o f Free Wales Army. Document Folder, pages 115-203, p. 199. Denis 
Coslett private papers.
Interview between WT & Rhodri Evans, 28 February 2006.
258 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001. Cayo Evans appeared ‘more like 
16 or 17’, stated J. O. Evans. A police report compiled in 1967 suggested ‘about 12 years’. TNA, 
DPP2/4455. Report on William Edward Julian Cayo Evans. C.R.O. No.43958/66.
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thoughts on the matter, interviewed shortly before his death, Cayo Evans comically 
declared the weapons to be ‘so old, any museum would have been glad of them’. 
However, the calibre and potency of the arms suggests something more serious. 
Certainly, events in Northern Ireland at this juncture may provide an explanation. On 
21 September 1968, the Belfast Telegraph published a report that arms stolen from 
depots in the Irish Republic were smuggled into Wales. Moreover, two recent bank
96nraids in Eire were also undertaken to finance the FWA. Later commenting that 
‘links’ between the two groups did exist and the IRA was ‘very generous’, Denis 
Coslett nonetheless did not ‘think’ this generosity extended to arms and weaponry,
9 6 1but had rather taken the form of financial support.
During the war, RAF Pembrey played an important role as a fighter station. 
By 1968, it was used for target and dive-bombing practice by trainer aircraft from 
RAF Chivenor in Devon. In recent years, it was the focus of considerable 
consternation from local farmers and the townspeople of Kidwelly, owing to the 
number of ‘low flying’ exercises. This, officers soon determined - irrespective of the
969arms cache discovered in Maesllyn - held the secret for the militant action. In 
2000, Denis Coslett revealed the RAF was warned it ‘would have a problem to think 
about’ unless the low-flying exercises were halted. The ‘hearing of children was 
being affected’; the elderly ‘were frightened’ and ‘cattle were aborting’ due to the 
sudden, piercing noise. Yet, despite an initial admission that ‘a bomb was put there’
259
Only Yesterday, HTV Wales Production. Screened 1995.
260 Belfast Telegraph, 21 September 1968. The article was entitled Special Branch investigates 
IRA/FWA liaison. Cathal Goulding, the Official IRA chief o f staff, was reported as having given the 
FWA the guns held in store by the IRA. In May 1969, as passions threatened to ignite a powder keg in 
Northern Ireland, IRA leaders in Belfast visited Dublin to seek from the army council ‘large supplies o f  
arms without delay’. The request was not granted. The IRA was discovered to be almost demilitarized. 
This was due to most o f its weapons having been sold to Welsh nationalists and a chronic lack o f funds. 
Tim Pat Coogan, I.R.A. (London, 1993), p.333.
261 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also, 10 March 2001 and, 21 
November 2003. In response to whether the claim o f activist collusion had substance, Denis Coslett 
chuckled and while slightly shaking his head and shrugging his shoulders declared, ‘No...I don't think 
so...I don't know’. Also, FWA: Ir Gad, Zenana Production. Screened S4C, 1999. ‘The IRA spread the 
rumour it had armed the FWA, but whether it was started by the ‘Officials’ or the ‘Provos’, not to 
mention why, is anyone’s guess’. Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 23 October 2010.
2 2^The Times, 11 September 1968; also, WM, 12 September 1968. Police considered ‘a local man with 
a grudge against low-flying jets’ responsible. Having initially included the midlands and the west 
country, police soon concentrated on the immediate west Wales area. Owing, Jock Wilson announced, 
to the indication the saboteurs had ‘considerable local knowledge’. WM, 11 September 1968. Yet, in 
2004, resident Stella O’Brien claimed investigating officers were informed townspeople harboured no 
animosity for the exercises. This, despite a plane having crashed near Kidwelly twelve months before 
the explosion. TNA, AIR 2/18360. Local reactions to RAF use o f Pembrey Range. 1968 - 1971.
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and the Royal Air Force was contacted informing it of such,263 Coslett later amended 
his statement, conceding the FWA ultimatum was not acted upon.264 Asked if he 
might illuminate the matter, John Jenkins categorically denied MAC’s involvement. 
Furthermore, during its campaign of militant action, the movement used gelignite, not
9 ASgun-powder. Frederick Alders was deeply disturbed by the explosion at RAF 
Pembrey. On arriving at Jenkins’ home to formally renounce all further involvement 
in the militant campaign, Alders was placated by Jenkins and assured it was ‘not one’
of their ‘crowd’. What was more, MAC activists, Jenkins insisted, were ‘expert’ and
266rigorously ensured no innocent party suffered physical harm.
However, speaking in 2009 about the Pembrey blast, Gethin ap Iestyn was 
more circumspect. Having denied any personal involvement, he nonetheless believed 
it an operation foolhardily undertaken by rogue nationalists. Moreover, the 
perpetrators ‘made a stupid mistake’ 267 It was not a view shared by the FWA’s 
leading apologist, R. O. F. Wynne of Garthewin Hall. During an interview on the 
BBC’s late-evening television programme 24 Hours, Wynne was asked to comment 
on whom he believed responsible. While no prosecutions had been achieved 
concerning the explosions for some three years, he declared, to intimate a group’s 
responsibility was prejudicial. Nevertheless, ‘history’ suggested a subject people who 
attempted to attain their ‘rightful status’ through ‘constitutional methods’ alone ‘failed 
in their endeavours’. It was necessary to ‘throw half a brick at John Bull’s top hat’ 
before he took ‘the least notice’. As to whether he was prepared to plant a bomb for 
Wales, he was, R. O. F. Wynne believed, ‘too old for that sort of thing’. If however 
he felt it ‘his duty’, he would have ‘to pull up’ his ‘socks and do something’.
263 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
264 „ Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 10 March 2001. Efforts to receive the official account o f
the blast were curtailed in 2009, when an attempt to invoke the Freedom of Information Act proved
unsuccessful. So too did contact with the National Archives, Ministry of Defence and Dyfed Powys
Police, which maintained a retention policy of ‘seven years’ existed with regard ‘incidents’.
Correspondence from Heather Hughes, Head of Data Protection, Dyfed Powys Police to WT, dated, 6
May 2009. The application also failed to meet Section 7 of the D. P. Act, which allowed ‘the release o f
personal data o f which that individual is the data subject’. The National Archives and Ministry o f
Defence claimed not to have the official account.
265 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007 & 20 November 
2008.
266 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders.
267 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009. Denis Coslett also believed ‘nationalists’ 
responsible. There was one thing for sure, he added, he ‘didn’t do it’, nor ‘give the command to do it’. 
However, he was not prepared ‘to say any more’. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 
December 2000.
268 24 Hours, BBC Production. Screened 10 September 1968; also, CT, 13 September 1968.
260
Despite the overwhelming denouncement which followed Wynne’s remarks, not all 
joined increasing calls for his expulsion from Plaid Cymru. On being informed of 
Wynne’s comments, Saunders Lewis wrote congratulating him on his ‘courageous
Oldspeech’. In the October edition of Barn, outraged at the decision of the party 
hierarchy not to formally oppose the investiture, Lewis went further still. Plaid 
Cymru’s failure to prevent Tryweryn and Clywedog, wrested solely at the door of the 
party leaders’ pacifism. Furthermore, its parliamentary ‘pointlessness’ and reverence 
for ‘England’s constitution’ would ensure Plaid Cymru’s quiescent demise. To 
inform the Welsh electorate that independence could be achieved through ‘painless 
voting’ was self-deceptive and mendacious. You could not, Lewis added 
mischievously, ‘make an omelette without breaking eggs’. Even for Saunders Lewis, 
it was remarkably provocative. Yet, there was worse to come. ‘The only way 
forward’, he declared portentously, ‘was to make the governance of Wales too 
expensive and too liable to provoke anger and mockery across the world’.272 It was a 
summation comprehensively embraced by republican militants across the Irish Sea. 
Not surprisingly, for the remarks, Saunders Lewis was roundly condemned by Plaid 
Cymru,273 but toasted by the Cayo Evans as ‘the greatest man alive in Wales’.274
Having established the explosion at Pembrey was caused by black gunpowder 
and not ‘eight sticks of gelignite’ as initially thought,275 the investigation into the blast 
took a dramatic and unexpected turn when a cache of identical material was 
discovered in the chimney flute of a derelict house in Bynea (near Llanelli).
269 WM, 12 September 1968; also, LDP, 12 September 1968, p .l. Having asked for a transcript of the
interview, the Plaid Cymru leadership later decided to take no action.
270 Hazel Walford Davies, Saunders Lewis A Theatr Garthewin (Llandysul, 1995), p.371. Letter to R. 
O. F. Wynne, dated 18 September 1968. ‘Plaid Cymru’, wrote Lewis, ‘is all out for costless popularity;
it is a grave deterioration’.
271 Y Cymro, 26 September 1968. The resolution was ‘left on the table’ in order to avoid tension and 
so that Gwynfor Evans could ‘claim party unity’. For the party’s reasons, see also, Gwynfor Evans,
For the Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 2001), p. 194.
272 Barn, Rhif 61-72, 1967-1968, p.314. Any ‘means’, declared Lewis, which hindered the 
irresponsible violence o f English corporations upon Wales was ‘wholly just’...‘so long as Welsh blood 
and not English blood’ was spilt. Ned Thomas, The Welsh Extremist (Talybont, 1973), p.69; also, Y
Cymro, 17 October 1968.
273 WM, 10 October 1968. Lewis had no ‘active part in practical politics for over a quarter o f a 
century’, stated Edward Millward; also, WM, 7 November 1968. Lewis should ‘not look to England as
an enemy’, declared Dr. Gareth Evans.
274 Film entitled Welsh Nationalism. Compiled September 1968. Exhibit 81. Trial o f the FWA and 
anti-investiture campaigners. Lewis, added Evans, was ‘worthy o f a better country and a prouder 
people’.
75 CT, 13 September 1968; also, WM, 12 September 1968. The error had resulted in the explosive 
black powder being siphoned into eight paper tubes, in preparation for the assault.
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Weighing between ‘one and two pounds’, it was placed in several small cloth bags 
and wrapped in ten of the fourteen pages of a copy of the Western Mail, dated 5 
September. In a bid to seek shelter, a tramp entered the house and was about to light 
a fire, when he noticed the package protruding. As he groped inside the flute, the 
bags fell into the grate.276 It was soon determined the copy of the Western Mail was 
among ‘one of the first 10,000 copies of the West Edition’; this was established, 
owing to a slight difference in ink intensity. Police immediately contacted all
9 7 7newsagents in the area which received the paper, hoping a lead might be provided.
It was to no avail. Later, as ‘a high level security conference was held in north
97kWales’, the gunpowder was traced to explosive materials produced at a Royal 
Ordnance Factory, which, until its closure four years earlier, had been sighted two 
miles from the RAF station at Pembrey.279
Despite this apparent breakthrough, the perpetrators remain unknown. The 
failure of the authorities to apprehend those responsible has led to much conjecture. 
RAF Pembrey was in comparative proximity to the home of at least one prominent 
peripheral nationalist figure. Nonetheless, it remains possible that a disgruntled local 
or rogue militant was responsible. It has also been suggested that there existed an 
internal RAF feud, with Denis Coslett citing the unsubstantiated claim that William 
Houghman was having an affair with a colleague’s wife.280 The identity of the tramp 
who discovered the gunpowder in Bynea is un-established, as is his apparent pattern 
of behaviour. A number of former militants allege that the device might have been 
planted by the security services at the behest of the British state, both to ensure the 
arrest of the FWA and to discredit the wider nationalist community before the
9k 1investiture. Asked whether he believed intelligence agents might deploy such a
276 Carmarthen Journal, 20 September 1968; also, WM, 18 September 1968. The house near Loughor 
Bridge had been empty for six weeks. Following the discovery, it was visited by Jock Wilson. Had the 
package ignited, the consequences, a police spokesman remarked, would have been ‘fatal’.
77 WM, 19 September 1968.
278 WM, 26 September 1968. More than 5,000 people were interviewed regarding the Pembrey 
explosion. CJ, 11 October 1968.
27 CJ, 27 September 1968; also, WM, 25 September 1968. At the height o f its operation, 3,350 were 
employed at the Ordnance Factory. Police believe a former employee smuggled out the materials 
before its closure. CJ, 4 October 1968, p .l. A further cache of the explosive powder was later 
discovered at the disused factory. WM, 1 October 1968.
280 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
281 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also, 10 March 2001; also Toni Lewis, 
20 May 2004. Pembrey was close to the Llanelli home of known nationalist and Abergwesyn attendee, 
Dai Bonar Thomas. In a search at his home, following his arrest, police discovered a timing device. 
Thomas was never charged with its possession.
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282strategy, a retired former senior police officer candidly declared he did not know. 
Once instrumental in the search for the saboteurs, John Owen Evans also veraciously 
claimed not to ‘think so’. Moreover, there was ‘no contact’, Evans maintained, ‘with 
MI5 as far as ‘Shrewsbury’ was concerned’. Yet, if  intelligence operatives were
JOA
responsible, as a number of former militants suggest, why did they not use 
gelignite? It would have heightened, rather than diminished, a possible connection to 
Welsh activism. It was, after all, well established by September 1968, that gelignite 
was the bombers ‘preferred’ choice of explosive material.
Despite the tantalizing supposition, the episode did not end there. In the 
weeks after the explosion at RAF Pembrey, Gwynfor Evans twice received 
correspondence from a vicar in the Midlands alleging the guilt of a parishioner. 
Unable to remain silent at the unjust manner with which the Welsh nationalist 
fraternity was being tarnished for the incident, the vicar felt compelled to contact the 
president of Plaid Cymru to inform him that a cadet, both known for being 
obsessively interested in explosions and fires - and crucially stationed at the RAF 
station at the time of the blast - was now an in-patient at an RAF psychiatric 
facility.285 Yet, would the unnamed English airman - if only stationed at the airbase 
for four days prior to the blast - have acquired such a degree of local knowledge?
Despite another potential breakthrough in the enquiry, efforts undertaken by 
Gwynfor Evans to raise the issue in parliament with the Secretary of State for Wales 
proved fruitless. Without compelling proof, George Thomas comfortably countered 
any possible link. What is more, he roundly condemned the suggestion as ‘the 
monstrous slur of an innocent man’.286 Possibly so, but nationalist claims of a ‘done 
deal’ may have been averted, had George Thomas responded favourably to Gwynfor 
Evans’ request to throw light ‘on the interrogation’ of the cadet by police. Such 
speculation was hardly undermined, when contacted by Evans and invited to his 
Llangadog home to discuss the matter further, Jock Wilson - having looked at the
282 Anonymous interview with WT, December 2008.283
Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 August 2009. ‘I’ve no information of
that’, stated J. O. Evans.
284 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 25 March 2004; also with John Jenkins, 19 October
2007 & 20 November 2008; also, with Glyn Rowlands, 20 March 2004
285 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. The length o f time the unnamed 
cadet was at Pembrey, was also relayed to Gwynfor Evans by the cleric.
286 Hansard V ol’ 774. Columns, 706 -707. 28 November 1968.
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letter - conceded mysteriously to knowing ‘all about it’.287 Whatever the truth, despite 
Jock Wilson’s beguiling, if terse admission, no one has yet been convicted, let alone 
tried, for the Pembrey blast. It remains, in common with many of the explosions 
which characterized this period in the nation’s past, an unresolved enigma.
Nevertheless, the forces required to obliterate the FWA were assembling. 
Notified of the Sunday Telegraph article, an increasingly concerned Harold Wilson - 
having earlier heeded advice that a prosecution might martyrize the group - contacted 
the Director of Public Prosecutions, demanding to know why action under the 1936 
Public Order Act, which proscribed the wearing of uniforms and the carrying of 
firearms, had not been taken. Days later, the final piece in the judicial jigsaw was 
provided with the discovery of the weapons in Maesllyn. Finally, the authorities had 
all it required to make a prima facie case against the Free Wales Army.
Speculation emerges that the state has ‘a card up its sleeve’
Despite the best efforts of the police, those responsible for yet another explosion had 
escaped detection. Consequently, members of the FWA became the focus of almost 
unprecedented police surveillance. Speaking in 2000, Denis Coslett remained 
convinced that officers assigned to the group ‘loved it’. Both the ‘overtime’ and the 
‘prestige’ of monitoring individuals having proved seductive. Nonetheless, it was
• O O Q
Detective Chief Inspector, John Owen Evans, the FWA regarded as its nemeses. 
Assigned to arrest Denis Coslett in September 1968, for firearms offences 
unconnected with the weapons discovered in Maesllyn, Coslett refused to comply 
until adorned in the uniform of the Free Wales Army.290 On returning resplendent to 
the living room, Coslett observed Evans ‘hunting through’ Avril Coslett’s handbag. 
With all the force he was renowned for, Coslett punched John Owen Evans in the 
face. Remarkably, no action was taken against the FWA man.291 On 10 October
287
Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
288
TNA, DPP/4455. E. Brampton (F2, Home Office Police Division) to J. F. Claxton, Department of 
the Director o f Public Prosecutions. Letter dated, 10 September 1968. On 7 October 1968, Gwynfor 
Evans wrote to Home Secretary, James Callaghan, also calling for the FWA to be proscribed. Rhys
Evans, Portrait o f  a Patriot (Talybont, 2008), p.296.
289 Interview between WT & Denis Colsett, 14 December 2000. Further claims by D. Coslett that 
three officers were dismissed for providing the FWA ‘information’ was refuted by J. O. Evans. A 
small number o f officers were ‘reprimanded for fiddling their expenses’, he retorted. Interview with 
WT, 19 February 2001.
290 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001.
291 Interview between WT & Denis Colsett, 14 December 2000; also telephone interview between WT
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1968, Denis Coslett, the ‘hot-headed, eccentric extremist’, was sentenced to three 
months imprisonment, on being found guilty of ‘uttering a forged document and 
making a false statement for the purpose of obtaining a firearm certificate’. Yet, of 
somewhat added surprise when considering the political climate, magistrates declared
'J Q 'J
the sentence ‘to run concurrently’ and be ‘suspended for two years’. It was the 
second occasion in which Coslett found himself in the dock in 1968. He was not 
alone. In July, Andrew John Morgan, known affectingly as the gorilla and Denis 
Coslett’s ‘bodyguard’, was fined £50 and given a three months suspended prison
993sentence on charges relating to the illegal possession of a firearm.
Following the announcement the FWA was now part of a Celtic conspiracy,294 
and the group’s notable appearance in Sweden’s leading newspaper Dagens
9Q^Nyheter, the ‘cat and mouse’ game with the authorities continued. In the
October/November edition of Y Ffrynt, the Patriotic Front’s mouthpiece publication, 
accusations of police aggression toward Denis Coslett and fellow ‘combatant’
9QARhobert ap Steffan were alleged. In 2002, Coslett responded to the charge that 
police officers physically assaulted him in custody, by conceding with a wry smile the 
experience had not been ‘too bad’; while furthermore, on reflection, he ‘probably
907asked for it’. Whatever the truth, having been arrested on 9 May for assaulting a 
police officer, Coslett was later fined £25. A charge of wilfully damaging a police
9QQ
station window was dropped.
In 2009, Rhobert ap Steffan described an altogether more invidious
& Avril Coslett, 8 March 2009.
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WM, 11 October 1968; also, CT, 11 October 1968. Coslett claimed that Dr. John Brooks, an 
Irishman whom he met at a St. Patrick’s Day Parade in Birmingham, agreed during a telephone 
conversation to sign his application form for a shot-gun certificate. Moreover, the form was delivered 
to the Dr. and returned signed to Coslett by an FWA courier. The Dr denied this series of events and 
dismissed Coslett’s claim he was a general in the FWA as ‘utter nonsense’. Dr. Brooks qualified as a 
doctor in the British army, having enlisted as ‘an other-ranker; digging trenches’ etc.293
The Times, 1 August 1968; also WM, 1 August 1968.
294 The Times, 26 October 1968. It was claimed the Celtic League was established to ‘finance,
encourage, equip and assist’ all those who ‘desired national freedom’.
295 Dagens Nyheter Supplement, 22 September 1968. The article written by Kurt Malarstedt, pondered 
how long the FWA would be ‘allowed to carry on its activities o f terror’. It also alleged Cayo Evans 
planned to discharge ‘tar and feathers from a helicopter’ over the investiture ceremony and the 
activities o f the ‘very extremist MAC’ comprised o f ‘six men’ had caused police disquiet. Exhibit 83. 
Trial o f FWA and anti-investiture campaigners.
296
YFfrynt, Hydref/Tachwedd 1968. (October/November).
297
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
298 Llanelli Star, 29 June 1968. Coslett was approached by officers as he waited outside Llanelli Town 
Hall to hear the local election results. Ordered to remove his ‘illegal’ FWA insignia, Coslett instructed 
an officer to likewise remove his ‘imperialist badge’. In the ensuing melee Coslett was arrested. He
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encounter. Arrested in Aberystwyth, not for urinating in public as the article in Y 
Ffrynt suggests, but for allegedly tipping sand into the petrol tank of a police car, ap 
Steffan was arrested at his lodgings and escorted to the station. There, police claimed 
a sample of sand was discovered beneath his finger nails. Having denied all 
responsibility for the offence, ap Steffan continues to utterly refute this. What ap 
Steffan claims next transpired, cannot be corroborated. Yet, he vehemently 
maintains to have been ‘beaten black and blue’ during a ‘sustained beating’. Quick 
to establish ‘local Aber’ Bobbys were not responsible’, but rather detectives 
unknown to him; they were, ap Steffan added incongruously ‘also drunk’.
When the case came to trial, Rhobert ap Steffan produced photographs of his 
injuries. The bruises were dismissed by legal council for the police as merely 
‘mascara’. Called to give evidence on ap Steffan’s behalf was Cayo Evans. He and 
ap Steffan were together when the alleged offence occurred. Launching into a 
‘political speech’ from the witness box, Evans’ attention was caught by a mirror 
positioned to his flank. Unable to resist the temptation of ‘looking at himself, 
Evans, ‘ever the showman’, with ‘one finger in his belt and another held aloft’, 
produced a ‘grandstand’ performance. ‘Despite the seriousness of it all’, it was, ap 
Steffan added, ‘very funny’. Nonetheless, it cut no ice. Found guilty, magistrates 
fined Rhobert ap Steffan for the offence. No charge was brought against the 
officers.299 Rhobert ap Steffan received some good news that Autumn. At the end of 
October, confronted by the ‘menacing’ rise of nationalism throughout the UK, the 
Wilson cabinet appointed a Royal Commission on the Constitution.300
Despite the claim that the government took the decision to appoint the
■>A 1
Commission, owing to the applied pressure from the nationalist movement, on 2 
November, the Patriotic Front terminated its affiliation with the Free Wales Army. It 
did so in response to the failure of the group to appoint a democratically elected 
governing body, the on-going manner with which unnamed members courted self­
promotion and publicity and as a means to condemn those who entered into a pact 
regarding the discovery of the group’s arms.302 Once the FWA had stood shoulder to
pleaded not guilty.
299
Telephone interview between WT & Rhobert ap Steffan, 9 August 2009.
300 Richard Weight, Patriots (London, 2002), pp.424,558,719,798.
301 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
302 Gethin ap Iestyn private papers. The letter, dated 2 November 1968 from Toni Lewis and 
addressed to Cayo Evans, declared no evidence of the ultimatum issued three months earlier, whereby
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shoulder; it was now riddled with division and enmity. Derided as ‘in it for 
themselves’ Denis Coslett and Cayo Evans took the brunt of the disdain. ‘It was all 
right for him’, one former Llanelli member remarked of Evans in 2006, ‘up there in 
his big house; how do you think the rest of us lived’.
On 14 December, following the annual Cilmery rally, Gethin ap Iestyn informed a 
BBC news team that Welsh persons who accepted an honour or award for organizing 
the investiture, would ‘automatically receive the death penalty’ when the Patriotic 
Front was elected to government.304 Later asked if the threat had substance, ap Iestyn 
remarked he was merely ‘upping the ante’; just saying ‘anything and everything off 
the top’ of his head. He and others opposed to the investiture ‘were saying all sorts of
■ J A f
atrocious things.. .just to raise the temperature’. That evening, as marchers carrying 
flaming torches burned a Union Jack outside Builth police station, Cayo Evans was
^A/r
arrested for allegedly assaulting an officer. In court on 14 January, despite having 
‘gone berserk’ when ‘attacking’ a detective sergeant - a conviction of which routinely 
carried a term of imprisonment - Cayo Evans was sentenced to four months in prison
lAT
suspended for two years. For giving evidence on his behalf, Cayo Evans gave Toni 
Lewis ‘a mandolin’. It was, Lewis recalled, a typical act of generosity, if a little 
disproportionate.308 Despite the apparent fortunate outcome however, the decision of 
the court was greeted with a certain degree of incredulity, as many began to wonder if 
the authorities had bigger ‘fish to fry’. Did they want Evans, Denis Coslett and other 
leading figures amid the FWA charged and tried together, in order, if  - or when - 
convicted, to send a resounding signal the state had crushed the collective Free Wales 
Army? It is a suggestion given added credence by FWA member Glyn Rowlands, 
who claimed a police officer informed him in the weeks before his arrest - despite his 
customary habit of driving when ‘probably’ over the legal alcohol limit - they wanted
volunteers would elect a governing body, had been adhered to. It is believed that Lewis was referring
to Denis Coslett and Vivian Davies.
303 Anonymous interview with WT, October 2006.
304
BBC Wales News. Screened, 14 December 1968.
305 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009. It was the third anti-investiture rally that
Autumn, following a march and demonstration in Caernarfon 16 November and Cardiff 30 November.
306 WM, 16 December 1968. The 40 protestors allegedly chanted Sieg Heil, Nazi ’s and Gestapo.
307 WM, 15 January 1969. Cayo Evans, it was claimed, accused officers o f being ‘traitors’.
308
Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
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him ‘for something bigger’.309 It was all too much for Glyn Rowlands. The day 
following Evans’ arrest at the Cilmery rally, in a letter to President Tony Lewis, 
Rowlands officially resigned his post as General Secretary of the Patriotic Front.310
MAC targets the pipeline at West Hagley
It also proved an eventful end to 1968 for Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. On 2 
December, at 1.48 a.m., a MAC active unit based in mid-Wales sabotaged the water
711
pipeline from Cwm Elan to Birmingham at West Hagley in Worcestershire. The 
four man unit, based in the Newtown/Llandrindod area, drove to the site; on arrival, 
two carried out the attack. When later discussing the logistics of the operation, John 
Jenkins stated those directly involved in planting the device ‘were dropped off and 
collected ten minutes later’. A ‘parked, waiting car in a lonely lane’ he added, would 
invariably ‘attract interest’ and so it was precipitately agreed the car would return to a 
designated ‘place at ten minute intervals’. The attackers emerged from behind ‘a 
fence or hedge’, got in and left. Knowledge of this adopted strategy was passed to 
cell members, by the cell leader, via Jenkins. The delivery of the device had not run 
so smoothly. En route to mid Wales, with ‘sixty pounds of explosives under the 
driver’s seat’, Jenkins’ car had a puncture. At such moments, he declared, in a bid to 
appear unduly troubled, it was necessary ‘to be a bit of an actor’ and retain a fa9ade 
of normality. It was a ‘performance’ Jenkins was called upon to exercise, when later 
approached to ‘sign over dental mirrors to military police’. On rods, they enabled the 
‘observer to look around comers’ without disturbing the mechanism. Following an 
inconspicuous attempt to discover their purpose, Jenkins was sententiously informed 
the matter was ‘very hush-hush’. With capacious irony, Jenkins soon deduced the 
mirrors were acquisitioned to ascertain the structure of any unexploded device he had
i p
assembled.
309 Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004. Rowlands claimed the encounter, 
whereby he asked why he was never stopped, occurred in a pub after crossing the border one Sunday
from ‘dry’ Meirionnydd to ‘wet’ Powys.
310 Trial o f FWA and anti-investiture campaigners. Exhibit, 99. Denis Coslett private papers.
311 WM, 3 December 1968. The explosion, at a point where the pipelines cross the Kidderminster to 
Stourbridge railway line, fractured two of the four pipes. No one was injured. The resulting damage 
caused water capacity to Birmingham to fall by a 1/3. The week before, police called off a twice- 
nightly patrol o f the site. The attack was undertaken as Prince Charles was in Wales to chair the
inaugural meeting o f the Countryside Committee for Wales.
312 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 April 2009; also, interview between WT & 
John Jenkins, 25 March 2004. When the red caps left, Jenkins ‘started to assemble some more’.
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It was decided to target the pipeline at West Hagley, Jenkins revealed, both to 
highlight the pipeline issue and to ensure the authorities believed Mudiad Amddiffyn
313Cymru was an all-Wales movement; comprised of units throughout the nation. Just 
how many comprised MAC membership at this juncture, was later given 
consideration by Owain Williams. He believed - in terms of those actively involved 
in the militant campaign - ‘about twelve’.314 Yet, it is a figure somewhat refuted by 
John Jenkins, who, while refusing to be pinned down, confirmed a higher figure was 
accurate. As sole provider of the necessary weaponry, the potential difficulty of 
delivering the devices, was circumvented by Jenkins’ position of inspector of supplies 
and performance in Western Command. Crucially, Jenkins later explained, it always 
ensured a reason for being in a particular location. Moreover, MAC’s operational - 
director timed these visits with prior calculation, making ‘damn sure’ his presence
l i e
could be explained.
The head of West Mercia CID claimed the attack was undertaken by the 
‘lunatic element’ of Welsh nationalists from the English/Welsh border; an accusation 
slammed by Plaid Cymru as unfounded ‘political assassination’. Nonetheless, the 
police commended the perpetrators for the ‘expert’ manner in which the operation 
was achieved: both with regard the quantity of explosives deployed and the ‘effective’
<5 1 s
positioning of the device. In parliament, the House united to ‘deplore’ the
‘outrageous’ incident.317 Days later, as police anxiously appealed for ‘two men seen a 
few hours’ before the blast ‘near a grey or green mini-van’ parked in a lay-by some 
400 yards from the scene, intelligence reports indicated another attack along the
1 Q
supply route was imminent. It was not forthcoming, but the announcement more
313
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October, 2007; also, 20 November 
2008. The location was suggested and reconnoitered by the mid-Wales MAC unit; Jenkins then 
sanctioned the attack. A peripheral member o f the mid-Wales MAC unit was Peter Barnes. He was, 
Jenkins alleged, ‘an advisor, not an activist...Peter moved in circles useful to us, like the police. Any 
information received he then fed back to me’.
314 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
315 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 
2008. Jenkins stated the figure o f MAC ‘active’ members was ‘not much higher’ than Williams’
suggestion.316 WM, 3 December 1968. Army Disposal Technician, Major Clifton Jefferies discerned that ‘just 
enough’ explosives were used.
317 Hansard, HC Deb, 2 December 1968, vol.774, cc 1035-8.3 ] 8
WM, 4 December 1968. Birmingham City Council was informed by Dr. Louis Glass, chair o f the 
city’s Water Committee, that another explosion was expected ‘tonight or tomorrow night’. John 
Roberts claimed Jenkins planned three extensive and simultaneous explosions. TNA, ASSI 84/577, 
witness statement by J. R. L. Roberts, 5 December 1969. ‘During 1968’, Ann Woodgate later informed 
police officers, F. E. Alders ‘took John Jenkins to South Wales in his mini van’. TNA, ASSI 84/577,
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than revealed the state o f high tension which now existed.
Conclusion
1968 was a milestone in the militant campaign in Wales. What had been consideied 
and largely dismissed as a parochial and bewildering irritation became a cause of 
national alarm as a result of the impending royal investiture of Prince Charles. If the 
authorities were in any doubt as to the veracity of the MAC offensive, it was dispelled 
by the interview three leading figures within the movement gave to three journalists in 
May that year. The Welsh militant campaign, all now reasoned, was a sericus 
business. The establishment of the Shrewsbury unit to apprehend the saboteurs was 
the result.
If it appeared that the tide had turned against the insurgents, Owain Williams’ 
acquittal at Caernarfon Assizes, satisfied neutral observers that the letter of the law 
was still being adhered to, despite increasing calls that the state was prepared to adept 
fair means or foul to ensure the success of the investiture; and more succinctly, the 
safety of the Royals. Just how far  the British state was prepared to go however, was 
about to be revealed.
witness statement by Ann Woodgate, dated 15 December 1969; also TNA, ASSI 84/577, witness 
statement by John Roberts, dated 15 December 1969, in which he claimed two late night visitors who 
implored him to undertake militant activity departed in a ‘grey mini van’.
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Chapter 5 
‘A menace to everyone’.
MAC and the Investiture
Introduction
This chapter addresses the period from January 1969 to April 1970. It highlights the 
efforts of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru to initially prevent and subsequently undermine 
the royal investiture; the efforts of the security forces to ensure the success of the 
ceremony; and the factors which led to the arrest, trial and sentencing of the leading 
members of both the Free Wales Army and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.
Despite the real and serious threat which Welsh militants posed to the 1969 royal 
investiture, there exists no analytical study which comprehensively addresses this 
factor. For example, in 2008, Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in 
Wales, 1911 -  1969, by John S. Ellis, was published. Although a study which 
extensively focuses upon each state occasion, it also fails to make substantive 
analytical comment with regard the threat to the success of the subsequent ceremony, 
as represented by Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru and to a lesser extent the Free Wales 
Army. Nonetheless, it should be noted that Ellis does consider each group and other 
subordinate organisations to some notable degree. However, where Ellis does 
consider this threat, he employs no oral testimony and is often guilty of supposition 
and factual inaccuracy.1 For example, he claims that on the eve of the investiture, the
o
Royal Train halted ‘under armed guard at a secret destination near Abergele’.
1 J. S. Ellis, Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911 -  1969 (Cardiff, 2008), 
pp.209, 210, 211, 212, 225, 235, 236, 240. Ellis erroneously claims that while in the army, John 
Jenkins was trained in explosives; that MAC carried out the failed Crossgates action in March 1967; 
that the Vymwy protest was in September 1967; that Cayo Evans founded the FWA and attended the 
opening o f Llyn Celyn with his two cousins; that Owain Williams was arrested in September 1968; that 
a bomb was discovered on the A5 as Prince Charles journeyed to Caernarfon; and that the day after the 
investiture and crucially minutes prior to the prince passing over, a biscuit tin packed with explosives 
was discovered beneath a bridge near Betws-y-Coed. Yet, perhaps Ellis’s most contentious appraisal, 
concerns Robert Trigg and the unattributed Cardiff explosions. His description that ‘all were...but a 
prelude to the plans being laid by the MAC for Caernarfon’, leaves the reader under the somewhat 
inaccurate assumption that these protests were undertaken by MAC.
2 Ibid. p.233. Ellis sources: TNA, PREM 13/2903, 14 April 1969, Home Secretary to Prime Minister;
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However, archival evidence does not support this. John S. Ellis further states that 
‘although reputedly members of a MAC cell, the bomb planted by Alwyn Jones and 
George Taylor was not among the three actions recognized by John Jenkins as official 
MAC operations during the Investiture’.3 Yet, this revelation contradicts all that John 
Jenkins has revealed about the protest, both in private and ‘on the record’. 
Nonetheless, in a wider sense, Ellis’s study does address the extent to which hostility 
for the ceremony - whether for reasons of financial extravagance or nationalist 
sentiment - was expressed.
Both preparations and the security operation surrounding the investiture 
increase
On 2 January 1969, in what was regarded as an attempt to amass incriminating 
evidence against the Free Wales Army, detectives led by Jock Wilson - the head of 
the police unit assembled in Shrewsbury to ensure the success of the investiture and 
the safety of the Royal party - raided FILMLINE studios near Covent Garden and 
removed documentary film evidence of the group undertaking ‘military’ manoeuvres. 
Entitled Do Not Go and directed by Israeli Gideon Haendler, it was shot mostly in the 
Black Mountains some weeks earlier. It was lavishly endowed with contrived scenes 
of pipeline explosions and some ten FWA stalking alongside a wall in emulation of a 
nocturnal guerrilla advance on the enemy.4 It later transpired the explosion - as 
performed by a furtive-looking and fatigue adorned Denis Coslett - was in fact 
achieved by igniting two cans of petrol.5 Nevertheless, the case against the group was 
gathering apace, as prominent figures were interviewed regarding various media 
appearances.6 One notable interview allegedly occurred between members of the 
‘Shrewsbury squad’ and Gethin ap Iestyn. In 2008, ap Iestyn maintained he was
26 June, B. Cubbon to M. Halls; 27 June, J. F. Mayne to A. N. Halls; also, The Sun, 1 July 1969.3
Ibid, p.234. Ellis also states that G. Taylor and A. Jones were killed by their own bomb apparently 
while transporting it to the railway line the Queen was due to arrive upon the following day. Moreover, 
‘the Daily Mail repeated erroneous rumours that the Abergele men’ were ‘killed on their way to blow 
up a social security office’, p.286. Yet, the device activated while being placed at the bottom o f the 
Social Security building. It did not detonate while being carried or at half body height.
Trial o f FWA and anti-investiture campaigners. Exhibit, 89. Denis Coslett private papers. For 
refusing to show officers more than an eighth of the four hour film, G. Haendler alleged that Jock 
Wilson threatened to confiscate it, he also apparently instructed him not to sell it to TV companies.
5 Western Mail, 25 April 1969. Evidence o f G. Haendler. To resemble a tommy-gun, one of the FWA 
ambushers allegedly carried a car-jack. To increase the visual impact, a shot-gun was placed on a 
mantelpiece and the book Total Resistance on the arm of a chair at Glyn Rowlands home as props.
6 Trial o f FWA and anti-investiture campaigners. Report entitled: The Activities o f the Free Wales 
Army. Folder No.4B, Part 4. Denis Coslett private papers.
272
threatened with electrocution at Bridgend police headquarters, as a means to ensure he 
put a halt to his anti-investiture activism. His interrogation comprised a ‘darkened 
room, a low lamp positioned to reveal half of Wilson’s face’, and a descending 
‘electrical lead from the over-hanging light bulb cable’.7
It was not only Gethin ap Iestyn who received a shock that month, as Ann 
Woodgate allegedly ended both their twelve month engagement and terminated the 
three-year relationship with MAC insurgent Frederick Ernest Alders. She had, 
Woodgate later informed police, repeatedly implored Alders to end his involvement in 
the militant campaign, especially she added, ‘in the latter part of the courtship’.8 How 
Alders reacted to Woodgate’s decision to end their relationship is unrecorded, but 
whatever his immediate response, the extent of its impact on the life and the liberty of 
the covert Welsh militant was yet to be felt.
Despite the formation of the Shrewsbury Unit six months earlier, the ‘security 
position’ in Wales, PM Harold Wilson informed James Callaghan, the Home 
Secretary, still ‘gave cause for concern’. It was, he added, necessary to ‘advise the 
Queen that in the government’s opinion, the investiture ‘programme’ could ‘go 
forward without significant risk of any untoward interruption’. To substantiate the 
governments’ position, Callaghan was asked to provide assurances the protection of 
the prince, while at Aberystwyth, was being addressed; and that all ‘obstacles’ for 
‘maintaining law and order in the principality’ had been removed.9 In a letter of 
reply, James Callaghan spelled out the increasing security position - but refused to be 
drawn. An assurance of ‘complete protection’ could not be ‘guaranteed’, Callaghan 
demurred, as the ‘most elaborate precautions’ would not ‘prevent a determined 
extremist’ from undertaking ‘some mischief. Nevertheless, the endeavours of the 
Shrewsbury Unit, the Home Secretary added, were ‘undoubtedly of value’. Its 
position as a centrally-based intelligence organization had already paid dividends; 
with the ‘flow of intelligence’ it had provided Welsh chief constables.10
7
Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 26 January 2008. He did not ‘swallow’ the threat 
‘for a moment’ and was, ap Iestyn conceded, ‘more worried about the heavies standing behind’ him ‘in 
the dark’. He was not physically assaulted, but informed he would ‘be taken care o f  and ‘rounded up 
before the investiture’. An officer who attended the ‘interrogation’, later informed ap Iestyn he was 
‘embarrassed and uncomfortable’ throughout.
8 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, dated, 15 December 1969. She had ‘on 
several occasions, nearly every night... pleaded with him to wash his hands o f the whole thing’.
9 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Memorandum M6A/69, from Harold Wilson to James Callaghan, 4 February 
1969. Secretary o f State for Wales, George Thomas, also received a copy.
10 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Letter from James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, 12 February 1969. Tracts of
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Yet, whatever the value of the Shrewsbury unit to the investigation into Welsh 
militancy, only the Prime Minister’s personal interjection brought the case against the 
Free Wales Army to a head. Having written to the Attorney General - following the 
explosion at RAF Pembrey - seeking an explanation as to why the ‘scurrilous’ FWA 
had not been brought to book for contravening the Public Order Act,11 Harold Wilson 
finally received the news he was waiting for. Against earlier fears such action would 
only martyrize those arrested, the Attorney General now ‘decided a number of Welsh 
nationalists should be prosecuted for wearing uniforms and carrying arms; and in one 
or two cases, for possessing explosives’. The proceedings should ‘in the least 
establish’ that those in Wales who contravened the Act could ‘not expect to go scot- 
free’. As for a time scale: arrests were ‘expected in a few days’. It had also been 
decided that ‘special surveillance’ of known extremists would be undertaken during 
the investiture period. With regard co-ordination between various chief constables in 
Wales - through whose regions the royal party would travel - and other ‘organizations 
concerned with security’, the picture, James Callaghan opined, was ‘satisfactory’. 
Nonetheless, a determined activist could strike at ‘water pipelines, railways or roads 
at a considerable distance from Caernarvon’. Consequently, ‘a survey of vulnerable 
points’ had been ‘drawn up by the Security Services’ and distributed to all concerned 
‘agencies’.12
Recognising the political capital at stake, the success of the ceremony now
appeared uppermost in Wilson’s mind. On 17 February, the Duke of Norfolk was
asked to Downing Street to discuss how ‘arrangements for the investiture were
proceeding’. Whether pre-occupied with more ascetic considerations, the Duke of
Norfolk failed to make any substantive comment about the security threat, appearing
11
more concerned about the risk of inclement weather. Four days later, the Duke of 
Edinburgh was asked if he harboured any doubts as to whether his son should be 
exposed to the controversy surrounding the ceremony. The Duke was
the letter are still retained (reviewed 1999) under Section 3 (4) of the Public Records Act, 1958 and 
1967.
11 TNA, DPP/4455. E. Brampton (F2, Home Office Police Division) to J. F. Claxton, Department o f  
the Director o f Public Prosecutions. Letter dated, 10 September 1968.
12 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Letter from James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, 12 February 1969. The 
‘security arrangements for the investiture ceremony’, were ‘in the hands o f the Col. Williams, chief 
constable o f Gwynedd’... It was hoped the questioning of those charged under the Public Order Act and 
searches at premises would ensure a ‘good deal of information’ regarding the bombing campaign 
would emerge.
13 TNA, PREM 13/2903.
274
characteristically forthright. The only doubts he and the Queen possessed ‘was to 
what extent the virtually mediaeval revival was relevant’.14
The arrests of the FWA and anti-investiture campaigners
At 6.00 a.m. on 26 February 1969, nine prominent figures within the Free Wales 
Army and the anti-investiture movement were simultaneously arrested.15 If, as widely 
supposed by sympathetic and non-sympathetic observers, the arrests were in 
anticipation of the investiture, the manner in which they were undertaken suggested 
more purge than protection.16 During the melee which surrounded the arrest of Cayo 
Evans, a pet rabbit died. Despite the accusatory suggestions of hard-nosed 
campaigners, Dalys Evans, aged just two at the time of her father’s arrest, believes
| n
nothing sinister transpired. Yet, it was undoubtedly an event replete with emotion.
Moments before being escorted handcuffed to a police car, Cayo Evans, no doubt
fearful o f what lay ahead, solicitously instructed his crying children to ‘remember’ the
1 8occasion ‘and learn to hate’. With no credible or established link to the bombing 
campaign, Denis Coslett later dismissed any ambiguity as to the motive which 
precipitated the timing of the arrests. ‘The authorities’, he declared adamantly, 
‘wanted us out of the way; well out of the way, before we could use any more 
propaganda against them’.19 It is a view shared by FWA sympathizer, Lyn Ebenezer.
14 WM, 22 February 1969. The ‘final governing factor’ which ‘tipped the scales’, was that ‘a large 
proportion o f Welsh opinion favoured it’, the prince added.
5 WM, 27 February 1969. Claims that one arrestee - on being transported to Carmarthen - asked if  
‘Owain’ was among them was rejected by Denis Coslett as a police undermining tactic. Interview 
between WT & Denis Coslett, 23 November 2003.
16 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. Within hours o f magistrates
issuing warrants, the ‘arresting party’ gathered at Carmarthen and smaller groups assigned an arrestee.
Each was timed to arrive simultaneously. The procedure was acted upon immediately to prevent
‘information getting out’. Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2000.
11 Interview between WT & Dalis Evans, 28 February 2006. The arrest was ‘traumatic’ stated Toni
Lewis. His children ‘were taken from their beds’ as the house was searched. It was left ‘in a mess’.
Interview with Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. ‘Police took everything, including our wedding presents;
they even dug up the garden: it needed doing’. Mair Griffith (wife o f G. ap Iestyn). Guardian, 9 July
1969. When police arrived at the home of Glyn Rowlands, the occupants assumed another explosion
had occurred and Rowlands was to be questioned. Rowlands’ children were also allegedly removed
from their beds as officers searched for evidence. Having implored officers not to disturb his elderly
and infirmed parents, Dafydd y Dug’s mother - who had recently suffered a stroke - was allegedly
instructed to get out o f bed. She was informed her son would ‘be back in a few days’. Y Cymro, 9 July
1969.
18 WM, 7 March 1969; also interview between WT & Rhodri Evans, 28 February 2006. Expecting to 
be arrested, ‘a lot o f the boys left’, revealed Coslett. ‘Some went to Patagonia; some to work on a 
kibbutz in Israel. Others went to Ireland - a lot o f them; and Turkey’. Interview between WT & Denis 
Coslett, 14 December 2000.
19 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
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Contrary to the archival evidence which appears to ‘legitimise’ the police action, 
Ebenezer proclaimed the arrests ‘a sham’. Moreover, his opinion was 
contemporaneously shared by ‘a number of serving police officers’, who also
90considered the arrests - in a criminal context - to be ‘unwarranted’.
From all parts of Wales and backgrounds as diverse as their professions, the 
nine arrested - all charged with various offences under Public Order, firearms and 
explosives laws - were: William Edward Julian Cayo Evans, horse breeder, aged 30; 
Denis Coslett, rabbit breeder, aged 29; Vivian George Davies, metal merchant, aged 
27; David Bonar Thomas, plumber, aged 46; Keith Griffith (aka Gethin ap Iestyn), 
labourer, aged 22; David John Underhill (aka Dafydd y Dug), lorry driver, aged 29; 
Anthony Harold Lewis, bus driver, aged 31; William Vernon Griffiths, farmer, aged 
35 and Dafydd Glyn Rowlands, forester, aged 31.
From Carmarthen - the rendezvous and charging point - the ‘nice lads’ were
91taken in buses with white-washed windows to Llanelli. The next morning, they 
were transported to Cardiff,22 where that same afternoon, they appeared before 
stipendiary magistrate John Rutter. In court, having been informed by Det. Supt. 
Vivian Fisher there existed ‘a distinct possibility of interference of witnesses if
9 ^granted bail’, all were remanded in custody. The timing of the arrests - with the 
authorities having ‘struck much earlier’ than expected - curtailed plans established by 
Gethin ap Iestyn that many of those ‘picked up’ would go to safe houses in Scotland. 
It was then the intention, ap Iestyn revealed, they would return shortly before the 
investiture to undertake a campaign of disruption. The evening before his arrest, 
Gethin ap Iestyn collected a consignment of anti-investiture literature delivered 
aboard a ferry from Ireland. It was, he later explained, ‘part of a major 
misinformation/propaganda push’. The idea being to leave the leaflets in places of 
public assembly, such as: toilets, pubs, phone boxes and libraries. Cayo Evans was 
actively engaged in this process. Despite later accusations of inaptitude, Evans, ap 
Iestyn maintained, fulfilled a mission to engage the ‘international media’ in a way
20 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Ebenezer admitted to being fearful o f arrest, 
believing his ‘friendship with Cayo’ to be ‘enough of a reason’. Not having attended Abergwesyn, he 
felt, was decisive.
21 WM, 27 February 1969; also, interview between WT & Gillian Davies, 15 June 2006. Former wife 
o f Cayo Evans.
22 Y Cymro, 9 July 1969.
23 WM, 28 February 1969.
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‘only he’ was capable of.24 He was not alone in utilizing the press to establish a 
political or legal viewpoint. The day after the FWA arrests, a letter by Owain 
Williams was published in Y Cymro. It reaffirmed the Anti-Investiture Campaign 
Committee’s ‘non-violent’ pledge.
Between 6 and 12 March, the nine arrested FWA and anti-investiture 
campaigners appeared again before Cardiff Magistrates. Seven of the nine faced five 
counts under the Public Order Act 1936 which prohibited quasi-military 
organizations. They were charged with the control and management of an 
organization called the Free Wales Army which existed in the county of Carmarthen 
and elsewhere between 22 October 1965 and 31 December 1968. Through the display 
of physical force, the members and adherents of the said association, were organized 
and trained in such a manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension it was for the
9 f \purpose of promoting a political object.
Moreover, Cayo Evans, Denis Coslett and William Vernon Griffiths together 
faced three charges under the 1965 Firearms Act of unauthorized possession of a Sten 
machine-gun, a Mauser self-loading pistol and a .38 revolver. All three offences were 
alleged to have been committed at Lampeter in October 1967. Denis Coslett was 
further charged, under the 1883 Explosive Substances Act, with having illegal 
possession of sticks of Unigel, detonators, a battery, electric wire and a timing device 
at Llangennech on 20 July 1968; and with having unauthorized possession of a 
Mauser self-loading pistol, a revolver, a Sten machine-gun and unlawful possession of 
an explosives timing device on various dates in 1966 and 1968. Cayo Evans was 
further charged with having unauthorized possession of a Sten machine-gun between 
1 January and 23 August 1966; and with possession of a Luger pistol at Lampeter on 
14 July 1968. David Bonar Thomas was charged with having unauthorized 
possession of a revolver at Lampeter on 14 July 1968 and Vivian George Davies of 
having unauthorized possession of a Mauser self-loading pistol at the same time and 
location.
24 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, August 2009. Scottish Resistance groups agreed 
to provide ‘safe houses’. On Investiture Day, D. Coslett and V. G. Davies planned to ‘storm’ the 
Welsh Office. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 23 November 2003.
25 Y Cymro, 27 February 1969.
26 Liverpool Daily Post, 7 March 1969. The training received enabled the men to be employed for the 
use - or in the display - o f physical force. A contravention of the law could result in a maximum 
sentence o f  two years imprisonment and a £500 fine.
27 WM, 17 April 1969.
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Following a succession of evidence - including: uniforms, letters, newspaper cuttirgs 
and transcripts of television and radio interviews, books concerning urban/guerrilla 
warfare, diagrams illustrating how an explosive device was assembled, and the 
testimony of numerous witnesses - the accused were remanded in custody aid 
committed to stand trial at Swansea Assizes the following month. The location itself 
caused controversy. On the grounds that ‘most of the offences’ were alleged to have 
occurred in west Wales and it was ‘fit and proper for a Welsh-speaker to be tried iy 
his peers’, defending council asked that the impending proceedings be held at either 
Cardigan or Carmarthen Assizes. The claim that such a venue was ‘in the interests of 
justice’ was rejected by the Magistrate, who remarked the accused would ‘suffer 10 
hardship’ if tried in Swansea. The decision to hold the trial in the ‘more anglicizsd 
atmosphere’ of Wales’ second city was greeted with uproar, as shouts of ‘fascist’ 
echoed from the public gallery; Cayo Evans shouted derisorily ‘British justice’ aid 
Denis Coslett demanded to know, in Welsh, ‘what right an Englishman’ had ‘to sit in
9fta Welsh court?’. Yet, it was not simply the venue of the trial which raised an 
eyebrow. Remarkably, all accused were committed to be tried within a fortnight of 
being arrested, when a period of several months was more typical for most crimiral 
proceedings.
Such accusatory speculation that political rather criminal factors had ensued, 
was not helped by the fact the nine men were committed for trial in Swansea, on the 
very day it was announced in Aberystwyth, that Prince Charles was to begin his eight 
week course in matters pertaining to Wales on 21 April. The news was greeted by 
150 protestors outside Pantycelyn Hall of Residence and a flurry of confetti from a 
few open windows ‘to symbolize the marriage of Welsh educational life to the royal
90 •family’. By way of retaliation, pro-Royalist students - congregated on the building’s
30rooftop - launched water upon the demonstrators from filled waste-paper baskets 
They were emboldened with news that 76% of the Welsh public now supported the 
investiture; even if on closer inspection, the figure dropped to 60% for those surveyed
28 WM, 7 March 1969; also, WM, 8 March 1969; also, The Times, 11 March 1969; also, WM, 11 March 
1969; also, WM, 12 March 1969; also, WM, 13 March 1969. As he was led to the cells, Cayo Evans 
shouted ‘God save Wales’. Other cries o f ‘Cymru am Byth’ (Wales Forever) resounded throughout the
court. Magistrate John Rutter presided over the proceedings.
29 Anonymous interview between WT & retired Carmarthen based police officer, November 2002.
30 WM, 13 March 1969. It was also claimed - and denied by college officials - that MI5 officers world 
masquerade as students during the prince’s visit which was scheduled to end on 27 June.
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under the age of 45.
The trial of the FWA and anti-investiture lobby
Whether dismissed as ‘comic opera’, or the state-inspired judicious sledge-hammer 
smashing of a Welsh demimonde patriotic nut, the 53 day trail of the FWA and anti­
investiture campaigners, largely hinged on the dossier of media material amassed by 
Det. Supt. Vivian Fisher throughout the preceding six years.34 Despite this being the 
bulk upon which the prosecution case wrested, the trial was so lengthy, that it raised 
accusations from sympathizers that the entire proceedings were merely to ensure the 
nine men were safely under lock and key during the final preparations for the royal 
ceremony. Nonetheless, there are those, most notably retired Deputy Chief 
Constable John Owen Evans, who remains confident the trial - although surprisingly 
lengthy - did run its natural course and that the defendants were tried correctly on 
presented criminal evidence.36 However, Sir John Mortimer, who acted as Defence 
Counsel for Denis Coslett, held a contrary view. He believed the trial was both 
‘politically governed’ and ‘deliberately spun out’.37
On the other hand, Sir Tasker Watkins, who acted as Crown Prosecution 
Council, adamantly stated not. Furthermore, Judge Thomson, declared Sir Tasker, 
was a man held in high regard, who would not have allowed any degree of outside
i o
political interference to sully his jurisdiction. Asked how the accused considered the
31 John S. Ellis, Investiture: Royal Ceremony and National Identity in Wales, 1911 -  1969 (Cardiff, 
2008), p.240. Figures recorded March 1969. Seven months earlier, a poll conducted by the Opinion 
Research Centre revealed 44% of Welsh people surveyed considered the investiture programme ‘a 
waste o f money’. Anthony Holden, Charles: Prince o f  Wales (London, 1979), p. 159. The findings 
were immediately questioned by the pollsters themselves, who suggested a particularly young and 
extremist element had been approached. In the 18-34 age bracket, 53% voiced disproval. Observer 
Supplement, 22 June 1969.
32 WM, 18 April 1969. The trial ran from Wednesday, 16 April 1969 to Tuesday, 1 July 1969.
33 WM, 20 June 1969.
34 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001; also, WM, 2 July 1969; also TNA,
DPP 2/5980; DPP 2/5981; DPP 2/5982; DPP 5983; DPP 2/5985; DPP 2/5986; DPP 2/5987.
35 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006; also interviews between WT & Denis 
Coslett, 14 December 2000; between WT & Dafydd y Dug, 20 May 2004; between WT & Glyn 
Rowlands, 22 March 2004; between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004 and correspondence between 
WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
36 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001; also, 10 August 2009.
37 Telephone interview between WT & Sir John Mortimer, 10 April 2004. The trial, declared Sir John 
was ‘hilarious’. Judge Thompson had also, he believed, appeared ‘a little nervous’, as indeed, all felt a 
‘little wary’. Mortimer was ‘pleased’ with Coslett’s sentence and like Coslett, believed it would have 
been more severe if  later coinciding with the IRA campaign. J. Mortimer felt those on trial were 
‘absolutely justified’ in the wider aspect o f their protest to safeguard the Welsh language and culture.
38 Telephone interview between WT & Sir Tasker Watkins, 13 March 2003; also 15 April 2007. The
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proceedings, Denis Coslett also opined ‘it was political’. So too Glyn Rowlands; 
who later remarked that despite Judge Thomson’s insistence to the contrary, when 
later he ‘decided to sue for wrongful arrest’, he was implacably informed by his local 
county court: ‘sorry; political trial, can’t help you’.40
Whatever the truth, of the 73 prosecution witnesses called to give evidence, 
the majority were journalists who appeared either willingly, or were subpoenaed to do 
so in order to maintain the fa?ade of protecting their sources. Only a handful who 
gave evidence were police officers, adding to the belief that those in the dock were 
there owing to an inability to resist media attention, rather than the culmination of 
astute detective investigation.41
The trial, which soon degenerated into a traverse of somnolent boredom for 
Denis Coslett,42 was certainly not without its moments: funereal or otherwise. Along 
with the oath of allegiance to Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, a further document 
discovered at the home of Gethin ap Iestyn, called for a ‘full-time campaign against 
the occupational forces of the enemy’. To be undertaken during the immediate 
investiture period, it proposed a hitherto un-witnessed escalation in the violence ‘to 
weaken the English grip on Wales’.43 Following the refusal of one witness to speak,44 
and a report that Det. Sgt. John Lavery had received a parcel bomb the day he gave 
evidence at the trial,45 it was announced a ‘general plan’ had been formulized, 
whereby a state of war would ‘exist between Free Wales forces and England unless an 
ultimatum to get out of Wales’ was heeded. Found at the home of David John 
Underhill (Dafydd y Dug), the ultimatum was to be issued ‘to England’ in 1975 46
matter o f Judge Thompson’s appointment was raised by John Jenkins, who claimed that while perhaps 
not ‘instructed’, an implicit ‘understanding’ existed of Thompson’s likely verdict, prior to his 
appointment to preside over the trials. Interview between WT & John Jenkins 20 November 2008.
3 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
40 Telephone interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 2 August 2009. ‘It was a show trial 
specifically because o f the investiture; undertaken for no other reason’, stated Dafydd y Dug. 
Interview with WT, 20 May 2004.
41 WM, 20 June 1969. In the course o f the trial, more than 130 exhibits were used and 1 million words 
recorded.
42 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December, 2000.
43 The Times, 19 April 1969; also, WM, 19 April 1969; also, trial of FWA and anti-investiture
campaigners. Exhibit, 48. Denis Coslett private papers.
44 WM, 24 April 1969. In the witness box, 19-year-old David Price refused repeated requests to take 
the oath or give his name. He was eventually dismissed by Judge Thompson with the words: ‘Let him 
go away’.
5 WM, 2 May 1969; also TNA, DPP 2/5988. It is believed the culprits, who posted the device to 
police HQ, intended to unsettle John Lavery before he gave evidence.
WM, 3 May 1969. The day after, Dr. W. Ogwen Williams, one of Prince Charles’s Aberystwyth
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Called to give evidence, Det. Ch. Insp. John Owen Evans, believed Denis Coslett 
talked of ‘violence and aggression simply to get his name in the papers’. As for Keith 
Griffith (Gethin ap Iestyn), he was ‘a great propagandist’, who threw ‘ideas in the air 
like little balls’. Nevertheless, he denied the FWA was regarded ‘as a joke and a 
publicity stunt’ by 1968.47 Described as ‘wedded to violence’ by leading prosecution 
council Tasker Watkins, Gethin ap Iestyn, denied being a ‘fanatic’, but admitted 
advocating violence against the investiture and the taking of human life to further the 
cause of Home Rule for Wales. Under mounting evidential pressure, ap Iestyn re­
entered a guilty plea to the charge of ‘organizing members and adherents’ of the 
FWA. However, he reiterated his innocence regarding the alleged charge of ‘control 
and management’ of the group.49
Part of the evidence against ap Iestyn involved a series of letters. One to Cayo 
Evans, warned that ‘heavy fines or even prison terms’ awaited those who opposed the 
investiture. It also stated that he was becoming ‘more and more ashamed’ of the 
FWA and that Denis Coslett and all his posturing was making the ‘army look stupid’. 
Would he still ‘be in this game’ were it not for the media attention, ap Iestyn 
ruminated? ‘Probably yes’, he conceded, but the army ‘lived on a legend of 
newspaper cuttings’.50 There was, ap Iestyn declared in further correspondence, 
‘nothing substantial behind us at all’. Even he speculated whether the bomb attacks 
were the work of the security services. Yet, without the explosions ‘the FWA was not 
worth two pence’. If the group was not responsible for the militant campaign, the past 
would ‘catch up’ with it and it would not require the authorities to destroy the Free 
Wales Army, Gethin ap Iestyn grimly pronounced, the ‘jackals’ of the media would 
ensure it.51
A figure Gwynfor Evans was desperate to see give evidence - both to witness 
the destruction of his journalistic reputation and the credibility of the FWA - was the 
journalist John Summers. Despite Summers’ initial efforts to support the defendants
lecturers, was found drowned on the beach at Ynys Las. Foul play was ruled out. WM, 5 May 1969.
47 WM, 6 May 1969. During his testimony, J. O. Evans was interrupted by Justice Thompson who 
chastised Denis Coslett for making ‘trigger gestures’ at the officer. Interview between WT & John 
Owen Evans, 19 February 2001.
48 WM, 7 June 1969.
49 WM, 10 June 1969. Both pleas were accepted by the prosecution.
50 WM, 7 May 1969. ‘Eight o f the nine individuals arrested were innocent’, stated Dafydd y Dug in an 
interview with WT, 20 May 2004.
WM, 6 June 1969. Cayo Evans wrote back to ap Iestyn stating Coslett was ‘a good nationalist’, but 
he would ‘have a word with him’. Denis Coslett private papers. Letter dated 24 July 1968.
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by offering to appear for the defence, Evans believed the prosecution was 
determined to prevent it. This was on the grounds that Summers’ testimony would 
cast serious doubt on the veracity of allegations, that those in the dock represented an
Cl
authentic threat to the investiture and the state. The subsequent failure to call 
Summers - for whatever reason - appeared particularly unjust in light of John Owen 
Evans’ testimony, whereby he suggested the journalist had enjoyed ‘a two year 
association’ with the FWA. It had, John Gower QC for David Bonar Thomas 
attested, ‘left a generally nasty’ ‘prejudicial’ ‘smell’ upon the nine accused.54 Yet, it 
was not solely the prosecution which undermined John Summers. Aubrey Myerson 
QC, for Vernon Griffiths, declared him a ‘shadowy creature’ who exploited the group 
for his own ends. As for Summers’ claim the threat of violence from the FWA 
ensured bereaved Aberfan parents received £5,000, it was, countered Myerson, 
‘undiluted rubbish’.55
On a lighter note, Denis Coslett’s earlier claim that dogs were trained to attack 
approaching ‘English tanks’ was given consideration by Judge Thompson. How, he 
enquired, were they to remove the pins? To laughter in the public gallery and a smile 
from Judge Thompson, Coslett replied with typical aplomb: ‘damn, you’ve got me 
there sir’.56 Despite the trial demonstrating the FWA’s limitation, the accusation that 
the proceedings were subject to predetermined political manoeuvring refused to 
subside. During cross-examination, Det. Supt. Vivian Fisher angrily resented the 
suggestion he was a ‘political policeman’ engaged in ‘political policing’. The FWA, 
although possessed of an ‘exhibitionist side’ comprised a deeper philosophy.57 As for 
the pervading issue of ‘a deal’ allegedly struck between Cayo Evans and Jock Wilson 
over the discovery of arms, the head of the Shrewsbury unit dismissed the charge as
52 Trial o f FWA and PF: Free Wales Army Document Folder, pages 115 to 203. Part 2. In a telegram 
to ‘Kayo (sic) Evans, Swansea Jail’, dated 19 April 1969, John Summers stated that despite his ‘sincere 
efforts’ to assist in Evans’ defence, his advances had been ‘entirely rejected by defence council...They 
alone’, he concluded, ‘must bear responsibility for any sentence or outcome in the trial’. Two days
later, Arnold Davies solicitors in Lampeter received a telegram, in which Summers stated he had ‘just 
been’ visited by ‘Bristol Special Branch’ and told he was ‘not required by the prosecution’ either. On 
29 May, Summers sent another telegram to Arnold Davies Solicitors, in which he said he was not 
prepared to be ‘pilloried by the defence’. It was, he believed, ‘a trap Wilson’ (Jock) had ‘prepared’. 
Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
54 WM, 7 May 1969.
55 WM, 21 June 1969.
56 WM, 2 July 1969; also, interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
57 WM, 14 May 1969.
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‘completely untrue’.58
On 28 May, following the death of his mother and his attendance at her 
funeral under prison guard, David John Underhill (Dafydd y Dug) returned to court 
and was acquitted on all charges. Justice Thompson also directed the jury to return 
not guilty verdicts against the other six accused - although not Cayo Evans and Denis 
Coslett - on the Public Order charge alleging they participated in the training of the 
FWA. It was a decision welcomed as indicative of the Crown’s intention not to 
arbitrarily penalise those in the dock, despite considerable evidence proving their 
willing involvement. Nonetheless, all six still faced other charges. It was not the only 
dramatic moment of the day. In refusing to give evidence, Cayo Evans read from a 
prepared statement in which he thanked Justice Thompson for the ‘courtesy and 
patience’ he had ‘extended’ to the defendants. Nevertheless, Evans added, he did not 
recognise the tyrannical ‘regime’ ‘symbol’ which adorned the wall behind Justice 
Thompson. As for the trial, the state was using it as an instrument to oppress Wales 
for its own political ends.59
The following day, Vernon Griffiths gave testimony concerning his 
involvement in the Free Wales Army. Despite photographic and transcript evidence 
suggesting active participation, Griffiths countered the claim by declaring he involved 
himself in the group believing it akin to ‘the Salvation Army’.60 It was a line of 
defence which aroused the ire of Denis Coslett. Amid cries of ‘take him down’, 
Coslett was ordered to remain silent. The years did little to dampen his annoyance. 
Griffiths, he declared robustly in 2000, had brought embarrassment on himself.61 It 
was a sentiment supported to some degree by Lyn Ebenezer, who believed in view of 
the fact he was Cayo Evans’ cousin, Vernon Griffiths might have pursued a different
fsyavenue of explanation. Yet, contrary to Coslett’s stinging appraisal that Griffiths 
sold this co-conspirators down the river, Gethin ap Iestyn was more charitable.
WM, 15 May 1969.
59 WM, 29 May 1969. Contrary to strict Home Office guidelines, on the tacit understanding he would 
‘not make a run for it’, accompanying prison officers removed the handcuffs Dafydd y Dug was 
wearing. Interview between WT & Dafydd y Dug, 20 May 2004.
WM, 30 May 1969. Among other declarations, Vernon Griffiths informed Tit-Bits in September 
1966, that he knew ‘how to use a gun’ and would not ‘hesitate to fire it if ordered to’. In his defence, 
Griffiths claimed he believed the FWA to be like the ‘St. John’s Ambulance’ brigade.
61 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. Coslett declared to having ‘forgiven’ 
V. Griffiths his remarks, but subsequent programmes (FWA: I ’r Gad!) in which he ‘talked up his
involvement’ and his failure to mention his defence in court had angered him.
62 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
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Vemon Griffiths, he later remarked, ‘is a very decent guy’. He held nothing agahst 
him. ‘It was daft what he said’, ap Iestyn remarked, ‘but for Christ sake, he wa> a 
country lad trying to get out of a hard situation’.63
Vemon Griffiths was understandably forthright when later commenting on he 
episode. While awaiting trial, his legal counsel arranged for the RSPCA to undertake 
the farm work. His father had died and there was nobody else to do it. To be 
‘truthful’, declared Griffiths, ‘they did not do a very good job...but they did their 
best’. Vemon Griffiths feared he might lose the farm his father built up. Moreover, 
he was instructed as to the best way to proceed, namely: to distance himself from he 
organization and/or any suggestion he supported militant activism. He defended lis 
interests as best he could. Had those who criticized him ‘prospects’, they too mijht 
have avoided a custodial sentence. His cousin, ‘just had horses’. It was not wlat 
might be termed ‘farming’...or ‘heavy work’. In that sense, he believed, Cayo Evais’ 
family had ‘managed OK without him’. Nonetheless, he did not believe any of these 
sentenced should have received prison terms. Yet, in recognizing they made a staid 
for their beliefs - as had he - they did not defend themselves adequately.64 As for he 
Frost Show, in which he appeared two years previously, it proved the ‘last straw’ in 
his affiliation with the FWA. ‘Hoping for serious discussion’, he returned to Waes 
‘disappointed and disillusioned in every way’. To his credit, at the close of lis 
testimony, Vemon Griffiths refused to buckle to judicial pressure and speak in favour 
of the investiture. It was, he proclaimed, an ‘outmoded and archaic ritual’. The 
money could be far better deployed to establish ‘Welsh agricultural and veterinary 
centres’.65
Despite the refusal of Cayo Evans, Denis Coslett and Vivian Davies to give 
evidence in their defence, Vemon Griffiths was not alone in challenging tie 
remaining charges against him. In taking the stand, Dai Bonar Thomas denbd 
‘organizing’ the FWA, or possessing a revolver. Furthermore, the journalist Join 
Summers had ‘baptized’ him ‘Dai Bomber’, recognizing its increased impact in 
journalistic terms.66 It was a claim rejected by the irked Summers, who in a letterto 
Cayo Evans’ solicitor, maintained the term was generically and consensualy
63 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 26 January 2008.
64 Telephone interview between WT & Vemon Griffiths, 2 February 2008.
65 WM, 31 May 1969.
66 WM, 4 June 1969.
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67introduced to represent the background and opinions of the militant Welsh. Called 
to give evidence on behalf of Glyn Rowlands, Dr. Cyril Lewis, the family GP, 
declared him ‘a perfectly decent man in every way’. Nevertheless, a book: The Use o f  
Explosives in Mines and Quarries, discovered the morning he was arrested proved a 
harder delivery to field. Asked how the volume came to be ensconced beneath a 
carpet at his home, Rowlands could only improbably declare he did ‘not know’.
In summing up the case for the prosecution, Tasker Watkins drew the jury’s 
attention to the ‘extraordinary license’ which allowed the British people to ‘express 
their views; however odd or unusual’, both publicly or privately. Yet, violence was 
‘detestable and the preaching of it odious’. Moreover, a society which did not ‘keep 
peace with itself and ‘keep order’ was in an ‘unhappy state’. Those on trial had 
referred to the police as ‘Gestapo’, which - for many involved in the proceedings - 
was an ugly word with ‘sinister meaning’. Much attempt had been made to present 
the defendants as ‘comic figures’, worthy of little attention. Yet, was there anything 
frivolous about men who assembled arms, or were ‘prepared to use violence for 
political purposes? ’69 Asked in 2003 for his thoughts on the Free Wales Army, Sir 
Tasker Watkins, decorated with the VC for storming a German machine-gun post 
during the Normandy Landings, thought the group possessed little substance. He may 
have harboured ‘a certain sympathy for what they hoped to achieve, but certainly not 
the manner in which they set out to achieve if . The FWA did not compare to other 
Welsh nationalist protest groups, in terms of intelligent and considered
i(\campaigning. John Owen Evans, the former Shrewsbury unit member and pivotal 
figure in the demise of the FWA, also admitted to having felt some empathy for those 
on trial. He acknowledged the wider campaign for Welsh cultural recognition and 
was himself ‘proud to speak the Welsh language’; furthermore, he had informed Cayo 
Evans as much. Nonetheless, the former investigating officer did ‘not believe in
67 Trial o f FWA and PF: Free Wales Army Document Folder, pages 115 to 203. Part 2. Letter from 
John Summers to Arnold Davies Solicitors, 4 May 1969. Despite Jock Wilson’s accusatory testimony 
concerning the authentic threat posed by the FWA, Summers claimed that Wilson ‘sneeringly’ 
informed him before the trial, that he had ‘been conned’ when photographs o f weapons held by FWA
members were proved to be harmless.
68 WM, 14 June 1969. The book was concealed beneath the stairs carpet. Another book in Rowlands’ 
possession was Total Resistance. It contained diagrams outlining how to construct small underground 
bunkers. It was intended that Glyn Rowlands would build one in the slate tips near his home in Corns 
and place within it the FWA’s stock o f weapons. Before this was possible, they were found in 
Maesllyn. Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 23 October 2010.
69 WM, 17 June 1969.
70
Telephone interview between WT & Sir Tasker Watkins, 13 March 2003.
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anybody breaking the law to further their aims’ and this had resulted in him asking 
Cayo Evans, ‘why the FWA’ had ‘to go so far? ’.71
However, the case against those in the dock was not water-tight. James 
Mulcahy, council for Cayo Evans, questioned both the timing of the arrests and why 
none of the interviewing journalists was questioned by police until 1969. 
Additionally, ‘none of the accused’ was charged with involvement in the militant 
campaign. The alleged offences occurred under the media glare. It was ‘not very 
often’, Mulcahy added incredulously, that ‘a man’ was ‘charged with a criminal 
offence’ having committed it on ‘television or to a team of journalists’. Another 
‘extraordinary feature’ concerned the piece of legislation under which the accused 
stood trial. Only once prior to these proceedings had charges under this section of the
79Public Order Act 1936 been brought. It was a line of defence taken up by John 
Mortimer QC for Denis Coslett. His client had shown nothing more than ‘a 
misguided flash’. Moreover, the cause with which the accused had aligned 
themselves, was ‘dear to the hearts of hundreds’ in Wales. It was the political 
birthright ‘like the air we breathe’ that UK citizens could freely express their views. 
This extended to ‘Cabinet Ministers and statesmen’ and men of ‘little education’. As 
for the evidence against the accused: should any connection exist of involvement in 
acts of violence or sabotage, ‘the proper charges would have been levelled long 
before’. Apparently suggesting they were ‘planted’, the discovery of the arms at 
Maesllyn was challenged by John Gower QC, for David Bonar Thomas, as ‘a 
stratagem’; and a ‘golden opportunity to hamstring the FWA’. Furthermore, the 
‘rigorous 23 hours a day confinement’ of men un-convicted was ‘cruel’ and 
‘inhuman’. If a means to lower ‘the spirit and mental condition’ it succeeded.74
In his summing up, Justice Thompson directed the jury to dismiss all 
suggestion the trial was politically inspired,75 or that a ‘deal’ was hatched between
7AJock Wilson and Cayo Evans. Moreover, in response to James Mulcahy’s point
71 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001.
72 WM, 19 June 1969. The Act was passed to combat the ugly scenes of public disorder in the 
Metropolis and large cities in Britain in the pre-War period, when groups of fascists, under Mosley’s 
direction, fought fiercely with other sections of the community.
73 WM, 20 June 1969.
74 WM, 24 June 1969.
75 WM, 26 June 1969.
76 WM, 27 June 1969. It was ‘truthfully denied’ by Jock Wilson, claimed Justice Thompson. The 
discovery o f the arms, he declared, was more the result o f ‘cold feet and wise repentance’ by persons
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concerning the Public Order Act, it did not legislate against ‘political objectives’, but 
‘against certain methods of obtaining them’. Changes in government or status, must 
only be ‘achieved through constitutional means’ Justice Thompson added, not through 
‘violence or intimidation’.77 Having threatened to clear the public gallery if further 
interrupted,78 the verdicts were returned and Justice Thompson summoned Glyn 
Rowlands and David Bonar Thomas. Rowlands was cleared of organizing the FWA 
and Bonar Thomas of controlling, managing and organizing the group and possession 
of a revolver.79 Both men, along with David John Underhill (Dafydd y Dug) were
OA
asked for their co-operation in keeping ‘the temperature’ in Wales ‘down’. There 
was ‘too much violence in Wales’, Judge Thompson declared; it was not positive.81
The following day, as the six remaining accused climbed the stairs into the
82court, many in the public gallery rose to their feet and sang Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau. 
Those in the dock, announced a solemn Justice Thompson, were ‘not the only people 
with violent ideas’ in Wales. Maybe it was correct, he added, that a Judge 
discouraged those yet to be tried. He had, nonetheless, taken into account that all 
before him - however misguided the manner in which expressed - loved Wales. 
Consequently, he intended to treat them leniently; certainly more so than many would 
believe appropriate. He hoped he understood ‘patriotism, love of one’s country and 
liberty’. He further understood ‘the desire’ to ‘improve the conditions and the values’ 
of Wales. Yet, the ‘Welsh way of a life’ was ‘civilized’ and ‘cherished’ and ‘crime 
had no place’ in it. Some of the defendants had caused ‘anxiety and alarm’ by their 
‘claims and boastings’; others by their ‘weapons and explosives’. All however, had 
‘served Wales ill’.83 While it was true no evidence existed connecting the accused 
with the explosions in Wales, what was not known, was the degree of encouragement 
and influence their actions had on others. Taking into account time in custody, the 
length of the trial, the ‘strain’ to which all had been ‘subjected’ and signed assurances 
by all - save Gethin ap Iestyn - as to their future conduct, Judge Thompson then
unknown.
77 The Times, 26 June 1969.
78 WM, 28 June 1969.
79 WM, 2 July 1969.RO
The Times, 2 July 1969.01
WM, 2 July 1969.
82 WM, 1 July 1969. The FWA, Justice Thompson pronounced, ‘was not brought into existence for the
investiture’.
83 The Times, 2 July 1969. Had he confessed the extent o f his involvement, Justice Thompson
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handed down his sentences.
Found guilty on five charges, three under the Public Order Act alleging 
control, management, organizing and training of FWA members, along with two 
firearms charges, Cayo Evans, ‘the prime mover and stimulator of others’ was 
sentenced to fifteen months in prison. Found guilty on each of the eight Public Order 
Act, firearms and explosives charges, Denis Coslett received the same sentence. 
Keith Griffith (Gethin ap Iestyn), was sentenced to nine months on a charge of 
organizing FWA members or adherents. For the same charge, Toni Lewis was 
sentenced to eight months, suspended for two years. For possession of a Mauser self- 
loading pistol, Vivian Davies was gaoled for six months, suspended for three years. 
For unauthorized possession of a Sten-gun, Vemon Griffiths was sentenced to three 
months, suspended for two years.84
Before being taken down, Denis Coslett made an impassioned speech from the 
dock. It has since entered militant Welsh folklore. He had, he declared, been brought 
before the court on the charge of using ‘force to promote a political object’ and that 
much mention was ‘made of the word violence’. Yet, he was instructed and trained in 
the use of violence in the British Army’. That was ‘to promote an English political 
object’ and therefore ‘honourable’. Across Wales there were ‘military camps, 
bombing schools and rocket stations’. ‘During the investiture, warships’ would be 
‘witnessed on the Menai Straits’ and ‘battalions of armed soldiers on the streets of 
Caernarfon’ and ‘warplanes over Eryri (Snowdon), all ‘to safeguard English security’. 
Moreover, it would be ‘perfectly legal’: ‘English violence’ was virtuous, yet ‘Welsh 
violence a terrible crime’. Justice Thompson instructed John Mortimer QC to ‘stop’ 
his client. Mortimer informed Coslett it might affect his sentence if he continued. 
Coslett carried on. On the table before Thompson lay a piece of paper on which 
Coslett’s sentence was written. Infuriated by the defendant’s perceived insolence,
Of
Justice Thompson slammed his fist onto the paper. Having spoken of the ‘terrible
informed Cayo Evans, it would have ‘saved some of the others the agony’ they ‘endured’.
84 WM, 2 July 1969. Cayo Evans and Denis Coslett agreed not to take part in any military-like activity, 
or handle weapons illegally; not to associate with those engaged in military-like actions; not to 
advocate or use violence for a political cause; not to form or attempt to form a military-like 
organization: not to use or advocate the use of violence and not to associate with anyone doing so: and 
not to take part in an illegal military-like organization. V. Griffiths, T. Lewis and V. G. Davies signed 
smaller undertakings. A police officer later told G. ap Iestyn that he and colleagues respected his 
refusal to sign the pledge. Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009.
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also 13 March 2001. ‘Expecting more’ 
Coslett was ‘pleased’ with his sentence; he had ‘practically run down the stairs in case Thompson
288
morning’ when the nine were arrested by the ‘political police’, Denis Coslett declared 
he would forget neither ‘the look of fear and horror on the faces of his children’, nor 
‘Wales’ in his ‘lonely cell’. He prayed God would give ‘Wales the strength to cast off 
its fetters’. Much of the courtroom erupted in tumultuous applause and cries of 
support.86 It was cleared, apart from his sobbing wife, as Denis Coslett received his
07
sentence. The trial cost the British taxpayer £130,000: between £8 - £10 a minute.
It was £70,000 less than the investiture.
In court to hear the sentences handed down was Lyn Ebenezer. It was an 
experience, he later confessed, he would never forget. ‘Expecting to be dismissed’, 
Cayo Evans fixed his gaze on his friend from west Wales. His tear-filled expression 
of fear, shock and frustration, brought forth an equally emotional response from Lyn 
Ebenezer.88 In stark contrast, on receiving his judicial chastisement, Denis Coslett
OQ
refused to reveal his feelings, staring impassively ahead. Emotions were running 
high. For refusing to attend the trial and support those who derived ‘fun provoking 
and outraging the respectable, peace-loving Plaid Cymru’,90 Saunders Lewis ‘never 
forgave’ Gwynfor Evans.91
Later describing his subsequent prison term, Denis Coslett admitted matters 
became decidedly worse on being convicted. A ‘category A’ prisoner, with the 
customary yellow patches sown onto his uniform, Coslett was segregated and even 
exercised for half-an-hour-a-day on his own, while surrounded by barbed wire fences, 
dogs and the obligatory two guards. Escorted whenever visits were taken to the toilet 
or library, his cell - with the light on day and night - was stripped bare each day. 
Coslett remained convinced his food was poisoned with human excreta, blaming the 
step-son of the Swansea-based Express journalist John Christopher, who was in prison
changed his mind’. Justice Thompson remarked witheringly, ‘just go’.
86 The Times, 2 July 1969; also, interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. The 
speech was written largely by David Bonar Thomas and Toni Lewis during trial recesses during its 
latter stage. Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
87
WM, 2 July 1969; also, Y Cymro, 9 July 1969; also New Statesman, 4 July 1969; also NS, 11 July
1969. During the trial, the wives o f the accused stayed at the home of a sympathetic lady in Llanelli.
88 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006. Evans looked as if he had been ‘horse 
whipped’, Ebenezer stated. Coslett, he was later told, had looked unfazed and could have taken news 
o f ‘20 years’.
89
Interview between WT & Avril Coslett, 5 March 2009.
90 Barn, Rhif 73-84, 1968-1969, p.258.
91 Gwynfor Evans, For the Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 2001), p. 193; also, Barn, October 1985. Saunders 
Lewis attended ‘on a few occasions’. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
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for embezzlement. The FWA had threatened Christopher’s life,92 following his 
refusal to acknowledge the group’s salutary involvement in the Aberfan parent- 
payment issue. Employed in the Swansea prison kitchens, Christopher’s step-son, 
allegedly exacted his revenge. Yet, perhaps surprisingly - or perhaps not - it was the 
Welsh guards who reserved the greatest animosity towards Coslett, rather than their 
English counterparts, who, Coslett believed, ‘were pretty good’ to him.94 The effect 
of Dafydd y Dug’s relatively short incarceration had nonetheless left its legacy; he 
later explained his eye sight was permanently damaged owing to prolonged spells 
amid artificial lighting.95
Anti-investiture demonstration, Gordon Wyn Jones enters the picture and MAC 
targets the Chester Tax Office
Despite the trial of the FWA and anti-investiture lobbyists having attracted 
considerable attention, events outside Swansea Assizes continued unabated. At an 
anti-investiture rally in Caernarfon attended by 5,000, on 1 March,96 the Welsh 
language activist Emyr Llywelyn Jones was approached by a man - unknown within 
the nationalist movement - ‘wanting to do something for Wales’. He had, he further 
announced, ‘already planted a device in a shoe box on Anglesey’. The stranger, called 
Gordon Wyn Jones from Holyhead, was quickly informed that ‘Cymdeithais yr Iaith 
Gymraeg was non-violent’. Basically ‘trying it on with different people’, it would 
not, Jones added, ‘have taken much for Wyn Jones’s intentions to get back to John 
Jenkins talking like that’. How the connection between Gordon Wyn Jones and John 
Jenkins was established, remains unclear. For his part, Emyr Llywelyn Jones
92 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 13 March, 2001. The yellow patches were to indicate the 
prisoners were ‘in danger o f escaping’. Y Cymro, 9 July 1969.
Daily Express, 31 August 1967. No mention of the FWA ultimatum threatening direct action was
included in the article written by John Christopher.
94 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000; also, Coslett’s book of prose entitled 
Rebel Heart, contains Within the Walls, p.44. His ‘time inside’, he remarked, ‘was hell’. Coslett left 
prison eight stone. Contrary to the English warders, the Welsh guards were ‘horrible bastards’. It was 
a view similarly expressed by Dafydd y Dug, Y Cymro, 9 July 1969. G. ap Iestyn and C. Evans were 
held in Cardiff prison.
95
Interview between WT & Dafydd y Dug, 1 March 2004; also, Y Cymro, 9 July 1969. In an 
interview, Mair Griffiths and Gillian Evans discussed how neighbours, family, friends, sympathizers 
and the vet had supported them financially (along with social security payments) since their husband’s 
imprisonment. ‘Only the Celts’, declared journalist Mark Bourke, ‘could get themselves in such a
jam’. Only they ‘solve it with such divinity’. Guardian, 9 July 1969.
96 LDP, 3 March 1969. The march was led through Caernarfon by a car which relayed Dafydd Iwan’s 
satirical song Carlo. Other sources claimed the attendance was 3,000. WM, 3 March 1969.
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07rigorously denies any involvement. Yet, evidence at the National Archives suggests 
Gordon Wyn Jones soon met fellow rally-attendee Gareth Miles, another leading 
figure within CylG; and that - in turn - Miles then arranged for the ‘seaman, or liner-
QO
worker’ G. W. Jones to meet John Jenkins. Commenting on the degree of contact 
between the two groups, John Jenkins admitted senior members of Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru ‘were known to each other’.99 
Responding to the charge, Gareth Miles audibly sighed and remarked if Jenkins had 
stated such, then so be it.100 Yet, it is a suggestion refuted as spurious by Emyr 
Llywelyn Jones.101 Interestingly however, Ann Woodgate informed investigating 
officers that during the final stages of her relationship with Frederick Ernest Alders - 
which ended in January 1969 - he and John Jenkins regularly visited Miles at his
107home in Wrexham. John Jenkins further revealed his combined status within the 
British Army and as director of operations of MAC, was a situation recognized within 
‘certain circles’.103 One such person ‘in the picture’ was David Walters. Although far 
from being ‘common knowledge’, within the south Wales ‘inner sanctum’ Walters 
disclosed, it was ‘well known’.104 Nevertheless, just how problematic was the fear of 
infiltration, was illustrated by Owain Williams. Approached at this juncture by ‘lots 
of people’ with ‘plans to disrupt the investiture’, he did not know if they were ‘MI5, 
MI6 or genuine’. Yet, one thing he quickly discerned: he could ‘only trust people’ he 
‘really knew’.105
Amid such an atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue, at 2.15 a.m. on 10 April, 
following a three month lull in its campaign, designed, John Jenkins later revealed, ‘to
97 Telephone interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 20 February 2009. Two days after the 
rally, a package containing a timing device and a liquid substance was discovered in a control building 
at RAF Mona on Anglesey. It did not contain explosive matter. WM, 3 March 1969. ‘I believe 
Gordon Wyn Jones was allowed by the authorities to plant the device in the RAF station, in order to 
obtain credibility in the eyes o f John Jenkins, whom it was hoped he (Jones) would then meet’. 
Anonymous interview with WT, August 2010.
QO
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones.
99 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
100 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 14 October 2008. Gareth Miles denied being in 
MAC.
Telephone interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 20 February 2009.
102
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, 15 December 1969.
103 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 January 2009. Jenkins admitted his 
confidante and ‘adviser’ Harri Webb had known.
104
Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
105 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
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give the authorities a sense of false security’,106 Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru activated a 
device containing 5-101bs of explosives at the offices of Chester Inland Revenue. It 
caused, a secret memo to the Prime Minster declared, ‘considerable damage’,107 with
1 AO
virtually every pane of glass at the back of the building destroyed. ‘Directed by the 
Shrewsbury unit’, the resulting police enquiry included ‘house-to-house’ searches and 
interviews with ‘persons known to hold extreme views’.109 If the authorities required 
conclusive evidence the bombing campaign was not the work of the FWA, then this - 
with the most prominent members of the organization behind bars awaiting trial - was 
surely it. Watching the news unfold, journalist Ian Skidmore was convinced the 
action was undertaken at his behest. This, he perceived, having casually replied that 
the Chester Tax Office seemed a reasonable proposition, when asked by Jenkins what 
he would like targeted at the conclusion of the MAC press conference some twelve 
months earlier.110 Yet, the reason for targeting the site, John Jenkins later divulged, 
was - as ever - two fold. The timing of the blast - coinciding with the visit to Chester 
of the Duke of Norfolk - did not go unnoticed by either the Home Office, or 
precipitately, John Jenkins.111
Acting alone, Jenkins climbed onto the flat roof of a garage adjoining the 
building to plant the device. Was he happier to ‘work independently’ at this point, 
Jenkins was asked. ‘Well’, he replied with typical candour, ‘some people are able to 
bear pressure better than others, let’s put it that way’. He had not really felt that ‘to be 
the case with Alders, but he was to marry in a matter of weeks’. However, he was not 
pleased with the ‘strike’. The ‘main object of the exercise was to get the Duke of 
Norfolk (responsible for all state ceremonial involving the monarchy) to castigate the 
Welsh people’, he explained. It was targeted, partly owing to its status ‘as a
106 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
107 TNA, DPP 2/5993; also PREM 13/2903. Memo from James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, 14 April 
1969. ‘The Security Services and the Shrewsbury Unit’, Callaghan declared, had each concluded, 
Prince Charles ran more the risk o f ‘personal embarrassment than physical harm’, by attending
Aberystwyth University. Yet, it was ‘never possible to rule out the activities o f a determined fanatic’.
108 WM, 11 April 1969. The bomb shattered over 200 windows and tore a hole through a six-inch- 
thick reinforced concrete wall. Hundreds of tax forms cascaded through the broken windows into the 
street.10Q
TNA, PREM 13/2903. Memo from James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, 14 April 1969. Plans by 
Welsh extremists to ‘disorganize selected railway junctions and de-rail trains’ on, or just before, the 
investiture had been received.
110 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, August 2007. The anonymous Jenkins 
allegedly replied: ‘yeah, we can do that for you’.
111 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Memo from James Callaghan to Harold Wilson, 14 April 1969. The Duke 
was scheduled to speak at the army headquarters in the city, on the role of the armed services during
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government tax office’, but also because the Duke was to attend ‘a highly secret 
engagement’ where the security arrangements for the ceremony were to be discussed. 
‘Nobody’, Jenkins added, ‘knew anything about it; but we did, via a sympathetic 
police source; and we also knew the Duke was ‘highly coloured’ with ‘a very bad 
temper and that he hated Welsh people’. Furthermore, he ‘was a drunk’ and when ‘in 
his cups or angry’, would let fly irrespective of who might be listening. From a MAC 
perspective therefore, the Duke, Jenkins declared, ‘was exactly what we were looking 
for’. It was hoped, when he arrived in Chester the following morning, the Duke 
would be greeted with the sight of ‘the tax office in absolute bloody chaos’. It was 
then expected, with the press in attendance, he would ‘start shouting and bawling’ and 
deriding the Welsh as a ‘bunch of ungrateful bastards’. Did they not know, Jenkins 
demanded with mock similitude, ‘what was being done to give them the Prince of 
Wales?’
Jenkins felt sure the Duke of Norfolk would have reacted this way, but 
unfortunately for MAC, ‘the authorities realized this as well, and as soon as he 
arrived, they ‘shoved him straight into a helicopter and he was gone’. And how was 
this reported, Jenkins asked with deliberate incredulity? By saying ‘the Duke was so 
impressed with the security arrangements being put in place at Caernarfon, that he left 
to inspect what was happening personally’. The decision to remove him was merely 
to prevent him commenting to the press, Jenkins believed. By the time he returned, 
‘because he did not land in Caernarfon, he’d settled down’. So, John Jenkins added 
ruefully, the operation was a partial success, yet the most important aspect was denied 
them. Responding to why such a ‘loose cannon’ had been put in charge of 
arrangements for the investiture, Jenkins stated it was owing to the authorities’ failure 
to anticipate ‘outrages’ like a tax office ‘being blown up’ the night before he arrived.
Despite the ‘huge’ security operation, the director-general of MAC waited on 
the garage roof until ‘the coast was clear’. However, his journey to Wrexham also 
proved eventful, as the car - possibly as a result of ‘wrong petrol’ - ‘kangaroo jumped’ 
all the way.112 If Jenkins was aware the Shrewsbury unit had received information the
the investiture.
112 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. The press, Jenkins declared, deduced 
why the Duke was removed from Chester. Moreover, as the tax office was closely positioned to the 
city police headquarters, the area ‘was bloody crawling’ because o f the Duke’s impending arrival. The 
‘one or two’ police contacts, although not directly known to Jenkins, ‘were feeding information of  
things they thought might come in useful’. The officers were not subsequently discovered or 
reprimanded.
293
group responsible for the bombing campaign comprised ‘a policy director...and six-
113highly trained saboteurs’, his return home might have been even more nerve- 
wracking. Nonetheless, news that ‘windows in a hospital half-a-mile-away were 
shattered’ in the blast, 114 was allegedly greeted with incredulous amusement by 
Frederick Ernest Alders,115 and palpable alarm in Downing Street. In a further memo 
to the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, six days later, Harold Wilson ruminated 
whether ‘we might be wiser to cancel Aberystwyth’.116 The prince, Wilson was curtly
117informed, was already there.
More attacks in Cardiff
However, with a ‘crack army bomb disposal unit’ in Aberystwyth and ‘the most
110
elaborate security operation’ Wales has ‘known’, on the eve of what the press was 
indolently referring to as ‘the Free Wales Army Trial’, 119 a !4 lb device blasted 
Cardiff’s new police headquarters.120 Denying responsibility for the action, John 
Jenkins has nevertheless now revealed the Cardiff MAC cell discovered the primed 
device, when they themselves attempted to target the exact central-heating duct in the 
early hours of the same morning. Having ‘no idea’ who planted the explosives and in 
recognition it detonated at 1600, it ‘might well’, Jenkins believed, have ‘been a 
Special Branch operation’. Asked to expand the point, Jenkins added that had its
113 WM, 12 April 1969. The information was received following a public appeal.
114 WM, 11 April 1969.
115 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, dated 15 December 1969.
116 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Memo dated 16 April 1969.
117 TNA, PREM 13/2903. Memo dated 21 April 1969, from the Welsh Office to Downing Street. 
Harold Wilson was not alone in ‘expressing grave fears’ with regard the prince’s safety. A letter from 
Dr. Tom Parry, the Aberystwyth college principal, to George Thomas ‘indicated he could not accept 
responsibility’. George Thomas, Mr. Speaker (London, 1985), p.l 19.
1 1 X
The Times, 19 April 1969. For MI5 and Special Branch infiltration of students and staff, see: TNA,
CAB 164,386; Ellis, Investiture, p.230; WM, 13 March 1969. Dr. T. Parry, the college principal,
dismissed speculation agents would masquerade as students as ‘merely rumours’. ‘Charles was
protected by a unit o f fifteen some o f them armed’. Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC
Timewatch Production. Screened July 2009.
119 WM, 17 April 1969. ‘I cannot stress enough’, stated Gethin ap Iestyn, ‘it was neither a show trial or 
just the FWA. It was about disrupting and stopping the anti-investiture campaign. Full stop’. 
Correspondence with WT, 26 January 2008. For anti-investiture material including posters 
proclaiming ‘If You’re Welsh You’re Watched’, ‘Charles Windsor Shall Not Pass’ and emotive 
depictions o f Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s death, see: ‘Seize the Time’, Penderyn, Ty Cenedl 1 AIM; AI5. 
NLW.190
The Times, 16 April 1969; also WM, 30 April 1969. The device was planted at the rear o f the 
building in a central-heating duct. The explosion shattered three windows and dislodged a boundary 
wall and coping stones. ‘With 70 or 80’ employed at the station, ‘the two damaged rooms may well 
have been occupied at the time’ stated an ‘appalled’ George Thomas on arriving at the scene.
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activation caused ‘death or serious injury’, the authorities would have been provided 
‘the moral high ground’, it desperately sought. Moreover, ‘Special Branch’ at this 
juncture ‘literally’ had ‘a blank cheque’ to act as it saw fit; the group was ‘an absolute 
law unto itself .121
Yet, following police speculation that the far from infallible timing
199mechanism had ‘triggered twelve hours later than intended’, speaking in 2004, Toni 
Lewis, the former leading figure within the Patriotic Front, threw new light on what 
transpired. Some years later, during a ‘march against unemployment’ through Cardiff 
civic centre, two men approached Lewis near the point the rally passed Cardiff City 
Police Headquarters. As the conversation turned to the bomb which exploded in the 
central heating duct, the verbal exchange further meandered toward the MAC unit 
which discovered the already installed device. Unexpectedly, one of the two men 
announced that having received explicit instruction from John Jenkins as to where and 
when the device was to be planted, he had received ‘the shock of his life’ on 
discovering the already positioned explosive ensemble. Asked if he might identify 
the two anonymous activists, Toni Lewis disclosed the apparently more senior and 
reticent of the two was ‘from south Wales, no longer alive and a little bit older’ than 
himself. Despite his subsequent efforts, Toni Lewis was unable to corroborate the 
admis sion.123 The identity of the would-be MAC operatives remains a mystery.
So does the identity of the person or persons who did plant the device which 
exploded at Cardiff City Police HQ. Despite John Jenkins’ trenchant assurance only 
he possessed the wherewithal to orchestrate the campaign of militant activism, might 
a dissident republican have been operating? Or indeed, was it perhaps the inevitable 
emergence of a politically - and morally - less-inspired copy-cat? Whatever the truth, 
the explosion sent shock waves through Whitehall. On being informed of the blast, 
Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office, convened an urgent 
meeting with James Callaghan and his Private Secretary. There, despite the 
establishment of the Shrewsbury Unit and the appointment of Frank Williamson, all 
conceded the hunt to apprehend the militants was leading nowhere. Asked to 
respond, Frank Williamson informed the Home Secretary that the militant campaign
121 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. Special Branch, Jenkins believed, 
covered up its actions ‘whichever way it could’. Jenkins contacted the cell leader to be informed the 
MAC limit had ‘discovered a device already there’.
122 WM, 16 April 1969.
123 Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004. One o f the two men stated: ‘our lot did that’.
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in Wales was indeed more precarious than first considered. Furthermore, the threat
posed by Welsh extremists was not confined to the impending investiture. What
Wales required, Williamson suggested, was a ‘central intelligence agency’. It was a
proposal accepted by the seven Welsh chief constables.124 It also received the
endorsement of government security advisors, who - in response to increased activity
in the build-up to the investiture - proposed an anti-terrorist organization be
permanently established to combat the menace of Welsh extremism. Moreover, when
operational, English police forces would share full responsibility for policing Welsh
nationalist agitation.125
The decision to implement such a drastic measure in how the country was
policed, was given considerable impetus by explosions - all steadfastly denied by
Jenkins as undertaken by MAC - which rocked the Welsh capital during the 53 day
trail of the FWA and anti-investiture campaigners. On 23 April, a device was
discovered in a locker at Cardiff s Queen Street railway station. Noticing a surcharge
was payable on a briefcase placed inside the locker four days earlier, the booking
clerk, Bernard Wall, slightly opened it. Had he opened it any further, army disposal
officer Terence Keane announced on arrival from the unit’s temporary base at
Aberystwyth, the device - as perhaps intended - would have activated and Wall almost
certainly killed. The explosive material was ‘entirely different’ from devices used in
previous sabotage incidents, a police spokesman revealed.126 Three days later, as
British Rail announced the closure of its left luggage facility in Wales and further
bomb hoaxes were reported,127 police arrested 20-year-old Robert William Trigg in
128connection with the locker-room incident. He was remanded in custody until trial.
In July, the Sheffield University Physics and Metallurgy student was found 
guilty of possessing an explosive substance and theft of such materials. The jury
124
HO, 325/122. Report by James Waddell, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Home Office, to Philip 
Allen, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, 20 May 1969. The proposal was also 
endorsed at the same meeting by the chief constables of Gloucestershire, Cheshire, West Mercia and 
the security services.
125
HO, 325/122. Dennis Trevelyan, Home Office Division F2 (counter terrorism), 26 June 1969. In
the meantime, the Shrewsbury Unit would perform the function.
126 WM, 25 April 1969. The device was detonated on waste ground near the railway station. Rather 
than gelignite, it contained ‘15 % oz o f RDX/TNT, a propellant powder; a No. 107 detonator; a .22 ball 
cartridge and a magazine o f a fuse’.
127 WM, 26 April 1969.
128 WM, 7 May 1969; also, WM, 7 June 1969. R. W. Trigg lived at Heol Poyston, Ely, Cardiff. He 
admitted stealing two anti-tank grenades, smoke-grenades and possessing explosives. He denied 
intending to harm anyone. Had the device activated, it would have had the same force as between six -
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nonetheless failed to agree if this was with intent to endanger life or damage property. 
Despite his established links to the British Anarchist Movement and sympathies for 
Welsh Republicanism, Trigg claimed he perpetrated the incident as a hoax. This, he 
proposed in mitigation, by claiming to have deliberately disabled the device. He 
further claimed he was not politically inspired, but wanted ‘to make the police and 
Establishment jittery’. Although Howard Yallop, principal scientific advisor to the 
Home Office, admitted the bomb’s assembly rendered it ‘unreliable’ as an explosive
190 •instrument, Trigg was imprisoned for four years. Watching events unfold in 
Wrexham, John Jenkins declared Trigg’s action to be a ‘worrying development’ and 
discerned the young man was ‘mentally unstable’.130
Despite R. W. Trigg’s arrest, in the early hours of 29 April, an explosion 
ripped through the Central Electricity Generating Board offices in the Gabalfa area of 
the city. The device was planted in a flowerbed and encased with ‘nuts and bolts’. 
On detonating, it shattered windows and caused extensive damage to the buildings 
interior. The device, police admitted, was similar in design to that which caused 
damage at Cardiff Police Headquarters a fortnight earlier. No one was injured in the
i
Gabalfa attack and no one has been convicted of the crime. The following day, 
contrary to previous press statements, police announced the latest upsurge in militant 
activity was not thought to be the work of Welsh extremists, but rather a group 
‘jumping on the publicity bandwagon’. Moreover, both the police station and 
Electricity Board explosions were significantly smaller. In each, a % lb of explosives 
were used, with both employing a wrist watch to activate the charge rather than a
1 ^ 9sophisticated time mechanism. Investigating officers drew the same conclusion, 
when a device inserted in a letter box exploded outside the postal sorting office in
I  ^o
Victoria Park, at the end of June. It followed the discovery of two sticks of
twelve hand grenades.
129
WM, 24,25,26,29 July 1969. Cardiff’s Peter Geoffrey Raymond o f the Anarchist Movement 
tentatively agreed to deposit the device, but ultimately did not. Trigg considered it too pacific an 
organization. Trigg’s sister discovered him assembling the device when she returned from babysitting 
at 2.00 a.m on Saturday, 19 April. Some hours later, he placed the device in locker CIO at Queen
Street Station. He was arrested in Sheffield seven days later.
130
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November
2008.
131 WM, 29 April 1969. 75-year-old night-watchman, Frank Hill, walked past the site o f the blast 
minutes before.
132 WM, 30 April 1969.
133 WM, 30 June 1969. The explosion at 1.40 a.m. was heard throughout the city. It blew a three-foot 
square metal casing 30 feet across one of Cardiff’s main roads.
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gelignite at Taf Fechan Reservoir near Merthyr Tydfil.134 Here too, John Jenkins 
denies any MAC involvement.
The ‘unrest’ in Wales was now a news item of global proportions. As a result 
of the ‘political turmoil’ sweeping the nation, a package holiday, aimed to coincide 
with the investiture and arranged for 300 Americans and Canadians was cancelled. 
Dismissed as an over-reaction, it nonetheless coincided with the announcement that 
an ‘eighteen-vessel armada’, including minesweepers, submarines and naval ships,
i
would patrol the Welsh coastline during the investiture period.
MAC targets the Mackenzie Pier monument
On 26 June, a MAC active unit placed a 61b device at the foot of a monument in 
Holyhead. The plinth, which commemorated the ‘first visit of the Prince of Wales on 
9 August 1938’ was ‘near the Mackenzie Pier’. It was from there, the Home 
Secretary, James Callaghan was informed in a report of the incident, that Prince 
Charles was ‘to board the royal barge to take him out to the royal yacht’ Britannia 
following the investiture. Placed within a ‘blue’ canvass hold-all ‘with one side 
completely cut out’, the unexploded device was discovered shortly before 7.00 a.m.136 
Interviewed following its discovery, 50-year-old crane-driver James Crookston, 
revealed he peered inside the bag, heard ticking and saw ‘ten sticks of weeping 
gelignite’. In such a perilously unstable condition, the safety of four boys who slept 
the night in a tent ‘only a few yards’ from the hold-all raises serious questions. Also 
interviewed the following morning, one of them, 16-year-old Paul Gregory, recalled 
he and his companions were disturbed by ‘footsteps crunching in the sand and gravel’ 
as they chatted at 1.00 a.m. Believing a walker was enjoying the night air, they
1 37attached no importance to it.
Later discussing the Holyhead action, John Jenkins admitted it was ‘a protest 
laden with symbolism’. Moreover, despite those who suggest the intention was to 
prevent Prince Charles from utilizing the pier, Jenkins added that from what he ‘was
134 WM, 26 May 1969.
135 WM, 20 June 1969. From the ramparts o f Caernarfon Castle, with its imposing view of the Menai 
Straits, the coastal minesweeper Anglesey cut a reassuring presence throughout the ceremony.
136 TNA, PREM 13/2903; also, DPP 2/5994. J. Crookston was accompanied by two colleagues as he 
walked to work on the jetty being built in Holyhead harbour. Believing the bag was left by a tourist, on
discovering its contents, he flung it down and shouted a warning to ‘run like hell’. WM, 26 June 1969.
137 WM, 26 June 1969. The device was removed by Major Clifton Jeffries, head of Western 
Command’s bomb disposal unit. Had the bomb detonated, the plinth would have been ‘blown to bits’,
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told’, it was indeed ‘quite some distance between the pier and the monument’. Asked 
to quantify its symbolic relevance, it was, Jenkins replied, ‘symbolic in the sense that 
MAC wanted to demonstrate its willingness to kill’; it had of course, ‘no intention of 
doing so’. Nevertheless, desperate to take the armed struggle to the state in protest 
at the investiture, John Jenkins’s behaviour became increasingly cavalier in the 
immediate pre-investiture period. During a visit to the home of Alders’ step-father 
John Roberts, Jenkins enquired as to whether Roberts would steal gelignite from the 
Hendre Quarry where he was employed. On the grounds that security was ‘tight’, 
Roberts refused to cooperate. He further refused to draw Jenkins a map locating the
1 'IQQuarry’s magazine. John Jenkins then suggested either he, or his son, collect a 
‘man from Abergele’ and travel to Holyhead. This, Jenkins revealed, was in order for 
an explosive device to be planted at the Prince of Wales monument. Both John 
Roberts and his son refused.140 John Jenkins later confirmed that MAC activist 
Alwyn Jones was to be collected from Abergele to undertake the action.141
Steadfast in his belief the monument in Holyhead should be targeted, John 
Jenkins turned his attention to Gordon Wyn Jones. In accusatory and incriminating 
statements, which Jones and his wife later gave to investigating officers, each 
described how John Jenkins entered their lives. Six weeks after the anti-investiture 
rally in Caernarfon, during which he approached Emyr Llywelyn Jones voicing intent 
to engage the militant struggle, Gordon Wyn Jones received a letter from Gareth 
Miles requesting they meet. He would, Miles stated, meet Jones off the train in 
Chester. On arrival, Jones was eventually approached by a man, who while travelling 
to Wrexham by car, informed him he was called ‘John’. Having each declared their 
displeasure at the investiture, they arrived at Jenkins’ home. There, Jones asked his 
host if he was in the army. Asked how he knew, Jones replied that he noticed 
Jenkins’ cap as he entered the building. For the next ‘two hours’, a ‘trance-like’ 
Jenkins discussed MAC stratagem for achieving Home Rule for Wales. This involved 
escalating the militant campaign, which, in turn, would ensure an increased British 
military presence in Wales. As a means of ‘antagonizing the local populace’, Welsh
he stated.
138 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
139
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Exhibit 132. Witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders; also, witness 
statement by John Griffith Roberts, dated 15 December 1969.
140
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by John Griffith Roberts, dated 15 December 1969; also,
witness statement from John Richard Lewis Roberts, dated 5 December 1969.
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women were to be raped by MAC personnel wearing British Army uniforms.142
On returning Jones to Chester railway station, having first visited Gareth 
Miles, John Jenkins asked G. W. Jones if he would ‘consider’ ‘getting rid of the stone 
on Mackenzie Pier’. Informed he would, Jenkins then asked Jones to take the MAC 
oath of allegiance. As Jones alighted from the car, John Jenkins, G. W. Jones alleges, 
formally introduced himself. A ‘month later’, Jones returned from work to discover 
the director-general of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru had visited his home in Holyhead 
and placed in his garden shed, an explosive device within a ‘tartan bag’.143 Jenkins 
had left instructions with Jones’ wife as how to activate the charge, and that her 
husband should plant the device ‘as near as possible to the date of the investiture’.144
Commenting on the apparent abandonment of his erstwhile strict adherence to 
security matters, the former director general of MAC conceded that all aspects of the 
encounter with the wife of Gordon Wyn Jones was ‘a gross breach of security’. He, 
Alders and his fiance, arrived expecting to find Gordon Wyn Jones at home. To learn 
that Jones was ‘at sea’ had set Jenkins upon a chain of conduct he recognized in 
security terms to be highly improper. Yet, with the investiture drawing ever nearer 
and the pressure mounting, Jenkins felt he had no choice.145
The ceremony now impending, G. W. Jones noticed campers near the 
monument. Deciding not to carry out the attack, he was ‘most surprised’ to learn an 
explosive device was located at the base of the monument some days later. Gordon 
Wyn Jones later told police that on the Saturday prior to the investiture, he 
‘accidentally met’ John Jenkins in Caernarfon. Asked by Jenkins ‘what went wrong 
at the Mackenzie Pier stone’, Jones - not wanting to admit he was not responsible - 
replied he disabled the device, fearing its activation might endanger the lives of those 
camping nearby.146
14] Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009.
142 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones.
143 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones. Jenkins is alleged to have said: ‘By 
the way, my name is John Jenkins’. Jones claimed he ‘hid the hold-all containing the explosives ‘by a
disused farm on Holyhead mountain’.
144
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Mary Elizabeth Jones, dated, 13 March 1970. Jenkins 
was accompanied by Alders and his fiance Rowena. When explaining how to assemble the device, 
Rowena assured Jenkins she and Alders would return him again, if  G. W. Jones had difficulty. On 
being asked what would happen if  her husband was caught, Jenkins allegedly informed Mary Jones that 
it was he the authorities were ‘trying to catch’, but they would be unsuccessful as he was ‘too clever for
them’.
145 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 14 January 2009.
146 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones. The Jones family was in
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Asked who he believed responsible, John Jenkins, having denied personal 
involvement, replied firmly ‘MAC’ and more specifically, ‘Gordon Wyn Jones’. G. 
W. Jones subsequently distanced himself from the incident, Jenkins believed, on the 
prior understating that no action would be taken against him in return for giving 
evidence at his and Alders’ trial. John Jenkins also vehemently challenged other 
inclusions in Jones’ written testimony: most notably, Jones’ claim to have visited 
Jenkins at his home in Wrexham. He and Gordon Wyn Jones, Jenkins protested, only 
ever met in Caernarfon. Moreover, renowned for his fastidious appearance, Jenkins’ 
uniform was always diligently placed in a bedroom cupboard when not being worn. 
Furthermore, while the sexual assault of Welsh woman was discussed at senior MAC 
level, it was rejected as immoral and ineffective. Nevertheless, asked what other 
tactical avenues were explored, Jenkins revealed that Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru had 
considered ‘capturing the Lord Lieutenant of Caernarfon and threatening his life 
unless the investiture was cancelled’. It was thought an ‘appropriate member of 
MAC’ would lure the ‘homosexual into woods’. This proposal was also rejected, 
Jenkins declared, on the grounds ‘it sounded too much like Sicily’. Intriguingly, 
Jenkins added, the Lord Lieutenant was removed from his post in the weeks before the 
ceremony, ‘possibly because the authorities realized he was a weak link’.147
The arrest and trial of the ‘Mackenzie Pier three’
However, within 24 hours of the device at Mackenzie Pier being discovered, John 
Allan Jones (20) of Ty Croes, Anglesey, William Glyn Jones (22) of Trearddur Bay, 
Anglesey and Dewi Jones (22) of Porthmadoc - all three assistants in the architects 
and county planning department at Anglesey County Council - were arrested on a 
charge o f conspiring to cause an explosion. Released within hours, all were re­
arrested the following day, when examination results for explosives - which involved 
taking ‘scrapings’ from finger nails - were returned. The tests revealed a positive 
reaction to substances similar to nitro-glycerin on Dewi Jones and William Glyn 
Jones. The latter also responded positively to traces of ammonium nitrate and 
chloride. 148 All three were further charged with possessing a quantity of materials 
required to assemble an explosive device, such as: gelignite, wooden trips, batteries,
Caernarfon, staying at the home o f Mary Jones’ mother.
147
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007.
148 WM, 23 July 1969.
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an alarm clock and a copper detonator. Having not submitted a bail application, the 
three remained in custody until after the investiture.149 They were then released on 
bail until their trial in October.150
At Flintshire Assizes, four months after their arrest, the three council assistants 
- despite the apparent wealth of incriminating evidence - pleaded not guilty to the 
charges against them. This included planting the device found at Mackenzie Pier, 
Holyhead. Nonetheless, during the court proceedings, details were heard of The 
Organization which William Glyn Jones purported to belong to. The underground 
movement, Jones allegedly informed police, pledged to destroy symbolic, inanimate 
objects such as water pipes and other items associated with the ‘established regime’. 
Asked how it functioned, Jones declared the group was comprised of small units 
which received instruction from ‘a link man’. The mysterious figure would supply 
the explosives and identify the target. Interestingly, unlike Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru explosive ensembles, the pier device was set to activate at 2.00 p.m., a senior 
bomb disposal inspector revealed.
During police questioning, Dewi Jones disclosed that a week before the 
Holyhead device was located, he and W. G. Jones travelled to Graig Farm, at 
Llandegely, Radnor. He received notice the farm was involved in the militant 
campaign through Michael Lewis, whom he met earlier at Aberystwyth University. 
On arrival, they apparently received instruction regarding the assembling of a timing 
device from a Scot called Ron Curtis. Asked by police to explain the diagram handed 
them by Curtis, Dewi Jones initially claimed to have discarded it. He later stated that 
the ‘sinister’ hand-written instruction simply outlined the procedure required to install 
under-floor heating. It was not the only instruction the two Joneses received at Graig 
Farm. Later handed to John Allan Jones and found in his car, was a sheet of paper on 
which a second unnamed man at Graig Farm had written ‘Seamus O’Thannagh, 
University College, Dublin’. Implored by investigating officers to reveal the 
Irishman’s identity, J. A. Jones revealed he was ‘connected to the IRA’. Yet, 
although a meeting was organized between his co-defendants and O’Thannagh, the 
north Wales men failed to attend, owing to having had ‘cold feet at the last minute’.
It was a line of defence which failed to convince the jury. Following the
149 LDP, 30 June 1969. During the committal hearing, Inspector Tecwyn Williams alleged that all 
three made statements admitting being involved with explosives’. It was a charge denied by Dewi 
Jones, who interjected claiming he made no such admission.
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revelation that fibres from Dewi Jones’s clothing matched those from the hold all in 
which the Mackenzie Pier bomb was placed, Dewi and Glyn Jones were found guilty 
of having jointly conspired with persons unknown to unlawfully cause an explosion. 
It was considered likely this would endanger life, or cause serious injury to property. 
Each was imprisoned for eighteen months. Crucially, neither they, nor John Alan 
Jones, were found guilty of planting the Mackenzie Pier time-bomb. J. A. Jones was 
nonetheless found guilty of ‘having possession of, or control of, explosive substances’ 
and sentenced to six months. This was suspended for two years.151
After John Jenkins’ later arrest, Dewi Watkin Powell, the senior Plaid Cymru 
figure and defence lawyer for the two imprisoned men, approached Jenkins in prison. 
John Jenkins believes his subsequent statement that none of the three were in MAC, 
was instrumental in Dewi and Glyn Jones’ period of incarceration being reduced from 
eighteen months to nine months on appeal. Asked in 2007 to re-visit speculation that 
at least one of the three had links to MAC, Jenkins declined to comment; before 
adding that he was opting to do so as might a politician respond; ‘neither stating yes, 
or no’.
However, the arrests of the three Joneses resulted in a harvest of suspicion 
within the Welsh militant community. Did he believe Gordon Wyn Jones to be an
1 S?agent provocateur, John Jenkins was asked; and instrumental in the arrests of the
1three planning assistants, as Gareth Miles and Emyr Llywelyn Jones opined? He 
did not. Further adding the three had only themselves to blame for their predicament, 
having been ‘far too vocal about their intentions’. Jenkins believed ‘they very quickly 
came to the notice of the authorities’. What is more, he had neither heard of Michael 
Lewis nor a Ron Curtis from the Llandrindod area, nor indeed Graig Farm. Certainly 
the MAC unit based in mid Wales was not in any way connected to it. Rather, 
Jenkins was convinced ‘that either Curtis or Lewis, or indeed both, was an agent 
provocateur’. Such people who ‘shouted loudly their intent to strike a blow for 
Wales, were easy pickings for agents'. Their ‘subsequent arrest could then be used to
150 WM, 19 July 1969.
151 LDP, 23 July 1969; also WM, 23, July; also, WM, 7 October 1969; 8 October 1969; 9 October 1969; 
10 October 1969; 11 October 1969; 14 October 1969; 15 October 1969; 16 October 1969; 21 October
1969. W. G. and D. Jones visited Graig Farm on 13 June 1969.
152 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009. ‘None’ o f the Anglesey employees
‘were in MAC’, Jenkins affirmed.
153 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 14 October 2008; also telephone interview
between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 22 October 2008.
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demonstrate the efficiency of Special Branch, to show it was on top and causing holy 
hell’, which, Jenkins added derisorily ‘was absolute nonsense of course’.154
The importance of Ron Curtis to the police investigation is supported by 
Gwynfor Evans, who also suggests the ‘Radnorshire connection’ proved the Joneses 
undoing. Through his enquiries, Dewi Watkin Powell soon established the enigmatic 
Ron Curtis was from Hamilton near Glasgow. Contacted by Gwynfor Evans, Winnie 
Ewing, the Scottish nationalist MP, visited the address in her constituency, where 
‘Curtis’s mother swore an affidavit her son’s room was full of police equipment’. 
Determined the matter should be brought to wider notice, the president of Plaid 
Cymru contacted The Times. Renowned at this juncture for undertaking such 
investigative journalism, it dispatched two enquirers to investigate further. Refusing 
them entry into the house, Ron Curtis’s mother steadfastly declined to discuss the 
matter.155
In October 2008, Gareth Miles revealed that following the arrest of John 
Jenkins, he was questioned over his having introduced Gordon Wyn Jones to the 
operational-commander of MAC. During the interview, police asked him to ‘sign a 
statement’. As to what the statement outlined, Miles refused to comment, adding he 
nevertheless ‘refused’ to cooperate. Having declared their disappointment at Miles’ 
decision, officers ‘threatened to contact the Director of Public Prosecutions, so as to 
compel’ Miles ‘to give evidence at Jenkins’ trial’. Refusing to be intimidated, Miles 
impassively challenged the officers to do so. He remains unsure whether the Director 
of Prosecutions was contacted, as he ‘heard no more about it’. Yet, strangely, 
considering the degree of evidence Gordon Wyn Jones provided the police with 
regard John Jenkins, he also failed to appear as a prosecution witness. Responding as 
to why, Miles declared to his knowledge, Jenkins’ trial coincided with seaman Jones 
being ‘on a boat bound for South Africa and put there by Special Branch’.156 Did he 
consider such a course of action credible, Jenkins was asked. Remaining steadfast in 
his belief that Gordon Wyn Jones was neither an agent provocateur, nor pivotal to the 
arrest of the so-called ‘Mackenzie three’, Jenkins rather believed the authorities 
‘turned Jones’. Having done so, they embarked on a course of ‘damage limitation’.
154 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009.
155 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
156 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 14 October 2008. Asked to verify if Gordon 
Wyn Jones visited his home in Wrexham, as Jones later informed police, Gareth Miles stated he would 
‘rather not comment’. Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 8 November 2009.
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Au fond, Jenkins proclaimed, the authorities ‘sacrificed’ Jones - merely ‘a pawn’ - ‘to 
get to’ him .157
Efforts increase to safeguard the investiture as Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg are 
‘warned’ and troops confined to barracks
Amid this febrile atmosphere, the security surrounding the investiture left little to 
chance. Recognizing the importance of radio communication throughout the 
ceremony - and the Prince’s subsequent three-day tour of Wales - a complex 
information network system was established. Such was the perceived militant threat, 
radio stations were protected by a cordon of barbed-wire. Nonetheless, in the event of 
attack, the Civil Defence would provide emergency fixed radio contact. Motorcycle 
police officers were also issued with mobile radio sets which linked to regional crime 
squads and Special Branch. In another attempt to prevent telephone links being 
sabotaged, manhole covers throughout Caernarfon were ‘sealed’.159 As for 
Caernarfon Castle, closed circuit television was installed. This afforded views both 
within its walls and surround.160 All the stops were now pulled out. Frustrated by the 
ponderous procedure in establishing traces of nitro-glycerin on the hands of a suspect, 
laboratory technicians devised a mobile testing kit. Henceforth, the results would be 
revealed to officers within minutes.161
Having established the royal party was most vulnerable as it journeyed, 
helicopters began 24-hour surveillance patrols along each yard of their route. In the 
event that roads, bridges or rail track was impaired, a company of Royal Engineers
1 AOwas placed on standby. Even these measures failed to allay the escalating 
trepidation of Harold Wilson. In a memo from Downing Street to the Home Office, 
the Prime Minister ‘assumed’ among ‘the special precautions’ to be implemented, that 
troops would be deployed to safeguard ‘vital and vulnerable’ installations during the
157 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009.
158 HO, 325/124. Memorandum entitled The Prince at Aberystwyth and Caernarfon, by W. P. Nichol, 
Director o f  Communications, 22 April 1969; also New Statesman, 30 May 1969.
159 WM, 30 June 1969.
HO, 325/124. Memorandum entitled The Prince at Aberystwyth and Caernarfon, by W. P. Nichol, 
Director o f  Communications, 22 April 1969. Nightly patrols o f the fortress began in November 1968.
161 HO, 325/122. Letter dated 20 May 1969, from Ronald Mitchell, Director of the Forensic Science 
Laboratory, Cardiff, to Frank Williamson, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary.
TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from J. F. Mayne Assistant Private Secretary to Denis Healey, Minister 
o f Defence, to Michael Halls, the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, 27 June 1969.
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1 63investiture period. In a letter of reply, Brian Cubbon, the Private Secretary to 
James Callaghan, ‘assured’ the Prime Minister that troops had indeed been mobilized. 
Yet, he urged Wilson ‘not to underestimate the difficulties’. It was, he declared, ‘not 
possible to guard every vulnerable point’. Nevertheless, those ‘the Security Service’ 
had ‘identified’ would receive ‘suitable precautions’; this included ‘frequent’ 
monitoring by police. As for Caernarfon, the Castle had been closed to public access 
from 1 June, and teams of detectives were inspecting ‘premises along the processional 
route’.164 However, alarming intelligence reports continued unabated. In the midst of 
an escalation in bomb hoaxes, information was received regarding the safety of the 
prince and that attempts to disrupt the ceremony were likely.165
Yet, notice that military servicemen were protecting key installations came as 
news to the Ministry of Defence. Troops would be involved in ‘street lining’ at 
Caernarfon, stated J. F. Mayne, and instruction had been issued as to the course of 
action soldiers should take, if ‘various situations arise’. However, ‘no troops’ were 
assisting in the guarding of ‘vulnerable’ sites.166 Nonetheless, 2,500 military 
personnel from the three armed services were deployed to Caernarfon. Each was 
warned to be mindful of ‘subversive activity’ and any approach ‘by subversive 
elements’.167 They were not alone; as 2,755 police officers and an undisclosed 
number of special constables joined them from across the UK.168 As it transpired, the 
stringent security arrangements proved justified. The belief, as maintained by 
Gwynfor Evans, that MI5 might be responsible for the bomb attacks in Wales, had not 
gone unnoticed in Moscow. In 1992, Russian dissident Vasili Mitrokhin handed 
details to MI5 of Operation Edding. Formulated by the KGB, it proposed a bridge be 
destroyed between Porthmadog and Caernarfon a month before the investiture. An 
anonymous letter was then to be forwarded to Gwynfor Evans at Westminster, stating 
agents of British Intelligence as responsible. It was further hoped, that Evans would
163 TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from Michael Halls to Brian Cubbon, 25 June 1969.
164
TNA, PREM 13/2903. Letter from Brian Cubbon to Michael Halls, 26 June 1969. Two three-hour 
checks, morning and night, were made throughout the castle.
165 WM, 30 June 1969.
166 TNA, CAB 164/389. Letter from J. F. Mayne Assistant Private Secretary to Denis Healey, Ministry 
o f Defence, to Michael Halls, the Prime Minister’s Principal Private Secretary, 27 June 1969. 
Regiments assigned to Caernarfon, received training in Cyprus to find ‘Barabbas the bomb’, a fictitious
saboteur reputedly trained in Wales. WM, 1 May 1969.
167 WM, 26 June 1969. Against Wilson’s proposal to increase the figure, Denis Healy, the Secretary of 
State for Defence, declared to do so might resemble ‘an invading force’. Wales: The Prince and the 
Plotter, BBC Timewatch Production. Screened, July 2009.
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then censoriously raise the matter in Parliament. For whatever reason, presumably 
concern the Soviet intelligence service might somehow be implicated, the idea was 
abandoned.169
Of especial concern to the Prime Minister however, was the safety of both the 
Royal Train and another which would carry VIP attendees to and from Caernarfon. 
Just three days before the investiture, Wilson suggested ‘a small pilot train’ traverse 
the track in advance of each train destined for the ceremony. This ‘particular 
precaution’, would ensure ‘any untoward incident’ was suffered by the decoy and not
1 70for those it was presumably intended. Within hours, a reply was received. Having 
contacted British Rail, both the Royal and VIP train, the Home Office informed 
Downing Street, would be immediately preceded by either a passenger or pilot train. 
The same precaution would be taken when the prince left Cardiff at the conclusion of
171the post-investiture Royal Progress on 5 July. Yet, perhaps most sobering of all the 
security measures implemented, was the bullet-proof vest manufactured for the prince 
to wear beneath his regalia. Interwoven into fabric, the carbon-fibre plastic, it was
1 77confidently declared, would ‘stop bullets at close range’. One person prepared to 
draw militant gunshot was the custodian of Caernarfon Castle and coordinator of the 
ceremony, Lord Snowdon. Apparently unconcerned, while undertaking 
organizational business, he drove around the town in his ‘open-top Aston Martin’ or 
on his ‘motorbike’. If they so desired, Lord Snowdon remarked in 2009, ‘the 
terrorists could practice’ on him. He was ‘unimportant’.173
Despite Lord Snowdon’s characteristic deprecation, Owain Williams later 
disclosed how stringent the security effort was to safeguard the ceremony. ‘A few 
weeks before the investiture’, revealed Williams, a friend of his was taken from his
place of work in north Wales, driven to the offices of the Shrewsbury unit and told to
relay to Owain Williams that if ‘within 50 miles of Caernarfon on investiture day’ he
168 WM, 2 May 1969. The population o f Caernarfon was under 10,000.
169 The Times, 13 September 1999. Verification o f Operation Edding was not provided until files were 
discovered deep in the KGB’s archives in Moscow.
170 TNA, PREM 13/2093. Letter from Michael Halls to Brian Cubbon, 27 June 1969.
171 TNA, PREM 13/2093. Letter from Brian Cubbon to Michael Halls, 27 June 1969.
172 WM, 30 June 1969. The Leicester design and development centre produced five other such vests. 
Might other Royal attendees have worn one? A Buckingham Place official denied a vest was destined 
for Prince Charles, angrily contacting the design company to know why ‘the project had been given 
publicity without Palace clearance’.
Interview between WT & Lord Snowdon, 11 November 2009. See also, Cambria (Carmarthen, 
December 2009).
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would ‘meet with a nasty accident’.174 Already the focus of ‘heavy security 
surveillance’ at his parents’ farm, Williams considered the threat genuine. Weeks 
earlier, the brake cable on his car was allegedly sawn through. The investiture now/ 
imminent, Owain Williams caught the Holyhead ferry to Ireland.175 Contacted to 
respond to the charge, John Owen Evans retorted that Owain Williams was 
untrustworthy and a man ‘with his own agenda’. What is more, added the former 
Shrewsbury unit figure, ‘no one’ in the immediate investiture period received a
i  ' i z
warning of ‘any description’ to his knowledge. Yet, despite having been instructed 
by the Daily Mail to ‘cover’ the event, Ian Skidmore was also allegedly contacted by 
Special Branch. He would, he was informed in no uncertain terms, ‘be arrested if  
within a mile of Caernarfon’ during the ceremony.177
Asked what ‘disruptive measures’ were planned for the investiture, Patriotic 
Front member Gethin ap Iestyn disclosed a veritable stratagem. As a means to 
convince the authorities that fires were raging throughout the town, a significant 
number of industrial ‘plumbers’ smoke bombs (drain testers) had been amassed and 
stored on ‘Forestry Commission land in mid Wales and among a slate slag heap in 
north Wales’. Once activated, these would be placed in public toilets, in drains - from 
where smoke would surge from outlets - and in empty buildings with their windows 
ajar. As a means of disrupting the procession, marbles were to be discarded beneath 
the hooves of horses to ‘bring them and the rider down’. Barricades were to be 
established: petrol bombs, stones and even potatoes embedded with razor blades were 
to be thrown. Recognizing that to truly affect the proceedings - and ensure world 
reaction - some measure of assault upon the ceremony was required, model airplanes
174 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004. Police wrongly suspected Bryn 
Williams was involved, regarding him ‘a weak link they could threaten’. Working as a carpenter 
weeks before the investiture, ‘he was bundled into a car and driven to Shrewsbury to meet Jock Wilson; 
all the bigwigs involved were there’. Apparently told ‘you’ll listen to advice, but your friend won’t ’til 
he’s six feet under’; he was instructed to relay the message: ‘Bring your war over the border and look
out’.
175 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 10 February; also 4 April 2009. Williams 
confessed he ‘was scared’ for his ‘life’. Knowing IRA activists had been ‘taken out’ he slept with a 
gun under his pillow. The ‘almost sawn through brake lead’ was discovered by an English mechanic 
(who lived locally) when working on another part of Williams’ car. He had ‘no doubt’ who was 
responsible. ‘The council even built a lay-by for the armed SB’s to park in!’.
Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 April 2009. Telephone interview 
between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 April 2009. To indicate Williams’ weak character, J. O. Evans 
stated he returned to Britain from Canada ‘after only a few months’ with a heavy ‘American accent’. 
Owain Williams remained in Canada between May 1958 and December 1959. TNA, DPP 2/4471. 
Witness statement by Detective Robert Gwynne Owen, 22 October 1968.
177 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 23 August 2007.
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replete with smoke canisters and/or horse excrement was contemplated; all to no 
avail. His active participation - with his arrest and prison sentence - now curtailed,
1 78Gethin ap Iestyn instructed ‘all groups to stand down’. One person very much 
hitting the ‘right tone’ at this juncture was Prince Charles. Having ‘put Aberystwyth
170 1 80on the map’, at the end of his ‘endurance test’ at the Welsh university, the prince
scored an impressive PR victory in a televised interview. Asked to reflect upon his
time at Aberystwyth, the prince declared if he had ‘learnt anything’, it was about
Wales, its problems and the strength of feeling its populace attached to the Welsh
language and culture. It was, he added, ‘very unique and special’ and worthy of 
181preservation. It went some considerable way to ensuring Prince Charles did not 
again face the degree of heckling protest which marked his first public speech in
1 87Welsh at the national Eisteddfodau a month earlier.
Ten days before the investiture, Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg held a rally in
1 87Cilmery denouncing the ceremony. Both its distance from Caernarfon and its
] 78 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 19 May 2009; also, correspondence with WT, 26 
January 2008; also correspondence with WT, August 2009. Numerous proposals were rejected as most 
activists ‘were against personal violence’. One potential protestor who later held a position o f some 
influence in Welsh society, told ap Iestyn he was ‘sorry’, but having started a new job, he now had his 
‘career to think o f  . . . ‘There were four o f these 2/3 member groups, all based in the south... members 
were divided into two sections; one covert, one overt’. All were ‘100% dedicated to causing the 
maximum amount o f “circus day chaos’” . Also, see Meic Stephens (ed)., A Most Peculiar People 
(Cardiff, 1992), p. 141.
179 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 10 April 2009. Dismissed by historian A. 
J. P. Taylor as a ‘sordid...party political plot to exploit’ the prince, ‘Mr. Wilson’ he added, was 
‘imposing on Prince Charles a sacrifice which he would not dream of imposing on his own son’. 
Anthony Holden, Charles: Prince o f  Wales (London, 1979), p. 143.
180 Jonathon Dimbleby, The Prince o f  Wales (London, 1994), pp. 149, 147,167; also, Holden, Prince o f  
Wales, p. 143. Prince Charles does not appear to have greatly enjoyed life away from Cambridge - 
where he enjoyed a far greater degree o f anonymity - apparently regarding the Aberystwyth experience 
‘as an unwelcome interruption’ to the real matter o f his education. Despite the ‘incredibly warm and 
reassuring’ welcome...the difference from ‘this place and Cambridge is very marked’, wrote the prince 
to a friend. The ‘contrast’, he later declared, being ‘so great that one might be living in another world’.
181 BBC/ITV interview. Screened, 26 June 1969. Earlier claims by Francis Jones, the Wales Herald 
Extraordinary, that Prince Charles was descended from none other than the very doyen o f Welsh 
medieval history ‘Llewellyn The Great’. (Llywelyn ab Iorwerth) and the ‘first princes o f Powys and 
Dehuebarth’ were also sensitively addressed. WM, 16 July 1968. ‘Any Herald worth his salt’, he 
remarked disarmingly, ‘could trace a member o f the Royal Family back to anybody’. WM, 6 June 
1969.
182 WM, 2 June 1969. Speeches by Prince Charles were greeted with unease by George Thomas, who 
feared they might prove ‘useful’ for nationalists. Thomas implored the PM to ask the Queen to have ‘a 
discreet word’ with the prince. TNA, PREM 13/2907. Letter to Harold Wilson, 22 July 1969. Asked 
to comment on the charge he gave succour to the political growth o f Welsh nationalism during the 
investiture period, Prince Charles’s office declared ‘it would not be appropriate for His Royal Highness 
to comment personally on the matter’. Correspondence to WT, from Manon Williams, the Deputy 
Private Secretary to HRH The Prince o f Wales and The Duchess o f Cornwall, 28 October 2009.
183 WM, 30 June 1969. Amid a considerable police presence, a recorded message from Professor J. R. 
Jones was heard and a police helicopter hovered briefly overhead. At CylG’s 1967 AGM, a resolution 
was passed opposing ‘this little pantomime’, on the grounds that it was ‘an insult to the people of
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apparent decree which implored members to obscure with paint ‘English-only 
investiture signs, but to ignore those in Welsh’, crystallized the group’s inability to 
elevate its protest to a more practical and less farcical plateau, believed Gethin ap 
Iestyn. Moreover, while he acknowledged the ill-treatment suffered by leading 
activist Dafydd Iwan, who, it is alleged, received excreta through the post, he 
nonetheless questioned how far senior Cymdethias figures ‘rolled over’ under external 
authoritarian pressure. Expanding the point, ap Iestyn revealed he was reliably 
informed that leading figures were threatened the group would face the full wrath of
1 Sithe state, if  its members disrupted the ceremony. Responding to the charge, Gareth
Miles, the chair of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg at this juncture, declared activists 
were urged to obfuscate ‘all English language road signs’, irrespective of whether 
‘connected to the investiture’. Furthermore, it was the first he heard of any such
1 Of
‘understanding’ between the group and the authorities. Nevertheless, society 
members had suspected all along what ‘the Establishment was up to’, Miles added, 
but even so, he ‘welcomed the investiture really; it divided people and focused the 
mind’.186
Asked if he was tempted to re-enter the pantheon of militant Welsh protest 
over the investiture issue, Emyr Llywelyn Jones disclosed to having been the subject 
of routine and systematic surveillance as the ceremony approached. Moreover, the 
campaign of militant action, as orchestrated by John Jenkins, greatly troubled him. 
He was, he confessed, ‘very afraid’ of it.187 To what degree Jones was subject to 
police monitoring, was highlighted one morning when his car refused to start. 
Subsequently, rather than being followed as was customary, school teacher Jones was
Wales and its history’. WM, 23 October 1967.
184 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iesyn, 24 January 2008; also interview with WT, 19 May
2009. D. Iwan’s satirical view o f  the investiture ‘Carlo’ sold 15,000 copies; impressive for a Welsh- 
language record. Taith y r  Iaith. S4C Production. Screened, 4 October 2007.
185 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 8 November 2009. Emyr Llywelyn Jones also 
denied any such ‘deal’. Yet, questioned following an explosion in the months before the investiture, 
Jones was allegedly ‘offered a car’ in exchange for an assurance he would not campaign against the 
ceremony. They would, a police officer added, ‘deny any such offer was made’ should Jones go
public. Telephone interview between WT & E. LI. Jones, 19 September 2010.186Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 14 October 2008. About ‘one hundred
protesters’ were removed by police from outside Caernarfon Castle on the eve of the ceremony. South
Wales Evening Post, 1 July 1969.
187 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones 12 September 2003. To the pacifist Jones, fear the 
campaign o f militant action might escalate was sobering. ‘Well, who’d have been the number 1 
suspect?’. Jones replied, when asked about his involvement. ‘It was possibly because I was viewed as 
such’ he added, ‘that the authorities took so long to catch the people who were involved’.
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1 oo
graciously transported to work in a police car. Yet, despite this gesture of ‘good 
will’, the contemporaneous tension which necessitated Jones’ surveillance soon 
caught the eye of Saunders Lewis, who declared the atmosphere in the days before the 
investiture to have resembled ‘something close to open warfare between the
1 fiQgovernment’s police and young people of Welsh Wales’. Whether concerned they 
might prove susceptible to infiltration by activists,190 or borne of fear they might get 
into fights with Covies, (town inhabitants) on the eve of the ceremony, troops were 
consigned to their temporary barracks positioned outside Caernarfon.191
Abergele and the deaths of William Alwyn Jones and George Francis Taylor
Wales awoke on Investiture Day, to news that two men had been killed when
10*7apparently planting an explosive device in Abergele. As news of the explosion 
disseminated through those congregating in Caernarfon, the deaths of Alwyn Jones 
(22) and George Taylor (37) was relayed to John Jenkins by a fellow serviceman, 
who, on opening the flap of his tent, piquantly remarked: ‘we’ve got two of the 
bastards’. Recognizing that any visible adverse reaction, or effort to establish details 
of the incident was ‘a gross breach of security’, Jenkins - who was in Caernarfon in 
the event of army personnel requiring dental attention - spent the day feigning both 
disinterest and mild amusement. He was, he later conceded sombrely, ‘secretly in 
agony’. Moreover, for years following, the former director-general of MAC was 
haunted by the belief ‘it should have been’ him .193 Owain Williams received notice of 
the Abergele explosion ‘in Cork’. News that ‘two freedom fighters had been killed in 
Wales’, adorned a billboard outside the city’s Sinn Fein office, above which, the
188 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 23 August 2005. Jones was monitored by a ‘team 
o f eight’ 24 hours a day. He also believes CylG was ‘infiltrated with police officers and informers’. 
For further information regarding surveillance, see Ellis, Investiture, pp. 224,225.1 KQ
Bam , Rhif 73-84, 1968-1969, p.258.
190
Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Wales Production. Screened July 2009; also, TNA, BD 
67/135. Report on the Services Participation, Standing Orders from Llandwrog camp.
191 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 15 November 2009. ‘All leave for those in the 
medical services was cancelled due to the expected rush o f casualties resulting from public
disturbances. As it transpired, there were only a few casualties’.
192 WM, 1 July 1969. (Late edition). A massive security operation sealed off Abergele after the blast, 
with motorists stopped and questioned. Also that evening, a television cable in Anglesey was cut. It is 
believed it was designed to prevent the investiture being broadcast. It was however repaired and
service not affected. WM, 2 July 1969.
193
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also 20 November
2008 & 5 July 2009.
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party’s flag flew respectfully at half mast. 194
It was not until ‘late afternoon’ on investiture day that television news 
announced the deaths had occurred outside the social security office in Abergele. 
Only then, John Jenkins later revealed, could he ‘deduce who was involved’.195 
Heard throughout the town at 23.45, arriving police officers were greeted with a scene 
of unimaginable horror.196 Passionately convinced her father was not involved in the 
militant campaign, or a member of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, Jennie Evans, George 
Taylor’s daughter, has undertaken her own investigation into the tragic events which
1 07transpired that night. Contrary to reports in the Western Mail that following a game 
of darts in the Castle Arms, Alwyn Jones and George Taylor left together when it 
‘became too crowded’, 198 the former licensee (Ron Corris) revealed a conflicting 
account. He informed Jennie Evans that Alwyn Jones exited the pub a good ten 
minutes before George Taylor; and before doing so, the two men appeared to quarrel. 
Having approached the reputably affable Taylor to enquire if all was well, Taylor 
allegedly informed the licensee that Alwyn Jones was ‘off his bloody head’; and that 
he (Corris) knew what ‘Alwyn’ was Tike with his stupid ideas’.199
Jennie Evans, in accordance with other members of the Taylor family, also 
maintains that on returning home ‘relaxed and cheerful’ from the Castle Arms at 
22.50, George Taylor enquired after Jennie, entered her bedroom to ruffle her hair and 
‘about half an hour later’, made his excuse to leave on the pretext of having forgotten 
his cigarettes in the pub. Stating that ‘Alwyn might have them’, the Taylor family 
believe their father caught up with Alwyn Jones and desperately implored him to ‘see 
sense; go home and forget the whole thing’. That Alwyn Jones’ Jamaican-born wife 
Marie had just months previously given birth to their first daughter, was a 
development they feel sure George Taylor would have highlighted to dissuade the
194
Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 4 April 2009; also, 23 November 2009. G. 
ap Iestyn was informed by an inmate on being escorted into Cardiff Prison that ‘two o f your boys have
died’. Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009.
195 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009. Jenkins heard confirmation o f the 
blast on the 17.50 news. WM, 1 July 1969.
196 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001. The explosion occurred along a
passageway o ff Market Street, outside what is today the town library.
197 Correspondence between WT & Jennie Evans, 3 August 2009.
198 WM, 2 July 1969. As he was leaving the Castle Hotel, it was claimed Alwyn Jones cheerfully 
complemented the landlord’s wife on her ‘kinky earrings’. Yet, the licensee (Ron Corris) was also 
reported as saying they left separately. Sun, 2 July 1969.
19 Correspondence between WT & Jennie Evans, 3 August 2009.
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younger man from continuing.200 The police interpretation of the appalling episode, 
as relayed by John Owen Evans, is that he and other crime scene officers deduced that 
George Taylor had indeed stood some way back from Alwyn Jones. This assumption 
was based on the position of the two bodies. The force of the blast inflicted horrific 
facial injuries and stripped George Taylor’s body of its clothing. Yet, Alwyn Jones, 
who was presumably within inches of the device when it activated, was thrown some
90140 yards by the blast and mutilated beyond appropriate description.
Asked how police linked her father to the explosion, Jennie Evans revealed 
officers were informed by the attending fire crew, that inexplicably, George Taylor 
did not ‘answer the fire call’ to his home. The bell-ring had earlier sounded at the 
Taylor residence, on the understanding that - as was customary - George Taylor 
would contact the fire station and receive further instruction. Some two hours after 
the blast, police officers led by Jock Wilson arrived at the Taylor home. Having 
established George Taylor was not there, they undertook an extensive search. 
Nothing incriminating was discovered. George Taylor was identified by dental
909records and finger prints retrieved from items in the house. Alwyn Jones was
90^identified by a ring on his finger which bore his initials.
Yet, further explaining why she remains adamant her father was not involved 
in Welsh militant extremism, Jennie Evans stated that as a respected fireman, her 
father was appalled by such acts of violence. Furthermore, had her father not been 
killed on the eve of the investiture, the following day - although ‘a proud Welshman’ - 
he would have been placing celebratory bunting throughout the town as an active 
member of the Abergele Investiture Committee. Not once did he express support for
200 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 15 August 2009; also, telephone interview 
between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009; also, correspondence between WT & Jennie Evans, 17 
August 2009. Aged three in July 1969, Jennie Taylor had been baby-sat by her fourteen-year-old sister 
Elaine. Their mother was out tending elderly grandparents. On returning, G. Taylor mildly rebuked 
Elaine for letting the ray-bum go out; backed it up, had a cup o f tea, asked after and kissed Jennie, and 
left. Having said he would be ‘about 10 minutes’, moments after leaving, unknowingly watched by 
Elaine, he lit a cigarette. Having not returned, Elaine realized her father ‘had wanted to get out o f  the 
house’ and imaginatively considered he was having an affair. Her anxiety was disturbed by an 
explosion which woke and upset Jennie. Elaine comforted her claiming it was ‘a gas explosion’ and
telling her ‘not to worry’.
201 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 8 July 2009. G. Taylor’s body was 
discovered fifteen minutes after the blast. An hour later, A. Jones’s body was discovered in a nearby
garden. WM, 1 July 1969.
202 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009.
203 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 8 July 2009. One elderly resident near the 
scene o f the blast, awoke to discover a human hand on her bed. It had entered the open bedroom 
window in her bungalow. ‘They were so badly mutilated we didn’t even realise there were two o f
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the nationalist agenda, less still, the militant campaign.204 However, to some degree, 
this is challenged by contemporary media reports, which quote Kathleen Jones, a 
‘friend and neighbour for thirteen years’ as stating George Taylor was ‘a nationalist’ 
who told her he ‘objected to an Englishman becoming Prince of Wales’.205 It was a 
claim dismissed by the Taylor family in 2010, on the grounds that ‘no one of that 
name lived near’ them .206
Nevertheless, Jennie Evans also questioned her father’s assumed close 
friendship with Alwyn Jones, claiming that while the two men were certainly known 
to each other as Abergele Urban Council employees, they did not - as their varying
907ages might suggest - enjoy a notably amiable acquaintance. It is a claim supported 
by licensee Ron Corris, who remarked they ‘had their own circle of friends’, seldom
90Rspoke to each other and had not done so that evening. Of particular angst to Jennie 
Evans, is that her father’s alleged membership of MAC is only sanctioned by the 
word of John Jenkins and he concedes he was only aware of George Taylor’s 
involvement, solely because Alwyn Jones informed him so. Moreover, contrary to 
Alwyn Jones, who was well known in Abergele for espousing republican sympathies, 
according to one former retired north Wales police officer Jennie Evans has spoken 
to, George Taylor did not feature to any degree in police intelligence regarding 
involvement in militant activism: either through active participation or through having 
voiced Republican sensibilities.209
Nonetheless, despite the claim of the retired north Wales officer, this account 
is questioned by John Owen Evans. He believes that both Alwyn Jones and George 
Taylor ‘were known to police in north Wales’. Furthermore, if George Taylor was 
not involved in the bombing campaign, why did he leave his house and join Alwyn 
Jones? That he did so to try and talk his friend and junior work colleague out of
them’, declared Evans. ‘That and the fact we only found one pair o f shoes on the wall’.
204 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 15 August 2009.
205 Sun, 2 July 1969. Kathleen Jones also declared George Taylor to be ‘a quiet, gentle man’.
206 Correspondence between WT & Jennie Evans, 6 October 2010.
207 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009.
208 Sun, 2 July 1969.
209 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 15 August 2009; also, telephone interview 
between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009. Alwyn Jones was employed as a labourer, George 
Taylor a painter. ‘They were more acquaintances than friends. They’d known each other for about 
eighteen months to two years, having met through work’, explained Evans. ‘They were in the darts 
team together with five or six others...but as a fireman my father could not guarantee he’d always be 
available, so he was on the reserve team. So they were not bosom buddies, as alleged’.
314
910undertaking the protest did ‘not add up’. John Owen Evans’ apparent incredulity 
requires further examination. A full hour had passed since the two men were together 
in the Castle Arms; how did George Taylor know the exact time Alwyn Jones would 
either be walking towards the ‘target’, or had arrived there presumably moments 
earlier? Did a prior understanding exist between the two men? Yet, it is a point 
unendorsed by Jennie Evans, who argues that Alwyn Jones - as typified by his 
renowned espousing of nationalist principles - may very well have informed George 
Taylor of his intentions and the specific time he intended to plant the device. 
However, an acceptance of such, she contests, still fails to provide inconclusive proof
911of her father’s active association.
Yet, in accordance with John Owen Evans, John Jenkins also believes that 
little importance can be attached to George Taylor’s reticence regarding his 
involvement in MAC. ‘I did not want my family knowing of my involvement’, 
Jenkins protested; ‘and I was in the middle of it all’. It was simply preposterous of 
the Taylor family to deny their father’s affiliation purely on the basis he did not 
discuss his actions with them. It was ‘not’, Jenkins added bluntly, ‘something 
discussed over the breakfast table’.212 It is a claim given correlation by Owain 
Williams, who confidently professed both George Taylor’s membership of MAC and 
his inclusion in the militant struggle.213
In August 2009, John Jenkins offered by way of intriguing contrast, a contrary 
series of events with regard the Abergele action. After repeatedly and contentiously 
maintaining he was ‘on duty in Caernarfon’ the evening before the investiture, and yet 
despite this, delivered the device to Abergele ‘an hour before the explosion’,214 
Jenkins conceded the handing over of the device to Alwyn Jones actually transpired a 
week before the blast. It was then, Jenkins added, he ‘saw George Taylor’ for the first 
and only time. The encounter occurred when having entered the Abergele British
210 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 8 July 2009.
211 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009.
212 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009.
213 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 November 2009. ‘He was a member o f  
MAC’, stated Williams, ‘I know he was’. However, while Williams admitted having met Alwyn Jones 
through their mutual involvement in the Patriotic Front, it was ‘possible’ that he never met George
Taylor, he conceded.
214 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 
2008. His account was fiercely challenged by Jennie Evans who queried how John Jenkins was able to 
make the 80 mile-round trip if ‘on duty’. Jenkins maintained that he was not constrained to that degree 
and could ‘pop out’ to stroll around the town. It was then he claimed to have delivered the device.
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Legion, he momentarily made eye contact with Alwyn Jones. Moments later, as 
predetermined, Jones joined Jenkins in the car park where the explosive device - 
including the fail-safe mechanism - was handed over.215 Jenkins recognized George 
Taylor, he later revealed, adding: ‘he was known to me by name...he didn’t know me, 
but I knew him’. It was partly owing to George Taylor’s involvement in the 
Snowdonia Country Club action in January 1968, declared Jenkins; but so too was it 
‘more than that’. Jenkins ‘knew Alwyn had recruited him’ but he never spoke to 
George Taylor, ‘then or at anytime’.216 George Taylor‘s alleged participation in the 
Snowdonia action remains fiercely contested by the Taylor family.217
This account of the episode is further challenged by a subsequent police 
interview with John Jenkins. Six weeks after his arrest, Jenkins refused to comment 
when asked if he and Owain Williams - in the garden shed at the home of John 
Roberts - handed Alwyn Jones a quantity of explosives and a time delay. They then, 
officers claimed, demonstrated to the Abergele man ‘the principles of the timing 
mechanism’. The chronology in which this incident was placed, officers suggested, 
was crucial: having transpired ‘a week or so before the investiture’;218 a few days 
after Jenkins implored John Roberts or his son to collect and return a man from 
Abergele to undertake the Holyhead strike and days before Owain Williams departed 
for Ireland. Owain Williams stated he could ‘not remember it at all’, when asked to 
comment on the alleged meeting. It was, he declared, ‘utter nonsense’. Moreover, he 
had no prior knowledge of the Abergele action, until learning of the explosion in
910 9 9 nCork. John Jenkins also dismissed the meeting’s alleged occurrence as ‘absurd’.
Interestingly however, a police witness statement later given by Frederick 
Ernest Alders, appears to support the police account of events. Alders claimed that 
while on holiday in Rhyl, he delivered notice to Alwyn Jones that rather than 
investiture day itself - as John Jenkins had earlier directed - the explosion should 
occur ‘the day before’ the ceremony. The message, Alders added, he passed to Jones
215 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009. It was essential that Jenkins 
knew where a MAC operative was at any given time: ‘he stayed in on a Monday evening, played darts
on a Tuesday, etc’.216 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 22 August 2009; also, telephone interview with
John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
217 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 13 August 2009. Jennie Evans dismissed the 
suggestion her father was involved in the Snowdonia action as ‘absolute rubbish’.
21 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Police interview statement by Richard William Evans, 16 December 1969.
219 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 4 April 2009.
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at his home in Abergele ‘two or three days before the investiture’. Even more 
beguilingly, Alders also maintained that having undertaken the short journey from 
Rhyl to Abergele, he was greeted by a somewhat agitated Alwyn Jones, who handed 
him, along with other bomb-making equipment, ‘one of the two batteries’, which
991Jones announced ‘was flat’. Nonetheless, it is a suggestion countered by John 
Jenkins, who claimed that not once did Alders undertake any such communication 
unless accompanied by him. Furthermore, it was vehemently understood by Alders, 
that any such action was ‘unacceptable’.222 It is a statement supported by Ann 
Woodgate. During a subsequent police interview, she informed officers that 
following her engagement to Alders in January 1968, her fiance embarked on a series 
of visits ‘to the Abergele area in his van’. Although she could not state with certainty 
if John Jenkins accompanied him, Woodgate nevertheless ascertained from Alders’
99^‘conversation’ that ‘somebody’ had.
The authorities had ‘no idea’ as to the identity of MAC’s operational-director 
at this juncture, John Owen Evans attests; and what is more, were it remotely 
suspected Jenkins was responsible, ‘he would not have been within a hundred miles of 
Caernarfon, let alone on duty there’.224 It is a belief resolutely shared by John 
Jenkins,225 who also states that he spent the evening before the ceremony - while 
constrained to some degree by his dental duties in Caernarfon - ‘popping out’ every so 
often to walk around the town. It was during such time, that he was verbally abused 
‘by a car full of local lads on account of the British Army uniform’ he was wearing. 
Looking suitably ‘non-plussed’, he was, he admits, secretly ‘thrilled’. In addition, the 
experience further ‘convinced’ him that contrary to contemporary and subsequent 
reports claiming the investiture was roundly supported by the people of Caernarfon 
and Wales, his own understanding through ‘keeping an ear to the ground’ vehemently
220 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
221 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders. Alwyn Jones 
apparently handed Alders ‘pieces o f a timing device, clock, bulb, piece o f wire and the two batteries’,
one o f which was flat.
222 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
223
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Ann Woodgate, dated, 15 December 1969.
224
Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 7 July 2009. ‘We didn’t know about John 
Jenkins at the time o f the investiture. He had not been seriously identified. The police did not have 
hard facts about him. His name might have been on the books as a sympathizer from south Wales, but 
there were many people from south Wales whose names were cropping up. Had there been any
stronger information on Jenkins, he wouldn’t have been anywhere near Caernarfon’.
225
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009.
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226suggested otherwise. The Secretary of State for Wales also received a less than 
genial greeting on arriving at Caernarfon by car. ‘Slowed to a snail’s pace’ by the 
‘throng of excited visitors’. . . ‘two tough-looking young men leaned in through the 
car’s open window and spat “Bradwr - Traitor” George Thomas later alleged.227
Owing to the fact the rail line to Caernarfon passes through Abergele, much 
speculation has since abounded as to the true target of the action. Some, such as 
former Shrewsbury Unit figure Raymond Kendall, have suggested the explosives were 
intended for the rail-track, in a pre-emptive attempt to either sabotage the Royal Train,
998or at least prevent it passing through en route. John Humphries, the former Western 
Mail journalist appears to concur with this view. In his study Freedom Fighters, 
Humphries - in an uncorroborated and contested assertion - claims that the device 
which exploded in Abergele on the eve of the investiture, comprised ‘a fifty stick 
gelignite bomb’ and was ‘the largest ever assembled’ by MAC. It was, Humphries 
tantalisingly intimates, ‘clearly intended for a major target’.229 Yet, historians and
9 mpolitical figures also seem content to allow the conjecture to stand.
Nevertheless, either scenario is dismissed by John Jenkins, who strenuously 
insists the target was ‘a government installation in the town’. It was, he added, 
‘romantic nonsense to say the track itself. Moreover, ever mindful of the ‘hearts and 
minds’ philosophy which underpinned MAC doctrinaire code, Jenkins was 
contemporaneously aware that any attack on the Royal party would prove ‘massively 
counter-productive in political terms’; as would injury suffered by police officers, 
who, Jenkins was further informed through a police contact, were ‘patrolling the rail 
line in Abergele searching for devices throughout the evening’. This same police 
contact, Jenkins maintains, could have provided information as to the time the Royal 
Train was passing through Abergele, if this information Jenkins so desired. Yet, it
226 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also 20 November
2008.
227 Thomas, Mr. Speaker, p. 120. Thomas also claimed that at this point he ‘received almost weekly 
threats’ to his life and his mother was ‘frequently awakened’ by anonymous threatening phone calls.
Mr. Speaker, p. 118.
228 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 2 August 2009.
229 John Humphries, Freedom Fighters (Cardiff, 2008), pp.123,124. Each aspect o f Humphries’ 
account is dismissed by John Jenkins. Conceding that Alwyn Jones, the cell leader, ‘orchestrated the 
action’, Jenkins nonetheless questioned Humphries’ claim that Jones and Taylor transferred the device 
by way o f  a paint pot tied to a ladder. Moreover, he had ‘no idea’ where Humphries acquired this 
information. Nor Humphries’ assertion that it was the biggest device MAC had assembled. It was 
‘normal size’ countered Jenkins. Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009.
230 John S. Ellis, Investiture, p.234; also, John Davies, A History o f  Wales (London, 1993), p.671; also, 
Evans, Sake o f  Wales (Cardiff, 2001), p. 195.
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was not requested, as it was utterly superfluous to his intentions.
That the target was not in any way connected to either the Royal party or the 
railway track, is supported by a police witness statement later given by Frederick 
Ernest Alders. Asked to reveal all he knew regarding the Abergele explosion, Alders 
claimed that John Jenkins earlier informed him ‘there was to be an explosion at a
9T9Government Office’ in the town. However, this lack of tangible evidence 
concerning the target of the operation, has remained a source of lingering resentment 
for Jennie Evans. What has ‘annoyed me most about John Jenkins in the years since 
my father died’, she stated in 2009, ‘is that he has allowed the press to speculate the 
railway track was the intended target’. This, she believes John Jenkins has contrived 
‘as a way of glorifying the MAC cause’.233 It is an accusation John Jenkins dismissed 
as lacking ‘credibility’.234
One of the first officers at the scene was John Owen Evans. He also believes 
the ‘explosive device was deliberately placed at the base of a social security building’. 
Furthermore, in response to those who suggest otherwise, ‘there was’, Evans added, 
‘nothing to stop them walking the mile or so further and planting the device on the 
railway track’. Yet, having stopped at the site of the intended target, what did he 
believe next transpired, Evans was asked. As the ‘clock on the device was being set’, 
he replied, some ‘error’ on the part of the saboteur resulted in the ensemble 
activating.235 It is an explanatory view shared by Evans’ former Shrewsbury unit 
colleague, Raymond Kendall.236 John Jenkins thinks it ‘possible they tested the 
device after it was primed’, thus causing its activation. However on the basis that 
Alwyn Jones - and John Jenkins believed George Taylor - was responsible for the 
Snowdon Country Club explosion eighteen months earlier, error on their part seemed
231 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009; also, interview between WT & 
John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008. ‘The order I gave’, 
declared Jenkins, ‘was any government building in the town itself. There was no ambiguity at 
all.. .Anything (target) which threatened the safety o f the police - or anyone else for that matter - 1 was 
against. Not everyone shared my view, but that’s how it was: a political not a military objective at all
time’.
232 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders.
233
Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009. Although ‘wholly wretched’, 
there were in Wales those prepared to find significance in the fact two Welshmen, five and three
quarter centuries after the Glyndwr Rising, had ‘died for Wales’. Davies, History o f  Wales, p.671.
234 Telephone interview with John Jenkins, 24 August 2009.
235 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 8 July 2009. ‘I think what happened, was 
that they probably messed about with the clock; they tried to set it at the scene, rather than before’, J.
O. Evans opined.
236 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 9 August 2009.
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unlikely, Jenkins added.
Such conjecture has led John Jenkins to wonder if the device was ‘deliberately 
tampered with by the intelligence services’, as a means to ensure it detonated
*)'1H
prematurely. Not surprisingly, it is a suggestion angrily renounced by John Owen 
Evans, who remarked that John Jenkins had much to lose at this juncture should his 
identity be revealed. Who could say with certainty, Evans declared, ‘that Jenkins 
didn’t set the time mechanism to explode early?’ Such action, Evans suggested, the 
operational-commander of MAC might deploy as a ruthless means to prevent his 
detection. It is an accusation dismissed by John Jenkins as ‘pathetic’. Moreover, it 
merely demonstrated the failure of the legal authorities to understand both Welsh 
extremism and the militant community.
At the inquest into the explosion at Abergele, E. Talog Davies, the West 
Denbighshire coroner, returned verdicts of accidental death. He too believed the 
explosion occurred at the target site. ‘These men’, he sombrely announced, ‘had no 
business...handling explosives’. Someone who knew more about such material than 
they, gave ‘either one or both of them a substantial quantity...the greatest 
responsibility’ for their deaths, therefore lay with those ‘people’. The coroner felt he 
could state ‘quite clearly’ ‘they were not intent on inflicting personal injury’. . . ‘It 
would have been extremely unlikely anyone would have been walking along that 
passageway at that time’...The ‘two men without any reason’ known, ‘decided they 
wanted to cause an explosion at that point’. Having ‘set up the explosive’...‘one wire 
might have touched another’. He imagined ‘something like that happened’. It was 
improbable, Talog Davies added, the device activated ‘because the explosives were in 
a poor state’, but rather because it was ‘incorrectly handled’.240
It was further revealed that Alwyn Jones enjoyed a somewhat colourful 
reputation in Abergele, where his Republican and anti-investiture views were both 
‘well known’ and a source of amusement. Having boasted of being in possession ‘of
237 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009; also, interview between WT & 
John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also 20 November 2008. It could ‘neither be 
proved nor disproved that MI5 was responsible...The authorities were desperate for casualties; for 
someone to be killed, either on the MAC side or the other side: any one’. Furthermore, Jenkins
believes MI5 would ‘go to any lengths at that time; they were desperate’.
238 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 23 August 2009.
239 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
240 WM, 15 October 1969. ‘A more futile exercise was hard to imagine’, declared the coroner. Farm 
worker Vernon Jones donated his £8 recitation Eisteddfodau prize to the fund established for the 
families o f Alwyn Jones and George Taylor. WM, 9 August 1969.
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something which would go o ff  at the time of the investiture, interestingly, some 
‘eighteen months before’ the explosion which killed him and George Taylor, Jones 
revealed to his cousin Wyn Roberts, a quantity of ‘some 50 sticks of gelignite, a 
timing device akin to an alarm clock and a press-button battery switch’. The 
ensemble was ‘kept in a biscuit tin and stored in the garden shed’ at the home Jones 
shared with his mother. Asked by the coroner why he did not challenge Jones or 
inform the police of the bomb-making equipment, Roberts replied: ‘it was Alwyn’s 
business’.241 As a regular contributor to the letters page of the region’s newspaper, 
where his republican views were eloquently espoused,242 Alwyn Jones’s 
correspondence and his apparent suitability to the militant cause, soon came to 
Jenkins’ attention through ‘the efforts of a sleeper in the Abergele area’.243
Having contentiously disclosed that Alwyn Jones and George Taylor were 
responsible for the Snowdonia Country Club action, John Jenkins nonetheless 
resolutely rejected the suggestion of Wyn Roberts, that his cousin, Alwyn Jones, had 
possessed such a stash of explosives; or indeed had acted as a Quarter Master for 
MAC. Had he done so, quantified Jenkins, it would have provided Jones ‘the ability 
to use it without my jurisdiction’. Which, the former director-general of MAC added, 
‘went against’ the movement’s ‘ethos’ and Jenkins’ own strategic control.244 Yet, the 
inquest was further informed that following his departure from the Castle Arms, 
Alwyn Jones returned to the home he shared with his wife Marie and announced he 
was ‘going to have a bath’. She remained apparently unaware Jones had left the 
house until later notified by the authorities of his death.245
Whatever the truth regarding George Taylor’s involvement in the Snowdonia 
Country Club action, or the appalling Abergele episode, no such ambiguity surrounds 
the manner in which the community of Abergele vilified the Taylor family following
241 Ibid. Alwyn Jones ‘had tattoos over his body which said ‘freedom for Wales’ and the like’ stated 
Jennie Evans. ‘He wrote articles supporting Welsh nationalism in the local press...He was very proud 
o f  Wales and stated often that he wanted ‘Welsh freedom’...H e was proud o f ‘spraying slogans to 
further the cause and so on’. Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 13 August 2009.
242 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 13 August 2009.
243 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 2009. ‘The sleeper was involved 
in letting me o f  anyone local who’d strong support for us. I wanted someone in the area, because it was
on the route o f the Royal Train. Not that the train or tracks were targeted’.
244 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 8 November 2009.
245 WM, 15 October 1969. As Jones played darts, his wife entertained Catherine Brazier and Michael 
Hassett. When another friend o f Alwyn Jones, Alan Barton, out walking his dog heard the explosion, 
he called at Jones’ home enquiring after him. He twice received ‘vague explanations’ from Marie 
Jones regarding her husbands’ whereabouts. Finally, he and Hassett left to discover the source o f the
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the death of the much-loved father and husband. Once respected as community 
minded with regard his fire service and active participation in the town’s under 14’s 
football team, George Taylor’s family was systematically subjected to invective and 
profane taunts that he tried ‘to kill the Royal Family’. Forced to place ‘seven pairs of 
net curtains across the windows to prevent people peering in’, Jennie Taylor’s mother 
Mary, struggled bravely to protect her three children from the emotional onslaught of 
having slogans daubed across the walls of their house and a dead rat and excrement 
pushed through the letter box .246
Investiture Day, MAC and other dissenters
Speaking in 2009, Lord Snowdon revealed that while news of the explosion in 
Abergele had ‘naturally been noted’, the authorities were determined ‘to play it 
down’.247 Nevertheless, as reports were received that overnight Union Jack bunting 
had been ‘ripped down in Bethesda’,248 ‘celebratory flowerbeds vandalized in 
Aberystwyth’ and the vicar of Caernarfon ‘had urged Welsh extremists to observe a 
truce over the investiture period’,249 the threat posed by the militant fraternity 
remained ‘serious’. Revealing police concerns, Jock Wilson conceded ‘a bomb could 
be in any one of a million places’.250 Later discussing the extent of the planned 
disruption, Owain Williams declared a ‘storming of Caernarfon Castle was genuinely 
considered’.251 It is a notion dismissed by John Jenkins as ‘fanciful’.252 Whether 
fanciful or no, the Shrewsbury unit deemed it ‘unlikely’ a physical assault on ‘any 
individual’ might be attempted, Raymond Kendall remarked, but those employed in 
the protection of the Royal Family nonetheless recognized their ‘reputations were on 
the line’.253
blast. As they walked, Hassett admitted he too was unsure if Jones was ‘upstairs’ or had left the house.
246 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009. Jennie Evans was also 
systematically bullied by her head teacher. When a new pupil or member o f staff joined the 
Comprehensive school, Jennie Evans was forced to stand on a chair and inform the new arrival her 
father had ‘tried to kill the Prince o f Wales’. Such a malevolent and unverifiable accusation ‘gave the 
|reen light’ for a number o f pupils to bully and intimidate her.
47 Interview between WT & Lord Snowdon, 11 November 2009; also New Statesman, 27 June 1969.
248 WM, 27 June 1969.
249 LDP, 30 June 1969.
250 WM, 27 June 1969. ‘The first indication we have’, Wilson added, ‘is when a bomb has indeed 
exploded’.
25 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 March 2004.
252
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
253 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 2 August 2009.
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As the motorcade containing Prince Charles passed along the A5 from Holyhead to 
Caernarfon - where he would meet the other Royals waiting aboard the Royal Train - 
police received notice that ‘cables’ were protruding suspiciously from a man hole 
cover in the road. Despite their initial fears, bomb disposal officers and telecom 
engineers, soon deduced the ‘device’ was ‘part of the GPO system’.254 It was 
nevertheless a tense moment and followed the discovery of another suspect package - 
although ultimately discovered to be harmless - beneath a railway bridge in Chester 
the previous evening.255
Having arrived safely, at 14.00 the Royal Train drew slowly to a standstill 
adjacent to the Ferodo brick factory on the outskirts of Caernarfon. To announce its 
arrival, the BBC’s esteemed broadcaster Kenneth Baker informed viewers he could 
‘now confirm’ the Royal Train had ‘halted for the night near Menai bridge’. If this 
supports a belief the Royal Train passed over the England/Wales border at 16.00 the 
day before,257 it nonetheless conflicts with an account proffered by George Thomas, 
who later revealed the Royal Train was delayed in Crewe just hours before the 
ceremony, ‘because the signalling wires had been cut’.258 Whatever the truth 
surrounding the train’s clandestine journey, a little while later, twenty-year-old Prince 
Charles - adorned in the uniform of Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Regiment of Wales
259- disembarked and the Royal carriage began the journey to Caernarfon Castle.
At 14.25, the remaining royal party alighted. As the horses jostled and the 
Queen, Prince Philip and Princess Anne began the 200 yard journey to the castle, an 
explosion was heard in the distance. Unsure if it was part of the ceremonial welcome,
254 1969, Unwaith Eto, HTV Production for S4C. Screened, September 2002. Via an anonymous 
telephone call to post mistress Catherine Griffiths, police were alerted to ‘youths acting suspiciously
with cabling’. They discovered it ran from behind a stone wall to the man hole cover.
255 WM, 18 August 1969. The Royal Train was due to pass over the bridge en route for Caernarfon 
some time later. Prince Charles boarded the Royal Train just short o f Caernarfon. He and the Royal 
Party then travelled to the Ferodo Plant.
256 The Investiture o f  HRH the Prince o f  Wales. BBC Parliament, 28 June 2009. Contacted to clarify 
where the Royal Train halted investiture eve and the extent o f any concern the Royal Party harboured 
during the investiture period, a sympathetic written reply declared that ‘the Queen has made it a rule 
not to publicly express her personal views’. Correspondence to WT, from Sonia Bonici, Senior
Correspondence Officer at Buckingham Palace, 20 January 2010.
257 Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Timewatch Production. Screened July 2009.
258 Thomas, Mr. Speaker, p. 120. Although ‘satisfied’. . . ‘we cannot cater against lunatics’ replied G.
Thomas regarding security measures. WM, 30 June 1969.
259 WM, 2 July 1969. The Royal train halted near Bangor and close to Plas-Newydd, the Marquis o f  
Anglesey’s home. The rendezvous point the following morning was Vaynol, the mansion home of the 
Lord Lieutenant o f Caernarfonshire. Anthony Holden, Charles: Prince o f  Wales (London, 1979),
p. 162
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or something altogether more sinister, the Queen, with what appeared resigned 
apprehension, failed to return her husband’s wry smirk. Rather, she fixed her
uncomfortable gaze downwards while straightening the grey warming blanket placed
261across her knees. In the preceding carriage, a quizzical Prince Charles enquired as 
to the cause of the blast. It was, he was informed by the Secretary of State for Wales, 
‘the Royal Salute’. If so, it was ‘a peculiar Royal salute’, remarked the prince. 
‘There are peculiar people up here’, returned George Thomas.262
The retort coincided with television images of a man being chased across open 
ground by uniformed - and what was assumed to be - plain clothed police officers. As 
he was apprehended, Richard Baker announced that moments before he too heard a 
single explosion. It was, he assumed, ‘a cannon going o f f .263 One man in no doubt 
as to the cause of the blast was John Jenkins. The activated device, designed to 
undermine the status of the traditional 21 Royal Gun Salute by adding a 22nd, was 
planted in Love Lane by a MAC active unit the previous evening. Close to the home 
of the Chief Constable of Gwynedd, Colonel William Williams, it was, Jenkins later 
proclaimed, ‘the first time the Queen heard a shot fired in anger’.264 The following 
day, it was reported that police discovered ‘a hole in the ground and scorched trees on 
wooded hilly ground’ above the town. With two of the four devices planted on the 
eve of the investiture having detonated - one with tragic repercussions - John Jenkins 
knew that moments later, as the procession neared Caernarfon Castle, another was set 
to explode; it did not.
As the Royal procession made its way to the castle, Prince Charles was 
greeted with ‘heart-warming enthusiasm’. Yet, moments after, several loud boos 
were heard before being all but drowned out by sudden increased voluble cheering. 
Several minutes later, amid more noticeable though measured jeers, an egg appeared 
to be thrown in the direction of the Queen’s open-topped carriage. Smashing on the 
road beside it, the incident did not go unnoticed by the royal party, who exchanged
^  WM, 1 July 1969.
261 The Investiture ofH RH the Prince o f  Wales. BBC Parliament, 28 June 2009.
262 Thomas, Mr. Speaker, p. 120. Shortly after the blast, a youth was seen ‘to throw a parcel’ onto the 
railway track near the Royal Train before disappearing. WM, 2 July 1969.
263 The Investiture ofH RH the Prince o f  Wales. BBC Parliament, 28 June 2009. ‘The crowd thought it
was part o f the 21 gun salute’. Sun, 2 July 1969.
264
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also 20 November 
2008.
265 WM, 2 July 1969.
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further glances of combined concern and amusement.266
Nevertheless, having arrived within ‘the comforting security’ of Caernarfon 
Castle,267 the Queen followed the ‘age old’ tradition and invested her eldest son
968Prince of Wales. Prince Charles swore fealty to the Crown and received the
symbols of office. With both his and the nation’s loyalty assured, George Thomas 
then delivered the Letters of Proclamation in what was later described as ‘his 
execrable Welsh’. As George Thomas approached the conclusion of his speech,
shouting could be heard beyond the castle walls. The newly invested prince appeared 
to inform his father he ‘heard something coming in’. The Duke of Edinburgh 
returned his son’s uneasy gaze with his customary wry smirk. If the prince 
harboured any concern, it did not show, as he delivered - in both Welsh and English - 
a speech in which he outlined his ‘pride and emotion’ at the ceremony. For those 
involved in the security operation, the most dangerous aspect of the entire proceedings
971was imminent. The pageant was to end with an echo of Edward I mythical gesture, 
as the Queen presented Charles to his subjects from a balcony above Queen Eleanor’s 
Gate. Overlooking the town square, it proved a near heart-stopping moment for 
Shrewsbury Unit figure, Elfyn Williams. Having earlier received ‘a pistol and twelve 
rounds’; from his own position on a nearby internal rampart, the prince’s vulnerability
266 The Investiture o f  HRH the Prince o f  Wales. BBC Parliament, 28 June 2009. As the procession 
approached the castle, Special Branch officers led away a man, having turned out the pocket linings of  
his coat and trousers and checked his camera. After the ceremony, a ‘special court’ was convened in 
Caernarfon to preside over ‘a number o f prosecutions’. Two were for indecent exposure. Two 18- 
year-old males and a 21-year old male, were fined £5 for ‘making V-signs at the Royal Carriages’ and 
holding aloft a placard bearing an anti-investiture slogan. Two further youths were fined £5 for ‘being 
in possession o f  offensive weapons’. (A sheath knife and a sock containing a lump o f lead). A 16- 
year-old male was remanded in youth custody for throwing ‘a banana skin’ under horses hooves. 
Caernarvon and Denbigh Herald, 4 July 1969; also, WM, 2 July 1969; also, New Statesman, 18 July
1969.
267 Thomas, Mr. Speaker, p. 120
268 The Investiture o f  HRH the Prince o f  Wales. BBC Parliament, 28 June, 2009. Lord Snowdon later 
conceded that swathes o f  the proceedings had little, if  any, historical legitimacy. Interview between
WT & Lord Snowdon, 11 November 2009.
269 Planet (Aberystwyth, December 1997/January 1998). George Thomas performed his task with 
adequate proficiency. Interview between WT & Lord Snowdon, 11 November 2009.
270
The Investiture o f  HRH the Prince o f  Wales. BBC Parliament, 28 June 2009. During the 
ceremony, two rafts containing RAOC bomb-disposal men and police dragged the river Menai
alongside the halted Royal Train.
271 John Davies, A History o f  Wales, (London, 1993), p. 179. In 1284 - or so legend alleges - in an 
attempt to legitimize the annexation o f Wales, Edward 1 held aloft his native-born son at Queen 
Eleanor’s Gate at Caernarfon Castle and declared triumphantly to those assembled below he was ‘their 
prince’. In 1301, in a ceremony at Lincoln, Edward 1 granted his son the title Prince o f Wales. The 
legend he was presented as an infant to the people o f Wales, was not recorded until 1584. At 20.00 for 
800 years, the Curfew Bell echoed across the royal borough o f Caernarfon. Perhaps due to its 
evocative imperial overtones, the tradition ended in the months before the investiture.
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raised the uneasy question of whether he might ‘return alive’.272 Yet, Elfyn Williams’ 
claim of being armed, is challenged by two of his former colleagues in the 
Shrewsbury Unit: John Owen Evans and Raymond Kendall,273 with each declaring 
their surprise that any of those involved in the security arrangements were issued 
firearms.
The investiture’s historical legacy
The invitation to attend the Royal Investiture, was extended to all MPs and Peers in 
Wales.274 Only Gwynfor Evans declined to accept.275 Evans’ anti-royal stance 
proved decisive in his losing the Carmarthen seat at the General election twelve 
months later, he believed. Among those apparently content to do so was Elystan 
Morgan, the Labour MP for Ceredigion. Since his election to Westminster three years 
earlier, the former Plaid Cymru party leader presumptive had risen steadily through 
the ranks of governmental influence. As ‘Junior Minister at the Home Office, 
involved in police matters’, Morgan received a number of threats to his life. He later 
confessed to feeling somewhat uncertain as to the degree of importance he should 
attach to them.276 Elystan Morgan was certainly a figure held in much contempt by 
the Free Wales Army. ‘No one turned the screw more tightly on the imprisoned FWA 
than that turn coat’, angrily spat Denis Coslett in 2000. All ‘the undermining tactics’ 
available to the state, Morgan readily and happily helped to deploy.277 Nonetheless, 
asked in 2009 to outline his feelings towards the investiture, Elystan Morgan 
remarked a little disconcertedly, that the ceremony ‘dealt specifically with Wales not
979
Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Wales Production. Screened July 2009. Elfyn Williams 
received the gun and bullets the day before at a Church-owned ‘missionary building’ in Caernarfon. 
‘Because George Thomas did not trust the Welsh police’, he and the chief constable o f Gwynedd were
the only ‘two Welsh policemen on duty’, Williams later declared. BBC Wales Today, 1 July 2009.
273 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 7 July 2009; also, correspondence between 
WT & Raymond Kendall, 2 August 2009. Elfyn Williams’ ‘talk of having a gun in a suitcase during 
the ceremony’, was Evans stated, ‘a farce’. He had ‘a question mark on that’. While it was possible, 
such action merely ‘undermined the security. You might as well’, Evans continued, ‘hand a gun to the 
person standing next to you and hope he knows how to use it’. While ‘it was possible’, declared R. 
Kendall he ‘was not aware o f  the issuing of firearms in Caernarfon’. ‘The police may not have been 
armed, but MI5 were’. Telephone interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 19 September 
2010. No televisual evidence supports an FWA anecdotal claim that the Laughing Policeman was 
played as Prince Charles waved ceremoniously to the crowd.
74 A PLOT TO KILL THE PRINCE? HTV Wales Production. Screened July 2009.
275
Correspondence between WT Sc Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
276 A PLOT TO KILL THE PRINCE? HTV Wales Production. Screened July 2009.
277 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. E. Morgan left Plaid Cymru to join 
the Labour Party on 12 July 1965.
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as a country, a nation’, as he ‘would have wished’, but rather ‘as a principality’; 
which ‘is a status a notch or two down from that’.278
97QLord Snowdon’s opinion that the investiture was ‘a resounding success’ cut 
little ice with John Jenkins, who declared intelligibly:
On the day, police lined the route along the streets in Caernarfon and behind each policeman
was a man turned around facing the crowd. This was in case the crowd started getting nasty.
Well, that takes a bit o f doing. This was no Mardi Gras or carnival with people dancing in the
streets, not by a long chalk. It was a charade, an insult and we wanted to show it as such. So
280we (MAC) succeeded in that.
Unsurprisingly however, it is not a view universally endorsed. Discussing Jenkins’ 
assertion, John Owen Evans expressed both his disapproval and disappointment at
i i .
‘some of the programmes’ broadcast to coincide the Investiture’s 40 anniversary. 
‘All seem to have been based upon the premise there was hostility and opposition to 
the ceremony and that there was this great threat to the prince’. Evans did not concur
901
with this view. ‘It was’, he added, ‘supported by people across Wales’. It is a 
belief roundly challenged by John Jenkins. In his ‘capacity within Western
Command’, he used ‘to drive around Wales’. While undertaking these trips, he 
gauged, what he termed, ‘grass roots reaction’. Subsequently, MAC’s director- 
general discerned that ‘a minority, but a considerable minority, felt disenchanted and 
resentful toward the whole thing. These people regarded the ceremony as ‘the stamp 
of the conqueror...Therefore’, he added, ‘it was our objective to stop the sweetness 
and light attitude, which the state was happy to perpetuate, and to give that 
disenchantment a voice’.
It was certainly ‘a voice’ worthy of ministerial and monarchical concern. ‘We 
would be untrue to history’, George Thomas declared magnanimously in 1994, ‘if we 
did not say that everyone - including the Royal Party - held their breath until the thing
Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Wales Production. Screened, July 2009.
279 Interview between WT & Lord Snowdon, 11 November 2009. ‘It didn’t matter actually if  you 
believed in the monarchy. It was a celebration and a very happy occasion. Look’, Lord Snowdon 
added a little impatiently, ‘it was bloody good for Wales and being Welsh I’m very proud o f it. I don’t
know if  it will ever happen again.. .1 think things have moved on, but it was good for that time’.
280 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 15 November 2009. It is estimated that security
personnel stood every 2.3 yards on either side o f the route. Ellis, Investiture, p.232. G. ap Iestyn came
to regard MAC’s investiture offensive as counter-productive. ‘It led to an inevitable response from the
authorities’, he later opined. Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 21 August 2010.
281 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 5 July 2009.
282 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 23 June 2009.
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283was over’. Yet, asked to comment on the perceived seriousness of the militant 
threat, Lord Snowdon appeared less troubled. ‘We weren’t worried about them’, he 
later remarked insouciantly/ 84 Nonetheless, if Lord Snowdon was unduly concerned, 
the BBC took the necessary steps to greet any eventuality, preparing an obituary: ‘just 
in case’.285
Gwynfor Evans was not the only Welsh Republican absent from Caernarfon 
on Investiture Day, so too were the ‘30 or so nationalist sympathizers’ placed under 
police surveillance. ‘Some’, John Owen Evans, later revealed, ‘disappeared to 
Ireland’. Yet, the monitoring of these individuals begged a question: if apparently 
known to north Wales police, why were George Taylor and Alwyn Jones not similarly 
the focus of police attention? By way of response, J. O. Evans declared each were 
known as ‘vocal sympathizers’, with the true ‘extent of their involvement’ not known. 
‘What the police had on them was not enough to warrant that degree of attention’, 
Evans added. ‘You can’t simply monitor people for holding a strong view’.286
Ian Skidmore’s Investiture Day proved somewhat surreal, as two senior 
policemen arrived at his home, each armed with a bottle of whisky. They were there 
‘to watch the ceremony’ with him, Skidmore was informed. At this juncture a 
prodigious drinker and the time already 10.30, he could not find his ‘way to the 
kitchen let alone Caernarfon’, Skidmore retorted. Having established he was subject 
to ‘a civilized form of house arrest’, Skidmore ‘took one look at the whisky’, deduced 
discretion to be the better form of valour and extended his hand in welcome.287
However, on reflection, was the investiture a success for the Royals and the 
British State? As a spectacle of Royal pageantry, the investiture was a success. So 
too did it appeal to ‘mainstream’ Welsh public opinion. It also succeeded largely in
283 Everyone Held Their Breath. ITV Wales Production. Screened, July 1994. The Queen ‘practically 
danced’ as she thanked George Thomas for ‘a wonderful day’. Every detail o f ‘the complicated 
procedure went like clockwork’, he later declared. Thomas, Mr. Speaker, p. 121.
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Interview between WT & Lord Snowdon, 11 November 2009.
285 Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Wales Production. Screened July 2009; also Holden,
Charles, p. 162.
286 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 5 July 2009. ‘They were under
surveillance for about a week’. The exploits o f one group who went to Dublin during the investiture
period, were later colourfully recalled in Cambria. It comprised: Royston Jones ‘Swansea Jack’,
Rhobert ap StefFan ‘Castro’, Peter ‘Gun’ Williams and Jimmie ‘Cnwc’ Evans. Cambria (July/August
2009); also, telephone interview between WT & Royston Jones, 27 April 2010.
287 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008. Was he, David Pritchard or 
A lf Williams placed under surveillance or subject to systematic ‘house arrest’, David Walters was 
asked. ‘They didn’t come to me’, Walters replied, ‘and I don’t think they went to Dave or Alf. But 
that’s not to say we weren’t being constantly watched’. Interview between WT & David Walters, 29
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sending the political message that Wales ‘rightfully’ belonged in the union of British 
nations. The apparent warmth shown by the people of Wales towards Prince Charles
as he toured the country following the ceremony - despite reports on Moscow radio
288which claimed ‘bombs were exploding and cars burning along the entire route’ 
suggests the investiture had struck a chord and that the prince was held in some fair 
degree of affection.289 Nevertheless, it did not attract the number of visitors to 
Caernarfon previously expected.290 Crucially, it was not the ‘jamboree’ organizers 
and royal and government officials hoped for. The security/police presence and the 
explosions on the day, were enough to ensure the militants could claim with some
9Q1 •justification, to having undermined the prestige of the occasion. Further evidence 
of the apparent discontent was the plethora of anti-investiture and FWA slogans 
reportedly daubed throughout the country. Also on investiture day - presumably in 
protest at events in Caernarfon - Bangor Post Office was subject to a bomb-hoax and a
9092,000 ft marquee in Pwllheli burned down.
Yet, despite bewildered unionist reaction throughout Wales (and the apparent 
complexity of the situation), many wondered what fuelled this level of hostility. In 
essence, nationalists opined, opposition was simple: were Wales not conquered by an 
Anglo/Norman invasion force in 1282, then Charles would not today be invested 
Prince of Wales. This, they argued, was not an extreme view, but rather an historical 
fact. Who, nationalists ventured, in the month which saw man walk upon the moon, 
clasped such anachronistic, unconstitutional nonsense to their hearts? Surely no true 
Welsh person, who recognised the ceremony as nothing more than an imperial act of 
conquest? Consequently, however amiable, however well-intentioned, however much 
the Buckingham Palace spin machine legitimized his credentials historically; however 
much Charles himself was the unwitting victim of political opportunism, the rigid fact 
remained that Charles Windsor was not, nor indeed would he ever be, the rightful
December 2008.
288 Guardian, 3 July 1969. Police were reportedly ‘run o ff their feet defusing mines owing to the anti­
monarchist feeling’. ‘Social problems’ in Wales were said to be at ‘boiling point’.
289 Thomas, Mr. Speaker, p. 121. The ‘triumphant tour’ across Wales, ended in Cardiff three days later. 
Gwynfor Evans’s decision not to attend the investiture, but to meet Prince Charles at Carmarthen, was 
dismissed by Thomas as ‘humbug’.
290
WM, 2 July 1969. Estimates declared between 70,000 and 90,000 attended. Organizers had 
expected 200,000. Officially, the televising o f the event was regarded as the reason numbers were 
down. Somewhat tenuous evidence also suggests the crowd was comprised o f a sizeable English,
rather than Welsh presence. Everyone Held Their Breath. ITV Wales Production. Screened, July 1994.
291
Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
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Prince of Wales.
Nonetheless, if it was felt by nationalists the investiture was politically 
inspired, such outrage was hardly assuaged when the trial of the FWA and anti- 
investiture activists culminated on its very day. This, they attested, was too 
convenient; too neat and too packaged. Suspicions were further roused, when images 
on the evening news adorned the nation’s flickering television screens. First the 
jubilant scenes from Caernarfon and then prison vans taking those convicted to begin 
their sentences. Surely this was no accident of timing, but rather a calculated attempt 
to send a resounding signal of what awaits those prepared to challenge the might of 
the British State.
A soldier is killed, MAC targets Llandudno pier and John Jenkins blames Plaid 
Cymru
However much these events were contrived, eight hours after the ceremony, a soldier 
was killed when a military police van he was sitting in outside Caernarfon Castle 
exploded into flames. Despite the initial journalistic speculation that Army Driver, 
Ronald Anthony Berry (21), died as a result of militant activity,294 a later inquest 
returned a verdict of ‘accidental death’. Tragically, it appears ‘a discarded lit match, 
or a spark caused by a heel plate on the ground’, ignited petrol which had seeped from 
two containers positioned ‘behind the driver’s seat’ alongside Berry in the rear of the 
van. It was claimed that prior to the combustion, the petrol was observed ‘flowing
295from the back of the vehicle onto the ground and down a drain’.
The following morning, despite police denials to the contrary, John Jenkins 
attests that an explosive device was located at Llandudno pier. The location and the
292
WM, 2 July 1969. One included: ‘Pechod dros Gymru’ (Shame over Wales).
293 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2009. Having sardonically commented on 
the timing o f the arrests, Walters added his belief the trials conclusion was ‘a simple political message’. 
Televised across the world, the government did not want demonstrations or any hint of discord on the
streets o f Caernarfon. Rather, a message o f constitutional unity was sought.
294 WM, 3 July 1969. Berry was arrested at 23.59. The explosion occurred at 12.20. Despite the 
subsequent conjecture, Jenkins resolutely ruled out MAC involvement. ‘How could we have done?’. 
Jenkins protested. ‘It would have required a different approach and target altogether in our campaign’. 
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 March 2004.
295 LDP, 30 July 1969; also, WM, 30 July 1969. During the inquest, military police (despite being 
exonerated) were criticized by members o f the public for the manner in which they arrested the 
intoxicated Berry o f Kirkby, Merseyside. This allegedly included punching him in the stomach. 
Further unease was raised as to how Berry apparently opened the ‘secure’ petrol cans (which against 
regulations were in the van), why he was left alone for some ‘15 minutes’ and how the fuel ignited. 
Despite not having initially searched Berry, he was not found to have ‘matches or a lighter’ after the
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objective of the operation was paramount. Having been planted by ‘one of the four 
groups out on the eve of the investiture’, it was hoped the bombs’ activation ‘would 
destroy the pier’, thus preventing the Prince from being able to moor. Nevertheless, it 
was not be. The operation, Jenkins believed, was probably ‘rushed owing to the 
twenty four hour surveillance’ the site was subject to. Whatever the reason, the
device failed to detonate.296 Sometime later, Prince Charles came ashore from the
}Q7
Royal Yacht and began his four-day tour of Wales.
In the days following the investiture, Lord Snowdon received a telegram from 
Prince Charles. Thanking both his uncle and his assistants for ‘all their hard work’, it 
just went to show, the prince added, perhaps a little mischievously, ‘what the British’ 
could ‘achieve with a little help from the Welsh’.298 Yet, if  the prince toasted the 
success of the ceremony, speaking in 2009, John Jenkins remained certain at whose 
door Welsh nationalists should lay the blame. ‘Had Plaid Cymru been less ‘Brit’ 
about it and called for people to protest at Caernarfon; had it said it was going to lead 
a mass sit-down in the town, it may well have been cancelled’. In the event, ‘the 
party’s directive, whereby it was left to the conscious of each individual to decide 
whether to vocally protest or not, was seen as merely a ‘cop out’. It actually ‘caused a 
lot of ill-feeling at the time’, Jenkins added. However,
had the authorities feared an outbreak o f militancy as routinely expressed by the French 
populace to protest hostile government legislature, then I’m sure it would have been stopped. 
They’d have claimed that Charles had a terrible cold; anything which offered a diplomatic
299way out.
Possibly so, but while Plaid Cymru may have provided leadership in opposing the 
ceremony, those intent on undertaking civil disobedience in Caernarfon, would surely 
have done so irrespective of whether orchestrated by Plaid Cymru or not. 
Nonetheless, Jenkins has a point: the authorities appeared alive to the possibility of an
fire.2Q a
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 24 December 2009. ‘It was 
definitely there. They couldn’t admit how great a danger Prince Charles was in. They’d have been 
sacked for not saturating the whole area and checking everywhere. When it failed to activate’, added
Jenkins, ‘a MAC operative told them where it was’.
297 WM, 2 July 1969. The Britannia followed the prince around the coast throughout the visit. It 
provided a safe haven should events turn sour. Following the investiture, Prince Charles was driven
back to Holyhead, as the Royal party returned to London.
298 Lord Snowdon papers, viewed by WT, 11 November 2009.
299 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 9 August 2009. ‘People have said that the 
military won because the investiture went ahead. But these people’, remonstrated Jenkins, had ‘simply 
missed the point. To cancel the ceremony was never our objective: it would have been the ‘icing on the 
cake’, but as the situation was (Plaid Cymru’s refusal to protest) that was never going to happen’.
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outbreak of militancy; certainly if the security operation in Caernarfon to combat its 
potential outburst is any indication.
Ian Cox
If MAC had notched up some notable ‘successes’ during its preceding two-year 
campaign, the events of 5 July 1969 was its nadir. News that a holidaying ten-year- 
old boy from England was injured on activating a MAC explosive device in 
Caernarfon brought John Jenkins - seemingly possessed of an almost fanatical degree 
of controlled detachment - near the point of inner devastation. Himself a father of two 
young boys, as with the deaths of Alwyn Jones and George Taylor, the injuries to Ian 
Cox would return to haunt Jenkins. Speaking about the incident in 2008, John Jenkins 
remained wrapped within a blanket of self recrimination and guilt. When news of the 
explosion broke, the director-general of MAC consoled himself in the knowledge ‘the 
press had greatly exaggerated the boys’ injuries’.300
Speaking in 2007, Ian Cox - today the landlord of a pub in Buckinghamshire - 
finally dispelled all ambiguity as to the extent of the injuries he sustained. Having 
‘jumped over a wall’ to retrieve his football, Cox saw it had come to rest near a pile of 
‘old junk’. Disguised within ‘a hollowed out bit of concrete, in what he believed was 
‘once an old lamp stand’ was the device. Cox ‘trod on it and it activated’. The 
injuries he received included: ‘an amputated right leg, severe burning’ to his ‘left leg’ 
and ‘flash bums to most’ of his body. This included his ‘face and left hand’. For 
having inadvertently and tragically become enmeshed in the struggle for Welsh 
independence, Ian Cox endured ‘about 10 years of painful plastic surgery’. As for the 
perpetrators of the explosion, he had neither time for ‘them nor their cause’, Cox 
added robustly.301 Having heard the horrific extent of the injuries sustained, John 
Jenkins quietly and unreservedly apologised for the suffering Ian Cox endured. It 
was, he conceded plaintively, ‘one of the greatest regrets’ of his life.302
300 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008.
301 Telephone interview between WT & Ian Cox, 15 November 2007. Ian Cox was ‘on a family 
holiday to Caernarfon’, ‘timed to coincide with the investiture’. Cox’s ‘grandmother was Welsh; from 
the Rhymney Valley’. A fund established for Ian Cox raised £4,300. One undisclosed contributor was
Prince Charles. WM, 6 October 1969.
302 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. ‘I am truly sorry for the injuries that 
little boy suffered, more than I can express’. As with George Taylor and Alwyn Jones, ‘it should have 
been me’, stated Jenkins. First on the scene was a 10-year-old Elin Rhys from Bangor. On investiture 
day she was part o f the procession. Having observed the extent of Ian Cox’s injuries, Roberts 
consequently suffered nightmares for years. Wales: The Prince and the Plotter, BBC Wales
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The device, Jenkins revealed, was one of the four planted on the eve of the investiture 
and meant to detonate as the royal procession went by. It was intended, he affirmed, 
‘to serve as a disruption’. Moreover, while he accepted ‘it would have frightened the 
horses’, it was merely ‘a symbolic protest’ and not designed to cause ‘harm, injury or 
damage’. Nevertheless, contemporary media reports state the device was planted 
beneath two large oil storage containers, which fortuitously happened to be empty; 
it certainly suggests the likelihood of something more grave than ‘a disruption’ might 
have occurred. Later discussing the logistics of the operation, Jenkins declared ‘to the 
best’ of his ‘knowledge a local MAC group planted it’. As for its location, he ‘was 
not aware it was positioned beneath oil containers’.304
Responding to the charge that MAC failed to contact the authorities to inform 
them of the device, Jenkins emphatically replied that numerous phone calls instructing 
officers of the bombs location were relayed. Yet, for whatever reason, no action was 
taken. In the days following his ultimate conviction, Jenkins asked police why they 
failed to retrieve it. He was informed that ‘thousands’ of such phone calls - the 
overwhelming majority bogus - had been received during the investiture period. It 
would have been, Jenkins was told by way of explanation, ‘impossible to investigate 
them all’. Having informed the authorities, Jenkins added, any attempt by MAC 
operatives to retrieve the device was thus prevented, owing to the likelihood the site 
was being watched.305
Despite Jenkins’ candour, it is an explanation many in Wales regard as 
insufficient. Even if caught in the act of retrieving the device and sentenced to a 
period of imprisonment - having established before the court the individual acted 
alone - surely this was better than what transpired? While ‘that may well be true’, one 
former activist on the extreme periphery of Welsh militancy later countered, there is 
Tittle room for such idealism’ in ‘a campaign of militant activism’. Moreover, such 
apologetic reasoning is sentimental, irksome and a hindrance to the political advance 
of a ‘cause’. However unpalatable, an effective militant campaign can only be 
undertaken with ruthless, emotional, insensibility. The injuries sustained by Ian Cox -
Production. Screened July 2009.
303 WM, 7 July 1969.
304 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 15 November 2009. One o f the two oil 
containers was dented and blown over in the blast. The device was planted at the back o f an
ironmongers in Bangor Street.
305
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
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and this is not a view shared by John Jenkins - amounted to ‘unfortunate collateral 
damage’, the former militant declared. Yet, it is the entire panoply of the 
Establishment ‘with blood on its hands’, having foisted ‘for its own political ends’, a 
ceremony of imperial conquest on a largely unsupportive, or at best, indifferent Welsh 
public.306
For many observers however, such comments are incomprehensible. Such 
injuries to a ten-year-old boy, they argue, can never be justified: whatever the political
0^7cause. Furthermore, the unfortunate Ian Cox reflected a grave and portentous truth: 
that the militant campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru had derailed itself morally 
and was now spiralling ominously out of control. As to the suggestion that warnings 
from MAC had been deliberately ignored in the hope that an innocent party might
< j / \ o
suffer injuries, though John Jenkins considered it ‘possible’, it was, he believed, 
‘too cynical a view’.309 Whatever the truth surrounding arguably the most shameful 
episode in the long and often painful odyssey of Welsh nationalism, the police now 
re-doubled their efforts to bring the ‘feckless’ Welsh extremists to book. Explosives 
on remote pipelines in the Welsh mountains was one thing; blood on the streets quite 
another.
The intractable chief constable of Gwynedd, Lt.-Col. William Williams
Determined to wrong-foot media intrigue into the explosion which injured Ian Cox, 
was the Chief Constable of Gwynedd, Lt.-Col. William Williams. Immediately after 
the blast, officers were instructed to release a statement which ‘ruled out’ the 
possibility ‘a bomb’ was involved. This, despite the discovery of detritus commonly 
located at the site of such an action.310 It was not until the Meirionnydd MP, William 
Edwards, asked in Parliament why conflicting accounts were emanating from the 
Gwynedd Constabulary in relation to the blast, that it was confirmed ‘a timed 
explosive device’ was responsible. In an attempt to engage public concern, the Chief
306 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009. ‘When’, it was argued, ‘has the British military 
ever apologized for the deaths o f civilians in Iraq or Afghanistan?’. Following the blast, angry prison 
inmates thrust newspaper photos o f Cox into D. Coslett’s hand. He returned with pictures o f Aberfan
shouting ‘what about these then?’. Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 24 November 2003.
307 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 5 July 2009.
308 Anonymous interview with WT, January 2009.
309 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
310 WM, 7 July 1969. The tin foil and ‘other small objects’ included a PP6 battery, pieces o f twisted 
metal, an electric flex and detonator wire and the remains o f a tin.
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Constable urged the community of Caernarfon to be vigilant. In the belief other 
devices may lie undiscovered along the processional route, any ‘unusual package or 
container’ should be approached with ‘caution’ and the authorities notified
311immediately. It was not however, enough to satisfy Frank Williamson, the Home 
Secretary’s appointee in Wales. Following reports an explosion had occurred near the 
International Eisteddfod pavilion at Llangollen,312 Williamson received instruction to 
investigate the explosion which injured Ian Cox. To his chagrined astonishment, 
Frank Williamson discovered further evidence of the recusant obstructionism which 
so frustrated the efforts of the Shrewsbury unit to apprehend the saboteurs.
During a meeting on 12 July, Williamson implored the indomitable Chief 
Constable to be more circumspect when releasing further press statements. Such 
conflicting and speculative declarations merely intensified and inflamed the position. 
Yet, despite the sobering catalogue of militant activity in Wales, Lt.-Col. Williams’ 
contempt for the intrusive Shrewsbury Unit remained unabated. With the investiture 
a memory, it was time, he believed, the unit disbanded and its members returned to 
their respective constabularies. The suggestion directly confuted with Frank 
Williamson, who saw no evidence that with the investiture over, ‘the activities of 
extremists’ would ‘decline’.313 His misgivings were further endorsed, when on 
contacting the Preston Forensic Science Laboratory, Williamson was informed that 
components of the apparent timing device which were recovered from the scene of the 
explosion in Caernarfon, had tested positive for nitro-glycerin. This, and the 
circumstances surrounding the bomb’s very location, compounded his increasing 
certainty the operation had been undertaken by Welsh militants.
It was not the only conflict of interests Frank Williamson discovered during 
his inquiry. In stark contrast to the assurances given by Lt.-Col. Williams prior to the 
investiture, no Special Branch officer within the Gwynedd Constabulary had been 
appointed to liaise with the Shrewsbury unit. Moreover, contrary to the Home 
Secretary’s directive that any occurring incidents during the investiture period should 
be accurately recorded, it was further revealed the incident room at Caernarfon police
311 WM, 8 July 1969. Days after the investiture, Lt.-Col. William Williams was honoured with the 
OBE; so too was Jock Wilson. The head of Gwynedd CID, Det. Supt. Allan Clarke, appealed for 
public support, declaring: ‘it would be impossible for us to search everywhere along the route’.
WM, 12 July 1969.
313 HO, 325/124. Report by Frank Williamson to Sir James Waddell, (Home Office) on extremist 
bombings in Wales. Dated, 16 July 1969.
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headquarters had failed to do so. A damning, if cloaked report to James Callaghan, 
the Home Secretary, was soon on its way.314
On receiving the report, James Callaghan endorsed its findings. In the bid to 
‘counter Welsh extremism’, nothing would be implemented which might ‘weaken the 
police security forces now available to counter Welsh extremism’. Simply stated, the 
Shrewsbury unit would remain. Furthermore, anyone deemed involved in militant 
activity, however tenuous the charge, would now likely be the focus of explicit 
surveillance. It was all too much for Lt-Col. Williams, who discerningly retired. It 
was not the only change in the fight to combat Welsh extremism, as Jock Wilson -
-J1 c
citing personal reasons - requested a transfer back to the Metropolitan Police.
Nonetheless, the mode in which the state policed its provinces had changed 
utterly. It was not long before whispers of the ‘secret policeman’ blew uneasily in the 
Welsh wind. Such was the concern, that the president of Plaid Cymru denounced the 
proceedings in which the FWA were convicted as a political ‘show trial’. Despite its 
failure, he declared, its purpose was to discredit the ‘growing nationalist movement’. 
A ‘dangerous precedent’ had been set, whereby Welshmen and others who cherished 
‘freedom of speech must be on their guard’. What was more, Evans added, ‘the 
police-state manner’ in which the nine were arrested was ‘repugnant’ and the degree 
of their subsequent solitary confinement ‘abhorrent’.316
If the condemnation of the state’s modus operandi was intended to dampen 
reactionary ministerial flames, Gwynfor Evans was wrong. Unknown to the president 
of Plaid Cymru, the party’s decision to contest every Parliamentary seat at the 
forthcoming General Election had rung alarm bells in Whitehall.317 Fearing what it 
termed ‘repercussions’, the Home Office proposed the Shrewsbury Unit continue its 
function as an intelligence-gathering centre. It was a resolution roundly endorsed by 
Ferguson Smith, Commander of the Metropolitan Special Branch and Dennis 
Trevelyan, a former Principal Private Secretary to the Leader of the House of 
Commons. The Welsh police forces, the latter opined, had failed ‘completely to 
establish an intelligence organization of their own’. Moreover, they were
315 HO, 325/124. Report by Sir Brian Cubbon, Private Secretary to Home Secretary James Callaghan, 
regarding meeting between Callaghan and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 29 July 1969.
316 WM, 2 July 1969.
317 HO, 325/124. William Farley, chairman/secretary, Committee of Chief Constables, to Sir Philip 
Allen, Permanent Under-Secretary o f State (Home Office) 10 January 1970.
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demonstrative and appeared wholly unacquainted with the nature of Special Branch 
activity.318
John Jenkins targets further MAC actions
With Jock Wilson’s return to London and Operation Cricket (the security operation 
around the investiture) deemed a success, it was decided a hand-picked squad of 
senior detectives from the Gwynedd and Cheshire constabularies would spearhead the 
hunt for the elusive MAC. Chosen as the focal point in the initial investigation was 
Abergele.319 Unknown to officers, John Jenkins had decided upon a fresh stream of 
targets, among them the South Stack Relay Station on Holyhead Mountain. It was, 
Jenkins realised, the main communications network between the British mainland and 
Northern Ireland. Furthermore, with the province on the threshold of sectarian civil 
war, ‘the attack’ was sanctioned in order to ‘show the IRA that we (MAC) did not 
appreciate what the British Army was doing in Ulster’.
Chosen by Jenkins to undertake the action was Gordon Wyn Jones. In a later 
statement to investigating officers, Jones claimed ‘some weeks after the investiture’, 
he received a letter from Jenkins suggesting they meet. This they did, Jones added, in 
Chester. Having left the Jones family in a cafe, he and Jenkins, it was alleged, 
departed for Saighton Barracks to discuss the logistics of the impending operation. 
There, G. W. Jones declared, he was both informed of the target and witnessed 
Jenkins remove a quantity of explosives from a locked room in the Dental Centre. 
Placed in ‘a parcel’, Jenkins allegedly handed the package to Jones on returning to 
Chester.321 John Jenkins utterly refutes such a series of events transpired.322 
Whatever the truth, in the early hours of 14 August 1969, the protest was successfully
l i e
HO, 325/124. Dennis Trevelyan, Home Office F2 Division, to Sir James Waddell, Deputy Under­
secretary, Home Office, 30 January 1970. That Special Branch was established to combat the 19th 
century Fenian threat did not help Welsh attitudes. Rupert Allason, The Branch (London, 1983), pp.l- 
15.
319
WM, 21 April 1970; also, correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 14 December 2009. 
The team was led by Det. Chief Supt. Anthony Clarke, head o f Gwynedd CID and Det. Chief Supt. 
Arthur Benfield, head o f Cheshire CID. Det. Chief Inspector William Evans, headed the hunt in north
Wales.
320 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. Jenkins was unable to confirm if  the IRA 
was notified o f  this explosion, but affirmed he and the group were at this juncture in ‘some contact, but 
not much’. Published intelligence reports stated saboteurs planned fresh targets. Sunday Telegraph, 6 
July 1969.
321
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones, 15 December 1969; also by Mary
Jones, 18 March 1970.
322 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009.
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undertaken. Despite Gordon Wyn Jones later admitting his guilt to investigating
officers, he was not charged with the South Stack protest.324 The decision not to 
prosecute Jones, John Jenkins believes, was in return for the wealth of incriminating 
evidence G. W. Jones provided officers, as they sought to establish a water-tight case 
against Jenkins before going to trial.
It was not the only target in Jenkins’ sights that August. Three days later, an 
explosive device was discovered on the doorstep of a council health office in Chester. 
It had failed to detonate, media sources revealed, owing to a loose wire in the timing 
mechanism. The device was ‘deliberately disabled’ by Frederick Ernest Alders,
revealed Jenkins, who had received instruction to undertake the action independently. 
Yet, the operational-commander of MAC had underestimated a crucial factor: 
Frederick Ernest Alders now harboured serious misgivings as to the legitimacy of the 
campaign. Moreover, he was increasingly fearful of how Jenkins ‘and the 
Organisation’ might respond to news he now wished to terminate his affiliation to 
MAC. The deaths of Alwyn Jones and George Taylor profoundly affected the ‘highly 
engaged’ Alders. Having been informed by John Jenkins ‘they probably connected 
up before testing the circuit’, thus activating the device when they ‘pressed the bell 
push’,326 Alders was appalled at their apparent ‘inexperience’. He quickly deduced 
‘there might be others like them’ who were ill-prepared and in grave danger. If 
Alders’ testimony is correct, officers might have had a third device to contend with, as 
the Pay Office at Saighton Barracks, was, Alders declared, Jenkins’ next intended
'1'yn ^98target. It is a claim dismissed by John Jenkins.
323 LDP, 15 August 1969, p.l; also, WM, 15 August 1969, p.l. Despite damage to ‘windows, doors, 
guttering and the entry point o f the cables’, the GPO claimed the ‘stations work was not affected’ by 
the blast and it remained ‘fully operational’.
324
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones. Exhibit, 145. G. W. Joaes 
initially claimed he discovered the explosion as he walked near the site during the early afternoon of 14
August. He had then notified the police, he also stated.
325 WM, 18 August 1969; also, LDP, 18 August 1969. Officers from the Shrewsbury unit were quicdy 
deployed to Chester. That Welsh nationalists were responsible for the recent attacks, was a theory ‘at 
the back’ o f their ‘minds’, they admitted. The city was targeted ‘because Prince Charles is the Earl o f  
Chester’. LDP, 14 April 1970.
326 TNA, ASSI M/511. Witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders. Exhibit 132.
327 TNA, ASSI M/511. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders. Along with preventing 
activation by placing a wire between the contact points, Alders claimed he also deliberately used lhe 
flat battery returned to him by Alwyn Jones in the St. Martin’s House action. The device vas 
discovered beneath an anorak at 6.55 a.m., by hospital porter William Blythin (57) as he walked to
work.
328 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009. One target ‘considered 
feasible’, owing to intelligence received that access to the clock tower was possible, was Big Ben. ‘It
338
The net closes in
At this juncture, Raymond Kendall attests, people began ‘to talk’. Indeed, Kendall 
maintains that immediately prior to the investiture, the Shrewsbury unit ‘received 
information that he (Jenkins) was a sergeant in the dental service in the military and 
based at a barracks near Chester’. It is however, a point questioned by John Jenkins 
and John Owen Evans. Whatever the true timing of this disclosure - and Jenkins 
remains convinced no information of the MAC offensive was ever disclosed to the 
authorities - with the considered opinion that Jenkins, if indeed involved, was likely 
undertaking the action independently, in August 1969, the investigation ‘switched 
to Wrexham’ and focused its attention on the regimental dental technician.
Following an explosion - not accredited to MAC - at Llandudno Junction in 
August, a little over a month later on 18 September, at the Dental Centre at 
Saighton Barracks, John Jenkins received a visit from two detectives. Cordially asked 
if he sympathized with Welsh extremism, Jenkins was emphatic: ‘good heavens no’, 
he exclaimed, they ‘are a menace to everyone’. Moreover, he would ‘most certainly’ 
inform the police should he receive ‘any information’ as to the identity of those 
involved in ‘extremist activities’. Asked why he was being interviewed with regard 
the matter, Jenkins was informed he was one of several persons similarly approached
 ^'IT
in the course of the enquiry’. Yet, not included in the officers’ statement at the 
National Archives, is an account of a suggestion also allegedly made to John Jenkins 
during the same encounter. In 2007, Jenkins declared he was asked to undertake a trip 
to Bargoed, where at a hotel he was known to frequent, he should ‘encourage people 
to talk about Welsh nationalism’. He was then, he was told, to ‘report back’ the 
response of revellers. Having replied he ‘might’ undertake the request on the 
condition he received a signed declaration of his instruction, Jenkins heard ‘no more 
about it’. Explaining his thoughts as to the motive of the officers, Jenkins felt certain 
the interview was ‘being recorded’. What is more, with the intention of it being
was chosen as a symbolic strike’, Jenkins added, ‘as its bell was used at the start o f the (22.00) news’.
329 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 14 December 2009.
330 WM, 21 April 1970. It did so, after police learned Alwyn Jones and George Taylor had contacts in
the Wrexham area.
331 WM, 18 August 1969. ‘It was not MAC: there was northing there o f interest to us’. Telephone 
interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 2009.
332
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Record o f interview by Det. Sgt. Christopher V. Moorcroft, dated, 18 March
1970. He was accompanied by Det. Constable. Owen. Jenkins denied knowing the identity o f the 
perpetrator o f the Chester Health Office action, or anyone involved from ‘the Wrexham/Mold area’. 
Moreover, he firmly denied being ‘in MAC’.
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played to Ian Skidmore, in the hope he might recognize his voice as that heard during
' i l lthe encounter with the enigmatic MAC in May 1968. Whatever John Jenkins’ 
suspicions, Ian Skidmore denies ever hearing a recording of the encounter.334
Following Jenkins’ police interview at Saighton Barracks, the director-general 
of MAC - convinced a full-scale search of the Dental Centre and his home was 
imminent - decided to remove the remaining stock of gelignite to another location. 
Having no reason to suspect Frederick Ernest Alders was also subject of the police 
investigation, it was decided Alders should take the supply and store it at his 
forthcoming marital home at Rhosllanerchrugog. The two cases, containing 39 sticks 
of gelignite,335 Alders placed in ‘a built in cupboard next to the fireplace’ and covered 
with strips of linoleum.
Yet, Alders’ decision to accept the stores, somewhat contradicts his later claim 
that following the Abergele explosion, he became increasingly convinced Jenkins 
‘was mad’ and deaf to reason and blind to logic.337 Alders later provided evidence for 
this assumption at his and Jenkins’ trial; when, as a key witness for the prosecution, 
he disclosed that Jenkins had suggested the militant campaign should increase in 
potency; to this end, proposing MAC purchase ‘guns and cross bows’.338 However, 
despite his acceptance that such weaponry was discussed, John Jenkins remains 
adamant that he ensured such proposals were not implemented. ‘What people don’t 
seem to understand’, Jenkins intoned in 2009, ‘is that I am a moderate sort of person 
at heart. There were people in MAC who were not moderate; and who wanted to do 
all sorts of strange things, but I vetoed them and put a stop to it’.339
It is a claim given certain credence by F. E. Alders; who asked MAC’s 
director-general - despite his apparent unease with regard Jenkins’ alleged mental 
health deterioration - to perform his duties as ‘best man’ when he married on 18 
October 1969.340 The irony of Alders’ decision to ask Jenkins, was not lost on
333 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
334
Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 23 August 2008.
335 LDP, 16 April 1970.
336 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Frederick Ernest Alders; also exhibit statement 
132. Assured by Jenkins the gelignite was ‘safe’, Alders informed officers he told his wife not to enter 
the cupboard as it ‘was full o f stuff from work’.
331 LDP, 16 April 1970.
338 LDP, 14 April 1970.
339 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 23 June 2009; also interview between WT & 
John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
340 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009.
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Jenkins’ barrister, Peter Thomas QC, who during their trial six months later, not only 
queried Alders’ paradoxical reasoning, but raised the point that he appeared intent on 
‘trying to shift as much blame as possible’ for his involvement in MAC onto 
Jenkins.341 Nevertheless, such acrimony was not evident that October Saturday, as 
both the groom and his attendant, bedecked in the same ceremonial uniform: (no.l 
dress, regimental scarlet and bearskin) appeared resplendent. It was the same 
ornamental regalia which Jenkins alleges proved instrumental in their ultimate 
detection.
By November 1969, the campaign of militant violence in Wales exhibited an 
autumnal quality; a sense that, like the decade, the end was in sight. And so it proved 
to be. Just a few days after learning from a junior dental employee that unaccountable 
footsteps were heard along the corridor of the dental offices one night,342 during the 
morning of 2 November, the Jenkins’ family Sunday was disturbed by two police 
officers. Informed a discrepancy had arisen concerning an amount of money in the 
cadet band funds, Jenkins was asked to accompany them to the station in order to get 
the issue resolved. Assured it would take ‘no more than ten minutes’, it was in fact, 
he declared ruefully in 2004, ‘ten years before I was released’.343
The events surrounding the arrest of John Jenkins have long been the cause of 
considerable conjecture in Welsh militant circles. For the most part, Jenkins’ account 
of what transpired has proved the most enduring. Throughout the intervening period, 
Jenkins has remained adamant his arrest was due to ‘an error of judgment’ on the part 
of Owain Williams. Moreover, that Williams contravened MAC’s established 
security framework, by taking along a female acquaintance to the meeting at 
Loggerheads, near Mold, on 1 March 1968. Although Williams, Jenkins concedes, 
did park some distance from the rendezvous point, his companion - in the glare of a 
passing car headlights - caught sight of the incognito Jenkins adorned in distinctive 
‘regimental rig’. Jenkins further explained the St David’s Day meeting was arranged 
between two ‘eating the leeks’ ceremonies. Consequently, he was wearing the ‘full 
uniform, including head dress’. However, following the events at Abergele, the 
female approached the authorities with news of the encounter, aware that Williams -
341 LDP, 15 April 1970.
342 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007. Jenkins realised 
only ‘someone official’ could obtain a key to gain entry. It was, he believes, a police officer checking 
store rooms for hidden explosives.
343 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004.
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her former partner - was somehow involved. The distinctive ornamental dress, added 
Jenkins, worn by just four people throughout Wales on the night of 1 March 1968, 
proved easy fodder for a coterie of detectives desperate for a breakthrough.344 Later 
asked to identify Williams’ companion, Jenkins conceded ‘it was Enys Roberts’.345 
Yet, speaking with regard the incident on numerous occasions since March 2004, 
Owain Williams remained steadfast in his utter refutation that any blame for Jenkins’ 
arrest lay at his door. The accusation, Williams angrily professed, was ‘utter rubbish; 
utter nonsense’. The former director-general of MAC was just ‘covering up for his 
own mistakes and his own naivety’, he declared. It was Ann Woodgate, Alders ex­
fiance, who provided the necessary information which led to Jenkins’ arrest and 
conviction. Jenkins, an irritated Williams continued,
chose and recruited Alders. As the senior member, he should have been far more stringent in 
‘laying down the law’ in telling Alders not to mention anything to anyone...What the hell was 
he doing allowing this person, Ann Woodgate, into his home to baby-sit for God sake? All 
that was needed was for her and Alders’ relationship to end and the potential existed for the 
floodgates to open. And what happened? Exactly that!
Owain Williams then outlined what he believed transpired. After the explosion at 
Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant, Alders boasted to Woodgate that he and Jenkins were 
responsible. Following the explosion at Abergele, an anguished Woodgate informed 
her father of her ex-fiance’s involvement in the bombing campaign. He implored her 
to notify the authorities. ‘Well, you just don’t do it’, Williams remonstrated. ‘He’s 
using me as a scapegoat. I admire and respect John Jenkins very much, but he should 
not apportion blame’. Williams knew what Jenkins was ‘insinuating’ and he resented 
it. ‘It was incompetence on his part. I made mistakes during the period’, confessed 
Williams, why did Jenkins ‘not have the grace to admit his own?’ Asked to comment 
on the degree of incriminating evidence provided by Ann Woodgate,346 John Jenkins 
pensively replied he had ‘no idea’, why she disclosed so much.347 Whatever
344
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also 20 November
2008; also, telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 August 2009.
345 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. Jenkins has also claimed Owain 
Williams’ companion was ‘in fact also named Williams’ and ‘took up’ with a detective after her and 
Williams’ relationship ended. To this detective, some sixteen months later, Jenkins maintained, she 
gave the incriminating evidence o f the encounter at Loggerheads. Like Enys Roberts, Jenkins added, 
the lady was also from Henllan. Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 
2009. Both this account and Enys Roberts’ culpability were dismissed by Owain Williams as 
‘ridiculous’. Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 28 January 2010.
346
TNA, ASS 84/577. Witness statements by Ann Woodgate, undated and 15 December 1969.
347 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009.
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Woodgate’s motives, it appears it was her information which began the escalation in 
the police inquiry, whereby Gordon Wyn Jones and others were subsequently 
approached.
Owain Williams’ ardent account is certainly supported by Raymond Kendall, 
who reacted with surprise when it was proposed the breakthrough in the inquiry came 
as a result of information received regarding the rendezvous at Loggerheads. As 
for John Owen Evans, he denied any knowledge of an ‘Enys Roberts’, but somewhat 
confusingly, believed it was Alders’ girlfriend, ‘who was both at the meeting and 
also involved’, who provided the key information. This occurred, Evans added, 
‘following the investiture’, when Jenkins ‘entered in the picture’. Having made the 
decision to ‘mark time on him and Alders’, investigating officers contacted this 
person (identified as Ann Woodgate), who subsequently notified them of Jenkins’ 
and her ex-fiance’s involvement.349 Yet, for those who share Jenkins’ assertion that 
Enys Roberts was crucial to his detection, Owain Williams also considered it 
possible that when later visited by police, Enys Roberts ‘got cold feet’ and disclosed 
certain information. Her immunity from prosecution being assured, Williams 
suggests, in return for the incriminating statements consequently provided by her 
brother and father.350 It is suppository chain of events indubitably given correlation 
by archival evidence.351
Nonetheless, of one thing Williams was in no doubt: while Enys Roberts did 
accompany him to Loggerheads, not only was it ‘physically impossible’ for her to see 
Jenkins, such was the distance between Williams, Jenkins and her, ‘she was involved 
in the campaign’ and ‘well known’ to Jenkins anyway; as was her father. For John 
Jenkins ‘to say that he was identified because of pips, or whatever else he has said, is 
ridiculous’.352 Certainly material stored at the National Archives would meet with 
Williams’ approbation. It appears the overwhelming evidence obtained to convict 
John Jenkins, came from those who - to whatever degree - were enmeshed in the
348 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 11 November 2009.
349 Telephone interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 5 July 2009. The relationship between 
Alders and his step-sister Enys Roberts, was not highlighted by police during Alders’ questioning.
Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 November 2009.
35]
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by John Griffith Roberts, dated 15 December 1969; also,
witness statement from John Richard Lewis Roberts, dated 5 December 1969.
352
Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 November 2009. Enys Roberts ‘was sat 
in the car which was about 100 yards away or something ridiculous’. She drove Williams to the 
appointment, owing to his ‘certainty’ he would be stopped by police if  driving his own car at this 
juncture.
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Welsh militant campaign. Of those who provided compelling testimony from he 
witness box were: Ann Woodgate, Frederick Ernest Alders, John R. L. Roberts - who 
admitted driving Jenkins and Alders to Llyn Vymwy to plant the device - aid 
journalist Harold Pendlebury. Yet, others also proved instrumental in establishhg 
Jenkins’ and Alders’ guilt through police witness statements. These included fomer 
TA and army colleagues: Brian Richards, John Hiscocks and George Wood; Alders’ 
step-father, John G. Roberts and the MAC activist Gordon Wyn Jones.354
Archival testimony reveals that George Wood, a junior colleague of John 
Jenkins’ in the Dental Corps, was asked by officers to identify the author of a 
discovered handwritten ‘Statement by MAC’. Having first verified an undispited 
sample of Jenkins’ handwriting, the ‘statement’, Wood confirmed, was also in 
Jenkins’ hand. Wood further informed the investigation team that in the summer of
1968, he and Jenkins travelled in Jenkins’ car to New Street railway station in 
Birmingham. En route, he was allegedly informed they were to meet ‘someone’ oTa 
train and that on no account should he mention to anyone the events about to 
transpire. Nevertheless, their journey proved ultimately unexceptional, as he
355mysterious visitor failed to disembark. John Jenkins later admitted he and Wcod 
did undertake the journey to Birmingham and that it was with the intention of meetng 
someone. As for whom, or why, Jenkins declined to comment. Yet, the fomer 
operational-director of MAC strenuously denied having implored Wood to remiin 
silent regarding subsequent events. Having asked if he could accompany him, Jenkns 
agreed, recognizing to refuse might not only seem ‘suspicious’, but that Wool’s 
presence provided a necessary ‘ballast’ should Jenkins’ reason for undertaking he 
journey ever be questioned. Strangely however, having conceded he did intend to 
meet someone, Jenkins questioned the apparent motives of the investigating tean. 
Suggesting they ‘put words in Wood’s mouth’, merely to both strengthen the ctse 
against him and to provide spurious evidence which countered the officers’ hitheto
353 LDP, 13-17 April 1970. Despite his involvement in the protest, Roberts was not prosecuted. ‘Iam 
o f the opinion that Jenkins was more o f a boss than Alders’. He would ‘simply agree when Jenkns 
spoke’. TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by John Richard Lewis Roberts, 5 December 1969.
354 TNA, ASSI 84/577; also, The Times, 11 April 1970.
355 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statement by Lance Corporal Colin George Wood, 16 Deceimer
1969. Apparently found ‘in a sideboard’ in his living room, Jenkins denies writing the ‘Statementby 
MAC’ (Exhibit JBP.9). The author referred to the ‘results of the investiture’ being ‘three dead and aie 
child maimed’. Wood identified it as written in Jenkins’ hand 6 November 1969. Jenkins also denes 
Raymond Kendall’s claim that he admitted keeping gelignite in the dental offices frid»e. 
Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 11 November 2009; also, telephone interview
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woeful investigation. Jenkins illustrated the point, by dismissing a claim by police 
sergeant George Bernard Atkinson. In a police statement, Atkinson alleged that on 
being escorted to the toilet the day following his arrest, Jenkins ruminated he would
-1 e n
‘not have been caught had it not been for informers; at least not as quickly’.
Nonetheless, within hours of his arrest on Sunday, 2 November 1969, 
Frederick Ernest Alders was questioned by police with regard a series of meetings. 
They were attended, officers believed, by John Jenkins, Owain Williams, Enys 
Roberts, Alders and a number of others embroiled - whether innocently or otherwise 
- in the campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Although somewhat initially 
reluctant to divulge information, following the discovery of the store of explosives at
-j c o
his home, Alders became more circumspect. During a police interview, John 
Jenkins was asked to throw light on the crucial meeting at Loggerheads twenty 
months earlier. He declined to comment when asked if, along with Owain Williams, 
he also met Gethin ap Iestyn and Philip Jeffries.359 Jenkins remained adamant that no 
such encounter occurred, when discussing these events some time later; declaring he 
‘would never have told two men from the south’ where he was ‘at any particular 
time’, owing to the security risk.360 Yet, further to apparent police suspicions he was 
involved in the militant campaign, ap Iestyn also declined to comment when asked if 
he attended the enigmatic meeting; adding nonetheless beguilingly, with regard the 
investigation which led to Jenkins’ conviction, ‘the police knew everything’.361 
Whatever the truth regarding the Loggerheads incident, the timing of police 
statements is intriguing. The witness statement of Det. Chief Inspector, Richard
between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009.
356 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 10 December 2009.
357 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Statement by police Sergeant George Bernard Atkinson.
358
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Statement by police Det. Chief Inspector, Richard William Evans. 16 
December 1969. Alders informed officers Jenkins met ‘two men from south Wales’ at Loggerheads. 
They were, Alders said, ‘unknown to him’. TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by
Frederick Ernest Alders.
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TNA, ASSI 84/577. Statement by police Det. Chief Inspector Richard William Evans, 16 
December 1969. Jenkins was also asked about meeting Owain Williams and Enys Roberts at Nant-y- 
Garth Pass in February 1968; being handed ‘a small package’ by Enys Roberts on Market Square in 
Wrexham ‘shortly after’; being handed a letter from her in late June 1969 at the Bull Hotel, Abergele; 
the alleged visit to the home o f John Roberts when Jenkins allegedly implored him to steal explosives 
and deliver ‘a man’ from Abergele to carry out the Mackenzie Pier action; and the alleged meeting 
days later in Roberts’ shed with Alwyn Jones and Owain Williams. Throughout, Jenkins declined to
comment.
360
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 21 January 2009.
361 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009. Owain Williams also denied that Gethin 
ap Iestyn or Philip Jeffries were present. Telephone interview between WT & Owain Willaims, 23
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William Evans, was compiled retrospectively, on 16 December 1969, a full six weeks 
after Jenkins’ and Alders’ arrest. Might it be that officers were informed of these 
meetings by Alders and others and then compiled statements to suggest progress in 
the investigation into the bombing campaign was more advanced than was truly the 
case? It is certainly a suggestion accepted by John Jenkins; who attests a number 3f  
those who gave implicating statements such as George Wood, John Hiscocks and 
indeed Gordon Wyn Jones were not called to give evidence against him during the 
trial. This is because, Jenkins maintains, their testimony would not have withstood 
the rigours of cross-examination and judicial scrutiny. It also explained, Jenkins 
added, although it is a suggestion contested by Raymond Kendall, why police 
appeared content to sweep many leads under the investigative carpet on his being 
sentenced.363
The charges are increased
Yet, prior to Jenkins and Alders standing trial, there was much work for the police :o 
do. At 22.45 on 2 November, John Jenkins and Frederick Ernest Alders were jointly 
charged with breaking and entering the magazine at Hafod quarry and stealing 
explosives.364 The following day at Ruabon Magistrates, they were remanded in 
custody.365 Four days later, they appeared before Wrexham Magistrates and were 
charged with conspiring ‘with persons unknown’ to cause various explosions in
-jz/:
Cheshire and Denbighshire between 1 January 1968 and 2 November 1969. A 
fortnight later, Jenkins and Alders appeared again before magistrates in Wrexham. 
They now faced a third charge of ‘attempting to cause an explosion at the Health 
Offices in Chester’ some three months earlier. On each occasion, applications for bail 
were denied.367 Three days after ‘hearing of Jenkins’ arrest’, Gordon Wyn Jones 
detonated MAC’s final stores of gelignite. Their activation was timed to coincide
November 2009.
362 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 11 November 2009.
363 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 21 January 2009.T.f.A
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Statement by police Det. Chief Inspector, Richard William Evans. 16 
December 1969; also, WM, 3 November 1969.
365 LDP, 4 November 1969. On the day Jenkins was arrested, 61bs o f gelignite were discovered in 
bushes near Gladestry in Radnorshire. WM, 3 November 1969. It was not to my knowledge’, stated
Jenkins, ‘to do with MAC’. Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 2009.
366 LDP, 8 November 1969. The explosions caused by ‘explosive substances and devices’, were o f a 
nature deemed ‘likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property’.
367 LDP, 22 November 1969.
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with the annual Guy Fawkes celebrations.
Six days later in Shrewsbury Prison, having been advised it was in his judicial 
interests to cooperate, John Jenkins attended a meeting with a number of individuals 
he quickly determined were from the Home Office, Special Branch, British 
Intelligence and the Diplomatic Core. Their objective: to ascertain ‘who was really 
behind MAC’. Jenkins was repeatedly asked if  when in Cyprus had he dealings with 
EOKA; or the communist Red Brigade when in Berlin. Had these, or indeed any such 
militant group, ever tried to recruit him? ‘They simply could, or would not believe, 
that MAC was an indigenous organization’, Jenkins declared indignantly. ‘There had 
to be an organization which was feeding us policy, strategy, tactics and all the rest of 
it. A Welsh militant campaign would need, these people believed’ Jenkins added, 
‘white settler officers; we’d then be alright. But on our own, the Welsh were 
incapable’. The verbal claim and counterclaim concluded, the mysterious party 
departed, ‘still unconvinced’. John Jenkins attended another meeting at this 
juncture with his probation officer. Asked if he believed he was being followed in the 
weeks before his arrest, Jenkins replied he was certain of it. Despite archival 
evidence which endorses Jenkins’ ‘gut feeling’, the MAC commander’s intractability 
served only to convince the probation officer that Jenkins was exhibiting clear
7^0patterns of delusional paranoia.
One afternoon at Risley Remand Centre, Jenkins’ contemplation was 
interrupted by Frederick Ernest Alders, who shouted from a neighbouring cell he had 
been offered ‘a deal’. Asked how he should he respond, Jenkins implored his 
quondam junior confederate to accept the plea-bargain, if it guaranteed a reduced 
sentence. He should however, Jenkins cautioned, ‘be careful’ what he said. It was a 
decision which ultimately prompted Jenkins to change his plea to guilty and conclude 
in nine days a trial expected to last weeks.
368 TNA, ASSI 84/577. Undated witness statement by Gordon Wyn Jones. Exhibit, 145. G. W. Jones 
hoped ‘the fireworks would cover the noise’. On 12 March 1970, Jones showed Det. Chief Supt. 
Clarke the location o f the blast and handed him the ‘tartan bag’ in which Jenkins allegedly delivered 
the explosives intended for the Mackenzie Pier action. The device was actually discovered in a blue
bag.
369 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, telephone interview, 20 November 
2009; also, Sir Tasker Watkins private papers, transcript o f interview, dated 11 November 1969. There 
were ‘about 20 o f them in dark suits and ties’. Refusing to believe Jenkins had no contact with another 
group, they repeated: “but you must have known or met them?”. And I said: ‘No, I never...well I 
might have met them’, I said, ‘who knows who I was meeting’. And then they said, “well did they try 
to recruit you?”. They would not believe it’.370Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 26 June 2010.
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At the commencement of the trial of John Barnard Jenkins and Frederick Ernest 
Alders at Flintshire Assizes on 9 April 1970, Jenkins pleaded not guilty to all 
nineteen charges against him. Fifteen of the charges he faced jointly with Alders. 
Having pleaded guilty to eight charges, Alders’ plea of not guilty to seven more, was 
accepted by the prosecution in exchange for his testimony. First offered by the 
prosecution was compelling forensic evidence. This included swabs from Jenkins’ 
car which tested positive for traces of nitro-glycerin; so too a hold all and various 
items of their clothing. If that were not incriminating enough, the explosives located 
in Alders’ house were traced to Saighton Camp.371 Significant evidence was then 
heard from ‘key witness’ Ann Woodgate.372
Next to give testimony against John Jenkins was Frederick Ernest Alders. 
Recognizing Alders ‘was beginning to turn Queen’s Evidence’ against him, Jenkins 
admitted he failed to anticipate ‘that most essential of all things: once people open 
their mouths to say something, the floodgates open and everything starts tumbling 
out’. In a bid to ensure further details of the campaign were not revealed - including 
the identities of those involved - Jenkins informed his council he now proposed to 
change his plea to guilty and accept all the charges against him .374 Nonetheless, 
despite John Jenkins’ assertion his endorsement of ‘the deal’ between Alders and the 
authorities at Risley Remand Centre precipitated the younger man receiving a softer 
sentence for his guilty plea, police statements suggest Alders began to divulge much 
incriminating evidence against himself and Jenkins, within just hours of their arrest, 
most notably, when he was informed of the discovery of the gelignite at his home at 
Rhosllanerchrugog. He was ‘not disappointed with Alders’ actions’, Jenkins later 
remarked benevolently. Naturally, it was with some sadness he viewed Alders’ 
decision to turn Queen’s Evidence against him, but he felt no ‘bitterness’; such ‘is the 
way of life’.
Yet why, Jenkins was asked, did he plead ‘not guilty’ initially; surely some 
indication of the compelling prosecution’s evidence was relayed to him? Having 
declared that with the proceedings imminent he ‘didn’t give a damn one way or
371
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statements by Major Clifton Melville Jeffries, 15 December 1969; 
also, undated witness statement by Frank Skuse.
372 LDP, 17 April 1970.
373 LDP, 13 April 1969. Justice Thompson informed Alders he need not give evidence and that it
would not influence the sentence o f the court should he do so.
374 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November
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another’, Jenkins nevertheless revealed he was both advised and implored to plead 
not guilty by his Defence Council, led by Peter Thomas QC. Moreover, ‘knowing 
how the state works’, as he did, he would not be surprised if his barrister had advised 
him to follow such a course of action, in order for as much information as possible 
regarding the MAC assault to emerge during trial. However, recognizing that he
*i nf .
too made ‘mistakes’ while orchestrating the MAC campaign, Jenkins 
countenanced the notion there existed a Freudian desire to be apprehended following 
a prolonged campaign; that clues are deliberately left to assist in a person’s detection. 
It was certainly a suggestion he ‘understood’, Jenkins conceded, but the need to 
continue the protest had been uppermost in his mind throughout the action, so he ‘did 
not want to get caught from that point of view; on the other hand’, Jenkins added 
reflectively, ‘the tension was pretty horrific’.377
On 21 April 1970, following Tasker Watkins QC’s summing up for the 
prosecution, in which he proclaimed MAC an organization ‘wedded to the use of 
violence’ and whose members scorned ‘the ordinary peaceful methods of achieving
970
political objectives’, John Jenkins, (37) ‘the clever, ruthless fanatic’ was sentenced 
to ten years imprisonment. Frederick Ernest Alders, (21) received six years. 
‘Wales’, declared Justice Thompson, would ‘not approve nor applaud’ what they had 
done. On the contrary, it would ‘condemn the terror’ they contrived to spread among 
its people with their ‘wicked deeds’...Wales would ‘disclaim and disown such 
methods of promoting’ its ‘interests’. Furthermore, the nation would expect Jenkins 
and Alders ‘to be punished’ for their ‘offences of the utmost gravity’ and ‘to 
discourage others who might be disposed to imitate’ them. He had no ‘desire to pass 
crushing sentences’, but nonetheless he had ‘a duty to perform’. Having recognized 
each was ‘intelligent’, of ‘hitherto good character’ and not prompted to undertake
2008; also, WM, 18 April 1970.
375 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. He did not ‘blame’ Alders, stated 
Jenkins. ‘He was very young, only 21 and just married; they’d run him ragged...In the field he was 
very good and he deserves full credit for how he conducted him self. Jenkins agreed that Peter Thomas 
QC may have received notice from senior political or judicial figures, imploring him to advise Jenkins 
to jfiead not guilty.
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2009. Within months o f  Jenkins 
trial, Peter Thomas, by now Conservative MP for Hendon South, was appointed Secretary o f  State for
Wales.
377
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also 20 November 2008.
378 LDP, 9 April 1970. Police received an anonymous telephone call that a bomb was planted in court. 
A search revealed nothing. In Ireland during the trial, Gethin ap Iestyn asked his wife Mair Griffiths to 
attend on his behalf. She reported back her disappointment that so few nationalist figures were present.
349
their action for ‘personal gain’, it was rather, Justice Thompson, added, ‘a misguided 
notion’ they were ‘patriotically promoting the interests of Wales’. Having 
recognized Alders’ testimony and apparent attempt to ‘break free of his involvement’ 
prior to his arrest, the same could not be said of Jenkins, who did ‘not appear to have
370relaxed his determination or resolve’.
Whatever the thoughts of Justice Thompson and British Judicial 
Establishment, quick to champion her husband was Thelma Jenkins. He was ‘not a 
violent man’. His only fault might be that he cared ‘too much for Wales’. She 
thought the ‘world of him’. Jenkins was ‘a kind husband and father who would not 
harm anyone’. He was ‘terribly upset when it was said he did not care if people lost 
their lives’. Approached to give her response to the verdicts, outside Flintshire
lOA
Assizes, Rowena Alders was said to be ‘too upset to talk’. Had his former wife 
known the extent of his involvement Jenkins was asked in 2004. He had, he 
explained, placated her increasing fears he ‘was having an affair somewhere’, by 
informing her he was ‘running errands’ for those involved in the campaign against
101
the investiture. Yet, this contradicts the testimony of Ann Woodgate, who not only 
informed the court she broke off her engagement to Alders ‘because of his activities 
in blowing up pipelines’, but that Jenkins had informed his wife ‘he would not dream 
of giving up’ when similarly encouraged to stop his militant activism.382
Questions remain
John Jenkins’ guilty plea to eight charges and the jury’s acceptance of not guilty on 
those out-standing, ensure a number of tantalizing questions endured. The files ‘may 
have closed’ on Jenkins and Alders, but they remained ‘open on a large number of 
Welshmen and a few women’, police believed they were within an ace of bringing to 
book. Most notably, the elusive ‘phoenix’, who media sources opined, ‘was the 
crucial link man between the shadowy figures within the Free Wales Army and the 
strong-arm group of MAC.
This apparent development in the inquiry followed Ann Woodgate’s
379 WM, 21 April 1970. Before hearing his sentence, John Jenkins was approached in his cell and asked 
if  he would accept ‘10 years’. He agreed. Moreover, Alders had been assured he would receive five 
years for his cooperation. Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
380 Ibid.
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 March 2004; also, 19 October 2007.
382 LDP, 17 April 1970; also, WM, 17 April 1970.
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condemning testimony. Specifically, her intriguing recollection that Jenkins ‘often 
received coded letters’ from ‘certain persons from south Wales’. One of whom he 
termed ‘Falcon’. Other (coded) names which Woodgate claimed to have heard 
Jenkins mention, included ‘Black Eagle’ and ‘Phoenix’.384 Asked to throw light on 
the identity of the euphemistic birds of prey and mythology, Jenkins confirmed that 
he adopted the moniker ‘Eagle’.385 As to whether the elusive ‘phoenix’ was the 
prolific letter writer from south Wales, Gethin ap Iestyn, John Jenkins refused to
-30/:
comment; as did ap Iestyn, when similarly questioned, adding the only ‘phoenix’
io n
he knew was ‘an Irish beer’. Nevertheless, ap Iestyn’s declination does not 
support documentary evidence stored at the National Archives, where - in a letter to
1QO
Owain Williams - he referred to himself as ‘phoenix’. The Shrewsbury unit 
appears to have had its suspicions who ‘phoenix’ was; certainly if the spectacle 
which greeted ap Iestyn on his release from Cardiff prison in October 1969, of squad 
members staring intently in his direction from across the road is any indication.389 
Yet, it should be noted that despite the initial confidence of the press, that further 
arrests were imminent, no other person has ever stood trial, let alone been convicted, 
for their involvement in the MAC offensive.
However, the extent of the authorities’ belief that Jenkins and Alders did not 
act alone, was highlighted just a fortnight into Jenkins’ sentence, when as a Category 
A prisoner, he was assured the status of solitary confinement would be lifted if ‘he 
gave just one name which implicated the involvement of another’ in the MAC 
campaign.390 John Jenkins remained intransigent. It was a standpoint earlier outlined
LDP, 21 April 1970; also, The Times, 21 April 1970.
TNA, ASSI 84/577. Witness statements by Ann Woodgate, dated 15 December 1969; also, LDP, 
14 April 1970.385
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also, 20 November 2008.
386 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 21 January 2009.
387
Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009.
388
TNA, DPP 2/4471. Correspondence from Gethin ap Iestyn to Owain Williams, 28 November 1967. 
The letter was discovered by officers at the home o f  Owain Williams following the Snowdonia Country 
Club action in January 1968. The letter was removed from file DPP 2/4471, when viewed by WT in 
April 2010. A stamp, clearly placed on top o f other stamps, also claimed the file was closed until 2009.
Yet, it was viewed by WT in December 2008.
389 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009. G. ap Iestyn was ‘surprised’ and alarmed 
‘to see members o f the Shrewsbury Squad staring’ at him. He had earlier refused to answer questions 
regarding the bombing campaign, when visited in prison by members o f the unit. Despite expecting ‘a 
hand’ on his ‘shoulder at any moment’ as he walked away, it did not come. Having lived on Anglesey 
prior to his arrest, on his release, Gethin ap Iestyn went to live in Eire.
390
Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 October 2007. ‘Just give us one name’ Jenkins was 
urged and the Category A status would be lifted. The officers were probably ‘getting castigated’ for
351
by Peter Thomas QC, when the barrister summed up the case for the defence at 
Jenkins’ trial. His client did ‘not intend to disclose the identity of others involved’, 
Thomas declared. To do so, Jenkins had told him, ‘would be contemptuous’.391
Despite facing a lengthy prison term, Jenkins’ trepidation for what lay ahead 
was tempered with knowledge he had survived. ‘I was grateful I suppose’, he 
candidly confessed in 2009. ‘I had been involved in quite a number of incidents and 
under the law of averages, I didn’t have much longer to go. So I was relieved in one 
sense to be out of the firing line; so I wasn’t too upset’. However, had six-and-half 
years in solitary confinement taken an emotional toll? Given ‘some of the characters 
in prison’, Jenkins replied, ‘it’s not such a bad idea at all’. Yet, more seriously, his 
‘belief and ‘faith’ in the cause he had directed, ‘reduced the damaging impact’. 
Also, the degree of support he received in the form of cards and letters from ‘the 
outside’ and the extent to which this ensured prison officers were warily cautious in 
not subjecting him to the same ‘regime as other inmates’. All contrived to make the 
passage of time that bit more bearable.
Did he nonetheless harbour any regrets? ‘I have great regrets that two men 
were killed and a little boy injured’, Jenkins replied intently, ‘but apart from that no.
I think from now on, they will not take us for granted’.393 Yet, parallel to Jenkins’ 
intelligible feelings of relief, David Walters, earlier fined for undertaking protest 
action at the Tryweryn reservoir site, ‘was shocked’ at the length of Jenkins’ 
sentence. He ‘didn’t think he’d get ten years’. Rather, a lesser custodial term would 
be handed down, borne of fear a more substantial period might ‘make a martyr’ of 
MAC’s operational-director. It was ‘a threat and a warning to others’, Walters 
believed, and ‘with the investiture over they could afford to do it’.394 It may also 
have reflected the authorities’ realisation that contrary to earlier fears, there existed 
no extensive clandestine movement to retaliate their leaders’ imprisonment.
Nevertheless, by looking more closely at the situation following the
their inability to unmask another MAC activist, he stated. Having rejected the proposal, Jenkins 
thought ‘we’ve won; they can’t get anybody else’.
391 WM, 21 April 1970.
392 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also 20 November 2008. Prison officers 
were aware political prisoners ‘could get back at them in a way criminal prisoners could not’. This was 
highlighted when irritated at one warden who ‘bawled’ at him, Jenkins spoke to the governor stating 
his fears he might - ‘owing to the pressure’ he was under - inadvertently mention it to a contact on the 
outside. The officer apologised and the ‘disdain’ not repeated. Jenkins also undertook an OU degree.
393
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009.394
Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
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sentencing of John Jenkins and Frederick Ernest Alders, a far from manifest picture 
emerges. The two former MAC activists were only convicted on three accounts - and 
all of their own admission - of causing explosions at: Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant, 
Llyn Vymwy and at Hapsford, in Cheshire. They furthermore pleaded guilty to 
procuring and counselling persons unknown, to attack with explosives the Llanishen 
Tax Office and with supplying the explosive material used, unsuccessfully, to target 
the Mackenzie Pier at Holyhead. The remaining charges, regarded the Hafod Colliery 
break in and the all-encapsulating one of conspiring to cause explosions between 
January 1966 and November 1969. So who was responsible for sabotaging the 
Clywedog reservoir site in March 1966? Who carried out the explosions in Cardiff: at 
the Llanishen Tax Office, the Welsh Office, Police Headquarters, the Central 
Electricity Board Offices and Postal Sorting Office? Moreover, along with the device 
which activated in Abergele, who planted the three others which comprised the 
investiture day action? These and other questions, such as, who was behind the West 
Hagley pipeline blast and the extent of a number of individuals’ true involvement, 
will perhaps never be answered.
Luck and good fortune played their part
Nonetheless, for all Jenkins’ understandable - if misplaced - confidence that no one, 
whether enmeshed within the movement or on its periphery, divulged information 
which led to his arrest, luck and good fortune certainly appear to have favoured the 
MAC leader; a feature which proved instrumental in the campaign continuing for so 
long. Of one thing there is little doubt: Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru was effectively led 
by the charismatic John Jenkins. Under his direction, the movement’s cogence 
magnified and blossomed. A Sergeant in the British Army, Jenkins was well hidden 
for some considerable time; partly because the authorities appeared disinclined to 
countenance the view that a member of Her Majesty’s forces would orchestrate such a
OQC
campaign of violence against the British State. It is a mistake unlikely ever to be 
repeated. Yet, with the admitted luxury of 40 years hindsight, by focusing on a 
number of avenues and potential breakthroughs, it is possible to deduce that the 
knowledge and information which could have led to Jenkins’ detection was indeed
395 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 23 November 2009. ‘John Jenkins was 
protected to some considerable degree because o f where he was. Had he not been in the army, I 
wonder whether he would have lasted as long’. Also: ‘They won’t make the same mistake again’.
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available. For instance: in the early spring of 1965, John Jenkins submitted a written 
request to the War Office to be posted to a camp either in, or within proximity to 
Wales. His reason for doing so, he frankly disclosed, was in order for his son to 
receive his secondary education through the medium of Welsh. With John Jenkins 
apparently alive to the possibility, surely the authorities were also aware that such a 
decision for wanting to return indicated Jenkins’ cultural allegiance? Furthermore, 
Jenkins’ re-structuring and evaluation process of MAC’s capabilities, prior to his 
undertaking the Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant action in September 1967, took some 
twelve months. Mercifully from Jenkins’ perspective, none of those he approached 
informed the authorities.
Just ten days after joining the Territorial Army, Alders and other members of 
the Drum Corps took a trip to Rhyl. Whilst en route, ‘four or five’ passengers on the 
bus engaged in a discussion regarding Welsh nationalism, during which. Jenkins 
allegedly remarked that ‘time bombs’ were ‘the means by which most propaganda 
could be achieved’. If such a disclosure in itself reveals little, TA member Brian 
Richards was aware two days before the Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant action, that 
Jenkins had approached Alders in the All Ranks mess, proposing both he and Richards 
involve themselves in an unspecified, but imminent militant strike.
Two months later, immediately following the explosion at the Temple of 
Peace, Cledwyn Hughes proffered the suggestion that those responsible appeared ‘to 
be a small group with expert (perhaps ex-Army) knowledge of bombs’. Such 
supposition surely ensured the ‘Army factor’ entered the equation? Hughes’ earlier 
speculation might have set alarm bells ringing, when following the explosion at 
Penisaurwaun in January 1968, officers on Anglesey were informed by John Gwilym 
Jones, that a raid with help ‘on the inside’ was to be carried out at Saighton Barracks 
in Cheshire, in order to procure arms for the impending militant struggle. Stationed at 
Saighton Barracks at this juncture was John Jenkins. It appears inconceivable that this 
degree of specific information - some 80 miles from Anglesey - was not acted upon. 
At the very least a study of personnel employed at the Barracks and any nationalist 
sympathies they may hold - openly or otherwise - might have been established.
Nevertheless, of arguably primary significance to the police inquiry, was the 
disclosure jointly reached by Ian Skidmore and Harold Pendlebury. Following their
Anonymous interview between WT & retired senior police officer, December 2000.
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conference with the elusive MAC in May 1968, the two journalists informed officers 
that the mysterious spokesman appeared ‘used to instructing others’, a person with ‘a 
military bearing...perhaps an ex-squaddie’. Three months later, John Jenkins was 
accompanied to Birmingham New Street Station by Colin George Wood, a junior 
member of the Dental Corps. En route, Jenkins allegedly implored Wood ‘not to 
mention to anybody else’ any events which may transpire. If indeed a true reflection 
of Jenkins’ behaviour, considering the political climate, did Wood not at least consider 
something underhand might be afoot?
In December 1968, a MAC active unit successfully targeted the Cwm Elan to 
Birmingham water pipeline at West Hagley, near Stourbridge. Press coverage of the 
incident reported an account that ‘a grey or green minivan’ was parked near the scene 
of the explosion just hours before. Surely a comprehensive investigation of all such 
registered vehicles in the UK, would have identified one such grey model in the name 
of a Frederick Ernest Alders. Moreover, it further suggests the operation was in fact 
undertaken by Jenkins and Alders and there was no MAC mid-Wales active unit. Or 
more charitably - and contrary to John Jenkins’ assertion of responsibility - if there 
was an operational unit in the area, it was not responsible for the Stourbridge action. 
Information such as that outlined, when received in isolation, reveals comparatively 
little. Yet, when collated and evaluated a profile emerges. Had this information been 
cross-referenced - admittedly at a juncture when the process relied on a timely and 
complex manual card system - a clear identifiable pattern may have resulted. As 
such, it is perhaps likely that John Jenkins would have come to the attention of 
investigating officers, some considerable time sooner.
However, this appears not the only example that the Gods were smiling on 
John Jenkins. How might matters have changed had John Hiscocks, the ad hoc MAC 
operative, contacted the authorities with his revelations or suspicions, following his 
recruitment and utilization with regard the Llanishen Tax Office action? Or indeed if 
others had approached the authorities, such as John Roberts - both senior and junior; 
not forgetting Enys Roberts, Ann Woodgate, Thelma Jenkins, and conceivably, others 
besides.
Fortuity certainly appears to have featured prominently in the campaign of 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Or perhaps not. John Jenkins used his finely honed 
intellectual charms to inveigle his way into the confidence of would-be MAC 
subordinates. Presumably through intellectual reasoning, Jenkins possessed an
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uncanny ability to gain the trust of these potential apostles. Yet, might the threat of 
‘sanctions’ have also proved instrumental in ensuring that only after his arrest was 
information received en masse? Whatever the truth, other questions remain 
unanswered also. How involved in the militant campaign was journalist Emyr Jones; 
so too the ‘sleeper’ who placed a rubber band between the Hafod Quarry’s alarm 
circuit’s contact points, thus preventing its activation when broken into by Jenkins 
and Alders in January 1968?
The campaign’s conclusion receives a mixed response
Asked for his thoughts on the bombing campaign orchestrated by John Jenkins, 
Patriotic Front figure Toni Lewis declared it ‘wonderful’. Furthermore, he remained 
throughout, completely in the dark as to Jenkins’ identity.396 Nonetheless, if  some 
raised a toast in honour of MAC’s brilliant strategist for having fought and 
coordinated a dogged and to many an inspired insurgence, others heaved a collective 
sigh of relief the campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru had reached its 
‘ignominious’ end. Of such mind is Raymond Kendall. ‘He had no remorse 
whatsoever’, Kendall declared, when later recalling Jenkins’ steadfast refusal to both 
assist the inquiry or explain his actions. To Kendall - and all those who applaud his 
pronouncement - ‘it indicated the kind of dangerous individual Jenkins represented. 
Who knows’, he added portentously, ‘what he might have gone on to do had he not 
been stopped’.397
Yet, with John Jenkins behind bars, the dissident remnants of MAC, bereft of 
leadership, apparently ignorant of know-how and fearful of arrest, lost it would seem 
the stomach to continue. Since his release from prison in August 1976, John Jenkins - 
in line with his earlier conduct - has refused to implicate any other person involved in 
the campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. As for Frederick Ernest Alders, Jenkins 
has neither spoken to, nor seen him, since the day they were sentenced.
396
Interview between WT & Toni Lewis, 20 May 2004.
397 Correspondence between WT & Raymond Kendall, 11 November 2009.
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Conclusion
[Wales] is not a beautiful young girl after whom I lust, or an old Duchess whose 
money and status I desire; she is old, well past her best, decrepit, boo2y, and has 
taken strange bedfellows without the saving grace o f desperation... She has given 
nothing to me, in fact by denying her I could be better myself... [Yet] I owe her my 
love and my loyalty, she is my mother. She may be a liability, but is the sort of  
liability that a crippled child is in the eyes o f its parents. If I ignore her in her hour of  
need, no one will ever know or condemn, except myself, and I have the sort of  
conscience that stops functioning the moment I stop breathing.1
So wrote John Jenkins from H.M. Prison, Wormwood Scrubs, one year into his ten 
year prison term. Yet, if as Byron declared: ‘it is in solitude, we are least alone’, what 
- if  anything - can be gleaned from Jenkins’ plaintive poignancy? And crucially, with 
the former director-general of MAC behind bars and the campaign of so-called ‘direct 
action’ at an end, how many in Wales shared Jenkins’ defiance and assured 
reasoning? How pivotal to the rise of militancy was the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn? 
Might ‘direct action’ have been avoided, had the Plaid Cymru hierarchy adopted a 
more acicular stance, when first faced with the judicial process to drown the valley, or 
indeed, ten years later, when the British state responded to the rise of political 
nationalism, by staging the royal investiture, with all the Ruritanian grandeur it could 
muster? What is the political and historical legacy of the MAC campaign? Was it 
really ‘the revolution which fainted at the sight of blood’?2 These are just a number 
of questions which require attention if a full appraisal of the militant campaign which 
rocked Wales between 1963 and 1969 is to be made.
The causes of militancy
The decision to flood Cwm Tryweryn is one of the significant milestones in the 
development of the Welsh nation. It crystallized cultural attachments and revealed 
national anguish. Nowhere in the nation’s recent history was its vulnerability in 
political, linguistic and cultural terms more exposed. The ‘battle’ to save Tryweryn,
provided the symbolic focus for the genesis of more populist programme of
2
nationalist action; becoming, for many, the starting point on the journey to self­
1 John Jenkins, Prison Letters (Talybont, 1981), p.25. Undated letter to Audrey White; also, Planet
(5/6 Summer, 1971).
2
Telephone interview between WT & Ian Skidmore, 20 August 2008. The sentiment was expressed 
by John Charges o f  The Times to Ian Skidmore following John Jenkins being sentenced.
3
David L. Adamson, Class Ideology and Nation (Cardiff, 1991) p. 126. Parliament fo r  Wales
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determination.4 Its political impact on the lives of those who later played a prominent 
role in nationalist politics is well documented;5 if not universally endorsed.6 It was 
also a central influence on those who led and carried out the militant campaign.
Yet, if Tryweryn was ‘a gift to Welsh nationalism’, as Patrick Hannan alleged 
in 2006, before adding, ‘which has always been crowded with prospectors panning for 
nuggets of English oppression’,7 so too was the former Secretary of State for Wales, 
George Thomas, whose invective antipathy towards all things nationalist throughout
o
his period in office descended to the farce of a McCarthy ‘witch hunt’. Nevertheless, 
for those on the militant wing of the nationalist movement, it is the political direction 
upon which Plaid Cymru embarked under Gwynfor Evans’ presidency, which 
requires most comment. The party leader’s re-moulding of Plaid Cymru, they 
believe, rendered it little more than an ersatz English Labour party. This was a
Campaign, p. 170. The growth o f nationalist sentiment in Wales and Scotland, compelled Harold 
Wilson to set up on 29 October 1968, the Crowther Commission. Following the death of its first 
chairman, it was renamed the Kilbrandon Commission after the next incumbent. The Scottish Liberal 
peer was a lifelong advocate o f ‘Home Rule’. The Commission eventually returned its findings in 
support o f devolving government to Britain’s ‘historic nationalities’ in September 1973. This led to 
the referendum in Wales on 1 March 1979. The proposed modicum o f devolved administration was 
rejected 4-1.
4 BBC Radio 4, The Lake That Stirred Nationalism. Broadcast, 19 October 2005. Owain Williams 
believed it was ‘the turning point in the battle for Wales to gain self-respect as a nation’. It ‘re-kindled 
a national awakening’.
5 Western Mail, 14 June 2006. The drowning of Cwm Tryweryn is seen as the key event in the 
politicisation o f former Plaid Cymru President Dafydd Wigley. So too, the Plaid Cymru MP for 
Meirionydd Nant Conwy, Elfyn Llwyd. He recalled his late father taking him to the condemned site 
during the destruction o f the village o f Capel Celyn, remembering ‘how visibly upset’ he was and 
thereafter imploring his son ‘never to forget that shameful episode. Like many people in Wales’, 
Llwyd had ‘never forgotten’. WM, 21 June 2006.
6 WM, 14 June 2006. Lord Dafydd Elis-Thomas’s attitude to the flooding o f Cwm Tryweryn is more 
circumspect and in particular, its place in the development of Plaid Cymru. Apparently, so stated 
Patrick Hannan: ‘snorting with impatience at the suggestion a political party can be constructed on a 
series o f complaints and resentments’. Moreover, ‘he is’, continued Hannan, ‘caustically 
unsympathetic to the refrain in some strands o f nationalist politics, that the Welsh have been in some 
way the victims o f the English down the ages and continue to be so. The idea that most o f the 
problems of Wales stem from gleeful English malevolence, Hannan concluded, ‘is something he seems 
to regard as juvenile folly’.
7
WM, 14 June 2006. On 19 October 2005, Liverpool City Council released a statement in which 
having realised ‘the hurt...when the Tryweryn Valley was transformed into a reservoir to help meet 
the water needs o f Liverpool’...it apologised ‘for any insensitivity by our predecessor council at that 
time’. Crucially for many, it did not apologise for actually drowning the valley.
8 Taith y r  laiih, Bont Production. Screened S4C, 4 October 2008. George Thomas was a virulent 
opponent of nationalism, the very pronunciation of which he delivered with all the disdain he could 
muster. Nonetheless, speaking shortly before his death in 1997, with regard Prince Charles’s eight 
week period at Aberystwyth University, Thomas remarked he was ‘unhappy about it’. The decision he 
also felt was ‘unwise’, ‘a bit patronizing to Wales and unnecessarily provocative’. Thomas, M r 
Speaker (London, 1985), p.118. John Jenkins was later conciliatory when considering George 
Thomas’s 1960s ‘centralist’ assessment o f Welsh nationalism. ‘He did after all’, state Jenkins, ‘have to 
secure his power base’. Interview with WT, 19 October 2007.
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synthetic, chameleonic, ‘all things to all people’ view of nationalism, undertaken in a 
desperate bid to attract the political mainstream. In so doing, Plaid Cymru regressed. 
It became a substitute, a dilution and mere understudy to that which might be 
achieved by adopting a more aggressive, less constitutional approach.
However, in particular, it is the perceived conception of Gwynfor Evans’ and 
the Plaid Cymru hierarchy’s toothless appeasement over the Tryweryn issue and its 
nebulous opposition to the Royal Investiture, which sticks most in the militant 
nationalist’s craw. It is this ‘failure’, which they consider instrumental in ensuring 
that gelignite became an all too familiar presence upon the geopolitical landscape of 
Wales.9 And it should be noted, that since the campaign of so-called ‘direct action’ 
ended in 1969, while a small number of Welsh valleys have been flooded, none have 
involved the ‘drowning’ of a community.10
The impact of militancy
The former Welsh militant community (which the Free Wales Army can fit within to 
some degree) is an interesting phenomenon. It comprised a disparate group of men 
and women, of different ages, from various educational and socio-economic 
backgrounds, who against their natural instincts as parents and in many cases as 
respected members of Welsh community life, collectively regarded themselves to be 
in conflict with the British state; and a central government, it considered indifferent, 
if  not hostile, to Welsh cultural identity and interests.
Remarkably however, seemingly at a loss as to why these people had taken up 
arms, ‘police’, John Jenkins later alleged, claimed he exercised ‘a certain control 
over insubordinate MAC cell members’. Namely, they were either afraid of him, or 
they ‘were engaged in homosexual activity’ which provided Jenkins a position of 
‘compromise’. ‘They just could not grasp’, exclaimed an exasperated Jenkins, ‘that 
it was purely an intellectual meeting of minds. The authorities had to assume there 
existed an unsavoury motive or element’.11
It is an interesting point, because MAC was not the amalgam of society’s
9 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
10 Interview between WT & John Davies, 28 March 2011. ‘The reservoir at Llys-y-fran was completed 
in 1972 and those at Brianne and Alaw in 1973. They had been planned before 1969, but that at Brenig 
was not planned until 1972’.
11 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. ‘They would not accept’ Jenkins 
remarked witheringly, ‘that the movement comprised men, who, with considered foresight, had 
embroiled themselves for reasons o f principle’.
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neglected cast offs and John Jenkins not the Mephistophelean guru expected by the 
authorities. On the contrary, Jenkins was intelligent, articulate and a brushed, 
polished and highly respected member of Her Majesty’s forces, and as such - despite
1 9later denials - apparently ‘above suspicion’. It is a degree of ‘protection’ not likely 
to be repeated. Following Jenkins’ imprisonment, ‘all’ became considered a possible 
suspect: no one it seems, irrespective of age, gender or social status, deemed beyond 
reproach. Merely the espousing of nationalist sympathies proved enough to warrant
i 'i
the diligent attention of Special Branch.
Writing some 20 months into his period of incarceration, John Jenkins 
considered his ‘greatest achievement’ not to be the £7 million estimated cost to the 
state of the MAC campaign, nor indeed that only two MAC cells were ‘destroyed: one 
by accident and one by betrayal’, but that only the intervention of an informant had 
resulted in his apprehension and - more importantly - that ‘the complete system of 
safe houses, dumps, dead letter boxes, active supporters and sleeping sympathizers 
had escaped detection’. It was not therefore ‘a matter of waiting for Arthur to wake’, 
Jenkins added portentously, but rather the reactivation of an existing machine which 
had already proved its worth ‘under fire’.14 It is all the more startling, in view of the 
somewhat established fact that a number of those involved in the campaign of MAC, 
later played a prominent role in the second home arson protest, as predominantly 
undertaken by Meibion GlynDwr.15
One thing which is clear, is that the MAC campaign was not fuelled by
12 Interview between WT & Owain Williams, 10 April 2009.
13 Anonymous interview with WT, December 2000. It was a lesson put into dramatic effect some ten 
years later when on Palm Sunday, 1980, sweeping arrests were made during what became known as 
Operation Tan: the search for the Meibion GlynDwr arsonists. The arson protest, during which over 
200 homes and business across Wales and England were targeted, began 13 December 1979 and is 
thought to have ended in 1992. It was principally undertaken to draw attention to the fact there existed 
in Wales some 30,000 second-homes and a council-house waiting list o f over 50,000. John Osmond, 
Police Conspiracy? (Talybont, 1984), pp.37,40; also, John Humphries, Freedom Fighters (Cardiff,
2008), p. 160.
14 Jenkins, Prison Letters, p.41.
15 John Osmond, Police Conspiracy? (Talybont, 1984), pp.37-41. Despite an earlier pronouncement 
that he had ‘played his part and on his release he should be ‘be put out to graze’, during an interview 
with BBC Nationwide, broadcast 12 March 1980, John Jenkins outlined the aims and determination o f  
those undertaking the holiday homes arson protest. A transcribe of the interview later proved crucial 
during the 1983 Explosives Trial, involving alleged members of the Workers’ Army of the Welsh 
Republic, where the prosecution case wrested upon the belief the bombing campaign against political 
targets - ie, Conservative party offices and the home of Nicholas Edwards, the Conservative Secretary 
of State for Wales - was inextricably linked with the holiday-home arson campaign. So much so, that 
the same people were involved. A written statement, handed to a BBC journalist with regard the arson 
campaign, was signed Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru; which he was informed, ‘was one o f the two main 
groups’ responsible.
360
bravura. It was a sophisticated, considered action. The authorities suffered at the 
hands of Jenkins. The British State and its security network emerged from the fight 
bloodied and exposed as hopelessly ill-equipped to meet a dogged, determined and 
intelligent opponent. Lessons were quickly learned. Such is the technological 
advance currently enjoyed by the police and security services, it is questionable 
whether in this age of ‘prevent thinking’ and 28 day detention of suspects under anti­
terrorist legislation, if  a similar campaign of direct action would ever be so sustained.
Throughout the three-and-a-half year offensive, John Jenkins believes ‘support 
for MAC throughout Wales was 50/50’, although predominantly acquiescent in 
nature.16 To Jenkins’ credit, the MAC bombing campaign did unite, to some degree, 
those from different political and cultural backgrounds. The bombers were seen by 
some - rightly or wrongly - as ‘standing up for Wales’. This appears to have created, 
Jenkins claimed, a certain degree of pride and unity throughout the nation, which, 
former militants allege, manifested itself in electoral endorsement for the nationalist 
political agenda, via support for Plaid Cymru.
By consulting the election results for the period, it is apparent that Plaid 
Cymru’s share of the vote certainly did increase: from 61,071 (4.3%) at the 1966 
General Election, 17 to 175,016 (11.5%) at the 1970 General Election.18 This rise was 
partly because the Labour Party’s vote in Wales was affected by its mishandling of 
the Aberfan financial settlement issue and the tip clearance controversy. 
Subsequently, when the more acute memories of the Aberfan disaster began to fade, 
the Labour Party’s electoral fortunes in Wales were revived. However, why Plaid 
Cymru ‘broke through’ the central party’s hegemony in Wales at this juncture is far 
more complex; and it should also be noted that support for the party was already 
falling in the months before the militant campaign ended.19 While militant activism 
was arguably a factor in Plaid Cymru’s electoral success - in that it propagated a 
sense of Welshness - it was not central to its advance and indeed, may well have
16 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
17 Beti Jones, Welsh Elections 1885-1997 (Talybont, 1999), p .l 11.
18 Ibid, p .115; also, Dafydd Williams, The Story o f  Plaid Cymru (Aberystwyth, 1990), p.27. The 1970 
General Election, held 18 June, saw Plaid Cymru contest every Welsh seat for the first time. It remains 
the highest vote the party has received. For a brilliant synopsis o f the MAC offensive, as written by 
John Jenkins, including its effect on Welsh ‘voting patterns’, see: Cambria, January/February 2009.
19 K. O. Morgan, The P eople’s Peace: British History Since 1945 (Oxford, 1999), pp.288,289. ‘As in 
Scotland, there were signs in 1969 that Plaid Cymru was passing its peak and that the Welsh Language 
Society - through its strident, aggressive campaign - was annoying more people than it was converting 
to its cause’.
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proved a double edged sword. For example, Gwynfor Evans believed the explosion 
at RAF Pembrey alone cost him between 1,000 -  2,000 votes.20 Rather, Plaid Cymru 
profited from disillusionment with the Labour Party’s economic record; frustration 
for which saw it lose votes across the UK. Moreover, the 1970 General Election saw 
Plaid Cymru contest all 36 constituency seats in Wales; surely this alone ensured an 
overall increase in the party vote. Nonetheless, while the militant ‘threat’ placed 
Plaid Cymru in a difficult constitutional position, it necessitated a serious reaction to 
its presence within the wider British political system; placing Welsh nationalism on 
the agenda and the newsstands from Knighton to Knightsbridge.
The episodic three-year-long MAC campaign against the British state attracted 
polemic comment: being vilified as craven by many and yet considered quixotic by 
others. For those in Wales prepared to countenance that type of action, John Jenkins 
is the forgotten Godfather of Welsh dissidence, passed by and ignored on the wayside 
of mainstream historical analysis, which appears content to see the episode swept 
forever beneath the carpet of unionist disharmony. Furthermore, for those 
sympathetic, Jenkins remains the litmus test of Welsh republican and historic virtue, a 
potent symbol of Welsh militant capability, built upon guile and cunning, against 
overwhelming military and financial odds. Yet, it must be acknowledged that at no 
time, either prior to, or following Jenkins’ arrest and imprisonment, did the green 
shoots of armed insurrection against the British state materialize, while latterly, many 
are unaware of either John Jenkins or the campaign of violence he effectively led.
Crucially, even within the nationalist community, support for John Jenkins and 
MAC was far from universal, either during its conflict period, or immediately 
following Jenkins’ detention. Writing in the Welsh Nation, Plaid Cymru’s English- 
language monthly magazine throughout the spring of 1973, R. C. Kennard and W. S. 
Parry questioned the efficacy of MAC’s policy of ‘direct action’. Moreover, Parry 
censoriously denounced Jenkins as ‘a mad anarchist’, who had been afforded the 
opportunity to moralize owing to his incarceration. If that were not clear enough, 
Jenkins’ directorship of MAC, Parry averred, had ‘failed in its bid for public support’. 
A rebuke by John Jenkins was not long in coming. He challenged W. S. Parry’s 
failure to understand and appreciate ‘the objectives of the exercise’, and - having not 
been personally involved in the militant action - to adequately ‘query the tactics,
20 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003.
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strategy or the results of the campaign’.21 However, despite any harboured sense of 
frustration with Plaid Cymru’s constitutional sensibilities, or irritation with the party’s
99Welsh Nation, or indeed, his increasing leanings towards socialism, John Jenkins 
remained ever the pragmatist. In 1974, he declined the approach made to him by the 
republican group Mudiad Gwerin Cymru, to stand as its candidate in either 
Caerphilly, or Brecon and Radnor at the forthcoming General Election. To do so, 
Jenkins recognized, would split the nationalist vote to the detriment of either group’s
9-7
electoral chances, most notably, he realised, Plaid Cymru.
Yet, why have no populated valleys in Wales been drowned since Jenkins was 
imprisoned in April 1970? The inspectors report, published eight months later, 
rejected the proposal of the River Severn Authority to construct a reservoir in Cwm 
Dulais near Llanidloes, on the grounds that the case in favour of doing so had ‘not 
been justified against all alternatives’. It further cited ‘the consequences for 
agriculture and particularly the community’ which comprised 300, as instrumental in 
its failure.24 Finally, it appeared that the intangible qualities of a living community 
had been considered and valued. Yet, how much more susceptible and appreciative of 
these factors were the authorities as a consequence of the campaign of Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru and the threat posed by militant nationalism? Did any such 
correlation exist? Of no doubt that protest did prove crucial is Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 
who remarked in 2003, that he ‘definitely’ believed ‘further sites would have been
9 Sflooded had a stand not been taken at Tryweryn’. Not unsurprisingly, it is a 
sentiment echoed by John Jenkins and others at the vanguard of the militant
9 f \struggle. John Jenkins wrote from Wormwood Scrubs, that the ‘tender approach’ of
21 Jenkins, Prison Letters, p.64. Letter to Raymond Edwards, 3 April 1973.
22 Ibid, p. 115. Letter to Robat Gruffudd, 1 May 1975. Jenkins hoped to create an egalitarian Wales,
devoid of the rigid social class distinction he deemed prevalent in English society.
23 Ibid, pp, 102,105. Letter to Sara Erskine and Ned Thomas, 26 August 1974; also letter to Raymond 
and Kitty Edwards, 12 September 1974. The General Election was held 10 October 1974.
24 The Times, 2 December 1970; also, The Times, 4 March 1971. It was noted that the Cwm Dulais 
Defence Committee based its case on the assurance given in 1966 by Secretary of State for Wales 
Cledwyn Hughes, that he would not authorize the development o f sites which involved the drowning of 
villages, the disruption o f entire communities or the use o f first class land. Following a campaign o f  
disruption and non-access to surveyors by residents o f  Cwm Senni in Breconshire, the Usk River 
Authority announced in 1971 its intention to locate an alternative reservoir site. It was hoped the
establishing o f the Welsh Water Authority in 1974 would address many o f the issues.
25 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 13 September 2003. ‘The drowning o f Tryweryn 
and the resulting bombing campaign, threatened the very stability o f the Welsh nation’, declared Jones.
26 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also between WT & Owain Williams, 23 
March 2004. Jenkins nonetheless questioned the wisdom o f ‘handing oneself over to the authorities’ in 
order to maintain ‘the moral high ground’. A philosophy he believed endorsed by Emyr Llywelyn
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the Severn River Authority to submerge Cwm Dulais, was not owing to ‘the leaders
of Plaid Cymru and the deacons singing hymns in the streets of Liverpool’, but
~)1because ‘force is to diplomacy what bullion is to banknotes’.
By way of explanation, MAC’s former director of operational policy, 
considered the movement for Independence for India, in the immediate pre and post­
war period. ‘Gandhi’s pacifism’, declared Jenkins,
could and only did  succeed, because Nehru’s more militant campaign was running parallel 
with it...both systems appeared diametrically opposed to one another, yet each worked 
tangentially...and the authorities knew this...one campaign could not have succeeded without 
the other. They lived and needed each other; and they could do it in the same way that Plaid 
Cymru and MAC could have lived together; except Plaid Cymru would not entertain the idea, 
because the party did not know what politics and power was all about.28 
John Jenkins is not alone in believing that Plaid Cymru failed to appreciate the 
importance of Nehru and Gandhi’s two pronged approach and ‘implied threat’; 
Owain Williams also feels much might have been achieved had Gwynfor Evans 
recognized the ‘golden opportunity’ of uniting the constitutional and non­
constitutional wings of the nationalist movement. Furthermore - and to add insult to 
injury - the ‘crachach cultural nationalists’, declared Williams, had since been 
‘beatified for doing nothing’. He ‘truly’ felt Plaid Cymru would not today enjoy the 
position of comparative electoral success were it not for the actions of the former 
militant community. What is more, Gwynfor Evans’ success at the Carmarthen by- 
election in 1966, would not have occurred ‘without the threat posed by direct action’, 
opined Williams; and moreover, he added, Evans ‘knew it’.29
Yet, for all John Jenkins’ and Owain Williams’ enticing condemnation of 
Plaid Cymru, it was not the party leadership’s constitutional adherence which flooded 
Cwm Tryweryn. The valley and the village of Capel Celyn were submerged by
Jones.
27 Jenkins, Prison Letters, p.27.
28 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007. ‘Wales is not India and what might work
there would not work here and it’s as simple as that... the decision in prison o f Emyr Llywelyn Jones to
adopt the pacifist policies o f Gandhi was a cop out...Had Plaid Cymru known what politics and power
was’, added Jenkins, ‘if it was a political party in the accepted sense o f the word, in 1979 when its
policies failed miserably and utterly, heads would have rolled. How many heads rolled following the
debacle o f the devolution vote in ’79? None! All that proved to me was that Plaid Cymru was merely
a cultural group. Were it a political party it would have followed established political rules which say,
when the chief says we do this and its proved to be wrong, then the chief is gone and replaced’.
29 Telephone interview between WT & Owain Williams, 24 February 2009. Gwynfor Evans, Williams 
added, ‘could never have stated that publicly of course. Also, the national consciousness which you 
find in Wales today, would not be where it is without our action. We re-kindled those feelings of 
nationhood’.
364
Liverpool Water Corporation. Its ‘act of corporate greed’, legislatively aided and 
abetted by an English dominated Parliament, with perhaps little understanding or 
respect for Welsh cultural expression or the nation’s landscape.
Nevertheless, with regard both the flooding of Cwm Tryweryn and the 
Investiture, Plaid Cymru claims it responded as well as it felt able, certainly when 
considering its observance of pacifist constitutionalism. Continually denounced, by 
most notably George Thomas, as ‘the two heads of the same coin’, how catastrophic 
might events have proved, had Gwynfor Evans openly declared support for militant 
protest? Speaking in 1961, at a time when ‘direct action’ entered the party agenda 
and Evans and the party hierarchy demurred from endorsing such a policy, Elystan 
Morgan made a valid point: a party which embraces illegal action is thus rendered 
little more than a protest group and not a bone fide  political party which campaigns 
along accepted constitutional lines.31 No one was more aware than Gwynfor Evans 
how precariously stood the party’s electoral tree. It may fallen irredeemably, if later 
expected to ‘validate’ the horrific injuries sustained by 10-year-old Ian Cox, when the 
militant campaign’s moral ascendancy - if indeed it ever existed in the collective mind 
of the Welsh people - was lost.
Having established that MAC and the FWA proved something of a ‘thorn in 
the side’ of Plaid Cymru, in later correspondence, Gwynfor Evans nonetheless 
declared Jenkins ‘an honest person’, who had ‘sacrificed’ much ‘for a cause he 
believed in’. Furthermore, Jenkins’ ‘writings had substance...seemed rational and 
fair’ and were ‘by no means mere froth’. In telephone interviews with his son 
Dafydd, it was further revealed that Gwynfor Evans did privately acknowledge the 
benefit of some degree of direct action to both the political advance of Plaid Cymru 
and the nationalist agenda, but these feelings had been tempered with fear of ‘where it 
might end’ and the realization that even the mildest utterance of public support for
30 Drowning o f  a Village. SALEMfilms Productions, 2006. Screened BBC2W, 13 March 2006. 2003 
saw the population o f  Liverpool rise for the first time in seventy years. Living in Liverpool, Real Estate 
TV. Sky, 7 October 2007. Ironically, as industry suffered a sharp decline on Merseyside, Liverpool 
had no use for all its newly acquired water provision; the down-tum in demand having even begun by 
October 1965, when the dam was comically declared open. Consequently, the city now has too much 
water. In 1955, Liverpool had a population o f over 750,000. In 2006, its population had fallen to 
under 450,000, its total residential and industrial needs being some 49,000,000 gallons o f water a day.
31 Gwynfor: YrAelod Dros Gymru? BBC Wales Production. Screened S4C, December 2005.
32 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. At a meeting in Swansea some 
time later, Jenkins and Evans were alone waiting to address a meeting. Neither made the initial 
introduction, with Jenkins later stating he ‘was not going to speak first’. Interview between WT & 
John Jenkins, 19 October 2007.
365
militant protest would have proved electoral suicide. As it was, Gwynfor Evans 
believed, militancy had certainly played its part - along with the investiture and the 
campaign undertaken by Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg - in his losing the Carmarthen 
seat at the 1970 General Election.34
When might constitutional campaigning, along with - albeit covert - militant 
protest action have proved crucial
However, in the collective mind of those angered at what they considered Wales’ 
subjugated position at this juncture, by not acting at the appropriate time and in the 
appropriate manner, Plaid Cymru ensured a militant response was inevitable. Had the 
Plaid Cymru hierarchy led a sit-down protest at the proposed reservoir site, it is 
argued, the Tryweryn valley’s fortunes might have been avoided. There is good 
reason to believe that many hundreds, possibly more, would have aligned themselves 
to the cause of preventing the Bill’s judicial passage through parliament.35 This 
assumption is based upon the fact that no single issue in post-1945 Welsh history has 
attracted such support across political, denominational and generational lines. 
Nonetheless, at what point might such a strategy have proved instrumental? It 
appears on reflection, that a sit-down protest - as exercised at Trawsfynydd in 1952 - 
might have proved decisive at Capel Celyn, if undertaken the weekend before the 2nd 
reading in the Commons of the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill, on 3 July 1957. Certainly 
before villagers began to leave and critically, not after the Bill was legally endorsed. 
For another problem which drastically undermined the prospect of a united protest 
was that villagers of Capel Celyn left in dribs and drabs. Whether this was an 
accident of timing is unclear - the first leaving just days after the third and final 
parliamentary endorsement of the Bill. Yet, this ensured no mass departure; and
33 Telephone interview between WT & Dafydd Evans, 19 October 2005. ‘I think he felt there was no 
alternative, that the party would suffer if  direct action was adopted...At times it did make the party look
weak, at least in the short-term’.
34 Correspondence between WT & Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. Gwynfor Evans believed his 
‘indifference’ to the investiture proved crucial. During the election campaign, even within the cultural 
heartlands o f Brynamman and more understandably perhaps, Llansteffan, there was animosity 
expressed on the doorstep towards the party for what was seen as its hostility to the ceremony. Plaid 
lost the seat due to its inability to organise itself and entrench its position, stated former language
activist Gareth Miles. Interview with WT, 31 July 2009. Evans re-won the Carmarthen seat in 1974.
35 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003. Emyr Llywelyn Jones was the 
only MAC activist to attend university. There is, he maintains, a clear distinction between the first 
conception o f MAC, to which he belonged and the second as directed by John Jenkins.
36 Telephone interview between WT & Eurgain Prysor Jones, 29 June 2006.
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crucially, prevented the need for mass removal.
Regarding the investiture, John Jenkins may well be correct in believing that 
history may have recorded a different outcome, had Plaid Cymru orchestrated a sit- 
down protest in Caernarfon a week or so before the ceremony. It is unlikely, if  not 
however inconceivable, that if supported by Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg and all 
those hostile to the ceremony, an ‘unfit’ prince might have provided the authorities a 
face-saving ‘get out clause’ were the threat of militant action deemed credible.
Nevertheless, the fear, as held by Gwynfor Evans as to where the militant 
campaign might have ended, has sat uneasily on the shoulders of the nation also. 
Despite an acceptance that ‘civilians were not deliberately targeted’ a policy which if
'in
deliberately undertaken crossed ‘the line of acceptability’, the appalling injuries 
sustained by Ian Cox and Flight Officer William Hougham - although responsibility 
for Hougham’s unfortunate injuries has never been directly linked to Welsh 
nationalist activity - indicates that such a development was all too real.
So too, the emergence of the as-yet unidentified militant group responsible for 
the Cardiff explosions not attributed to MAC; and the actions of Robert Trigg who 
was not a member of the group and was apparently acting alone. Each suggests that 
fear the bombing campaign might have escalated is neither unreasonable, nor without 
foundation. As for John Jenkins, while conceding in 1973 that ‘no one wants to see
•50
another Ulster’, a view later roundly endorsed by Gethin ap Iestyn, Jenkins 
nonetheless recognized that if the alternative was ‘deracination and cultural 
genocide’, he would ‘always take the way’ which would leave his children ‘no reason 
to regard him in the bitter way’ in which he himself regarded his ‘expedient 
ancestors’. However, the fear that Wales stared dangerously over the precipice of a 
Northern Ireland nightmarish scenario, led many to thank Providence that John 
Jenkins was arrested before escalation threatened to result in near catastrophe.
However, to leave aside Jenkins’ romanticism, it is clear that the former 
director-general of MAC is held in considerable esteem by the IRA, even to the extent 
of receiving the moniker ‘the general’ by Republican prison inmates.40 Yet, this
37 Telephone interview between WT & Rhobert ap Steffan, 9 August 2009.
38 Interview between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 20 May 2009.
39 Jenkins, Prison Letters, p.68. Letter to Cyril Hodges, 12 May 1973.
40 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 19 October 2007; also 20 November 2008. One notable 
Jenkins confidante during the earlier period o f his incarceration was Micky Gaughan, who died on 
hunger-strike at Parkhurst Prison on 4 June 1974, from injuries inflicted through force feeding. AN
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regard is not merely confined to Irish militants. If it appears that former members of 
the militant family consider it a sense of duty to speak in awe of Jenkins, under closer 
scrutiny, approbation and reverence for him does indeed appear genuine and heartfelt. 
For example, speaking in 2004, Owain Williams declared John Jenkins ‘very 
competent and capable’; a man who stood ‘head and shoulders with any revolutionary 
of the twentieth century’.41 It is an opinion echoed by David Walters. Jenkins, he 
remarked in 2008, ‘was held in great respect by those who knew him’. The only 
people who ever condemned him were ‘those who didn’t really know the guy’. As for 
Jenkins’ orchestration of the MAC programme, and its failure to continue following 
his arrest, there was, Walters thought, ‘nobody else to take over’. Might it therefore - 
from a purely militant perspective - have been better had Jenkins ‘retired’ from front­
line activity following the investiture protest, avoided detection and therefore have left 
this great question mark? It was a hypothetical chain of events, Walters endorsed. 
However, that was not to criticize Jenkins, Walters added, but rather ‘a condemnation 
of the people of Wales’ in that no suitable successor was evident.42
There is no type of sympathetic background or support in Wales for the type 
of nationalist action undertaken by either MAC or the FWA. Despite increased 
cultural awareness,43 most people in Wales throughout the 1960s saw themselves in a 
wider British political context. Each respective campaign was therefore swimming 
against the tide of moderate political thinking 44 And this is perhaps the sticking 
point; for while John Jenkins is justified in believing the campaign of Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru has its place among anti-colonial movements, as history is rife 
with similar such actions which led to the fall of a colonial powers, Jenkins’ greatest 
stumbling block - despite his undeniable intellect and formulation of a political 
doctrine - is that MAC action ran so much against the grain of mainstream popular
PHOBLACHT/Republican News, 14 June 1990, p. 12; also, Jenkins, Prison Letters, p.91.
41 Interview between WT & Owain Willaims, 23 March 2004. He ‘sacrificed a lot’. Moreover, 
Williams knew for a fact that Jenkins ‘was well respected in Ireland’.
42 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
43 Edwards E., Tanner D., ‘Opinion Polls, Welsh Identity and Devolution, 1966-1979’. Contemporary 
Wales 18 (2006), pp.57, 59. In 1966, nearly two-thirds of the Welsh population described themselves 
as Welsh rather than British; 70% felt it important to preserve Welsh cultural identity. Two years later,
even among Welsh nationalists, only 52% believed Wales could, or should, run its own affairs.
44 Telephone interview between WT & Hywel Teifi Edwards, 10 March 2008. Even during the period 
of Chartist and Rebecca unrest, when the social conditions were dreadful - certainly for those who 
comprised the preponderance o f 19th century Welsh society - there was great reluctance within the 
populace to orchestrate what might later be regarded - and termed - a ‘militant nationalist campaign’. 
The response o f the Welsh miners in the First World War is a case in point. Despite riots at Tonypandy
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opinion in Wales.
Yet, John Jenkins believes that ‘popular support’ in Wales also failed to 
materialize, owing to one crucial factor: the people of Wales - and more pertinently, 
the proletariat - did not incur the wrath of the British Army.
Had the people o f Wales been made to feel rather than just think, things might have been 
different. You don’t want to see your people suffer, but had an escalation in the MAC 
campaign led to strong-arm tactics been used against the people o f Wales, in the way they 
were in Cyprus and Northern Ireland, things might have taken a different course. Had there 
been assassinations and God knows what, this might have occurred; but it may well have 
proved counter-productive against us.45 
A policy of ‘sacrifice’, as deployed by Republican inmates at the Maze Prison in 
1981, may also have proved decisive. The deaths of the ten ‘martyrs’, through self- 
imposed starvation, was regarded as a prime opportunity to mobilise a sense of 
collective grief and victimhood, as well as a call for revenge.46 The ‘dilemma’ was 
not lost on John Jenkins. ‘It is such a balance’, he declared, ‘between active 
campaigning and maintaining the moral objective’.47 It is point well made. Yet, acts 
of rebellion and political theatre played with the lives of innocents, both to subvert 
ones democratic electoral enemies and - in this case - in order to exact the wrath of 
the British state on the somnolent Welsh masses, is a dangerous game.
Nonetheless, the ‘legitimacy’ of MAC’s protest remained uppermost in 
Jenkins’ mind. Writing in prison, Jenkins identified the paradox of being deemed 
‘heroic’ for killing ‘political undesirables’ while on active service in Cyprus for the 
British Army, yet, castigated as an ‘evil criminal’ for undertaking action in the name 
of Wales. ‘Was legality’ Jenkins queried, ‘the sole ‘measure of morality and duty?’48 
How pertinent Jenkins’ composition in an age in which the nomenclature whereby 
one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter remains as evocative as ever.
In more recent years, John Jenkins has demonstrated a dignified acceptance of 
life’s vicissitudes. Asked if he harboured any regrets, MAC’s former brilliant
and elsewhere, miners later enlisted to fight for the Crown in their tens o f thousands.
45 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 November 2008.
46 Michael Burleigh, Blood & Rage (London, 2008), p.319.
47 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 November 2008. On arriving in Cyprus, Jenkins was 
‘astonished at the behaviour o f the troops’. Where a short time before, ‘a soldier found drunk in a 
Cypriot village would have woken up in a bed, having been helped up and looked after’, due ‘to the 
attitude and strong-arm tactics o f the British Army, all that changed very quickly’. In ‘searching for a 
believed suspect, soldiers would enter a village, roughly treat villagers, damage their homes and to get 
a reaction from the men, even touch their wives breasts. It was’, Jenkins declared ‘appalling: pure 
thuggery and totally counter-productive’.
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strategist was typically candid. From what he could gather, Alders’ life had been 
‘ruined’ by the campaign. For instance, his marriage did not survive. For that, 
Jenkins was ‘truly sorry...It ruined a lot of lives’, he added plaintively. ‘George 
Taylor’s family’s life for instance’, and so too ‘for that matter’, his own. While ‘not 
complaining’, Jenkins had nonetheless come to see from his own ‘perspective’, that 
‘what goes up must come down’. It is, he realized, ‘the liability of leadership: you 
have to carry the responsibility’. But he was ‘sorry for the disruption it caused.’ In 
further expanding the point, Jenkins added:
as it was an army house, my wife and our two children were put on street. They were given 
time until the trial, because the army could not discharge me until I was convicted, however 
much they wanted to. A fortnight after my conviction, I was discharged and the family told to 
leave. She went to her parents in south Wales. Also, to leave before my conviction would 
have intimated my guilt, so she had to stay.
Yet, perhaps the greatest repercussion of the MAC campaign in Jenkins’ life, is the 
impact its legacy had on the relationship enjoyed with his sons. To this day, owing to 
the fact John Jenkins was ‘away’ for much of his childhood, Jenkins’ son Vaughan 
refuses to call his father ‘Dad’.49 It is a situation not lost on Glyn Rowlands. 
Speaking in 2004, Rowlands recalled how his involvement in the anti-investiture 
movement affected him: ‘I lost my home, my marriage and family life, which 
included life on a day-to-day basis with my three sons. We (FWA) sacrificed 
everything. What did Charles sacrifice for us?’.50
It is point worthy of further comment, for despite the appalling litany of 
alcohol abuse, divorce, suicide and premature death which proliferate the former 
peripheral nationalist community, perhaps no-one more than George Taylor’s 
daughter Jennie Evans has suffered. Nevertheless, for all she has endured: poverty, 
bullying and the ostracizing of her family by the Abergele community, Jennie Evans 
still recognizes that much of the blame for the escalation in violence which Wales 
witnessed in the 1960s, rests at the door of those, who with ruthless detachment, 
determined the fate of Cwm Tryweryn. ‘What they did to that valley’, she later 
remarked ‘was terrible’.51
Yet, to Jennie Evans and her family, the headstone bearing the inscription
48 Jenkins, Prison Letters, pp. 122,123.
49 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 2009.
50 Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004.
51 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 15 August 2009.
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George Taylor ‘died fighting for Wales’ is an on-going source of frustration and 
anger. Vehement in their belief that George Taylor was not involved in the campaign 
of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, the Taylor family was ‘surprised’ to receive a visit by 
John Jenkins and Owain Williams on Jenkins’ release from prison in August 1976. 
They were surprised still further, by the angry manner in which John Jenkins 
allegedly castigated the family for not having erected a headstone in Taylor’s honour. 
An emotional response that a lack of funds had prevented such was greeted with the 
assurance a headstone would be purchased by sympathetic observers. Asked to 
respond to these charges, John Jenkins resolutely denied he was anything less than 
congenially greeted; while furthermore, George Taylor’s wife Mary both welcomed 
the placing of the headstone and its inscription, in her husband’s memory.53
The Free Wales Army
What however of the Free Wales Army? Was it merely a hot-headed, neo-fascist 
band o f dissolute attention seekers, drunk with rhetoric and concupiscence? Was it 
an effete hindrance to the advance of the nationalist message, with its garrulous cries 
of intimated responsibility for the bombings? Can it be dismissed as ‘a nuisance’54 
and little more than ‘a Dad’s Army farce’, as Emyr Llywelyn Jones argued in 
2003?55 Or will history view its actions more kindly? Perhaps not surprisingly, 
opinion is still divided and still heartfelt. Within certain nationalist circles, there is
52 Telephone interview between WT & Jennie Evans, 19 August 2009. Jennie Evans has repeatedly 
implored organizers to respect her family’s wishes and not visit George Taylor’s grave during the 
annual Abergele martyr’s rally. Moreover, to a proud fire-fighter, the spectacle in the 1980s o f those 
purporting to be Meibion GlynDwr arsonists at the graveside would have outraged her father. As 
would the sight o f some attendees ‘sitting on headstones’ and ‘urinating and smoking’. Evans was also 
told by one organizer, she ‘should be ashamed’ o f herself, for denying her father’s involvement in the 
militant campaign. Attempts to have the stone removed have been thwarted by correspondence from 
the Church in Wales, which states this can only be realized if  the stone is either vandalized or removed 
b j those who placed it.
Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 2009. Of the six years and four 
months John Jenkins was imprisoned, he served all but the final fourteen months in solitary 
confinement as a Category A prisoner. Considerable credit was afforded the Welsh Political Prisoners 
Defence Committee and the MP for Meirionnydd, Dafydd Ellis-Thomas, whose representations to the 
Home Office proved significant in the campaign for Jenkins’ removal from Category A status. John 
Jenkins was released from HM Prison Albany on 15 August 1976. Throughout the period of  
incarceration, Jenkins demonstrated a degree of stoicism and courage worthy o f respect, even 
undertaking a one month ‘quite horrific’ ‘water only’ hunger strike. It was in protest at the Home 
Office’s refusal to allow him access to his children’s educational welfare, which as their sole custodian, 
he was entitled to. It was highly unusual for a Category A prisoner to be granted custody o f their
children.
54 Telephone interview between WT & Gareth Miles, 13 January 2008.
55 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 12 September 2003.
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an increasingly warmer view. Allied to those who have always maintained the FWA 
was essentially involved in a ‘campaign of propaganda’, the prevailing orthodox is 
that the Free Wales Army did have its role to play within the militant arena: it was 
visual, vocal and did succeed in diverting attention and resources away from the real 
bombers.56
Asked in 2003 for an evaluation of the group, Gwynfor Evans was forthright. 
‘The copy which the so-called Free Wales Army provided some journalists and 
photographers, brought them easy money’, he wrote, ‘but it also brought ridicule 
upon the Welsh national movement. They had no connection with Plaid Cymru and 
yet its opponents never lost an opportunity of suggesting an association’. Yet, 
despite his apparent contemporaneous frustration, Evans had developed a ‘respect’ 
for the way in which Cayo Evans later cared for his sister and a liking for Denis 
Coslett, whom he considered ‘a friend’ and ‘true eccentric’.57 For his part, Coslett 
too regarded the former Plaid President favourably. He believed that Evans had 
privately harboured a certain benevolence for the group and its methods, but - as with 
militant action - had been constrained by electoral pressures from publicly stating as 
much.
However, even more illuminating, was Coslett’s angry repudiation of 
militancy as exercised by John Jenkins. While the FWA had operated a campaign of 
propaganda and supported the attacks on remote pipelines, it had rejected 
undertaking action which might threaten the welfare of innocent people. ‘Jenkins’, 
added Coslett pointedly ‘could have killed civilians’. Nevertheless, despite Coslett’s 
protestations, he also conceded to later feelings of irksome indignation that the FWA 
had not been afforded the respect and recognition he felt it deserved. Consequently, 
he had come to ‘sometimes wish’ it had undertaken an effective ‘militant strike’. It 
would, he remarked tellingly, ‘have stopped all the back-biting and sneering: we 
could have looked them in the eye’. Yet, Coslett also revealed the FWA had 
collectively viewed with outrage the Forestry Commission’s planting of conifers
56 Interview between WT & David Walters, 29 December 2008.
57 Correspondence to WT from Gwynfor Evans, 20 August 2003. ‘The FWA provided the English 
media all it needed to further perpetuate the Welsh as music hall figures o f ridicule’. The group was an 
inconsequential ‘oddity: a curiosity got up by the press and made something o f .  Fishlock did not 
however ‘doubt their love for Wales’ and their sincere belief and anger at ‘what was happening’. Yet, 
history would ‘show they were a spark thrown o ff  by contemporaneous nationalist feeling. If the 
FWA warranted any inclusion within the pages of Welsh historical analysis, it was merely as ‘a rather 
small footnote in the history o f that period’. Interview between WT & Trevor Fishlock. 18 November
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upon vast swathes of upland Wales, during and beyond, the immediate post-war 
period. It perfectly exemplified, Coslett believed, the systematic erosion of Welsh 
rural society, cultural exploitation and English insensitivity to Wales and its 
landscape. From his prison cell, the order was issued to set areas of forestry ablaze. 
Coslett’s admission is supported by press reports in 1969, that ‘250 acres of valuable 
forestry plantations had been destroyed in south Wales’ in ‘suspected arson attacks’. 
‘I didn’t perhaps do as much as some people think’, Coslett remarked, ‘but that was
CO
one thing I was responsible for’.
Speaking in 2003, Denis Coslett sought to dispel the whispered inference that 
MAC and the FWA had worked together. ‘In all honesty’ he declared with 
commendable candour, ‘no contact existed between us and Jenkins’. Although aware 
of the name MAC, it had been ‘frowned upon to discuss the group’, even between 
him and Cayo Evans. At the time, Coslett admitted, he had ‘no idea who Jenkins 
was, or what he looked like’.59 It is an admission endorsed by John Jenkins. Having 
returned to Britain from a posting in Germany in April 1965, Jenkins had embarked 
upon a fact-finding mandate to ascertain the degree of both weaponry and support for 
a reconvening of a campaign of hostilities against the state. ‘The only group’ he did 
‘not make contact with’, Jenkins later revealed, ‘was the FWA’.60 Nonetheless, 
while former FWA member Lyn Ebenezer believed Jenkins was ‘far too clever to 
associate himself with such public figures. Unwittingly’, he felt, the Free Wales 
Army ‘had done exactly the right thing for him’, by presenting perhaps ‘the perfect 
smoke-screen’. Yet, not ‘for one minute’ did Ebenezer support Cayo Evans’ later 
assertion the two groups had acted in tandem. Jenkins, adding Ebenezer squarely, 
was ‘a different kettle of fish altogether’.61 It was a view identically expressed by 
fellow peripheral activist Dafydd y Dug.
However, claims of FWA opacity are rejected by John Jenkins. ‘Did anyone 
truly think the police were fooled by them? Really? Not for a moment’, he declared.
2002 .
Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 24 November 2003. See WM, 12 March 1969. Such was
the media interest in the pipelines protest, that in 1968, an episode o f Softly Softly, the BBC police
drama concerned the issue.
59 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
60 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 25 March 2004. ‘I wouldn’t have anything to do with 
them’, stated Jenkins.
61 Interview between WT & Lyn Ebenezer, 16 June 2006.
62 Interview between Dafydd y Dug & WT, 20 May 2004.
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Rather, Jenkins added, ‘they were arrested because the pressure was on the authorities 
to arrest somebody, so they arrested them’. It was simply because ‘they were handy’. 
The fact that police not once questioned him about FWA involvement proved to 
Jenkins that not even speculation of their responsibility existed. As for links between 
the FWA and MAC, he did not meet any of its members until being released from 
prison in 1976. Had he felt irritated by the FWA basking in his ‘reflected glory’ 
Jenkins was asked. ‘Well’, he replied intently, ‘they were knats on an elephants 
back’. He wasn’t bothered by them and had thought ‘let them get on with it’. He 
never ‘took them seriously’; and doubted ‘anybody else did’. As for the conviction 
Cayo Evans was a ‘master of propaganda’, it lacked credibility. ‘The point is’, 
Jenkins proclaimed: ‘you’ve got to do something; have something behind you before 
you can start strutting around’.63 If any doubt still exists, such a pronouncement 
certainly endorses the view that agitation in Wales was not a single, orchestrated 
movement.
However, convinced of the importance of the FWA to the wider nationalist 
programme throughout the era was Cayo Evans. Speaking during his last public 
appearance in 1995, Evans was adamant the FWA was ‘the conscience of the nation’; 
despite those who now ‘poked fun’. Moreover, it had ‘put Wales on the map of the 
world’. Despite the calculated treatment it had suffered at the hands of the British 
state, the FWA had emerged with dignified triumph. As for his involvement, he had 
‘no regrets whatsoever’.64 Cayo Evans might have been emboldened by the results of 
a survey published in 2004, which placed him at number 33 in an all-time Welsh 100 
heroes poll; even more so when it was alleged that the vote for the FWA’s self-styled 
leader, had been deliberately and fraudulently reduced in order to prevent him from 
appearing in the top twenty. Denis Coslett did not feature in the poll, nor did John 
Jenkins; more notably however, neither did the former Secretary of State for Wales, 
George Thomas.65
Nevertheless, Cayo Evans’ understandable lack of ‘repentance’ was a
63 Telephone interview between WT & John Jenkins, 24 December 2009.
64 Only Yesterday, HTV Wales Production. Screened, 1995. On being arrested, the group was 
subjected, Evans believed, to deliberate attempts to criminalize it in the collective mind o f the Welsh 
public. ‘If you want people to think someone’s guilty, stick him in overalls covered in yellow patches. 
Make him look like a clown. They’ll think he’s guilty’.
65 Cultureney Cymru, 100 Arwyr Cymru/Welsh Heroes, 2004, p. 80; also, WM, 14 July 2004. For the 
interview with the computer programmer who made the allegation, see: 
http://walesontheweb.blogspot.com/2004/09/culturenet-not-quite-right.html.
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sentiment similarly shared by Denis Coslett, who felt ‘every nation’ had the right to 
determine ‘its own destiny’. What is more, Coslett had ‘no doubt’ the group’s actions 
‘furthered the likelihood of devolution’ and prevented the drowning of other Welsh 
valleys.66 Asked for his thoughts, Glyn Rowlands also reflected ‘with pride’ upon 
both his own and the FWA’s contribution to the advance of Welsh political 
nationalism.67
Yet, for those who remain unconvinced, it was not the desire of the FWA for 
self-determination per se which saw it liberally disowned by Welsh society, but rather 
its widely embellished claims and inability to formalize a mature and efficacious 
political programme. If it is acknowledged the FWA was prepared to stick its head 
above the Welsh political and cultural parapet for the betterment of the nation, it 
nonetheless comprised, its critics maintain, young men for whom notoriety, if  not 
perhaps sought, was no doubt enjoyed. Subsequently, the joke soon wore tiresomely 
thin. Nevertheless, these were men of particular character and substance, if  only they 
had channelled their considerable intellectual efforts in another direction to further the 
advance of Welsh nationalism. However, might posterity yet reward the Free Wales 
Army the same honour more recently bestowed upon Iolo Morgannwg: himself once 
derided and denounced, yet, now deemed a national treasure? The FWA was surely 
part of the enigma of the 1960s: part of its colour and pulsating charm. Perhaps 
Wales needed it; perhaps not.
In 2000, Denis Coslett angrily dismissed the charge the FWA used violence to 
further its political ambitions. It was ‘not violence, but hostilities’, he argued. ‘It was 
propaganda; we had them going for four years for God sake’. Nonetheless, Coslett 
was aware that the authorities were all too willing to level the emotive term ‘terrorist’ 
at him and his fellow FWA adherents. Owain Williams later highlighted the 
paradoxical disdain when called upon to consider his protest ‘an act of terrorism’. 
The authorities used ‘terrorism’ to ‘remove the inhabitants of Cwm Tryweryn. 
Explosives were used to blow-up their homes. So who’, Williams asked, ‘were the
66 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000. ‘For the first time, an opinion needed 
to be formed: were you British or Welsh. I believe that both the FWA and MAC campaigns raised 
these questions among people for perhaps the first time’. Telephone interview between WT & Rhobert 
ap Steffan, 9 August 2009.
Interview between WT & Glyn Rowlands, 22 March 2004. ‘We were ridiculed then, but on 
reflection, media interest in the FWA still exists over 25 years later. So I don’t believe we could have 
been so ridiculous’.
68 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 14 December 2000.
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terrorists?’69 As for the efficacy of the militant action: ‘we were all revolutionary 
novices’, declared Gethin ap Iestyn in 2008; adding, ‘we lacked the great 
revolutionary tradition of the Irish; it was all trial and error’.70
Does terrorism work and is it ever justified?
The question of the FWA’s terrorist credentials raises the further question of whether 
a nation can advance its political standing by strictly adhering to constitutional means. 
And more succinctly, can a militant campaign of indiscriminate and potentially 
catastrophic action, be considered an effective tool for achieving political ends? Is 
‘militant protest’ merely ‘terrorism’ by another name? One notable feature of the 
terrorist ‘phenomenon’ is that it appears to exist in two distinct forms: so-called 
‘rational’ terrorism, as undertaken by Palestinian insurgents and militant Irish 
Republican groups; and ‘apocalyptic’ terrorism, as was witnessed in New York on 11 
September 2001.
However, considerable evidence supports the belief that violence as a political 
strategy invariably does reap constitutional reward; certainly if the Palestinian and 
Irish Republican struggles are considered. Moreover, each campaign also highlights 
another factor: territorial or political concessions are especially pronounced, within 
demographic groups which are traditionally ‘right-wing’ in their political expression, 
such as Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain. In contrast, terrorist 
action appears less inclined to achieve a political objective, when prosecuted against a 
country more rigid within its political and historical framework. This is clear in 
Russia, where despite the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union, insurgencies to establish 
independent Islamic states in the north Caucuses Emirates: Chechnya, Dagestan and
71Kalmytskaya, have proved both fruitless and costly.
Nevertheless, contrary to the prevailing view that terrorism is an effective 
means of political coercion, there remain those fiercely opposed to the notion that 
political capital results from terrorist action. Of such mind is Max Abrahms. In his
69
BBC Radio 4, The Lake That Stirred Nationalism. Broadcast, 19 October 2005.
70 Correspondence between WT & Gethin ap Iestyn, 25 January 2008.
71 Eric D. Gould & Esteban F. Klor, Does Terrorism Workl The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
(2006); also, Prospect Magazine, Does Terrorism Workl (November 2009); also, Richard English, 
Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford, 2009); also, Christopher Ankerson (ed.). Understanding Global 
Terror (Cambridge, 2007); also, Tilman Bruck (ed.). The Economic Analysis o f  Terrorism (London, 
2007); also, Tore Bjorgo (ed.). The Roots o f  Terrorism (London, 2005); Hoffman, B., Inside Terrorism 
(New York, 2006); also, Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure o f  Suicide Terror (New York, 2005).
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article Why Terrorism Does Not Work, Abrahms claims that militant groups which 
attack civilian targets in greater number than military targets, ‘do not tend to achieve 
their political objectives’. Furthermore, ‘the poor success rate’, Abrahms states, ‘is 
inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. Countries therefore, in which the civilian
79population is the primary target, are ‘reluctant’ to make policy concessions.
And this leads to the final point: if  terrorist action is indeed successful as a 
political tool, do the ends still justify the means? Probably not; but any nation ‘worth 
its salt’ will react with anger when confronted with political and cultural oppression 
by another state, such as was exercised at Tryweryn; as was well expressed by Emyr
7*5
Llywelyn Jones: ‘if we’re going to die, we’re going to die fighting’. Such 
sentiments may well reflect the nation’s response to the referendum vote for increased 
political autonomy for the Assembly in 2011. Should the ‘yes’ vote prove the greater, 
it may well appear that the campaign of militant activism as undertaken by MAC, and 
to a lesser extent the propaganda campaign of the FWA, were indeed part of the 
onward march to Welsh independence. However, no such endorsement may leave the 
picture less certain.
Was the Welsh militant campaign a success?
John Jenkins declared in 2009:
Considering what our objectives were it was a success. It was to draw attention to a 
democratic deficit, through a hearts and minds approach: a political objective at all time.
Despite what was said, it was not about stopping the people o f Liverpool per se from
receiving water, but to draw attention to the unfairness o f what was happening. Dramatic 
action, namely, a campaign o f direct militancy, proved to be the answer. The media - even 
the English media - could not ignore it; and this press attention raised questions among the 
Welsh populace. It was not a call for ‘armed revolution’, as was alleged, but rather the first 
step on the slow, incremental road to constitutional change’.74 
It is a view given countenance by Denis Coslett of the Free Wales Army. He also 
believed the pathway to the National Assembly began - to some degree - with the 
campaign of propaganda undertaken by the FWA.75 However, it is a view received 
‘with cynicism’ by John Jenkins. As for the future, while Jenkins deemed it probable
72 Max Abrahms, 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work’, International Security Journal. 31, (2006).
73 Interview between WT & Emyr Llywelyn Jones, 10 October 2005.
74 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 5 July 2009.
75 Interview between WT & Denis Coslett, 24 November 2003. ‘He’d think his time in prison was not 
in vain’ remarked Rhodri Evans, when asked how his father might have regarded the positive 1997
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- with increasing legislative status bestowed upon the Welsh Assembly - that Wales 
will ultimately be independent, owing to the lack of affordable housing, further 
cultural dilution and uncontrolled inward migration, ‘it will’, he added, ‘not be the 
Wales we want’.76
Whatever the future holds, the campaign of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru is 
regarded in certain Welsh circles as a ‘sacred cow’. A brilliantly marshalled strategy 
above reproach; and in strictly combative terms - despite the appalling deaths and 
injuries - it did prove a worthy opposition. It achieved notable successes, including, 
the breaking of an apparently un-breachable steel water pipeline in May 1968. Yet, 
there is evidence that after the investiture, one senior MAC official wanted to take the 
struggle to a higher level of militancy. And for all but the most ardent advocate, this 
is the problem. For, although John Jenkins can claim with justification that the 
militant campaign received a fair degree of acquiescent support throughout Wales, the 
ever present spectra of escalation casts an uneasy shadow.
John Jenkins is a man of integrity and intelligence, but an explosive device in 
the hands of one lacking his scruples does not bear thinking about. A campaign of 
militant action is - by its nature - a process of augmentation. Certainly history would 
suggest so; a series of increasing responses, either from the state or the militants. 
Such a campaign of violence therefore, ultimately destroys - or at least threatens to 
destroy - the very community it seeks to protect. If indeed, militancy is ‘totally in 
keeping with the Christian teaching on the right to resist oppression’,77 it is also true
n o
that ‘an eye for an eye leaves everybody blind’, as Martin Luther King espoused. 
Why? Because, as another 1960s icon declared: ‘violence begets violence’.79
Nevertheless, despite being castigated by former senior detective John Owen
Evans as ‘criminals’, whose undertaken campaign was ‘all part of policing at that
• 80time’, the MAC protest, as archival evidence demonstrates, did not go unnoticed in
Welsh Assembly election result. Interview between WT & Rhodri Evans, 25 July 2000.
76 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008. Both Cayo Evans and Denis Coslett 
felt sadness that Wales was ‘changing’. It was, each believed, becoming ‘as elsewhere in Britain 
following the Thatcher years, more selfish and charm less’.
77 Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles (London, 1996), p.386. IRA statement in response to a speech by the 
Pope on 29 September 1979, in which he condemned its campaign of violence.
78 Martin Luther King, Strength to Love, p.5. Detroit, 23 June 1963. King’s message conflicted with 
Black Panther leader Malcolm X, who professed: ‘if  our people can’t get their fair share in the house, 
they’ll bum it down’. Simon Sebag Montefiore, Speeches: That Changed the World (Singapore, 2005), 
pp.157-159.
79 John Lennon, Montreal, May 1969.
80 Interview between WT & John Owen Evans, 19 February 2001.
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Whitehall. Consequently, will it ensure, as John Jenkins decrees, that ‘never again
O 1
will the authorities take Wales for granted’. Time will tell. However, for all 
Jenkins’ commendable candour, there are few in Wales who believe there is any place 
in modem Welsh life for a similar campaign of militant activism. It belongs to 
history. It belongs in the 1960s.
81 Interview between WT & John Jenkins, 20 November 2008.
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Central Figures of Thesis
Political figures:
Gwynfor Evans: (1 September 1912 - 21 April 2005). Bom in Barry, assumes the 
presidency of Plaid Cymru on 6 August 1945. Holds the position until 31 October 
1981. Throughout his political career, Evans refuses to advocate militancy as a 
legitimate form of political expression - certainly with regard to any displays of 
violence towards the person. Considered by some to be ‘too nice for politics’, Evans’ 
failure to lead what detractors deem to be ‘effective opposition’ over the Tryweryn 
issue, is tempered somewhat by his decision to fast in 1980, in protest at the 
Conservative Governments decision to renege on its manifesto pledge to establish a 
Welsh-language television service. The stand sees Evans ‘redeem himself as a leader’ 
in the eyes of many; including Emyr Llywelyn Jones. Having been elected as the MP 
for Carmarthenshire at the by-election in July 1966, Gwynfor Evans loses the seat at 
the General Election in June 1970. He wins the seat again at the 1974 General 
Election, but is defeated in the May 1979 General Election. Having failed to re-win 
the seat at the 1983 General Election, Evans never stands for parliament again.
John Braddock: Labour Alderman of Liverpool City Council. Married to Elizabeth 
‘Battling Bessie’ Braddock, (24 September 1899 - 13 November 1970). She 
represents Liverpool Exchange as its Labour MP for twenty four years until her death 
in 1970.
Henry Brooke: (9 April 1903 - 29 March 1984). Appointed Minister for Welsh 
Affairs by Harold Macmillan on 13 January 1957. Antipathy for Brooke, across the 
Welsh political divide, for what is as regarded as his ‘incongruous’ support for the 
Tryweryn Reservoir Bill, is revealed when he is asked not to attend the National 
Eisteddfod at Llangefni on Anglesey just days after the Bill is ratified in Parliament. 
In 1961, also during Macmillan’s premiership, is appointed Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury. In 1962, Brooke reaches the pinnacle of his political career, being 
appointed Home Secretary. Along with a number of politicians of the day, Brooke 
receives unprecedented criticism in the BBC TV production, That Was The Week That 
Was, in the years 1962-3; on which he was much satired and famously dubbed, ‘the 
most hated man in Britain’.
Emrys Roberts: Persuaded in January 1959 to join Plaid Cymru’s staff as deputy 
secretary; Gwynfor Evans further requests that Roberts organise direct action to try 
and prevent the drowning of Cwm Tryweryn. Promoted to the position of Party 
Organising Secretary in November 1963, following J. E. Jones’s retirement due to ill- 
health. Roberts is sacked on 14 November 1964, officially owing to an extra marital 
affair; although speculation abounds that the true reason lies in the contents of the so- 
called ‘Bradwr’ (Traitor) letter and the position of threat to Gwynfor Evans, that 
Roberts enjoys among the youth of the party, the militant wing and throughout the 
predominantly English-speaking south east industrial region of Wales. Having rid 
himself of his turbulent Organising Secretary, Roberts subsequently confesses to 
harbouring respect for the party leaders’ political manoeuvring. This, despite being 
angered and disappointed by the party hierarchy’s deployment of ‘dirty tricks’ to 
ensure his removal. Roberts later claims that Gwynfor Evans and the Plaid Cymru 
leadership, deliberately failed to support his candidature at the 1970 General Election
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for the Merthyr Tydfil seat. When party support is eventually received, just a 
fortnight before the 1972 by-election, it proves ‘too late’. Roberts’ poll at each 
election is nevertheless impressive.
Elwyn Roberts: Succeeds Emrys Roberts as Organising Secretary following his
removal from post in November 1964.
Dr. Huw T. Edwards: (1892 - 1970) One of the nation’s foremost political figures 
during the post-war era. Edwards acquires the title of Wales’s unofficial Prime 
Minister, as chair of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire. He holds the 
position from 1949, until his resignation nine years later, in protest at the 
Conservative government’s refusal to implement the Council’s proposals calling for a 
Secretary of State for Wales and other administrative reforms. In 1959, Edwards 
leaves the Labour Party for Plaid Cymru. He rejoins the Labour Party in 1965, 
declaring the nationalist party of Wales ‘was not the answer for a socialist’.
David Elystan Morgan: Bom, 7 December 1932. Stands as the Plaid Cymru
candidate twice for Wrexham in 1955 and 1959 and once for Meirionnydd in 1964. 
Following a ‘rumour’ in November 1956, that Morgan - in protest over the Tryweryn 
issue - plans to undertake an explosion on the Vymwy to Liverpool water pipeline, at 
the Plaid Cymru annual conference in Llangollen in August 1961, he declares that a 
programme of direct action over Tryweryn would ensure the party remained little 
more than a ‘pressure group’. Having aligned himself to constitutional political 
campaigning, in the summer of 1965, now regarded as the dauphin of Plaid Cymru, 
Elystan Morgan leaves to join the Labour Party. He does so, believing Plaid Cymru 
has reached its political plateau. Owing to an unworkable majority of four MPs, PM 
Wilson calls a General Election in March 1966. Labour wins with a majority of 96. 
The newly elected Labour MP for Ceredigion is Elystan Morgan. It is intriguing to 
speculate what might have happened had Wilson not called the March election. 
Would Morgan have stood against Gwynfor Evans as the Labour candidate at the 
Carmarthen by-election four months later? Elystan Morgan serves as a junior Home 
Office Minister from 1968 - 1970. He loses the Ceredigion seat in February 1974 to 
the Liberal candidate Geraint Howells. In 1981, Morgan is made a life peer, as Baron 
Elystan Morgan of Aberteifi.
James Griffiths: First Secretary of State for Wales, October 1964 - April 1966. 
Having been devolved no actual power, on 19 November 1964, following Griffiths’ 
threat to resign, the Secretary of State for Wales is granted devolved authority for 
housing, local government, road transport and some aspects of local planning. 
Perhaps predictably, the decision is not greeted with universal approval in Wales. For 
many on the political fringes of Welsh nationalism, the decision to establish the 
Welsh Office and the appointment of the respected Jim Griffiths as the nation’s first 
Secretary of State, smacks of little more than meandering political pussy-footing. 
Furthermore, among the fading ranks of the Welsh Republican Movement, for what is 
seen as both his sanctimonious manner and his belief that Wales should be seen 
within the context of ‘the country as a whole’, Griffiths is ‘reviled’.
Cledwyn Hughes: Second Secretary of State for Wales, April 1966 - April 1968.
George Thomas: Third and most controversial Secretary of State for Wales.
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Appointed 5 April 1968; holds the post until 20 June 1970. If some felt Thomas’s 
arriviste reputation confirmed by his appointment, others - including Thomas - 
considered it both appropriate and necessary. Loved and detested in near equal 
measure throughout Wales. A month after Thomas’s death on 23 September 1997, 
just a fortnight after the country votes to accept devolution, Robert Rhodes James, the 
former Conservative MP, alleges that while Speaker in the Commons, Thomas was 
loathed by civil servants as ‘an arrogant, sanctimonious, deceitful and malicious 
bully’. Moreover, some regarded him ‘a fraud and a charlatan, eager to bend the knee 
to anyone above his station and thinly contemptuous of anyone deemed to be below 
it’. Yet, there is a contrary view: ‘George did a lot for Cardiff West; we thought the 
world of him’, declared one former constituent in 2002 during a radio phone in. ‘It 
upsets me to see how some have tried to tarnish his memory’. Gwynfor Evans also 
acknowledged Thomas as ‘one of the best Speakers in the history of Westminster’.
Harold Wilson: Labour Prime Minister, 1964 - 1970; 1974 - 1976.
James ‘Lucky Jim’ Callaghan: Home Secretary 1967 - 70. Prime Minster 1976 - 
1979.
Liverpool Corporation and city officials:
J. H. T. Stilgoe: Water Engineer.
Frank Cain: Chair of Liverpool Corporation.
David Cowley: Lord Mayor of Liverpool at the time Llyn Celyn is opened.
Alderman Sefton: Leader of Liverpool City Council.
Cwm Tryweryn inhabitants:
Martha Jane Roberts: Last head teacher at Ysgol Capel Celyn. Later admits the 
experience of teaching through the community’s destruction had ‘changed’ her. She 
recalls ‘one official from Liverpool’ who periodically visited the school, remarking 
‘with a sneer’ that ‘the work’ was ‘coming along well’. The employee’s officious 
detachment is best exemplified prior to the community leaving for Liverpool in 
November 1956, to appeal to the city council. ‘You can protest as much as you like’, 
he allegedly informs Roberts, ‘we’re drowning this place’. The day before Ysgol 
Capel Celyn closes seven years later, he revisits and reminds Roberts that he had 
‘told’ her ‘what would happen’. By way of reply, M. J. Roberts remarks that she 
hopes he and his colleagues have ‘made a good job of it; a thorough job of it. 
Because in the very near future all this’ will ‘belong to people of Wales’. Admitting 
to feeling ‘extremely angry’, at the injustice of the valley’s submersion, it nonetheless 
‘provoked this feeling of rebellion’; and instilled a subsequent determination to 
support Welsh nationalism.
Eurgain Prysor Jones: Member of the last family to leave Capel Celyn and today 
Bala school teacher. After living in a static caravan for eighteen months, in the spring 
of 1965, E. P. Jones’s new family home is finally complete. One afternoon, her father 
receives a telephone call from Liverpool’s water engineer J. H. T. Stilgoe, who is
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undertaking surveying work on a stream running into Tryweryn. Eurgain Prysor 
Jones later recalled what happened next. ‘He said that he wanted to come to see if the 
house was “up to Liverpool standards”, whatever that meant. He walked around and 
was saying “you’ve got a nice view from this window and a nice view from that 
window”...Then, as he was leaving, he said, “you do realise don’t you, we don’t drink 
your water, all we do is flush our toilets with it”. We couldn’t even understand why 
he was there; they hadn’t given us a penny to rebuild our house’.
Protest movements and personalities:
Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (the Welsh Republican Movement): Established in 
Neath in September 1949 by Clifford Bere, the group quickly comes to the attention 
of MI5. On 20 October 1952, the group targets the Fron Aqueduct near Llandrindod, 
in protest at the flooding of Cwm Claerwen, the last project in Birmingham 
Corporation’s water storage programme in Cwm Elan. On 13 March 1953, at Cardiff 
Magistrates court, Beriah Gwyndaf Evans pleads guilty to ‘having in his possession 
two sticks of gelignite and fifty detonators with intent to cause serious injury to 
property in the United Kingdom’. He is placed on probation for two years. On 14 
May 1953 at Caernarfon Assizes, Peter (Pedr) Lewis is sentenced to eighteen months 
imprisonment for being ‘suspiciously’ in possession of 200 high explosive detonators. 
Despite maintaining his innocence and the prosecution offering no direct evidence of 
Lewis’s involvement in the Fron Aqueduct incident, it is believed the ‘savage 
sentence’ imposed is owing to his ‘established’ Welsh Republican sympathies. 
Leading members of the WRM include: Ithel Davies, who stands as the party’s 
candidate in Ogmore at the 1950 General Election, polling 613 votes (1.3%); Gwilym 
Prys Davies, who as the Labour candidate is defeated by Gwynfor Evans at the 1966 
Carmarthen by-election; and Harri Webb, the editor of the group’s spirited newspaper 
the Welsh Republican (1950 -57).
Harri Webb: Educated at Oxford, the former navy serviceman advises John Jenkins 
as to MAC’s directional policy and acts as the liaison between MAC and the Front for 
the Liberation of Brittany. Following a series of proposals as to how this might be 
advanced, all militant co-operation suggested is vetoed by John Jenkins on the 
grounds of security. Nonetheless, Jenkins later confirms the two groups did share a 
degree of information and discuss how best each might forward their respective 
campaign. In 1952, while living in Cheltenham, Webb devises the White Eagle of 
Snowdonia, a symbol later adopted by the FWA. It was from Webb’s home in 
Merthyr Tydfil that Radio Free Wales, the Plaid Cymru pirate radio station was often 
broadcast. The librarian and poet also acquired a reputation for political journalism.
Gwilym Prys Davies: Active in Plaid Cymru in the mid 1940s. In 1948 Davies is 
instrumental in establishing Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (the Welsh Republican 
Movement). He severs links with Plaid Cymru in 1949 and joins the Labour Party in 
1954; standing as its candidate at the 1966 Carmarthen by-election won by Gwynfor 
Evans.
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg: The Welsh Language Society formed in October 1962. 
It followes the lecture by Saunders Lewis entitled Tynged yr Iaith (the Fate o f the 
Language) which is broadcast on BBC Radio Wales eight months earlier. The 
group’s most successful undertaking in its campaign to ensure equal legislative status
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for the Welsh language, is its controversial defacing of English-only road-signs, 
which begins 1 January 1969.
Gareth Miles: Senior member of Cymdeithais yr Iaith Gymraeg. It is under Miles’ 
chairship, that the official defacing of English-only road signs action is undertaken. 
In 1964, an unofficial action targets ‘Trevine’ (re-named Trefin) in Pembrokeshire. 
Miles and other members of the CylG subscribed to a Breton language magazine. 
There, they read accounts of Flemish language supporters in Belgium after WW2, 
painting out French and German road signs. Inspired by its success, a similar policy 
is adopted in Wales. It too proves successful. Miles enjoys a close friendship with 
John Jenkins when both live in Wrexham prior to Jenkins’ arrest. In 2008, Gareth 
Miles categorically denied being a member of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.
Gwilym Tudur Jones, Dyffig Thomas and Geraint Jones: All college friends and 
close associates of Emyr Llywelyn Jones; the latter of whom was also the second 
secretary of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg. For refusing to tax his car, owing to the 
taxation forms only being available in English, on 28 April 1966, Geraint Jones - soon 
followed by Neil Jenkins - becomes the first member of the society to be imprisoned. 
Requesting a Welsh Bible in order to take the oath, it is discovered that a Koran is 
available, but not a Welsh Bible.
John Saunders Lewis: Bom 1893 in Wallasey, Wirral. Died 1985 in Penarth. 
President of Plaid Cymru 1930 - 1939, although party leader 1926 - 1939. Succeeded 
by Jack E. Daniel until 1943, when Abi Williams becomes president. On 6 August 
1945, at the party’s Llangollen summer school, 31 year-old Gwynfor Evans is elected 
president. Imprisoned in 1936 - along with D. J. Williams and Lewis Valentine - to 
nine months in Wormwood Scrubs. It follows an arson attack on an RAF bombing 
school at Penyberth, Gwynedd. Ostracised by Welsh academia for the protest, Lewis 
loses his teaching appointment at Swansea University. He is however later 
‘canonized’ for his action by the so-called militant wing of Plaid Cymru. On 13 
January 1962, BBC Radio Wales broadcasts a radio lecture written by Lewis entitled 
Tynged yr Iaith (Fate o f  the Language). It leads to the formation of Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg eight months later. Lewis is remembered for this and for a prolific 
literary talent of depth and variety.
Trefor and Eileen Beasley: Miner and school teacher respectively, in 1952, the
Beasley’s refuse to pay their rate demand from Llanelli Rural District Council unless 
the demand is received bilingually. Despite all the councillors and ninety percent of 
the local population speaking Welsh, the council refuses; and so begins a nine year 
battle in which the Beasley’s appear in court sixteen times for non-payment. Their 
furniture is removed three times from their home in Llangennech. Finally, in 1961, 
the council agrees to their request. For their stoic stand, the Beasley’s receive many 
plaudits, most notably from students and others drawn to the ranks of Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg. Eileen Beasley is today regarded by many as the ‘Rosa Parks of 
Wales’.
On St David’s Day 1967, 48-year-old Trefor Beasley is released after seven days from 
Swansea prison, for non-payment of a fine received for failing to display a road fund 
licence on his vehicle. If the authorities ascertain that recognition for the Welsh 
language to be the extent of Beasley’s nationalist interests, revelations by John
401
Jenkins and another former militant paint an altogether different picture. One of those 
at the vanguard of the militant movement at the time of Jenkins’ re-structuring of 
Mudiad Amddifyn Cymru, Beasley later plays a prominent role with regard the 
movement’s storage of gelignite. Moreover, with Jenkins busily establishing a list of 
intended targets, Beasley’s involvement in the explosion at Llanishen Tax Office, is 
believed - by some - to have been invaluable. John Jenkins, who denies Beasley’s 
participation in the Llanishen protest, is a bearer at Trefor Beasley’s funeral.
Neil ap Siencyn (formerly Neil Jenkins): In November 1962, Jenkins is expelled from 
Plaid Cymru following a letter criticising Gwynfor Evans. Jenkins becomes one of 
the first members of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg to be imprisoned (April and 
September 1966) over the issue of bilingual forms being made available. Neil Jenkins 
is the link between the Aberfan Parents Association and the FWA.
Robert Oliver Francis Wynne: (1907-1993). Owner and resident of Garthewin Hall in 
Denbighshire, Wynne rises to prominence as friend of Saunders Lewis and supporter 
of the militant struggle. Greets the FWA on their arrival at the opening of Llyn Celyn 
in October 1965. Subsequent visitors to his home included: Cayo Evans, Denis 
Coslett and Lyn Ebenezer. Wynne often stands bail for defendants, including Owain 
Williams. Father of Gwenllian, the wife of Philip Henry, both, along with Gethin ap 
Iestyn, are arrested for discharging smoke bombs near Prince Charles during his visit 
to Cardiff in June 1968. Maintaining a claim to the princes of Gwynedd, R. O. F. 
Wynne is at the centre of the Patriotic Front’s Welsh Monarchy Society.
Hywel S. Hughes: Bom in Corwen. Hughes was the millionaire owner of Ganaderia 
El Triunfo Ltd, a cattle export and ranching company at Bogota in Columbia. During 
Owain Williams’ trial in 1963, it is alleged that Hughes, in a letter postmarked to ‘Bill 
Jones’, The Espresso Cafe, Meifod, Pwllheli, sends a cheque intended for Williams 
for $280. The claim that the letter was not produced as evidence in court is later 
dismissed by Williams, who remains adamant that it was. Following their release 
from prison, it is alleged that Hughes instructed an emissary to present Cayo Evans 
and Denis Coslett with a Columbian Hundred Peso gold coin.
Owen Pennant Hughes of Nebo, Caernarfonshire, David Robert Marcus Gale of 
Llangollen (later killed falling downstairs at his home) and Harry Jones of Cefti 
Mawr, Wrexham: all receive probation in the summer of 1966 for explosives charges. 
Police are satisfied none are the Clywedog saboteurs.
Edward Hope Wilkinson, Robert Griffith Jones, Arfon Jones and John Gwilym Jones: 
all are arrested following the Snowdonia Country Club explosion on 5 January 1968. 
Wilkinson and R. G. Jones later receive twelve months imprisonment, suspended for 
two years, for ‘unlawful possession of explosive substances’. Arfon Jones is fined 
£15 for stealing and then supplying them with the explosives. For implicating Owain 
Williams and assuring police he will testify against him in court, no charges are 
brought against J. G. Jones.
Sean MacStiofain: Bom John Edward Drayton Stephenson in Leytonstone, east 
London, the son of an English father and Irish mother from Belfast. Following a 
period in the RAF, Stephenson marries a lady from Cork and joins the IRA. In 1953, 
he leads a raid on the armoury at the British officers training corps in Felsted, Essex,
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for which he is sentenced to eight years imprisonment. MacStiofain later leads the 
break-away Provisional IRA. It is at MacStiofain’s home in Navan in County Meath, 
that Owain Williams stays, having absconded in March 1968. There, it is believed he 
and MacStiofain discuss the insular cell structure adopted by MAC. It later proves 
instrumental to the IRA’s ‘successful’ campaign.
Trefor Morgan: A pivotal figure in the 1950s Welsh Republican Movement and an 
English-speaker of considerable eloquence, Morgan is often at odds with Gwynfor 
Evans and the party hierarchy owing to its adherence to constitutional pacifism and 
fixation with rural Welsh culturalism. It leads to his being all but ostracized by Plaid 
Cymru, even to the point of Evans allegedly prohibiting party members from 
accepting Morgan’s offer of affordable insurance. Long suspected of supporting the 
militant struggle, Trefor Morgan - the millionaire founder of the Aberdare insurance 
company Cwmni Undeb - finances Owain Williams’ 1968 defence costs. Following 
his release from prison in 1976, John Jenkins lives for a period with Morgan’s 
daughter Lowri. Moreover, his wife Gwyneth, supports Jenkins’ family during his 
imprisonment.
Robert William Trigg: On 23 April 1969, an explosive device is discovered in locker 
CIO at Cardiff’s Queen Street railway station. It had been left four days earlier by 
Trigg, a 20-year-old Sheffield University Physics and Metallurgy student. Arrested 
seven days after leaving the device, in July, Trigg is sentenced to four years 
imprisonment after being found guilty of possessing an explosive substance and theft 
of such materials. Trigg claims he perpetrated the incident as a hoax.
Among the more prominent nationalist societies prevalent during this period are: the 
Patriots League Committee, Young Patriots League, Confederation of Welsh 
Workers, Llywelyn Society (formed in September 1967 and principally led by Dafydd 
y Dug, while ably assisted by Emyr Llywelyn Jones), Cymdeithas GlynDwr, Owain 
GlynDwr Memorial Committee, Patriotic Press, Patriotic Enterprises, Eagle 
Publishing, Cymru ein Gwlad and the Welsh Monarchy Society. It is open to 
speculation how much these groups shared the same objectives and the same 
membership.
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru, members and associates:
Owain Williams: Bom, 10 August 1933 at Pistyll, near Pwllheli, Caernarfon.
Marries in May 1957 and a year later leaves for Canada where he works on a ranch 
near Vancouver and as a warehouse hand in New Westminster. Returns to Wales at 
the end of 1959, and with his savings and financial support from his father, opens a 
cafe in Pwllheli. A renowned espouser of Welsh militancy and passionate believer in 
a Welsh Republic, Williams undertakes protest action at the Tryweryn reservoir site 
with Emyr Llywelyn Jones and John Albert Jones on 11 February 1963. Arrested 
along with J. A. Jones in April 1963, following an explosion on an electrical 
transformer, Williams is sentenced to one year’s imprisonment in July. On 14 
January 1968, he is arrested at Caernarfon police station, having earlier returned from 
London following the explosion at Snowdonia Country Club nine days earlier. On 8 
February 1968, Williams is inexplicably granted bail at Caernarfon Assizes; the order 
is continued on 29 February. Due to appear in court four days later, on 2 March 1968, 
he absconds to Brittany and Eire. Williams is arrested at Birmingham airport on 27
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August 1968. On 8 November 1968, Owain Williams is acquitted at Caernarfon 
Assizes of unlawful possession of explosives. Owain Williams remains active within 
Welsh politics, both in the wider and regional sense. A Gwynedd councillor, he is 
also the chair of both Llais Gwynedd and the Independent Wales Party. He lives 
today in Llanllyfni near Caernarfon.
Emyr Llywelyn Jones: The eldest son of T. Llew Jones, at that time, only the second 
man in the history of the National Eisteddfod to be chaired Bard two years in 
succession, in 1958 and ’59. At the time of his arrest in February 1963, E. LI. Jones is 
a fourth-year post-graduate student in the education dept at Aberystwyth University. 
The previous summer he worked as a sub-editor and translator with Wales West and 
North TV Ltd in Cardiff. Jones is also editor of the student newspaper Llais y  Lli 
(Voice of the Sea). When not writing Welsh plays or taking part in discussions on 
radio and television, E. LI. Jones is a leading member of the University’s Welsh 
Society. He is sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for his part in the protest at the 
Tryweryn Reservoir site on 11 February 1963 along with Owain Williams and John 
Albert Jones. A pivotal figure within Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg; Jones is largely 
influential in establishing Adfer (Restore) in 1971. This seeks to provide affordable 
housing for Welsh-speakers in the Welsh heartlands, where property value is affected 
by more affluent incomers; the preponderance of whom are English. Adfer further 
appeals for Welsh-speakers to leave Anglicised regions of Wales to settle in these 
sustainable Welsh communities. E. LI. Jones remains widely respected for the earnest 
and intelligent manner in which he has expressed his support for Welsh nationalism.
David Walters, David Prichard, Alf Williams, Trefor Beasley, O. M. Roberts and Dai 
Bonar Thomas: Admitted by David Walters as being responsible for the action at the 
Tryweryn Reservoir construction site in September 1962. Walters, Pritchard and 
Beasley were from Glamorgan; Alf Williams from Maesycwmmer in Gwent; Dai 
Bonar Thomas from Llanelli and O.M. Roberts from Meirionnydd. The group is 
assembled by Pritchard, who through his position on the Plaid Cymru executive, has 
decided the dissenting voices should merge to undertaken a single action. O. M. 
Roberts is also a senior figure on the Plaid Cymru executive. Later chairman of 
Gwynedd County Council, Roberts is also one of the team involved in the burning of 
the Penyberth bombing school in September 1936. Bonar Thomas later rises to some 
prominence within the FWA; while Trefor Beasley, David Pritchard and Alf 
Williams, are considered by some to have been responsible for the Clywedog 
reservoir action in March 1966 and subsequent members of the Cardiff MAC cell.
John Barnard Jenkins: Bom, 11 March 1933 in St. David’s Hospital, Cardiff and 
raised in Aberfan and Rhymney. Attends Bargoed Grammar School from 1944. 
Following a period as an apprentice at Newport Steel works, enlists in the Army 
Dental Corps on 30 November 1950; remaining in the post until a voluntary discharge 
on 29 November 1955. Following periods as factory worker; at Cardiff steelworks; as 
an underground collier and trainee nurse, on 8 July 1958, Jenkins rejoins the Royal 
Army Dental Corps. Marries Thelma in October 1958; has two sons, Vaughan and 
Rhodri. Receives postings to Germany and Austria and in 1959 Cyprus. In 1962 
returns to Germany. Returns to the UK in April 1965 and is posted to Saighton 
Barracks near Chester. In June 1965, Jenkins moves his family to Wrexham. He 
immediately begins establishing the strengths and capabilities of the Welsh militant 
threat. As Sergeant Instructor to the Corps of Drums of the Royal Welch Fusilier
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Cadet Force, Jenkins meets Frederick Ernest Alders in the summer of 1967. On 30 
September 1967, along with Alders, Jenkins - now director-general - re-convenes 
protest action in the name of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Following the two year 
campaign, both are arrested on 2 November 1969. John Jenkins is sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment in April 1970. Released in August 1976, Jenkins remains hugely 
respected within the militant nationalist community. He lives today in Ruabon, near 
Wrexham.
Frederick Ernest Alders: In the summer of 1967, Alders, a 21-year-old ariel-rigger 
and Territorial Army Cadet from Rhosllanerchrugog, meets John Jenkins. Following 
a somewhat, initial, fractious connection - in which Jenkins allegedly ‘sounds Alders 
out’ - in September 1967, the two recommence the campaign of direct militant action 
in the name of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Two years later, after a string of attacks 
on water pipelines and various government installations, Alders and Jenkins are 
arrested. Alders accepts a plea bargain of five years and turns Queen’s Evidence 
against John Jenkins. In the event, Alders receives a six year sentence. 
Magnanimously, Jenkins is more saddened than angry at Alders’ action, believing the 
recently married younger man to have ‘more than played his part’ and perhaps 
understandably, to have succumbed to the obvious pressures of his arrest and 
undetermined custodial sentence.
Anne Woodgate: Alders’ girlfriend and fiance for a year until January 1969. 
Woodgate appears to have been privy to a remarkable degree of knowledge with 
regard the campaign of MAC. Apparently distraught after the incident at Abergele - 
and fearing for the safety of her former partner - Woodgate divulges much of this 
information to her father. According to one theory as to Jenkins’ detection, they 
subsequently approach the police and Alders’ a n d  Jenkins’ d o w n fa l l  is assured.
Brian Richards: Close friend of Frederick Ernest Alders and fellow member of the 
Territorial Army. Allegedly approached by John Jenkins immediately prior to the 
Llanrhaedr-ym-Mochnant protest in September 1967 and obliquely asked if he too 
would like to be involved in the militant campaign. Richards refused.
Anthony John Hiscocks: Junior member to Jenkins in the Army Dental Corps and ad 
hoc member of MAC with regard the Llanishen Tax Office action in March 1968. It 
is Hiscocks’ ‘inside information’ which leads to the strike being undertaken. Later 
gives much information to the police regarding Jenkins and Alders; even identifying 
Alders as the driver during the reconnaissance of the Llanishen target site. It is likely 
Hiscocks was not charged for his involvement in this operation, in return for this 
information.
Colin George Wood: Junior member to John Jenkins in the Army Dental Corps. 
Undertakes a trip with Jenkins to Birmingham New Street railway station in the 
summer of 1968, en route to which, Jenkins allegedly informs him ‘not to mention to 
anybody else any person whom he may meet or speak to at Birmingham’. Wood later 
gives what he claims to be a full account of the day’s events to police. Four days after 
John Jenkins’ arrest, Lance Corporal Wood is shown three sheets of paper entitled 
‘Statement by MAC’ by investigating officers. He positively identifies it as written in 
Jenkins’ hand. Although in typical Jenkins prose, the former director general of MAC 
denies having written it.
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John Richard Lewis Roberts: 24-year-old step-brother of Frederick Ernest Alders, 
along with Alders and Jenkins, is involved in the press conference with journalists Ian 
Skidmore, Harold Pendlebury and Emyr Jones on 2 May 1968. Also drives Jenkins 
and Alders to undertake the Llyn Vymwy action at the end of May 1968. It is not 
thought that Roberts was further involved in the campaign of MAC, despite John 
Jenkins imploring him to transport Alwyn Jones to Holyhead in June 1969, to 
undertake the Mackenzie Pier action.
John Roberts senior: Employed as a stone crusher at Hendre Quarry. Married to 
Frederick Ernest Alders’ mother and father of Enys and John R. L. Roberts. Informs 
investigating officers that two men ‘from Wrexham’ who referred to themselves as 
‘Dai’ and ‘Jack’ arrived at his home late one evening and asked him to steal a quantity 
of explosives from the quarry’s magazine. This, Roberts refuses to do, along with 
drawing a sketch of the magazine’s location. Roberts also claims to have refused a 
request to transport a man from Abergele (Alwyn Jones) to undertake the Mackenzie 
Pier action in June 1969. Roberts further reveals that ‘Dai’ and Jack’ depart ‘in a grey 
mini van’ ‘driven by the younger man in his early twenties’. Despite Roberts’ failure 
to provide officers more substantial evidence, it is a matter of conjecture just how 
involved John Roberts was in the MAC campaign and how much unavailable 
‘evidence’ he gave officers in exchange for protecting his son and daughter.
Enys Roberts: The sister and daughter respectively of the above, it is believed that 
Roberts drove Owain Williams in her car to Loggerheads on 1 March 1968. Enys 
Roberts’ involvement in the militant campaign remains a matter of scrutiny, as does 
the extent of the information she later provides police. John Jenkins remains adamant 
that Roberts was the ‘informer’ who ensured his detection. Others, most notably 
Owain Williams, vehemently maintain that while Enys Roberts may have imparted 
some information when approached by officers after Jenkins’ arrest, it was F. E. 
Alders’ ex-fiance Ann Woodgate who was instrumental in ensuring his and Jenkins’ 
apprehension and conviction. Both Woodgate’s testimony during their trial and 
evidence stored at the National Archives, supports this latter version of events.
Emyr Jones: Journalist on the Wrexham Leader who organized the press conference 
with MAC in May 1968. The extent of Jones’s involvement in the militant campaign 
is open to conjecture, with John Jenkins admitting the lack of security measures 
surrounding Jones and the meeting, may well indicate their lack of necessity. 
Certainly the role played by Jones was raised during the subsequent trial of Jenkins 
and Alders, with Tasker Watkins QC criticizing him for his failure to co-operate with 
investigating officers.
Gordon Wyn Jones: On 1 March 1969, ‘seaman, or liner-worker’ G. W. Jones 
approaches Emyr Llywelyn Jones at an anti-investiture rally in Caernarfon and having 
stated he is responsible for a protest action at an RAF station on Anglesey, further 
declares his intention of ‘wanting to do something for Wales’. Reproved by E. Llew. 
Jones and informed that those gathered are non-violent, according to his later police 
statement, G. W. Jones is then allegedly introduced to Gareth Miles. Some weeks 
later G. W. Jones claims to have received a letter from Miles asking to meet him at 
Chester Railway Station. Having disembarked, some time later Jones is approached 
by John Jenkins. During the subsequent meeting - the details of which are challenged 
by Jenkins - Jones agrees to target a plinth sited at Mackenzie Pier in Holyhead. ‘At
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sea’ when the device to be used in the strike is delivered to his home by Jenkins, G. 
W. Jones informs Jenkins in Caernarfon days before the investiture, that he failed to 
undertake the protest, having discovered a group of campers near the monument. G. 
W. Jones is therefore ‘most surprised’ when the monument is targeted by persons 
unknown. There is a belief that G. W. Jones was in fact an agent provocateur who 
intimated to the authorities that the three Anglesey council employees - all called 
Jones - were responsible. None were convicted of the attack. In August 1969, 
Jenkins contacts G. W. Jones again, instructing him to place an explosive device at 
the South Stack Relay Station on Holyhead mountain. On this occasion, G. W. Jones 
claims he visited Saighton Barracks with John Jenkins, where he was handed the 
device to be used in the protest. Jones later admits to investigating officers that he is 
responsible for carrying out the attack. Moreover, having failed to hear in news 
bulletins that the device has activated, that he walked to the site and on observing that 
an explosion had occurred, contacted the police fearful that other walkers might report 
his presence. The last of the MAC munitions are activated by G. W. Jones on 5 
November 1969. It is believed that Jones was not charged for his alleged involvement 
in the militant struggle, owing to the incriminating information he provided officers 
regarding Jenkins.
Mary Jones: Wife of the above. One Saturday evening, in June 1969, Mary Jones is 
visited at her home in Holyhead by John Jenkins, F. E. Alders and a lady with ‘ginger 
hair, a very pale complexion and blue eyes’ whom Jenkins introduces as Alders’ 
‘fiance’. On discovering her husband is not at home, Jones claims she took receipt of 
a ‘hold all’ from John Jenkins and placed it in the garden shed. It is believed that this 
contained the Mackenzie Pier device. John Jenkins also attempted, so Mary Jones 
later alleged, to demonstrate the workings of a timing device which Alders produced 
from another package. She later claims to have met John Jenkins in Caernarfon on 
the Saturday before the investiture and again in Chester a month or so following the 
ceremony. John Jenkins denies the meeting in Chester took place, or that while she 
and her family waited in a cafe, he and her husband went to Saighton Barracks where 
Jones was handed an explosive device to be used in the targeting of the South Stack 
Relay Station.
Mackenzie Pier three: Within days of an explosive device being discovered at the 
Mackenzie Pier monument on 26 June 1969, John Allan Jones (20) of Ty Croes, 
Anglesey, William Glyn Jones (22) of Trearddur Bay, Anglesey and Dewi Jones (22) 
of Portmadoc are arrested. At Flintshire Assizes, three months later, all three plead 
not guilty. This, despite a positive reaction to substances similar to nitro-glycerin 
being found on the hands of Dewi and William Glyn Jones. The latter also responds 
positively to traces of ammonium nitrate and chloride. All three are further charged 
with possessing a quantity of materials required to assemble an explosive device. 
Dewi and Glyn Jones are found guilty of having jointly conspired with persons 
unknown to unlawfully cause an explosion and are imprisoned for eighteen months. 
Crucially, neither they, nor Alan Jones, are found guilty of planting the Mackenzie 
Pier time-bomb. Allan Jones is found guilty of ‘having possession of, or control of, 
explosive substances’. He is sentenced to six months imprisonment, suspended for 
two years.
Alwyn Jones: Prominent Welsh nationalist in the Abergele area and member of 
Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru. Thought to have undertaken the Snowdonia County Club
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action in January 1968. Is killed on the eve of the investiture, when the device he is 
apparently placing outside the town’s Social Security Office detonates.
George Taylor: Respected fireman and much-loved husband and father of three. It is 
a matter of considerable contention whether George Taylor was a member of Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru. While family members are adamant that he was not (see below), 
former activists insist that he was. G. Taylor is killed alongside Alwyn Jones in 
Abergele on the eve of the investiture.
Jennie Evans: Daughter of the above. J. Evans is the victim of wide-spread
community intimidation and head-teacher bullying as a result of her father’s alleged 
involvement in the Abergele action on investiture eve. In 2010, it is confirmed that 
Lord Roberts of Llandudno has agreed to lead the Taylor family in their quest to 
receive an official explanation as to their father’s role in the campaign of Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru. Contrary to accounts from former militants that George Taylor 
actively participated in the militant struggle, Jennie Evans and other Taylor family 
members, remain utterly convinced of their father’s innocence.
Free Wales Army:
William Julian Cayo Evans: (22 April 1937 - 28 March 1995). Educated at the 
prestigious Millfield Public School in Somerset, on leaving, Evans attends the Royal 
Agricultural College in Cirencester. Conscripted into the South Wales Borderers in 
1955 as Private 23164555. From 1965, Cayo Evans quickly rises to prominence as 
the self-styled leader of the Free Wales Army. Admired with genuine affection, the 
gifted harpsichordist and raconteur enjoyed life in the spotlight. Dismissed by some - 
notably strangers - as conceited and dissolute, speaking in 2007, close friend and 
fellow FWA enthusiast Rhobert ap Steffan declared Evans: ‘a giant of a man, a 
genuinely magnetic personality. The kind you don’t often find in today’s bland 
consumerist Wales’. Perhaps the most heartfelt tribute was paid by Evans’ former 
wife Gillian, who in 2006, declared him: ‘the greatest influence’ on her life. There 
was, she stated tearfully: ‘no one like him’. Yet, praise is not universal, even among 
former senior members of the FWA, as some, with disquiet, have raised Evans’ ability 
to orchestrate militant action, while having maintained a perceived safe judicial 
distance himself.
Denis Coslett: (12 September 1939 - 20 May 2004). Quick witted, fearless and 
considered by friends and many observers as extremely knowledgeable regarding 
Welsh cultural matters, Coslett was renowned for speaking an articulate form of the 
Welsh language. In the years before his death, the frustration, anger and sense of 
injustice, so prominent in the early years of his adulthood, had to the greater degree 
abated, with Coslett able to look back with some degree of equanimity and 
perspective. ‘I’m a lot calmer these days than when I was younger’, he remarked in 
2003. ‘I take my time more; I’m far less likely to fly off the handle. You change as 
you get older’.
David (Dai) Bonar Thomas: Considered cheery, knowledgeable and well read;
robust, yet well groomed and dapper. He was, so described retired police Assistant 
Chief Constable, John Owen Evans, ‘a very, very solid fellow...The mature presence 
among the others’. Nevertheless, D. Bonar Thomas was no shrinking violet. At the
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Eisteddfod in Swansea in 1964, a journalist from the Western Mail, who had been 
drinking whisky, became abusive about the FWA. He had, he informed assembled 
members, ‘fought in the war and waded knee high in Japanese blood’. ‘If you’re not 
careful’, remarked Bonar Thomas, ‘you’ll be wading knee high in your own’. It was 
the end of the matter. It is believed that D. B. Thomas died in the late 1990s.
Lyn Ebenezer: Former journalist, close friend of Cayo Evans’ and FWA sympathizer. 
Marched alongside Evans during the Dublin Easter Commemoration rally in 1966. 
By the Autumn of 1967, Ebenezer had distanced himself from the group. Today lives 
in west Wales, where he writes critically acclaimed books on Welsh history and 
Welsh sporting figures.
Rhobert ap Steffan (Castro): (4 February 1948 - 11 January 2011. FWA sympathizer 
and close friend of Cayo Evans. The gifted artist and photographer is instrumental in 
later years - among other Welsh nationalist and historical commemorations - for 
establishing the annual St. David’s Day rally in Cardiff.
Vivian George Davies: Physically strong and considered highly strung by others 
within the militant wing. Committed suicide in 1981, after allegedly killing his wife.
Vernon Griffiths: Cousin of Cayo Evans. Received criticism from most notably 
Denis Coslett, for what he considered Griffiths’ ‘betrayal’ of the group during the trial 
of leading nationalist figures in 1969 and subsequent media interviews in which he 
apparently ‘played up’ his involvement in the FWA campaign. It is a view roundly 
challenged by others however, including Gethin ap Iestyn, who regards V. Griffiths as 
‘a very decent guy’. Today farms at Cwrt-newydd, in Ceredigion.
Patriotic Front:
Gethin ap Iestyn (Keith Griffiths): Considered a ‘thinker’, impassioned and 
intelligent. Disseminated propaganda on behalf of the militant wing of Welsh 
nationalism with real aplomb. Speculation abounds as to whether ap Iestyn attended 
the crucial meeting with John Jenkins at Loggerheads on 1 March 1968 (along with 
Philip Henry), was the enigmatic ‘phoenix’ and member of the Cardiff MAC cell. All 
suggestions are rejected by ap Iestyn, who denies any involvement in the MAC action 
or indeed to having known Jenkins during the period of militant protest. Has since 
fallen out with latter day ‘movement’ owing to its failure to embrace militancy in its 
opposition to what ap Iestyn regards as English political domination. This has led to 
uncorroborated conjecture from certain quarters, that Gethin ap Iestyn is in the pay of 
the British security services. It is a claim dismissed as risible by those close to him.
Dafydd Glyn Rowlands: Died 22 August 2009 aged 71. Arguably considered the 
most approachable and upstanding of all those on the peripheral wing of Welsh 
nationalism during the 1960s. Possessed of an easy manner, Rowlands was 
nonetheless renowned for his intelligence, fighting spirit and sense of fair play.
David John Underhill (Dafydd y Dug): Leading figure within Cymdeithas Llywelyn, 
one of the anti-investiture movements which appeared prior to the ceremony. On 
returning to court following his mother’s funeral, y Dug is released without charge 
during the so-called Free Wales Army trial. Commonly regarded as ‘a hell of a
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character’. Lives today in Pontypridd.
Anthony (Toni) Lewis: (15 April 1937 - 8 November 2005). Extremely gifted 
musician and craftsman, specializing in Celtic silverware. Lived for many years on 
the Isle of Man before returning to Barry. Later claimed to have becoming aware of 
his Welsh cultural identity, due to being routinely teased and called ‘Taffy’ while in 
the RAF during National Service.
Media:
David Frost: Bom April 7 1939 in Kent, the son of a Methodist minister. A keen 
schoolboy footballer, Frost is offered professional terms with Nottingham Forest, but 
declines in order to concentrate on academic study at Cambridge. Like many of his 
peers who later become prominent figures in broadcasting, Frost is part of the 
Cambridge University Footlights set. It is the satirical, ground-breaking That Was the 
Week That Was, on which he first makes his name, cultivating a reputation as a 
hardnosed, erudite commentator and journalist. He later cements this reputation on 
his own programme, The Frost Report, which mns from 1966 to 1967. It is also on 
The Frost Report, that in opening the programme, Frost introduces the nation to his 
signature phrase: ‘Hello, good evening and welcome’. Throughout a largely 
distinguished career, David Frost interviews leading politicians on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Arguably his greatest moment in broadcasting came in 1977, when he 
interviews the disgraced - and ultimately candid - former President of the United 
States, Richard Nixon. Having interviewed the FWA in 1967, Frost might have been 
referring in part to the group, when he famously declared: ‘television is an invention 
that permits you to be entertained in your living room, by people you wouldn’t have 
in your home’.
John Summers: As journalist and chief conduit for the political philosophy of the 
Free Wales Army, Summers pens a number of incriminating articles concerning the 
group between 1966 and 1968. Many of these articles are later cited by the 
prosecution as evidence against the FWA at their trial in 1969. Although there is 
evidence that Summers attempted to appear for the Defence in order to undermine the 
prosecution’s case, material stored at the National Archives later revealed that 
Summers was also a police informer.
Police:
John ‘Jock’ Wilson: As head of Special Branch in Brixton, 46-year-old Wilson is 
appointed to lead the nine strong Shrewsbury Unit, owing to his knowledge of Cold 
War intelligence matters. Following the investiture he is decorated with the OBE.
John Owen Evans: As a Welsh-speaker, Evans is appointed to the Shrewsbury Unit 
to liaise with Welsh-speaking colleagues throughout the Welsh police force. Retired 
as Assistant Chief Constable. Lives today in Penparcau, near Aberystwyth.
Raymond Kendall: As the junior member of the Shrewsbury Unit, Kendall later 
becomes the head of Interpol. Lives today Villefranche-Cedex, France.
Lt. Col. William Jones Williams: Chief Constable of the Gwynedd Constabulary and
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fiercely resistant to efforts by the Home Office to undermine his autocratic control. 
Jones Williams is decorated with the OBE following the investiture; resigned position 
as chief constable shortly after.
Frank Williamson: HM Inspector of Constabulary and instrumental in establishing 
the Shrewsbury Unit.
Neil Galbraith: HM Inspector of Constabulary Wales.
Sir Eric St. Johnston: HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary.
Army:
Major Clifton Jeffries: HQ Western Command Ammunition Inspectorate, Royal
Army Ordnance Corps, Chester.
Judiciary:
Sir Tasker Watkins QC: (18 November 1918 - 9 September 2007). Decorated with 
the Victory Cross in 1944, for overpowering a German machine-gun post single- 
handed during the D-Day engagement. A former teacher, the self-deprecating 
Watkins decides on leaving the army to become a lawyer. He rises steadily through 
the ranks of the judiciary. Leads the Crown prosecution against Emyr Llywelyn Jones 
in 1963, the FWA in 1969 and John Jenkins in 1970. Hugely respected, Sir Tasker is 
appointed President of the Welsh Rugby Union in 1993. He holds the post until 2004.
Sir John Mortimer QC: (21 April 1923 - 16 January 2009). Respected in both judicial 
and literary worlds, John Mortimer began work as a barrister in 1948 and is appointed 
QC in 1966. Appears as Defence Counsel in a series of high-profile obscenity cases 
in the 1960s and 1970s. These included the Oz magazine trial and the Sex Pistols 
album cover trial. Appointed Defence Counsel for Denis Coslett in 1969. Mortimer 
is perhaps best remembered for his Rumpole books, about the eponymous Old Bailey 
criminal defence barrister; the first of which was published in 1978. Mortimer is 
made a CBE in 1986 and is knighted in 1998. Also father of successful actress Emily, 
one of his four children.
Peter John Mitchell Thomas QC: (31 July 1920 - 4 February 2008). Serves in the 
RAF during WW2, spending 1941 - 45 imprisoned as a PoW in Germany. Following 
the war, trains as a barrister; called to the Bar in 1947. In February 1964, Peter 
Thomas, the Conservative MP for Conwy, writes to Edward Heath, the rising star of 
the party, suggesting he meet Gwynfor Evans to discuss future party co-operation. 
This, Evans later reveals, relates to ‘regional development’ and most notably, the need 
for an Economic Authority for Wales to be established. Peter Thomas is the 
Conservative MP for Conwy from 1951 until 1966. He is appointed Defence Counsel 
for John Jenkins at his trial in April 1970. Thomas re-enters Parliament following the 
General Election two months later, when he wins Hendon South for the 
Conservatives. He is immediately appointed Secretary of State for Wales by Prime 
Minister Heath. He is preceded by George Thomas and succeeded in 1974 by John 
Morris. Peter Thomas remained the MP for Hendon South until 1987.
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Frederick Elwyn Jones QC: (24 October 1909 - 4 December 1989). Bom in Llanelli, 
Jones serves as junior British Counsel during the Nuremberg Trials. Later leads the 
prosecution of Moors murderers Ian Brady and Myra Hindiey. In 1963, acts as 
Defence Counsel for Emyr Llywelyn Jones. Appointed Attorney General by Prime 
Minster Harold Wilson in 1964. In 1969, Elwyn Jones approaches Tasker Watkins to 
lead the prosecution counsel against the Free Wales Army and John Jenkins.
Justice Thompson: A proud Scot, Thompson is sixty one when he presides over the 
Free Wales Army and John Jenkins. Months earlier, Thompson presided at the trial of 
Bruce Reynolds, considered the mastermind behind the Great Train Robbery in 
Buckinghamshire in August 1963. In stark comparison to the sentences imposed on 
the Welsh defendants, Thompson sentences Reynolds to 25 years imprisonment.
Civil servants:
Blaise Gillie: Senior civil servant within the Welsh Housing and Local Government 
department. Following Gwynfor Evans’ interview on BBC Wales television in 
February 1963, Gillie recognises Plaid Cymru as a potential Conservative Party ally, 
in the fight against the electoral threat posed by Harold Wilson and Labour.
Goronwy Roberts: Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Welsh Office.
Sir Burke Trend: Secretary to the Cabinet Office.
Sir James Waddell: Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Home Office.
Sir Philip Allen: Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Home Office.
Brian Cubbon: Private Secretary to James Callaghan, Home Secretary.
E. Brampton: F2 (Home Office Police Division).
Michael Adeane: Queen’s Private Secretary.
J. F. Mayne: Assistant Private Secretary to Denis Healey, Ministry for Defence, 
Michael Halls: Principal Private Secretary to Harold Wilson, Prime Minister. 
Intelligence services:
Sir Martin Fumival Jones: Head of MI5.
Dick Thistlethwaite: Director of F Branch, counter-subversion division of MI5.
Dennis Trevelyan: Home Office Division F2 (Counter terrorism).
Royalty:
Lord Snowdon: Former husband of Princess Margaret, Anthony Armstrong-Jones, 
the personable son of a north Wales GP, is appointed Constable of Caernarfon Castle
412
and requested to organise the pageant of the Royal Investiture of Prince Charles in 
July 1969. A pivotal figure, along with his wife, on the 1960s London ‘scene’, 
photographer Snowdon takes to his task with commendable zeal. Received much 
respect for the dignified compassion he extended to the villagers of Aberfan, during a 
visit hours after the disaster. Lives today in London.
Bernard Duke of Norfolk: Responsible for all state ceremonial involving the
monarchy. Considered gruff, Edwardian and possessed of an arid dry wit.
413
Time Line
1888 - earlier proposed as the site for a ‘monster reservoir’ to supply London with 
drinking water, Cwm Llanwddyn is instead flooded by Liverpool Corporation. At the 
time of Lake Vymwy’s completion in 1888, it is Europe’s largest man made lake. 
The dam wall being 100 feet high with a length of 400 yards across. The distance to 
Liverpool is 68 miles.
1892 - despite poet Percy Bysshe Shelley’s belief that ‘nature is here marked with the 
most impressive characters of loveliness and granduer’, Birmingham Water 
Corporation secures legislation permitting it to construct a series of reservoirs in Cwm 
Elan in mid Wales. The process is undertaken to build four dams (Caban-coch, 
Garreg-ddu, Penygarreg and Craig Goch) between 1894 and 1904. The final reservoir 
Claerwen, is constructed between 1946 and 1952. An attempt by Welsh militants to 
prevent Queen Elizabeth from opening the structure in October 1952, by blocking the 
route, is made by way of a half-ton granite boulder blasted from the rock above the 
road.
8 September 1936 - Saunders Lewis, D. J. Williams and Lewis Valentine commit 
arson at an RAF bombing facility at Penyberth. Having handed themselves in at the 
local police station, a jury at Caernarfon later fails to return a verdict. The case is 
transferred to the Old Bailey, where each receives a nine month prison term. It is the 
first use of ‘direct action’ in Welsh political history.
11 January 1947 - Plaid Cymru holds a rally on the slopes of Llyn y Fan in 
Carmarthenshire to protest army ‘land grabs’.
May 1949 - the Labour Government establishes the Council for Wales and 
Monmouthshire. It follows an announcement by Herbert Morrison seven months 
earlier, that the Attlee administration intends to set up a ‘nominated advisory council’.
30 August 1951 - hostile to the proposed military expansion in the area, Plaid Cymru 
stages a sit down protest at Trawsfynydd. Another rally is held to protest the same 
issue on 29 September.
October 1951 - the Conservative administration establishes the Minister for Welsh 
Affairs. It falls under the auspices of the Home Secretary. It follows the ‘vague 
promise’ of R. A. Butler, who announced in the ‘Welsh Day’ debate in the Commons 
on 26 January 1948 that the Conservatives would appoint a minister to act as ‘a 
watchdog’ or ‘ambassador’ on behalf of Welsh interests. A promise he confirmed at 
the party conference, held that October in Llandudno. The first incumbent is the 
Scotsman, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, known with derisory affection throughout Wales 
as ‘Dai Bananas’. This is ‘because of the ‘Fyfe’ connection with the company which 
conducted its banana trade through Barry Docks’. In 1952, Maxwell Fyfe (who in 
March 1946 brilliantly cross-examined Herman Goering at the Nuremberg trial) 
succeeds in preventing the Forestry Commission’s planned expansion in 
Carmarthenshire; in addition he also prevents the War Office from acquiring a further 
10,000 acres in Pen Llyn. As a result, he is renamed Dai Chwarae Teg; Dai ‘fair 
play’. Nevertheless, his appointment as Minister for Welsh Affairs is greeted with 
much initial hostility, owing to his not being Welsh. Maxwell Fyfe is succeeded in
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1954 as Minister for Welsh Affairs, by Gwilym Lloyd George, son of former Liberal 
Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The last Minister for Welsh Affairs is Keith 
Joseph, who later becomes a leading and respected voice on economic policy in 
Margaret Thatcher’s early government.
20 October 1952 - Mudiad Gweriniaethol Cymru (the Welsh Republican Movement) 
target the pipeline carrying water from Cwm Elan to Birmingham. The action, at the 
Fron Aquaduct near Crossgates, is undertaken in protest at the flooding of Cwm 
Claerwen; the last project in Birmingham Corporation’s water storage programme in 
Cwm Elan.
1955
March 1955 - to undertake confidential surveys on behalf of Liverpool Water 
Corporation, a secret delegation arrives in Cwm Tryweryn, Meirionnydd.
September 1955 - following reports recording hostility to Liverpool Water 
Committee’s alleged proposal to flood Cwm Dolanog in Montgomeryshire, Plaid 
Cymru issues a declaration that it will oppose ‘Liverpool aggression wherever it 
occurred’. It is widely felt within nationalist circles, that the Dolanog proposal is 
merely an attempt by Liverpool to ‘draw Welsh fire’, and to show its magnanimity by 
locating a site elsewhere. Whatever the truth, it is believed that ‘there never was any 
intention to drown Dolanog at all, and that choosing Capel Celyn as a second choice, 
was part of the deception to weaken any opposition expected from Cwm Tryweryn’.
20 December 1955 - it is announced in the House of Commons by the Minister for 
Welsh Affairs, Gwilym Lloyd George, that Cardiff will be the capital city of Wales. 
The climax to a controversy which has simmered for decades, follows a conference in 
May 1954, which, when the result is declared two months later, indicates 
overwhelmingly (by 90%) the vote in favour of Cardiff. It is awarded the 
nomenclature against Swansea, Aberystwyth, Caernarfon and Machynlleth.
22 December 1955 - the Liverpool Daily Post carries the headline: ‘Big new dam near 
Bala planned’. The report further outlines Liverpool Corporation’s plan to augment 
the city’s water supply, by promoting a Parliamentary Bill so as to receive the legal 
authority to dam the Tryweryn river and valley.
1956
March 1956 - the Capel Celyn Defence Committee and its Liverpool branch, the 
Tryweryn Defence Committee are formed.
April 1956 - following a five year campaign, a petition of 240,000 signatures calling 
for a Parliament for Wales is presented to parliament.
30 September 1956 - under the banner ‘Hands off Tryweryn’, Plaid Cymru leads a 
procession through the streets of Bala. Four thousand attend. Without a single 
dissentient, a resolution is passed calling on Liverpool Corporation to abandon its 
scheme.
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13 October 1956 - a motion to oppose Liverpool Corporation’s measure, on the 
grounds that it might adversely affect the towns existing supply from Llyn Arenig, is 
opposed by Bala Town Council.
7 November 1956 - accompanied by R. Tudur Jones and Councillor Dafydd Roberts, 
Gwynfor Evans, the president of Plaid Cymru, attempts to address Liverpool City 
Council. The three-man Welsh delegation is shouted down by councillors led by 
Bessie Braddock.
21 November 1956 - all but three of the community of Cwm Tryweryn march with 
banners through the streets of Liverpool to protest the proposal. Gwynfor Evans 
addresses Liverpool City Council for a quarter of an hour. Nonetheless, the council 
votes in favour to support the measure to flood Cwm Tryweryn by 95 votes to 1.
November 1956 - within Plaid Cymru circles, rumours abound that influential party 
member, Elystan Morgan, plans to undertake an explosion on the Vymwy to 
Liverpool water pipeline, in protest over the Tryweryn issue.
17 December 1956 - at a civic meeting, where support for Liverpool City Council’s 
proposed Bill is first required before it can pass through Parliament, on a vote by 
show of hands, 262 favour the Bill’s promotion and 161 vote against. Accusations of 
bias and underhand tactics on the part of Liverpool Water Corporation abound.
18 December 1956 - Liverpool City Council vote 160 to 90 in support of the proposal 
to flood Cwm Tryweryn.
1957
January 1957 - Henry Brooke is appointed Minister for Welsh Affairs. It is also 
announced that the office of Minister for Welsh Affairs will be held jointly with the 
post of Minister for Housing and Local Government.
30 January 1957 - a statement is released to the effect that Liverpool Corporation’s 
Private Bill has cleared its first parliamentary hurdle and had been granted its first 
formal reading in the House of Lords.
25 April 1957 - the community of Cwm Tryweryn receives an unexpected visit from 
the Minister ‘with the joint portfolio’ Henry Brooke.
1 May 1957 - the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill comes before a select committee of the 
House of Lords. Lasting for nine days, the Hearing decides ‘the Bill should be 
allowed to proceed’.
3 July 1957 - by 166 to 117, the House of Commons passes the Second Reading of 
Liverpool Corporation’s Tryweryn Reservoir Bill. Twenty-four of the thirty-six 
Welsh MPs vote in opposition, the rest either abstain or were not present. Those 
absent include: Aneurin Bevan, Megan Lloyd George, Iori Thomas and the 
Conservative member for Cardiff North, David Llywellyn, who was the only Welsh 
MP vocal in his support for the measure. Claiming that ‘a callous indifference to 
Merseyside’ existed, and opposition to the Bill was fuelled by ‘misguided romantics
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and professional Welshmen’, his endorsement brings a lively squib from Harri Webb, 
who derides Llywellyn as ‘the traditional Welsh version of what Moses said to the 
Pharaoh’.
1 7 - 2 5  July 1957 - the Tryweryn Bill receives another nine day Select Committee 
Hearing. It concludes by endorsing the measure.
31 July 1957 - following its Third Reading before the Commons, Liverpool 
Corporation’s Tryweryn Reservoir Bill is passed by Parliament by a majority of 
ninety six. The next day in the House of Lords, the Bill receives its Royal Assent and 
so becomes law.
August 1957 - ‘in view of the likelihood of disturbance’, Henry Brooke, the Minister 
for Welsh Affairs, is asked not to attend, as scheduled, the National Eisteddfod, held 
that year at Llangefiii on Anglesey. A joint statement, agreed by both the Minister 
and the Eisteddfod Council, declares it ‘undesirable to proceed with the original 
programme’.
15 October 1957 - David Cole, editor of the Western Mail, writes to Henry Brooke 
warning that ‘the seeds of an Irish problem’ have been sown in Wales
25 October 1957 - a national conference is called by Alderman J. H. Morgan, the 
mayor of Cardiff, to discuss a motion proposed by Gwynfor Evans. In this alternative 
proposition, Evans, to widespread consternation from within the ranks of Plaid 
Cymru, endorses the drowning of Tryweryn, but crucially proposes to safeguard the 
village of Capel Celyn; with assurances made to the Liverpool authority that it will 
receive the same amount of water as stipulated in the original Bill. It is agreed that a 
delegation will go to Liverpool led by Huw T. Edwards. They meet with Liverpool 
Corporation officials on 16 December 1957. The alternative proposals are rejected at 
a Liverpool Corporation Committee meeting, held in the city on 21 January 1958.
15 November 1957 - in a memorandum, Henry Brooke states that politically speaking, 
Wales is ‘presently, very disturbed’; yet nevertheless, his decision to advise 
parliament to support the Liverpool Tryweryn Bill had been ‘quite unavoidable’. 
Truth to tell, Brooke adds, ‘many people in Wales’ were inclined to say that the Prime 
Minister may have chosen ‘a well-intentioned man to be the Minister for Welsh 
Affairs’, but that since his appointment, ‘things had turned out badly for Wales’.
1958
1 April 1958 - preliminary work begins at the Cwm Tryweryn reservoir site.
May 1958 - Owain Williams leaves for Canada.
15 October 1958 - Huw T. Edwards angrily declares that ‘Liverpool’ has asked for 
‘whatever was coming to it’. The Tryweryn issue would ‘not be forgotten in Wales’. 
Edwards is ‘convinced that many thousands of Welshmen will be prepared to make 
sacrifices, including imprisonment’, if it might prevent Liverpool from ‘getting away’ 
with its action...Threats made against the Mersey Tunnel should not be taken lightly’. 
That same month, Edwards resigns his post as chairman of the Council for Wales and
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Monmouthshire.
3 November 1958 - Plaid Cymru president Gwynfor Evans embarks on a seven week 
speaking tour of North America. He returns invigorated and prepared to accept 
measured militant protest over the Tryweryn issue.
1959
5 January 1959 - the Plaid Cymru executive supports a resolution calling for ‘passive 
resistance at Tryweryn when the time comes’. Emrys Roberts is appointed to 
consider methods and preparations for direct action.
21 January 1959 - Gwynfor Evans receives a letter from Dewi Watkin Powell, stating 
that Plaid Cymru has a ‘pathetic, pathological fixation’ with the Tryweryn issue.
29 January 1959 - a device comprising ‘powerful blasting material’ is discovered at 
the Federation of Building Trades Employers in Liverpool. The ‘home made bomb’ 
is planted in a hollowed out loaf of bread and placed within a case containing two 
bottles of petrol. The following evening, police in the city receive two hoax bomb 
warnings.
31 January 1959 - following the decision by Gwynfor Evans to reject all forms of 
direct action, at a meeting of the Plaid Cymru sub-committee in Dolgellau - without 
the wider party’s consultation - it is decided to support the U-turn taken by Evans.
24 February 1959 - it is announced that the Queen has directed that forthwith, Y 
Ddraig Goch, and not ‘the flag carrying the augmented Royal Badge’, used since 
March 1953, will be flown on government buildings in Wales and ‘where appropriate’ 
in London.
December 1959 - Owain Williams returns from Canada.
1961
August 1961 - at the Plaid Cymru annual conference in Llangollen, Elystan Morgan 
declares that a programme of direct action over Tryweryn would ensure the party 
remained little more than a ‘pressure group’.
Autumn 1961 - Saunders Lewis is visited at his home in Penarth by Emyr Llywelyn 
Jones and Gwilym Tudur Jones. The two students attempt to ‘sound Lewis out’ as to 
his view on undertaking a peaceful protest at the Tryweryn site. A number of 
students, Lewis is told, have decided ‘to do something at Tryweryn’, and that its 
impact might be increased, should more respectable, ‘older’ people, also be involved. 
Despite, over the proceeding years, having directed a near constant barrage of 
criticism at Gwynfor Evans for failure to undertake imprisonable action over the 
issue, having listened in silence, Lewis declares any such action to be futile. He 
informs them ‘to go back to college: that it would be a pity to waste’ their ‘young 
lives’ over ‘Tryweryn’. It is nevertheless intriguing to consider how great, or not, the 
impact might have been, had a protest been carried out by a talisman such as Lewis, 
while aided and abetted by Emyr Llywelyn Jones, one of the sharpest cultural and
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political minds of his generation.
1962
11 February 1962 - veteran activist Saunders Lewis broadcasts Tynged yr Iaith (The 
fate o f  the Language) on BBC Radio Wales.
August 1962 - at the Plaid Cymru annual conference at Llangollen, as two opposing 
factions emerge: the Gwynforiaid and the self-styled activists, a compromise is 
reached. It is agreed that no one is ‘to take action in the name of Plaid Cymru’, but 
members can undertake specific action if a matter of conscience or conviction.
22 September 1962 - shortly after 10.00 p.m., David Pritchard and David Walters 
release oil from electrical generator at the Tryweryn reservoir construction site. They 
appear at Bala Shire Hall Assizes on 3 October and are each fined £50, ordered to pay 
£26 costs and given three months in which to pay. Their fines are paid by 
sympathetic spectators on their emergence from court.
October 1962 - at the White Horse in Aberystwyth, Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg is 
formed. Its title is taken out of respect for a society of the 1880s, which bore a similar 
name.
10 October 1962 - in a letter to Gwynfor Evans, published in the Western Mail, Neil 
Jenkins criticises the Plaid party president for what he regards as the lack of support 
Evans has espoused for the protest undertaken at the Tryweryn reservoir site by 
David’s Pritchard and Walters.
15 October 1962 - breaking two locks to gain access, Owain Williams, Robert Wyn 
Williams and Edwin Prichard raid the explosives magazine at Crofts Quarries, 
Llithfaen. They steal nearly 4,000 detonators and 15 fuses.
19 November 1962 - following the letter critical of Gwynfor Evans, Neil Jenkins is 
expelled from Plaid Cymru.
19 December 1962 - an attempt by ‘two men’ to disrupt work at the Tryweryn 
reservoir construction site is attempted. A small fire in a ‘fitters shed’ is started and 
before allegedly being startled by a watchman, an attempt is made to set ablaze ‘the 
timber compressor house’.
1963
2 February 1963 - Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg undertakes its first action: a sit-down 
protest at Trefechan Bridge in Aberystwyth.
11 February 1963 - Emyr Llywelyn Jones, Owain Williams and John Albert Jones 
undertake militant protest at the Tryweryn reservoir site.
18 February 1963 - Emyr Llywelyn Jones is arrested at his student lodgings in 
Aberystwyth by Detective-inspector Humphrey Jones, the head of Gwynedd CID, 
while accompanied by Detective-sergeant Glanmor Hughes.
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29 March 1963 - at Carmarthenshire Assizes, Emyr Llywelyn Jones is sentenced to 
twelve months imprisonment, for planting an explosive device at the base of a 
transformer at the Tryweryn reservoir construction site on 11 February.
31 March 1963 - Owain Williams and John Albert Jones target an electrical pylon at 
Gellilydan, Maentwrog, Trawsfynydd.
7 and 8 April 1963 - Owain Williams and John Albert Jones are arrested in 
connection with the Tryweryn and Gellilydan protests.
13 April 1963 - as members of the British media attend an open day in Cwm 
Clywedog, the Plaid Cymru executive announce a new tactic. With subscriptions 
raised by party members, it intends to take out a 25-year-lease on 2.6 acres of land at 
the heart of the threatened valley. Over the coming weeks, the land is sub-divided 
into 75 units and rented to some 200 people from Wales; and others from as far afield 
as Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States hostile to the plan. The reason 
behind the action, is a legal stipulation as outlined in the Property and Land Law, 
which states that any person in possession of land, or property on land desired by a 
corporation, whether occupied/inhabited or not, has to be allowed to voice his or her 
opinion, either for or against a takeover, to a public enquiry; irrespective of the 
owner’s place of residency. Nonetheless, having adhered to the letter of the law, an 
amendment is issued declaring that no longer will there be any need to call witnesses 
and interested parties to the enquiry. The decision causes outrage among the 
nationalist community.
14 June 1963 - John Albert Jones is placed on probation for three years at Dolgellau 
Assizes.
1 July 1963 - Owain Williams receives a twelve month imprisonment term at Ruthin 
(Denbighshire) Assizes.
28 July 1963 - following a party at the school three days earlier, Ysgol Capel Celyn is 
closed.
31 July 1963 - the Clywedog Reservoir Bill is passed by Parliament. With the Bill’s 
Royal Assent a mere formality, work begins to ready the valley for flooding.
28 September 1963 - a dissolution service is held in the chapel at Capel Celyn.
1964
26 October 1964 -  the Hughes Parry Report proposes equal status for Welsh and 
English with regard judicial, business and administrative affairs in Wales.
17 October 1964 - following its election victory two days earlier, Harold Wilson’s 
newly appointed Labour administration honours its election pledge and establishes 
both the Welsh Office and with the Llanelli MP Jim Griffiths (1890 - 1975) its first 
incumbent, the office of Secretary of State for Wales. Although a passionate socialist, 
as a first language Welsh-speaker, Griffiths is equally vocal in his support for Welsh 
cultural matters, believing the nation enjoys an unique, singular identity. The position
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comes into effect on 11 November 1964. The party’s endorsement of the proposal is 
only possible following Aneurin Bevan’s acceptance. Having been absent at its 
Second Reading, Bevan abstained when the Tryweryn Reservoir Bill received its 
Third and final Reading. In 1892, the National Institutions Bill sought to establish a 
Secretary of State for Wales. The Bill fails, but the notion receives renewed support 
between 1918 and 1922. In 1946, D. R. Grenfell leads a deputation to the government 
advocating the establishment of such an office.
14 November 1964 - at the Belle Vue Hotel in Aberystwyth, following what has since 
been described as a brutal and tempestuous meeting, Emrys Roberts is dismissed from 
his post as Organising Secretary after losing a vote of confidence.
19 November 1964 - following James Griffiths’ threat to resign, the Secretary of State 
for Wales is granted devolved authority for housing, local government, road transport 
and some aspects of local planning. In 1969, the Welsh Office is further devolved 
health and agriculture; in 1970, education.
1965
12 July 1965 - Elystan Morgan, Gwynfor Evans’s heir apparent, leaves Plaid Cymru 
and joins the Labour Party.
August 1965 - five years to the month after work at the site begun, the Llyn Celyn 
reservoir is full to its limit and finally completed. The water is first damned on 1 
September 1964.
21 October 1965 - Llyn Celyn is officially opened.
23 December 1965 - Roy Jenkins is appointed Home Secretary; he holds the post until
30 November 1967.
1966
6 March 1966 - saboteurs cause £30,000 damage at the Clywedog reservoir 
construction site.
15 March 1966 - 23-year-old Owen Pennant Hughes of Nebo, Caernarfonshire, is 
arrested after a search of his farm recovers 9 lb of gelignite and 6 detonators.
31 March 1966 - Harold Wilson is re-elected Prime Minister. James Griffiths, the 
Secretary of State for Wales, announces his retirement from office. Elected Labour 
MP for Ceredigion, is former Plaid Cymru ‘dauphin’ Elystan Morgan.
5 April 1966 - Cledwyn Hughes, the 49-year-old Labour MP for Ynys Mon is 
appointed Secretary of State for Wales.
10 April 1966 - over the weekend of 10 April, the FWA accept an invitation by Sinn 
Fein to march during the celebrations in Dublin to mark the 50th anniversary of the 
Easter Rising.
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4 May 1966 - as a result of the police inquiry into Owen Pennant Hughes, 27-year-old 
David Robert Marcus Gale of Llangollen and 25-year-old Harry Jones of Cefn Mawr, 
Wrexham appear at Denbigh Assizes. Marcus Gale is charged with being in 
‘possession of 9 electrical detonators in suspicious circumstances’ and receiving and 
possessing 6 sticks of mining explosives, known to be stolen. Harry Jones is charged 
with stealing and possessing mining explosives, the property of the NCB.
29 June 1966 - at Caernarfon Assizes, Owen Pennant Hughes pleads guilty to being in 
possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances and is placed on three years 
probation. It follows an earlier discovery by police of 91b of gelignite and 6 
detonators at his north Wales farm.
8 July 1966 - at Denbigh Assizes, having each pleaded guilty to the charges heard at 
the same Assizes on 4 May, David Robert Marcus Gale and Harry Jones both receive 
two years probation.
14 July 1966 - following the death of Megan Lloyd George two months earlier, a by- 
election is held in Carmarthenshire. It is won by Gwynfor Evans, the Plaid Cymru 
president.
8 September 1966 - threats to hamper the official opening of the Severn Bridge fail to 
materialize, as amid considerable security, the Queen opens the £8million 
construction without incident. However, to the amusement of the FWA, the official 
ceremony is conducted on the English side of the bridge.
21 October 1966 - the Welsh mining village of Aberfan is engulfed by tons of coal 
spoil, which cascades down a surrounding hillside. Warnings that an underground 
spring lies beneath the coal waste have been ignored. 144 are killed, 116 are children 
under the age of 11.
1967
12 March 1967 - a gelignite device is found in the water pipeline at Crossgates, near 
Llandrindod. The pipeline runs from Cwm Elan to Birmingham. It has remained 
undetected since being placed by the Free Wales Army on 27 February. The date of 
its placing coincides with the passing of the Welsh Language Act, which extends the 
use of Welsh to certain legal proceedings.
8 September 1967 - it is announced that each bereaved family affected by the Aberfan 
disaster is to receive £5,000. It is believed, in some circles, that the involvement of 
the FWA in the financial settlement issue is responsible for the decision.
30 September 1967 - an explosion blasts the pipeline from Llyn Vymwy to Liverpool 
at Llanrhaeadr-ym-Mochnant. It is later established that John Jenkins and Frederick 
Ernest Alders are responsible.
17 November 1967 - explosion at the Temple of Peace, Cardiff.
30 November 1967 - James Callaghan is appointed Home Secretary; he holds the post 
until 19 June 1972.
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1968
5 January 1968 - explosion at Snowdonia Country Club at Penisarwaun, near 
Caernarfon.
8 January 1968 - following the Snowdonia Country Club blast, Edward Hope 
Wilkinson and Robert Griffith Jones are arrested and charged with ‘unlawful 
possession of explosive substances’. While in police custody, each give a statement 
claiming the explosives were supplied by quarryman Arfon Jones. Also mentioned in 
the police statement by Edward Wilkinson is John Gwilym Jones. Brought in for 
questioning, J. G. Jones gives a written statement implicating Owain Williams.
14 January 1968 - Owain Williams is arrested at Caernarfon police station having 
earlier returned from London.
23 January 1968 - ‘having plenty of detonators’, John Jenkins and Frederick Ernest 
Alders raid the explosives magazine at Hafod quarry near Wrexham. Some 300 lbs of 
explosives are stolen. This single acquisition enables MAC to continue its campaign 
of direct action, until Jenkins’ and Alders’ ultimate detection nearly two years later.
January 1968 - Frederick Ernest Alders and Ann Woodgate are engaged. The 
engagement lasts until January 1969.
8 February 1968 - a weakened and shaking Owain Williams is inexplicably granted 
bail at Caernarfon Assizes.
15 February 1968 - at Caernarfon Assizes, quarryman Arfon Jones pleads guilty to 
stealing explosive material from his place of work and is fined £15. This is the source 
of the explosives obtained by Robert Jones and Edward Wilkinson.
28 February 1968 - Robert Griffith Jones and Edwin Wilkinson each receive twelve 
months imprisonment, suspended for two years, for unlawful possession of 
explosives. It cannot be proved if either man undertook the Snowdonia Country Club 
action. For having implicated Owain Williams and assured police he will testify 
against Williams when he stands trial, J. G. Jones is not charged with any offence. 
This, despite confessing to collecting explosive material from Robert Griffith Jones 
and passing it onto Owain Williams.
28 February 1968 - with media interest in Wales increasing, the BBC news 
programme 24 Hours features apparent anti-investiture sentiment in Caernarfon. The 
programme causes a storm of controversy with its reference to Prince Charles as 
‘Charles Windsor’; its claim that in spite of the cost of staging the ceremony ‘many of 
the town’s terraced houses’ are ‘without bathrooms, indoor toilets, electricity, hot 
water, or even a cold tap outside’; and footage of an investiture mug being allegedly 
smashed by disgruntled children. On seeing a received transcript of the programme, 
Harold Wilson declares its contents ‘fantastic’ and the programme’s description of the 
prince as ‘extraordinary’. In letters to Lord Hill, the director-general of the BBC, 
George Thomas accuses programme makers of ‘mischief making’ and not conforming 
to the BBC’s policy of impartiality. The Welsh Secretary may have had a point, as it 
is later revealed that Caernarfon District Council had ‘condemned or demolished over 
330 houses’ and improved ‘more than 167’. As for the mug smashing incident, it
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transpires that a mug was decorated with an unflattering picture of the prince and 
smashed by at least one child possibly paid to do so. See TNA, PREM 13/2505.
29 February 1968 - Owain Williams is further released on bail from Caernarfon 
Assizes.
1 March 1968 - John Jenkins meets Owain Williams at Loggerheads, near Wrexham. 
It is alleged that Gethin ap Iestyn and Philip Henry also attend.
2 March 1968 - Owain Williams absconds to Brittany and Eire.
6 March 1968 - Owain Williams fails to appear in court in Caernarfon, on the charge 
of being in unlawful possession of explosives with regard the explosion at the 
Snowdonia Country Club.
24 March 1968 - explosion at the Inland Revenue Office, Llanishen, Cardiff.
5 April 1968 - George Thomas is appointed Secretary of State for Wales; he holds the 
post until 20 June 1970.
2 May 1968 - journalists Emyr Jones, Harold Pendlebury and Ian Skidmore hold a 
press conference with three hooded figures purporting to be Mudiad Amddiffyn 
Cymru. The three are later identified as John Jenkins, Frederick Ernest Alders and 
John Roberts.
25 May 1968 - explosion at the Welsh Office, Cathays Park, Cardiff.
27 May 1968 - explosion at Llyn Vymwy, Montgomeryshire.
31 May 1968 - Welsh chief constables, Special Branch and the heads of investigating 
CID and Regional Crime Squads, hold a summit in Cardiff to discuss escalating 
militancy in Wales. Believing it has little alternative, the Home Office, in order to 
ensure is own instrumental presence in Wales, appoints Frank Williamson, HM 
Inspector of Constabulary (Crime), to report directly to the Home Secretary. 
Williamson is instructed to consider the options and suggest a proposal.
7 June 1968 - following another top level review of the investigation by MI5 and 
Special Branch operatives in London, Home Secretary James Callaghan is advised by 
a senior civil servant to stamp his authority on the recalcitrant Welsh police forces, 
even if it touched ‘on a number of delicate relationships’ and aroused ‘the 
susceptibilities of some Welsh chief constables’; it is surely time to take the matter ‘in 
hand’.
27 June 1968 - explosion on the Liverpool Corporation aqueduct at the Chester- 
Warrington railway crossing.
28 June 1968 - accompanied by his father, the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Charles 
arrives for what is billed his ‘first royal tour’ of Wales. During a melee with some 
anti-investiture campaigners, Gethin ap Iestyn, Philip Henry and Gwenllian Wynne 
are arrested for discharging smoke bombs.
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6 July 1968 - at an anti-investiture rally held at Machynlleth, a recorded message by 
Owain Williams is heard. Following its conclusion, the FWA undertake a series of 
manoeuvres for the media in the surrounding hills.
16 July 1968 - Gethin ap Iestyn is fined £20 for ‘disgraceful behaviour’ during the 
visit to Cardiff of Prince Charles on 28 June.
16 July 1968 - at a meeting in Cardiff attended by many of the UK’s senior security 
officials, the decision is taken to establish a special unit with its operational 
headquarters just over the border in England. It will be led by officers from the 
Metropolitan Police experienced in counter-terrorism and be accountable to 
Whitehall’s ‘man in Wales’ Frank Williamson, HM Inspector of Constabulary 
(Crime). The idea to establish the unit is proposed by Frank Williamson. The 
humiliation of the Welsh police service is complete, with news the security services 
will forthwith be primarily entrusted to combat nationalist agitation in Wales.
Summer 1968 - John Jenkins is accompanied to Birmingham New Street Railway 
Station by Colin George Wood, a junior member of the Dental Corps. En route, 
Jenkins allegedly implores Wood ‘not to mention to anybody else’ any events which 
may transpire.
27 August 1968 - Owain Williams is arrested at Birmingham airport.
30-31 August 1968 - the FWA and anti-investiture activists hold a training exercise 
at Abergwesyn in mid-Wales.
9 September 1968 - explosion at RAF Pembrey in Carmarthenshire. 42-year-old 
Warrant Officer William Hougham receives injuries to his hands and face.
12 September 1968 - a police sub-aqua team recover an arms cache from Maesllyn 
near Tregaron.
9 November 1968 - Owain Williams is acquitted at Caernarfon Assizes of unlawful 
possession of explosives.
2 December 1968 - a mid Wales cell of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru is thought 
responsible for planting a device which explodes on the Cwm Elan to Birmingham 
water pipeline at West Hagley, near Stourbridge.
1969
26 February 1969 - during dawn raids, Cayo Evans, Denis Coslett, Toni Lewis, 
Vernon Griffiths, Glyn Rowlands, David John Underhill (Dafydd y Dug), Gethin ap 
Iestyn (Keith Griffiths), Vivian George Davies and David Bonar Thomas are arrested.
1 March 1969 - Owain Williams addresses an anti-investiture rally in Caernarfon. 
Gordon Wyn Jones is introduced to Gareth Miles; he in turn allegedly puts Jones in 
touch with John Jenkins.
6 - 1 2  March - the nine arrested FWA and anti-investiture campaigners appear before
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the Cardiff Stipendiary Magistrate, John Rutter.
10 April 1969 - explosion at the Inland Revenue Office in Chester.
15 April 1969 - Minor damage is caused by an explosion at police HQ in Cardiff.
16 April - 1 July 1969 - the FWA and anti-investiture campaigners are tried at 
Swansea Assizes by Justice Thompson.
20 April 1969 - Prince Charles arrives in Aberystwyth to begin his eight week study 
course in matters pertaining to Wales.
23 April 1969 - a device is discovered in a locker at Cardiff Central Railway Station. 
26 April 1969 - Robert William Trigg is arrested in connection with the above.
29 April 1969 - an explosion rips through the Central Electricity Generating Board 
offices in the Gabalfa area of Cardiff.
2 May 1969 - a parcel bomb addressed to Detective Sergeant Lavery is intercepted at 
police HQ, Cardiff.
25 June 1969 - a device is discovered at the base of the Prince of Wales monument at 
Mackenzie Pier in Holyhead.
June 1969 - following the above, William Glyn Jones, Dewi Jones and John Allan 
Jones are arrested. They are soon dubbed ‘the Anglesey three’.
30 June 1969 - a letterbox explodes outside the postal sorting office at Victoria Park, 
Cardiff.
30 June 1969 - shortly before midnight, Alwyn Jones and George Taylor are killed in 
Abergele, when planting a device outside the town’s Social Security Office. They are 
each allegedly members of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.
1 July 1969 - at the conclusion of the so-called Free Wales Army trial at Swansea 
Assizes, Cayo Evans receives fifteen months imprisonment; so too Denis Coslett and 
Gethin ap Iestyn nine months. Acquitted on all charges are: Dafydd Glyn Rowlands, 
David John Underhill (Dafydd y Dug) and Dai Bonar Thomas. Toni Lewis is 
sentenced to eight months, suspended for two years; Vivian Davies is gaoled for six 
months, suspended for three years; and Vernon Griffiths is sentenced to three months, 
suspended for two years.
1 July 1969 - investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of Wales in Caernarfon.
1 July 1969 - bomb explodes in Love Lane, Caernarfon. Designed to undermine the 
status of the 21 Royal Salute of welcome, it is close to the home of the Chief 
Constable of Gwynedd, Lieutenant Colonel William Jones Williams.
2 July 1969 - a device is allegedly discovered at Llandudno pier; Prince Charles is due
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to come ashore from the Royal Yacht Britannia to begin a Royal Progress of Wales 
minutes later.
5 July 1969 - ten-year-old lan Cox is injured in Caernarfon when activating a device 
planted five days earlier by a cell of Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru.
28 July 1969 - Robert William Trigg is sentenced to four years imprisonment, in 
connection with the device found in a luggage locker at Cardiff Central Railway 
Station three months earlier.
14 August 1969 - explosion at the South Stack Relay Station near Holyhead on 
Anglesey.
17 August 1969 - a device is discovered on the doorstep of a Council Health Offices 
in Chester. It is later established that Frederick Ernest Alders planted the device, 
having deliberately de-activated it, prior to doing so.
18 September 1969 - John Jenkins is interviewed at Saighton Barracks. He removes 
the remainder stock of explosives - stored in a locked cupboard within the Dental 
Centre - to the home of Frederick Ernest Alders.
2 - 1 5  October 1969 - trail of so-called ‘Anglesey three’ is held at Mold Assizes.
18 October 1969 - Frederick Ernest Alders marries his fiance Rowena. John Jenkins 
is Alders’ best man.
20 October 1969 - following the conclusion of the trial of the ‘Anglesey three’, 
William Glyn Jones and Dewi Jones receive eighteen months imprisonment; John 
Allan Jones receives six months, suspended for two years.
2 November 1969 - John Jenkins and Frederick Ernest Alders are arrested at their 
homes in Wrexham.
5 November 1969 - the last of MAC munitions are detonated by Gordon Wyn Jones 
near Holyhead, on Anglesey.
1970
9 - 2 0  April 1970 - trial of John Barnard Jenkins and Frederick Ernest Alders at Mold 
Assizes. Jenkins receives ten years imprisonment; Alders six years.
1976
15 August 1976 - John Barnard Jenkins is released from H. M. Prison Albany, on the 
Isle of Wight.
2006
25 July 2006 - The Queen signs the Government of Wales Act. Clause 100 
theoretically enables the Secretary of State to override any Assembly measures in 
Cardiff, which affect water provision in England.
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